Com. v. Wilkersen, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 511 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Sullivan

Opinion

J-S39033-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KENYETTA WILKERSEN : : Appellant : No. 511 EDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 30, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008293-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED APRIL 1, 2026

Kenyetta Wilkersen (“Wilkersen”)1 appeals from the order dismissing

the second petition she filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).2 Wilkersen seeks relief from her negotiated guilty plea to third-

degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime and claims that the

Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because

the PCRA court properly concluded Wilkersen’s claims related to the

misconduct of a detective were untimely, and her claims based on the

Commonwealth’s recent disclosure of a note in a police file were timely but

meritless, we affirm.

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1 Wilkersen also spells her last name “Wilkerson.” We have retained the spelling “Wilkersen” for the purpose of consistency with the Court of Common Pleas docket.

2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. J-S39033-25

We summarize the background to this appeal as follows. In April 2014,

Wilkersen admitted to the following facts:

[Wilkersen] and the victim[, Kendra Burton,] were lifelong friends. On April 10th, 2013, . . . the victim was in her home . . .. At that time[, Wilkersen] knocked on her door with another lifelong friend, the witness in this case[,] whose name is Leona Taylor. [Wilkersen’s] intentions were to ask the victim for a cigarette.

. . . [A] physical altercation began. [Wilkersen] took out a knife that she had been carrying and stabbed the victim multiple times in the torso, back, arms, and face.

[Wilkersen] and her friend . . . then left the victim there in the apartment and left the scene. The victim’s body was discovered the next morning by a neighbor . . ..

See N.T., 4/21/14, at 15-16. Police initially interviewed Wilkersen on the

same day as the murder, and she denied any involvement in the killing or

being at the victim’s home; however, two weeks later, Wilkersen gave a

videotaped statement to detectives admitting she stabbed the victim and

afterwards threw the knife into a sewer. See id. at 16-17; see also Exhibit

C-1 & Transcript.3 Wilkersen told the detective that she was high when the

fight began, and she was apologetic for killing the victim. See N.T., 4/21/14,

at 17.

Following a thorough on-the-record colloquy, which included the above-

stated factual basis, the trial court accepted Wilkersen’s guilty plea to third- ____________________________________________

3 At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth identified a copy of the recording of Wilkersen’s confession as Exhibit C-1. See N.T., 4/21/24, at 17. The trial court directed that a transcript of the videotaped confession be included in the record. See id. at 29-30. The certified record in this appeal includes a transcript of the videotaped confession, but not the recording itself.

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degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime. See N.T., 4/21/14, at

5-20. Wilkersen acknowledged that as part of the plea bargain, the

Commonwealth agreed to recommend an aggregate sentence of twenty-two-

and-one-half to forty-five years of imprisonment and not to proceed on first-

degree murder, which would have carried a mandatory sentence of life without

parole were Wilkersen convicted of that offense at trial. See id. at 18. At the

conclusion of the April 2014 hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon

aggregate sentence. Wilkersen did not file post-sentence motions or a direct

appeal.

Wilkersen unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief on two previous

occasions. In her first attempt at post-conviction relief in 2020, Wilkersen

filed a pro se motion to compel production of DNA and biological evidence.

The trial court denied that motion, and this Court affirmed. See

Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 248 A.3d 473, 2021 WL 82298 (Pa. Super.

2021) (non-precedential memorandum). In 2021, Wilkersen filed a first PCRA

petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a petition to withdraw

and a Turner/Finley letter.4 The PCRA court permitted counsel to withdraw

and dismissed that petition. This Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________

4 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). As stated in the Turner/Finley letter, Wilkersen intended to claim that she did not stab the victim, her plea was unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, DNA evidence would prove her innocence, her confession was coerced, and her confession was false. See Turner/Finley Letter, 6/24/21, at 6-7. The PCRA court granted counsel leave to withdraw and dismissed Wilkersen’s first petition for raising meritless and/or untimely claims.

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Wilkerson, 285 A.3d 905, 2022 WL 4076045 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-

precedential memorandum).

