Com. v. Mach Transport, LLC

2023 Pa. Super. 203, 305 A.3d 22

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 13, 2023
• Docket: 1003 EDA 2022
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-S10045-23

2023 PA Super 203

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MACH TRANSPORT, LLC : : Appellant : No. 1003 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 11, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No: CP-09-SA-0000504-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2023

Appellant, Mach Transport, LLC, was issued a traffic summons for

driving an unregistered vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301. A magisterial district

justice found Appellant guilty and fined Appellant $4,652.00, and Appellant

timely appealed to the court of common pleas. On the day of trial, Appellant

appeared in court through counsel. Counsel and the Commonwealth agreed

that Appellant would pay a reduced fine. The trial court accepted the

agreement, entered a disposition of guilty and imposed the reduced fine.

Appellant now appeals to this Court and asks us to vacate its guilty plea

because it was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. Appellant asserts

that (1) its attorney entered the guilty plea by mistake by relying on a

registration for another vehicle, and (2) the registration for the correct vehicle

demonstrates that it was properly registered on the date of the traffic stop.

For the reasons that follow, we remand for further proceedings concerning

whether Appellant is entitled to vacatur of its guilty plea. J-S10045-23

Appellant, a limited liability corporation, is a Kentucky trucking

company. On January 22, 2021, a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a

tractor trailer owned by Appellant. The operator of the vehicle could not

provide a valid registration for the vehicle, so the officer issued a citation for

driving an unregistered vehicle. On October 21, 2021, a magisterial district

justice found Appellant guilty under Section 1301 and imposed a fine of

$4,652.00. Appellant appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

for a trial de novo.

On the date of trial, March 11, 2022, counsel for Appellant appeared as

the lone representative on Appellant’s behalf. The Commonwealth informed

the court, “This is an agreement . . . where the Commonwealth agrees to

reduce the fine to the amount of $2,326.00.” N.T., 3/11/22, at 2. Counsel

for Appellant advised that Appellant “[was] not present, [but] I have the

authority to go ahead and enter this [agreement] on [Appellant’s] behalf.”

Id. The Commonwealth stated that it had no objection to counsel negotiating

the agreement on Appellant's behalf. Id. The court asked whether counsel

“discussed with [Appellant] the fact that [counsel] was going to negotiate in

[an] attempt to get this [agreement]?” Id. at 3. Counsel answered, “Yes.”

Id. The court asked, “And your client was agreeable to that?” Id. Counsel

answered, “Yes.” Id. The court stated, “Based on that I will grant the

resolution that has been worked out between the Commonwealth and

[Appellant].” Id. On the disposition sheet, the court checked the box marked

“guilty” as well as the boxes marked “agreement,” “pay costs,” “pay fines”

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and “amended.” Miscellaneous Criminal Court and Information Sheet,

3/11/22. The court also wrote, “Reduce fine to $2,326.00 under 60-day

suspension.” Id.

On April 11, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

Subsequently, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal in which it raised one issue: “Did the trial court err in accepting

Appellant’s guilty plea as it was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary since

Appellant provided a current vehicle registration but it was not presented

during plea negotiations?” The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion

recommending that this Court affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. The

court stated, “[A]t the March 11, 2022 hearing, Appellant never entered into

a guilty plea nor was Appellant’s case dismissed; rather this Court merely

granted the Resolution stipulated to between Appellant and the

Commonwealth.” Opinion, 6/23/22, at 3.

