Com. v. Lane, U.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 9, 2025
• Docket: 879 WDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S06023-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEWALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : UNIQUE LANE : : No. 879 WDA 2024 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 22, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0000421-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: May 9, 2025

Unique Lane (“Lane”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following her guilty plea to murder of the third degree. 1 Additionally, Lane’s

court-appointed counsel, Charles R. Pass III, Esquire (“Attorney Pass”), has

filed an application to withdraw and accompanying brief pursuant to Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant Attorney Pass’ application and

affirm the judgment of sentence.

At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth provided the following

factual summary. On October 3, 2021, Lane shot and killed her girlfriend, Kia

Reynolds, who was sitting the driver’s seat of her locked vehicle. The evidence

established that Lane followed Reynolds from a residence and shot Reynolds

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2502(c). J-S06023-25

through the passenger side window of her vehicle, striking her in the head.

When police arrived, Reynolds’ body was lying next to the driver’s side door

of the vehicle, suggesting that the driver’s side window had been smashed

with a rock to unlock the door and remove the body from the vehicle.

Reynolds’ family informed police that the two women had a tumultuous

relationship marked by incidents of violence, and that Reynolds was

attempting to end the relationship at the time of the murder. After the

murder, police recovered a Valentine’s Day card from Reynold’s residence

which was written by Lane to Reynolds wherein Lane wrote: “To bullets do us

part.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/24, at 4.

The Commonwealth charged Lane with one count of criminal homicide.

In exchange for Lane’s plea, the Commonwealth agreed to amend the charge

to murder in the third degree, with no agreement as to the sentence. The

trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of presentence investigation

(“PSI”) report. Lane submitted an expert mitigation report prepared by Vickie

Piontkowski, a licensed clinical social worker. At the sentencing hearing,

Piontkowski testified that Lane had been exposed to violence from a young

age and was “at least the third generation in her family to experience intimate

partner violence,” which caused “mental health symptoms related to anxiety

and depression.” N.T., 2/22/23, at 9. The trial court reviewed fourteen victim

impact statements submitted by the Commonwealth, including statements

from Reynold’s father and sisters. The trial court also heard testimony from

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Reynolds’ three daughters and her mother, who testified as to the significant

impact the murder has had on every aspect of their lives. Lane exercised her

right to allocution, accepted full responsibility for the murder, and apologized

to Reynold’s family. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial

court imposed a standard range sentence of seventeen to thirty-four years of

incarceration.2 In so doing, the court stated:

I did read all [fourteen] statements, the father’s in particular, the fact that it took him six drafts to compose a letter for me. He mentioned he was getting some help at The Caring Place to deal with his loss. The sisters, no matter what happens, they are not going to see their sister again and daughter, losing their mother. It’s awful. It is just awful. I don’t know if this helps in any way, but you do have some closure and you didn’t have to go through a trial. There is nothing worse than going through a homicide trial. It even exacerbates the situation. Again, like I said, there is nothing I can do to make your life whole.

. . . Ms. Lane, I don’t know how you’re going to live with yourself for what you did because there was no excuse for this. It’s just awful.

Now, since you saved us the ordeal of going through a trial and you took responsibility, I’m going to go close to the max but not the max, and based on some of the mitigation factors there were, you did take responsibility, I’m going to sentence you to a period of not less than [seventeen] years and not more than [thirty-four] years in the state prison. You are to have no contact with any of the family members in this matter. While you’re there I’m going to have you undergo a mental health evaluation and treatment. ____________________________________________

2 The parties agreed that Lane had a prior record score of one and that the

enhancement for use of a deadly weapon applied. Under the deadly weapon enhancement/used matrix in effect at that time, the standard range guidelines for murder of the third degree called for a minimum sentence of eight and one-half to twenty years. The maximum punishment for murder in the third degree is forty years in prison. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(d).

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N.T., 2/22/23, at 23-24.

Lane did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal. However,

she subsequently filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), and the PCRA court appointed Attorney Pass as counsel,

who filed an amended petition seeking reinstatement of Lane’s post-sentence

and appeal rights. The PCRA court granted the requested relief. Lane then

filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of her sentence which the

trial court denied.3 Lane then filed a timely notice of appeal, and both she

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In this Court, Attorney Pass

has filed an application to withdraw and an Anders brief. Lane did not

respond to the application to withdraw or the Anders brief.