In 2022, Wilkersen filed a federal habeas action, during which the

Commonwealth discovered in the police homicide investigation file the

following handwritten note (“the note”) indicating police received information

about an alternate suspect:

See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/24, at Exhibit A (hereinafter, “the note”);

see also id. at 5; Commonwealth’s Answer, 11/4/24, at 5. 5 The

Commonwealth disclosed the note to Wilkersen in August 2023. ____________________________________________

5 We have modified the original image of the note for readability and to redact

extraneous personal information such as a phone number underneath the notation “Yetta’s boyfriend” and a Post-it note with the name and phone number of the victim’s father.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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In January 2024, Wilkersen filed the pro se PCRA petition which led to

this appeal.6 The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended

petition claiming Brady violations based on the Commonwealth’s failures to

disclose the note indicating that Tanya said Corey or “Champ” stabbed the

victim, as well as an internal affairs report about one of the detectives to

whom Wilkersen confessed. See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/24, at 5, 38.7

The Commonwealth filed an answer asserting (1) Wilkersen did not timely

seek relief based on the internal affairs report because the Commonwealth, in

2021, previously disclosed the detective’s misconduct history, and (2)

Wilkersen’s claims based on the note were timely but lacked merit because

the information in the note did not prejudice her guilty plea. See

Commonwealth’s Answer, 11/4/24, at 8-10. Wilkersen responded to the

The record indicates that Wilkersen went by a nickname similar to “Yetta,” and Wilkerson’s friend, Leona Taylor, went by the nickname “Peachy.” See Exhibit C-1 & Transcript, at 5 (indicating Wilkersen’s nickname was “Yetti”). Nothing in the record indicates who “Tanya” or “Fred” were; nor was there any evidence about the author of the note, the date of its writing, or when the author received the information that Tanya said Corey or “Champ” stabbed the victim, “Kendra.”

6 The federal court stayed Wilkersen’s habeas action pending this proceeding.

7 More specifically, Wilkersen alleged that Detective Edward Tolliver (“Detective Tolliver”) interrogated, or attempted to interrogate, her on three occasions and coerced her confession to the killing during the third interrogation. See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/24, at 39. Wilkersen asserted that the internal affairs report indicated that the detective assaulted an individual when responding to a domestic disturbance call. See id. at 38. Wilkersen did not attach a copy of the internal affairs report to her amended petition, and she did not specify when she learned about the detective’s misconduct.

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Commonwealth’s answer but did not dispute the Commonwealth’s assertion it

disclosed the detective’s misconduct history more than one year before she

commenced the instant PCRA proceeding. See Wilkersen’s Response to the

Commonwealth’s Answer, 11/12/24, at 2-7.

The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

the amended petition and advised Wilkersen that her claims based on the

internal affairs report were untimely, and her claims based on the note, while

timely, lacked merit because the undisclosed note was not material. See Rule

907 Notice, 12/13/24, at 1-2. Wilkersen responded to the court’s Rule 907

notice and challenged the PCRA court’s materiality analysis of the note.

Wilkersen’s Response to the Rule 907 Notice, 12/19/24, at 2-5. On January

30, 2025, the PCRA court dismissed Wilkersen’s petition. Wilkersen timely

appealed.8

Wilkersen raises the following issues for our review:

I. Whether the Commonwealth withheld an Internal Affairs report indicating that the detective who conducted the interrogations and

8 The PCRA court ordered a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but Wilkersen’s counsel did not timely file one. After the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion highlighting this omission, Wilkersen’s counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court filed a supplemental opinion addressing the issues raised in Wilkerson’s Rule 1925(b) statement.

Because counsel’s filing of a late Rule 1925(b) statement constitutes per se ineffectiveness, we decline to find waiver for counsel’s noncompliance with the PCRA court’s order for a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 441 (Pa. Super. 2018). Moreover, because the PCRA court filed an opinion addressing the issues raised in the late Rule 1925(b) statement, there is no need for a remand. See id.

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obtained [Wilkersen’s] alleged confession had a documented history of physical assault while on duty?

II. Whether the Commonwealth violated Brady and prejudiced [Wilkersen] by suppressing an exculpatory note during plea negotiations that identified an alternative suspect?

Wilkersen’s Brief at ix (reordered).

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well

settled:

Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). The PCRA petitioner “has the burden to

persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires

relief.” Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144-45 (Pa. 2018).