Appellant presents a single issue in this appeal: “Did the Trial Court err

in accepting Appellant’s guilty pleas [sic] as it was not knowing, intelligent and

voluntary since Appellant provided a current vehicle registration but it was not

presented during plea negotiations?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant asks this Court to vacate its guilty plea on the ground that

Appellant’s counsel entered the plea by mistake. In an affidavit appended to

Appellant’s brief, counsel averred that he had the correct registration in his

possession on the date of the common pleas hearing but mistakenly entered

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the guilty plea by using a registration for another vehicle.1 The correct

registration demonstrates that the vehicle stopped by the police was properly

registered in Kentucky on the date of the stop. Appellant’s brief concludes,

“Appellant in no way made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary agreement to

plead guilty to driving an unregistered vehicle [because] the vehicle was

legally registered.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

The Commonwealth’s brief does not address whether Appellant entered

a guilty plea. Instead, the Commonwealth states that “in the interests of

justice, as [Appellant] appears to have facially set forth a claim of [its]

innocence based on after-discovered evidence, the Commonwealth has no

objection to a remand of this matter to the trial court” for Appellant to raise a

claim of after-discovered evidence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

We begin by addressing Appellant’s argument that the court of common

pleas erred in declining to vacate its guilty plea. Three questions require

consideration: (1) whether the court had the authority to accept a guilty plea

in an appeal from a summary criminal conviction from a magisterial district

justice court, (2) whether the record demonstrates that Appellant entered a

guilty plea, and (3) whether the court should consider Appellant’s request to

withdraw its guilty plea.

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth correctly points out this issue could not have been raised

in the trial court, since Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) expressly provides that there shall be no post-sentence motion following a trial de novo in the court of common pleas. Appellant’s first opportunity to raise its issue therefore was on appeal to this Court.

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We answer the first question in the affirmative. In summary cases, the

Rules expressly permit guilty pleas in a magisterial district justice court, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 454(A-B), but the Rules are conspicuously silent as to whether

guilty pleas are permissible in common pleas court in appeals from a

magisterial district justice court. The only procedures that the Rules expressly

authorize in appeals are (1) dismissal of the appeal if the defendant fails to

appear on the date of trial, Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(D); (2) withdrawal of the appeal

by the defendant, Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(E); or (3) trial de novo followed

immediately by the verdict and sentencing (if necessary), Pa.R.Crim.P.

462(A), (F). The Comment to Rule 462 states that procedures in summary

appeals are “comparable” to the summary trial case procedures in Rule 454

(procedures before magisterial district justices). The term “comparable”

means that the procedures on appeal are similar, but not identical, to

procedures in a magisterial district justice court. See Merriam-Webster.com

(defining “comparable” as “similar, like”). Thus, the Comment leaves open

whether guilty pleas are available in appeals from a magisterial district justice

court.

Although the Rules are silent, the Judiciary Code establishes that

common pleas courts have the authority to accept guilty pleas in appeals of

summary criminal cases from a magisterial district justice court. The Code

provides in relevant part that “[e]very judge of a court of common pleas shall

have all the powers of a . . . magisterial district judge of the minor judiciary.”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 912. Since Pa.R.Crim.P. 454 authorizes magisterial district

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justices to accept guilty pleas in summary criminal cases, Section 912 extends

the same authority to common pleas judges in appeals from a magisterial

district justice court.2

The next question is whether Appellant actually entered a guilty plea in

common pleas court. The court asserts that “Appellant never entered into a

guilty plea . . . rather this Court merely granted the Resolution stipulated to

between Appellant and the Commonwealth.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion,

6/23/22, at 3. In our view, however, the “resolution” was equivalent to a

negotiated guilty plea. A guilty plea is “an admission of all the elements of a

formal criminal charge.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 351 A.2d 280, 282

(Pa. 1976). In a negotiated guilty plea, the defendant admits all elements of

the charge in exchange for some concession by the Commonwealth, e.g., a

reduced sentence. Comment, Pa.R.Crim.P. 590. Although the parties did not

2 This application of Section 912 is beneficial to our criminal justice system.

It has been approximated that in the past, ninety percent of all criminal cases end with guilty pleas. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1979). Without guilty pleas, the already large backlog of cases in our criminal justice system might swell beyond the breaking point. Section 912 helps reduce this backlog by authorizing guilty pleas in summary criminal appeals. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, plea bargaining is "inherent in the criminal law and its administration" and that "[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for many reasons." Id. citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970).

