Com. v. Meleschuck, W.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 19, 2025
• Docket: 2889 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S17037-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM MELESCHUCK : : Appellant : No. 2889 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003724-2013

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM MELESCHUCK : : Appellant : No. 2890 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003723-2013

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM MELESCHUCK : : Appellant : No. 2891 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003318-2013 J-S17037-25

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM MELESCHUCK : : Appellant : No. 2892 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered September 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002645-2013

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2025

Appellant, William Meleschuck, appeals from the orders entered in the

Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his motion for time

credit. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

December 9, 2013, Appellant pled guilty at four underlying dockets. 1 On

January 14, 2014, the trial court imposed the following sentence: at docket

No. 3724-2013, the court sentenced Appellant to undergo and successfully

complete the Treatment Continuum Alternative Program (“T-CAP”), an

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1 Specifically, Appellant pled guilty at docket No. 3724-2013 to receiving stolen property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a); at docket No. 3723-2013, to possession of drug paraphernalia, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32); at docket No. 3318-2013, to receiving stolen property; and at docket No. 2645-2013, to criminal conspiracy, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.

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intermediate punishment, for 22 months.2 At docket No. 3723-2013, the court

sentenced Appellant to 12 months of probation consecutive to the sentence

imposed at docket No. 3724-2013. At docket No. 3318-2013, the court

sentenced Appellant to undergo and successfully complete the T-CAP

program, for 22 months concurrent to the sentence imposed at docket No.

3724-2013. At docket No. 2645-2013, the court sentenced Appellant to 12

months of probation concurrent to the probation imposed at docket No. 3723-

2013.

On January 4, 2016, after a Gagnon II3 hearing, during which Appellant

admitted to violating his probation, the court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate 3 to 23 months’ incarceration followed by 12 months’ probation. 4

Appellant was granted immediate parole.

On November 13, 2017, the court conducted another Gagnon II

hearing and found Appellant in violation of his parole at docket Nos. 3724-

2 The court imposed the following term of intermediate punishment: “three to

six months of residential treatment at Keenan House; two to four months at a half-way house, three months of electronic monitoring followed by six to nine months of intensive out-patient treatment.” (Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No. 3724-2013, 1/14/14).

3 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).

4 The court imposed concurrent sentences of 3 to 23 months of incarceration

at docket Nos. 3724-2013 and 3318-2013. At docket Nos. 3723-2013 and 2645-2013, the court imposed concurrent sentences of 12 months of probation, to run consecutive to the sentence at docket Nos. 3724-2013 and 3318-2013.

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2013 and 3318-2013. The court revoked Appellant’s parole and remanded

him to serve the balance of the sentence previously imposed on January 4,

2016. In its sentencing order, the court noted that “credit shall be given to

you, as required by law, for all time spent in custody, as a result of these

criminal charges for which sentence is being imposed.” (Trial Court

Sentencing Order, Docket No. 3318-2013, 11/13/17; Trial Court Sentencing

Order, Docket No. 3724-2013, 11/13/17). That same date, the court found

Appellant in violation of his probation at docket Nos. 3723-2013 and 2645-

2013. In both cases, the court revoked Appellant’s probation and imposed a

sentence of 6 to 12 months, again specifically noting that Appellant was given

credit for all time spent in custody. (Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No.

3723-2013, 11/13/17; Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No. 2645-2013,

11/13/17).

Thereafter, the Department of Corrections gave Appellant credit for time

served while in custody at Lehigh County Jail from June 24, 2013 to January

15, 2014 (206 days), December 10, 2015 to January 15, 2016 (37 days), and

June 14, 2016 to June 16, 2016 (3 days), for a total of 246 days credit.

On September 10, 2024, Appellant filed a “Motion for Time Credit Nunc

Pro Tunc, Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9760, for Time Spent in Custody at an

In-Patient Treatment Facility” seeking credit for time spent at the Keenan

House and Lehigh Valley Halfway House from January 15, 2014, to July 20,

2014. (Motion for Time Credit, 9/10/24). The court denied the motion on

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September 26, 2024. These timely appeals followed. Pursuant to the court’s

order, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

on October 1, 2024. This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on

January 14, 2015.