We must initially determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to

adjudicate the claims raised in Wilkersen’s petition. Under the PCRA, any

petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one

year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

The PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court

may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not

timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa.

2010). Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider a facially untimely

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issue if the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth in

section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

In the present case, Wilkersen’s pro se 2024 PCRA petition was facially

untimely.9 In her amended PCRA petition, Wilkersen alleged timeliness

exceptions based on: (1) the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose an internal

affairs report concerning a detective’s prior misconduct in a different case and

(2) the Commonwealth’s disclosure of the note. See Amended PCRA Petition,

8/13/24, at 5-8, 10-11, 38.

To establish the governmental interference exception, a petitioner must

plead and prove: (1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of

interference by government officials, and (2) the petitioner could not have

obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence. See

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) also provides an exception to the jurisdictional time-

bar if “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Due diligence “demands that the

petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner

must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the

9 Wilkersen’s conviction became final on May 21, 2014, when Wilkersen did

not file post-sentence motion or a direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), (3). Therefore, she had until May 21, 2015, to file a facially timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Wilkerson, 2022 WL 4076045, at *4.

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exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v.

Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). Any PCRA petition invoking an exception under section

9545(b)(1) “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); Kennedy, 266 A.3d at 1133

n.9.

With respect to the internal affairs report, Wilkersen does not expressly

contest the PCRA court’s determination that she did not timely file a PCRA

petition presenting her claims based on the misconduct of one of the

detectives who took her videotaped confession. Nevertheless, she insists the

Commonwealth “failed to disclose a misconduct report in which the . . .

Internal Affairs report sustained a finding that Det[ective] Tolliver . . . had

previously assaulted an individual after responding to a domestic disturbance

call” and this claim is “directly relevant to the Brady claim” concerning the

note. Wilkersen’s Brief at 33-34.

The PCRA court dismissed Wilkersen’s claims based on the internal

affairs report as untimely and determined that the Commonwealth had

disclosed information about the detective’s misconduct history to Wilkersen in

2021. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/29/25, at 8-9. Citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(2), the court concluded that Wilkersen’s claims based on the

detective’s misconduct were time barred because she filed the pro se PCRA

petition presenting such claims more than two years later, in 2024. See id.

at 8-9.

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The record supports the PCRA court’s findings, and we discern no error

in the court’s conclusions of law. To reiterate, the PCRA requires a petitioner

to plead and prove a timeliness exception under section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) and

file a petition invoking an exception “within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In the present case,

Wilkersen did not contest the Commonwealth’s assertions that it disclosed

information about the detective’s misconduct history in 2021. See Answer,

11/4/24, at 10; See Response, 11/12/24, at 2-7. Thus, Wilkersen had until

2022 to present claims based the detective’s misconduct, see 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(2). Wilkersen has not explained why she waited until January 2024

to present her claims based on the detective’s history of misconduct, nor has

she established that her claims based on an internal affairs report fell within

a PCRA timeliness exception. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s

dismissal of Wilkersen’s claims based on the internal affairs report as

untimely. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954; Commonwealth v. Jones, 344

A.3d 1102, 2025 WL 1938521, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2025) (non-precedential

memorandum) (concluding that Jones did not plead and prove a PCRA

timeliness exception when he did not allege when he first learned of a

detective’s alleged misconduct, did not establish reasonable efforts to

ascertain the relevant facts, and did not assert how the Commonwealth

prevented him from presenting his claims).

As to Wilkersen’s claims based on the note, the PCRA court determined

Wilkersen met the newly discovered fact exception because she could not have

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discovered the note until the Commonwealth disclosed it. See PCRA Court

Opinion, 4/29/25, at 6. The record supports the PCRA court’s determination

in that (1) Wilkersen alleged that she could not have discovered the note, (2)

the Commonwealth averred that it only discovered the note in the police

investigation file when preparing a response to Wilkersen’s federal habeas

action, and (3) the Commonwealth conceded it had not disclosed the note to

Wilkersen until August 2023. See Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/24, at 2-6;

Commonwealth’s Answer, 11/4/24, at 5. Under the circumstances of this

case, we will not disturb the court’s conclusion that Wilkersen stated a PCRA

timeliness exception based on the disclosure of the note and timely presented

her claims in the instant proceeding commenced in January 2024. See

Staton, 184 A.3d at 954; accord Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 326 A.3d

455, 2024 WL 3914522, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2024) (non-precedential

memorandum) (affirming a PCRA court’s determination that materials in the

sole custody of the police department constituted newly discovered facts for

the purpose of section 9545(b)(1)(ii)). Therefore, we proceed to review the

PCRA court’s conclusion that Wilkersen’s Brady claims based on the note were

meritless.