Although Section 912 fills a gap left open by the Rules of Criminal Procedure, we respectfully suggest that it would assist practitioners for our Supreme Court to amend the Rules to state explicitly that guilty pleas are available in appeals from summary convictions in magisterial district justice court.

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expressly state that Appellant was “pleading guilty,” they informed the court

that Appellant agreed to pay a reduced fine of $2,326.00. Counsel for

Appellant further advised that Appellant consented to counsel negotiating this

agreement with the Commonwealth.3 These facts reflect a negotiated plea in

which Appellant admitted guilt for driving an unregistered vehicle in return for

a reduced fine.

The third and final question is whether the court should consider

Appellant’s request to withdraw its guilty plea. Upon review, we remand this

case with the directive that the trial court conduct a hearing on this issue.

The present case involves a post-sentence attempt to withdraw a guilty

plea, so the attempt must satisfy a stricter standard than a pre-sentence

motion to withdraw a guilty plea. In a pre-sentence motion, the defendant

must offer a claim of innocence that is “at least plausible to demonstrate, in

and of itself, a fair and just reason for . . . withdrawal of a plea.”

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015). In

contrast, to prevail on a post-sentence request to withdraw a plea, “[a]

defendant must demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court

were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest

injustice may be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly, ____________________________________________

3 It is permissible for an attorney to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a corporate

client, since “a corporation may appear in court only through an attorney at law admitted in practice before the court.” Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 480 A.2d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 1984). The same principle applies to limited liability corporations such as Appellant. Banks v. Cooper, 171 A.3d 798, 799 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017).

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intelligently, and voluntarily.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 180 A.3d 660, 664

(Pa. Super. 2017). “The determination of the existence or nonexistence of

manifest injustice lies . . . with the trial court in the first instance.”

Commonwealth v. Starr, 301 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1973). To determine

whether a guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court must

examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Id.

In this case, Appellant argues that its guilty plea was unknowing and

unintelligent because it is actually innocent of driving an unregistered vehicle.

Appellant argues that its counsel mistakenly entered Appellant’s guilty plea

based on a registration issued to another vehicle. The correct registration,

Appellant continues, demonstrates that its vehicle was properly registered at

the time of the traffic stop. In effect, Appellant contends that it would be

manifestly unjust not to allow it to withdraw its guilty plea because there was

no factual basis for the plea.

Manifest injustice may occur, inter alia, when a defendant enters a guilty

plea based on a mistake of fact that his attorney failed to recognize in advance

of the guilty plea hearing. See Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764,

765, 767 (Pa. Super. 2002) (denial of request to withdraw guilty plea

constituted manifest injustice, where (1) defendant entered guilty plea in first

degree murder case to avoid death penalty and was sentenced to life

imprisonment, (2) defense counsel believed mistakenly that defendant was

seventeen years old at time of offense, but (3) defendant was actually fifteen

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years old at time of offense and therefore could not be subject to death

penalty; under these circumstances, defendant’s plea agreement was not

knowing, intelligent or voluntarily). Alternatively, manifest injustice may

occur when a defendant provides evidence that satisfies the after-discovered

evidence doctrine. Under this doctrine, relief is available when the evidence

(1) could not have been obtained prior to conclusion of trial by the exercise of

reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will

not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely

result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted. Commonwealth v.

Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2007). The after-discovered evidence

doctrine also applies to evidence discovered after a guilty plea that meets

these four standards. Commonwealth v. Peoples, 319 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa.

1974).

In view of the evidence allegedly demonstrating Appellant’s innocence,

we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings concerning

whether to vacate Appellant’s guilty plea where it would be manifestly injustice

not to do so. Starr, 301 A.2d at 595 (determination of manifest injustice lies

with trial court in the first instance).

Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 10/13/2023

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