Preliminarily, we must ascertain whether the instant appeal is properly

before this Court. “This Court has explained that ‘[a] challenge to the trial

court’s failure to award credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing

involves the legality of sentence and is cognizable under the PCRA.’”

Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 314 A.3d 1286, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2024)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 595 (Pa.Super. 2007),

appeal denied, 596 Pa. 715, 944 A.2d 756 (2008)).

This Court has clarified the different claims a prisoner may raise regarding credit for time served and the mechanisms for raising such claims:

If the alleged error is thought to be the result of an erroneous computation of sentence by the Bureau of Corrections, then the appropriate vehicle for redress would be an original action in the Commonwealth Court challenging the Bureau’s computation. If, on the other hand, the alleged error is thought to be attributable to ambiguity in the sentence imposed by the trial court, then a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum lies to the trial court for clarification and/or correction of the sentence imposed.

It [is] only when the petitioner challenges the legality of a trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for time served as required by law in imposing sentence, that a challenge to the sentence [is] deemed cognizable as a due process claim in PCRA proceedings.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 115 A.3d 876, 880 (Pa.Super.

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2015)). See also, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a)(1) (stating “The Commonwealth

Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings ...

[a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting

in his official capacity....”).

In Wheeler, supra, this Court held that “[b]ecause the trial court

granted credit for time served at the time it imposed the sentences and [the

appellant] does not challenge the legality of an alleged failure to award credit

for time served, the claim is not cognizable under the PCRA.” Wheeler, supra

at 1289. Moreover, this Court held that “because the claim raised by [the

appellant] in his motion to the trial court challenges the Department of

Corrections’ application of his credit for time served, the challenge was not

properly before the trial court.” Id. Therefore, this Court affirmed the trial

court’s order denying relief on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction

“without prejudice to [the appellant’s] right to pursue his challenge to the

Department of Corrections computation of credit in an original action in the

Commonwealth Court.” Id. at 1289–90 (footnote omitted). This Court

“decline[d] to transfer this appeal to our sister court because the

Commonwealth’s Court’s case law precludes it from employing its original

jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of this issue as presented.” Id. at

1290 n.8 (citation omitted).

Here, the record confirms that the trial court awarded Appellant credit

for time served. (See Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No. 3318-2013,

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11/13/17; Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No. 3724-2013, 11/13/17;

Trial Court Sentencing Order, Docket No. 3723-2013, 11/13/17; Trial Court

Sentencing Order, Docket No. 2645-2013, 11/13/17). Our review of the

record further reflects that Appellant is arguing that the Department of

Corrections erred in its calculation of his time served. Specifically, in his

motion filed with the trial court, Appellant presented the following as a basis

for relief:

[Appellant] did not [voluntarily] admit himself to a drug and alcohol treatment facility (TCAP). Instead, he entered the rehabilitation facility by Court Order (Sentence), therefore, the time which [Appellant] spent as a[n] inpatient at the drug/alcohol treatment facility was “time spent in custody” within the contemplation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1). As such, he ask[s] this court for credit for time spent at in the Keenan House and Lehigh Valley Halfway House, against the sentence of imprisonment imposed. …

(Motion for Credit for Time Served, 9/10/24, at 3-4).

Based on these averments, Appellant is not claiming that there is an

error in computation based on either an ambiguity in the sentence, nor is he

challenging the legality of the trial court’s alleged failure to award credit for

time served. Rather, Appellant’s complaint is based on an alleged erroneous

computation of sentence by the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, “the

appropriate vehicle for redress would be an original action in the

Commonwealth Court challenging the [Department of Corrections’]

computation.” Wheeler, supra at 1289. See also Thompson v.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 606 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 1801656

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(Pa.Cmwlth. filed Apr. 17, 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (addressing

petitioner’s claim for credit for time served when in inpatient drug and alcohol

treatment programs while on parole and holding that Keenan House was not

equivalent of incarceration). 5

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order denying relief without

prejudice for Appellant to pursue his challenge to the Department of

Corrections computation of credit for time served in an original action in the

Commonwealth Court.

Order affirmed.

Date: 9/19/2025

5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of Commonwealth Court filed after January 15, 2008 for persuasive value).

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