A Brady claim presents a question of law, and an appellate court’s

standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. See

Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020). When

reviewing the PCRA court’s order dismissing Wilkersen’s Brady claim on the

merits, we are mindful of the following general principles:

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In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, [ ] 884 A.2d 848, 853-54 ([Pa.] 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The prosecution’s duty under Brady is limited as “the Constitution is not violated every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense.” Kyles[v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995)] . . .. “Thus, there are three necessary components that demonstrate a violation of the Brady strictures: the evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued.” Lambert, 884 A.2d at 854 . . ..

Commonwealth v. Conforti, 303 A.3d 715, 725-26 (Pa. 2023).

Prejudice, for the purpose of Brady,

occurs when a defendant shows a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. In other words, the undisclosed evidence must be material to guilt or punishment.

Id. at 730 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Materiality” for

the purpose of Brady is analogous to prejudice for the purpose of an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in that “a grant of relief depends upon

finding a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

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been different.” Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 417 (Pa. 2011)

(internal citations omitted).

In the context of a post-sentence challenge to the validity of a guilty

plea, this Court adheres to a “manifest injustice” standard. See

Commonwealth v. Felix, 303 A.3d 816, 820 (Pa. Super. 2023) (noting that

a defendant shows that a plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it

was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently). Moreover,

[o]nce a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, it is presumed that [s]he was aware of what [s]he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon h[er]. In determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, a court is free to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Furthermore, nothing in the rule precludes the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read, completed, and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea proceedings.

Id. (internal citation omitted). Given the similarity between prejudice for the

purposes of Brady and an ineffective assistance of plea counsel claim, see

Lesko, 15 A.3d at 417, it bears noting that “prejudice may be established by

demonstrating a reasonable probability that [a petitioner] would have opted

to go to trial rather than plead guilty” if she had been aware of information,

such as, being given “legally sound advice.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74

A.3d 185, 199-200 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citation omitted). “[T]he

reasonable probability standard in this context is not especially stringent, but

requires only a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

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Wilkersen’s lengthy and scholarly arguments in this appeal focus upon

the PCRA court’s determination that the note was not material, i.e., that

Wilkersen did not establish a reasonable probability that the results of the

proceeding would have been different. Wilkersen emphasizes that the

notation that Corey or “Champ” stabbed the victim was directly exculpatory

and, therefore, favorable to the defense. See Wilkersen’s Brief at 9-15. She

further contends that the note was material because it undermined confidence

in the outcome of the plea proceeding. See id. at 10. On this point, Wilkersen

asserts that materiality, in the context of a “post-plea” Brady claim, is a

reasonable probability that she would not have accepted the Commonwealth’s

plea offer and would have proceeded to trial. See id. at 10, 12-17, 23, 26,

28.10 She argues that the note was material in the present case because the ____________________________________________

10 Wilkersen devotes a substantial portion of her brief to arguing that a Brady

claim should survive a guilty plea in order to ensure fair, transparent, reliable, and trustworthy plea negotiations. See Wilkersen’s Brief at 12, 15, 18-19, 20-22. Our research has yet to uncover a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision opining on the viability or contours of a Brady claim in a post-plea setting, and we have found only one reported decision by this Court discussing a post-plea Brady claim. See Commonwealth v. Kephart, 594 A.2d 358, 360 (Pa. Super. 1991). We note that Kephart pre-dates United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), a United States Supreme Court decision, which, as noted by Wilkersen, curtailed the prosecution’s duty to disclose material impeachment evidence during plea negotiations. The non-precedential decisions of this Court, capable of citation under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), have reached mixed conclusions on post-plea Brady claims. Compare Commonwealth v. Wayda, 256 A.3d 48 (Pa. Super. 2021) (non- precedential memorandum) (discussing the merits of a post-plea Brady claims) with Commonwealth v. Early, 240 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non- precedential memorandum) (noting that a Brady claim was waived by the entry of a guilty plea). (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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non-disclosure of the note (1) impacted her ability to formulate a defense

