Com. v. Oliver, V.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VERNON OLIVER
Appellant No. 961 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 30, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001725-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2017
Vernon Oliver appeals from the October 30, 2015 judgment of
sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. We
reverse and remand for re-sentencing.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows:
The facts of this case, as read into the record at the time [Oliver] entered his guilty plea, are as follows. On the evening of January 21, 2014, the victim, Shawna Robertson, was walking in the area of 66th Street and Haddington Lane in Philadelphia, when she encountered [Oliver] and his dog. N.T. 2/25/2015 at 4. When she went to pet the dog, the dog ran away, and Ms. Robertson went to fetch the dog and return it to [Oliver]. [Oliver] became angry and accused Ms. Robertson of trying to steal his dog. Id. He ordered the dog to attack Ms.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Rober[ts]on, which it did. [Oliver]’s girlfriend also attacked Ms. Rober[ts]on, and then “they threw acid in her face.” Id. at 5. At the time of sentencing, Ms. Rober[ts]on, who this Court found to be credible, indicated that the dog did not immediately attack her, but that [Oliver] punched the dog and shoved it towards her until it began to attack. N.T. 10/30/2015 at 14. [Oliver] then struck Ms. Robertson with a belt buckle. At some point during the attack, [Oliver]’s girlfriend emerged from the house and sprayed an acid solution in Ms. Rober[ts]on’s face. Id. at 14. Ms. Robertson suffered approximately 30 puncture wounds, chemical burns, and cuts and bruises, and was hospitalized as a result of the attack. Id. at 18. [Oliver] was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2702(a)), Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 903), Possession of an Instrument of a Crime [(“PIC”)] (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 907(a)), Simple Assault (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2701(a)), and Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”) (18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2705).
...
On February 25, 2015, [Oliver] pled guilty to the charges of Aggravated Assault, Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault, and Possession of an Instrument of a Crime. The remaining charges were nolle prossed. On October 30, 2015, this Court sentenced [Oliver] to ten (10) to twenty (20) years of imprisonment for Aggravated Assault, ten (10) to twenty (20) years of imprisonment for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Assault, and five (5) years of probation for Possession of an Instrument of a Crime, with all sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate sentence of twenty (20) to forty (40) years of imprisonment followed by five (5) years of probation.[1]
1 The trial court also sentenced Oliver to a consecutive 7-years’
probation for violating probation that had been imposed at docket number CP-51-CR-0000636-2013 following a conviction for manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780- 113(a)(3).
Opinion, 5/24/16, at 1-2 (“1925(a) Op.”). Oliver filed a motion to modify
sentence, which was denied by operation of law on March 9, 2016. On
March 21, 2016, Oliver filed a timely appeal.
Oliver raises the following issue on appeal:
Did not the lower court err and abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Oliver to unreasonable and manifestly excessive statutory consecutive maximum terms of imprisonment, well beyond the top of the aggravated ranges of the Sentencing Guidelines, in a case in which appellant pleaded guilty, expressed remorse and accepted responsibility, the evidence was legally insufficient to support one of the charges, and the court failed to state adequate and proper reasons for deviating from the guidelines and properly balance the factors in 42 Pa. C. S. §9721(b)?
Oliver’s Br. at 3.
Oliver challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058,
1064 (Pa.Super. 2011). Before we address a challenge to the discretionary
aspects of sentence, we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
Oliver filed a post-sentence motion and a timely notice of appeal and
included in his brief a concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance
of appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f). We
must therefore determine whether he raises a substantial issue for our
review.
We evaluate whether a particular issue raises a substantial question on
a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220
(Pa.Super. 2011). A substantial question exists where a defendant raises a
“plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing
code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 53 A.2d 617 (Pa. 2002)).
Oliver maintains that his discretionary aspects of sentence claims raise
a substantial question because: he received two consecutive, above-the-
aggravated-range sentences; the court failed to consider Oliver’s
rehabilitative needs and other mitigating factors; and the trial court
sentenced him outside the guidelines range without stating its reasons on
the record.2 Such claims raise substantial questions for our review. See
2 Oliver’s motion to modify sentence requested that the trial court “modify its sentence in accordance with the sentencing guidelines” and “impose a sentence consistent with the mitigation that defense counsel presented at the time of sentencing.” Mot. to Modify Sent., at ¶¶ 3-4. The motion put both the Commonwealth and the trial court on notice that Oliver (Footnote Continued Next Page)
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(appellant raised substantial question when he alleged sentence was
excessive and court failed to consider mitigating circumstances);
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super. 2014) (finding
claim that “sentencing court imposed a sentence outside the standard
guidelines without stating adequate reasons on the record presents a
substantial question”).3
Although the trial court must consider the sentence ranges set forth in
the sentencing guidelines, it is not bound by the guidelines. See
Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923 A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. 2007) (“It is well
established that the Sentencing Guidelines are purely advisory in nature.”);
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 965 (Pa. 2007) (referring to
sentencing guidelines as “advisory guideposts” which “recommend . . .
rather than require a particular sentence”). A court may deviate from the
recommended guidelines as they are “merely one factor among many that
the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” Commonwealth v.
Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting Yuhasz, 923 A.2d at
(Footnote Continued)
was challenging the excessiveness of an outside-of-the-guidelines sentence and the failure to consider mitigation evidence.
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