strategy and prepare for trial, (2) compromised her bargaining position during

plea negotiations, (3) caused her to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer

unknowingly, unintelligently, and involuntarily. See id. at 7, 11-14. Put

differently, she asserts that if the Commonwealth had disclosed the note

during plea negotiations, she could have fashioned more effective defense

strategies by shifting blame to an alternate suspect and questioning the

integrity of the police investigation; this, in turn, would have altered the

parties’ assessments of the risks and benefits of going to trial, influenced the

sentencing recommendations offered and accepted during plea negotiations,

and altered her decision to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer of twenty

to forty years of imprisonment for third-degree murder. See id. at 11-15, 17,

24, 25, 28. She emphasizes that when reviewing her issue, the standard for

considering materiality is a “low” one, because if a higher standard were

applied, the Commonwealth “would likely err” on the side of withholding

exculpatory evidence. Id. at 10.

Wilkersen further suggests the PCRA court erred in its materiality

analysis to the extent the court hypothesized about a likely outcome at a trial,

considered the admissibility of the note at trial, or relied on her confession

and guilty plea. See id. at 22-28. Wilkersen contends such factors are ____________________________________________

This Court need not expressly determine whether Pennsylvania recognizes a post-plea Brady claim because even if Pennsylvania does so, Wilkersen has not stated a basis for relief under any applicable standard.

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“immaterial” to the issue of whether she stated a reasonable probability that

she would not have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea offer and instead gone

to trial. See id. at 24, 26, 28.

The PCRA court denied relief on Wilkersen’s Brady claims based on the

note because, it determined, the note was not material and Wilkersen could

not establish prejudice. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/29/25, at 7-8. Focusing

on the notation that “Tanya said . . . Peachy left[,] . . . Yetta was fighting

[the victim, and] . . . Corey or ‘Champ’ stabbed the victim,” the court observed

there was no record evidence establishing who “Tanya” was or how she got

information that Corey or Champ stabbed the victim. See id. at 7. The court

determined the note was itself “inadmissible hearsay,” and Wilkersen did not

establish she could have discovered favorable, admissible evidence had the

Commonwealth disclosed the note. See id. Furthermore, the court observed

that Wilkersen’s claims based on the note contradicted Wilkersen’s

admissions, both in her videotaped confession and her sworn guilty plea, that

she stabbed the victim. The court thus concluded that Wilkersen “failed to

demonstrate how she was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure to

disclose the note prior to the guilty plea hearing.” Id. at 8.

Following our review, we conclude Wilkersen has not demonstrated a

basis for relief, as the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and

she has not established legal error in the court’s conclusions. To the extent

Pennsylvania recognizes post-plea Brady claims, we agree with Wilkersen

that the focus of the materiality/prejudice prong is on whether she stated a

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reasonable probability that she would not have accepted the Commonwealth’s

offer and would have instead proceeded to trial. See Lesko, 15 A.3d at 417;

Barndt, 74 A.3d at 199-200. Moreover, we agree that consideration of the

admissibility of the note at a trial, or the fact that she confessed or pleaded

guilty, would not alone warrant dismissal of a post-plea Brady claim. See

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 412 (Pa. 2011);

Commonwealth v. Mach Transp., LLC, 305 A.3d 22, 27 (Pa. Super. 2023).

However, Wilkersen’s remaining arguments are unconvincing for several

reasons.

First, we discern no merit to Wilkersen’s broad assertions that her

confession and sworn admissions to the factual basis of her guilty plea are

“immaterial” to the proper consideration of a Brady prejudice/materiality.

Pennsylvania law permits courts to consider Brady evidence, as well as post-

sentence challenges to the validity of a plea, in light of the totality of the

circumstances. See Felix, 303 A.3d at 820 (noting that a court is free to

consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea);

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 20 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that

court are not to review the Brady evidence “in isolation, but, rather, the

omission is to be evaluated in the context of the entire record”) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted).11

11 The cases cited by Wilkersen do not support her legal arguments that her

confession and admission to the factual basis of her plea are “immaterial.” (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Second, we do not read the PCRA court’s opinion to suggest that the

court dismissed Wilkersen’s petition simply because the note would not have

been admissible at trial or that she pleaded guilty. Instead, like Wilkersen

herself, the PCRA court appeared to consider the materiality of the note in the

context of the totality of the circumstances of her plea, including the possible

uses of the note at trial.12 ____________________________________________

See State v. Alexander, 869 S.E.2d 215, 233 (N.C. 2022) (stating that “[t]he required materiality determination should be made based upon a consideration of the entire record and focus upon whether the evidence would have affected the jury’s deliberations”); Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 221 (W.Va. 2015) (granting relief on a post-plea Brady claim based on the suppression of DNA test results where the defendant “repeatedly requested the results of DNA testing; was incorrectly informed that such testing was not yet complete; and was presented with a time-limited plea offer that he accepted upon advice of counsel”); see also State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 99 (Nev. 2012) (summarizing the following elements of a test of materiality: “(1) the relative strength and weakness of the State's case and the defendant's case; (2) the persuasiveness of the withheld evidence; (3) the reasons, if any, expressed by the defendant for choosing to plead guilty; (4) the benefits obtained by the defendant in exchange for the plea; and (5) the thoroughness of the plea colloquy”); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing, as a factor, the “establishment of a factual basis” for a plea that complied with the on-the-record procedural requirements for accepting a plea) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).

12 Indeed, the cases Wilkersen cites suggest that a court may consider the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information. See Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that “the decision by the accused would have been different if the prosecution had not withheld the exculpatory evidence, the test is an objective one, depending largely on the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information”); see also United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 805 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting a district court properly assessed a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a plea in light of the strength of the evidence against him); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Miller).

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Third, we concur with the PCRA court’s decision in so far as the alleged

Brady claims—based on the existence of the note, the fact that police had

information someone else stabbed the victim or that Tanya said Corey or

Champ stabbed the victim—did not so alter the perceived risks and benefits

of proceeding to trial as would render Wilkersen’s plea involuntary or

unknowing under the totality of the circumstances. See Felix 303 A.3d at

820. Furthermore, the court’s findings of fact, which were supported in the

record, do not establish a reasonable probability that Wilkersen would not

have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea offer. See Lesko, 15 A.3d at 417;

Barndt, 74 A.3d at 199-200. Wilkersen’s videotaped confession alone was

powerful evidence against her. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436, 466 (U.S. 1966) (describing a confession as “the most compelling

possible evidence of guilt”). By comparison, the fact that police had

information pointing to an alternate suspect did not establish a reasonable

basis for foregoing the plea agreement. While favorable, the information

contained in the note was diminished by the fact that Tanya remained

unidentified and did not state a foundation for her statement that Corey or

“Champ” stabbed the victim. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/29/25, at 7-8;

Amended PCRA Petition, 8/13/24, at Exhibit A.

Moreover, the note bore no dates, and Wilkersen has not established

the information about Tanya’s statement was received before Wilkersen

confessed or even before Wilkersen pleaded guilty. Under the totality of these

circumstances, Wilkersen’s efforts to suggest she could have fashioned a

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better plea agreement had the note been disclosed is, at best, speculative,

and her arguments minimize the most obvious component of the

Commonwealth’s plea offer, i.e., the decision not to proceed on first-degree

murder, which would have carried a mandatory life sentence without parole if

Wilkersen had been convicted at trial. See N.T., 4/21/14, at 18.

For these reasons, we cannot say the PCRA court erred in determining

that the note was not material to the knowing and voluntary nature of

Wilkersen’s plea or her decision to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer.

Because the record supports the PCRA court’s findings of fact, and we discern

no error of law in the PCRA court’s determination that the note was not

material, we affirm the court’s decision that Wilkersen’s Brady claim based

on the note lacked merit. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954.

Order affirmed.

Date: 4/1/2026

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