Before we may address the merits of the issue raised in the Anders

brief, we must first assess the petition to withdraw from representation to

determine whether it meets certain procedural requirements. See

3 In its opinion, the trial court indicated that it entered its order denying the

post-sentence motion on July 1, 2024. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/24, at 1. Attorney Pass indicated in the Anders Brief that the motion was denied on July 10, 2024. See Anders Brief at 5. However, the docket bears no entry on those dates. Instead, the order denying the post-sentence motion was not entered on the docket until July 17, 2024, after Lane had filed her notice of appeal on July 12, 2024. Nonetheless, we treat the notice of appeal as having been filed after the order denying the post-sentence motion was entered on the docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (providing that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”).

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Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc). An Anders brief that accompanies a request to withdraw must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Counsel must

also provide a copy of the Anders brief to the client, and a letter that advises

the client of the right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2)

proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems

worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in

the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (citation omitted). If counsel has satisfied these requirements,

this Court will then conduct “a full examination” of the record “to decide

whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187

A.3d 266, 271 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at

744).

Here, in the Anders brief, Attorney Pass provided a procedural and

factual history of the case with citations to the record, discussed the issue

arguably supporting the appeal, and explained why he concluded the issue

was frivolous. See Anders Brief at 4-21. Attorney Pass also mailed a copy

of the Anders brief to Lane and in his cover letter advised her that she could

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raise any additional issues before this Court pro se or with privately retained

counsel. See Application to Withdraw, 12/5/24, Exhibit A. As Attorney Pass

has substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago,

we will conduct an independent review to determine whether the appeal is, in

fact, wholly frivolous.

In the Anders brief, Attorney Pass identifies the following issue for our

review:

Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion and acted inconsistently with the fundamental norms of the sentencing process by focusing on the seriousness of the offense to the exclusion of the other factors under 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 9721(b) and 9725 and—while acknowledging the general circumstance that [Lane], by the act of pleading guilty, “saved us the ordeal of going through a trial and . . . took responsibility, I’m going to go close to the max but not the max, and based on some of the mitigation factors there were, you did take responsibility”— referenced victim impact statements/testimony and emphasized the senseless inexcusable nature of the killing and—while ordering mental health evaluation and treatment during incarceration—did not (adequately) state reasons on the record for the sentence in light of the character of [Lane], the need of such a lengthy sentence to protect the public, why a lesser sentence of incarceration would depreciate the seriousness of [Lane]’s crime, and where the maliciousness involved here was much less than in the ordinary, usual or run-of-the-mill third-degree murder case where only one shot was fired, no other crime was committed/charged, where mental illness, longstanding exposure to violence from a young age, and/or other conditions were involved which affected the mens rea in the commission of the offense?

Anders Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

This issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Lane’s

sentence from which there is no automatic right to appeal. See

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Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en

banc).4 Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by:

(1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief setting forth “a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence[;]” and (4) presenting a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9781(b).

Id. at 328 (citation omitted). Furthermore, our determination as to whether

the appellant has raised a substantial question is limited to our review of the

Rule 2119(f) statement. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617,

627 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a substantial question exists only where the

appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the manner in which

the sentence violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme set

4 As explained above, Lane entered a guilty plea in this matter. When a defendant enters a guilty plea, the defendant generally waives the right to challenge on appeal all non-jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea. See Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). However, because the plea agreement did not call for a specific sentence, and the parties left the sentence to the trial court’s discretion, Lane retained the right to challenge the discretionary aspects of her sentence on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding that appellant could challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal after entering a plea that negotiated a particular aspect of the sentence but did not include a sentencing agreement).

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forth in the sentencing code or a particular fundamental norm underlying the

sentencing process).

Here, the record demonstrates that Lane preserved her discretionary

sentencing claim in a post-sentence motion and, upon the denial of that

motion, filed a timely notice of appeal. Attorney Pass included a Rule 2119(f)

statement in the Anders brief, setting forth the reasons for challenging the

discretionary aspects of Lane’s sentence. Thus, as Lane has met the technical

requirements for preserving her discretionary sentencing claim, we will review

the Rulle 2119(f) statement to determine whether she has raised a substantial

question for our review.

In the Rule 2119(f) statement, Attorney Pass avers that the trial court

focused on the severity of the offense, imposed an excessive sentence which

was not individualized, and failed to comply with 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(b) and

9725. We conclude that this allegation presents a substantial question for our

review. See Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875 (Pa. Super.

2012) (holding that an averment that the court sentenced based solely on the

seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a

substantial question). Accordingly, we will proceed to consider the merits of

the discretionary sentencing claim.

Our standard of review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a

sentence is well-settled:

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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In [the context of sentencing], an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error of judgment. Rather appellant must establish by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

When the court sentences a defendant to total confinement, it must

fashion a sentence “that is consistent with . . . the protection of the public,

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim

and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The court shall also consider any guidelines for

sentencing. See id. Additionally, the court shall impose a sentence of total

confinement if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime

and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, the court is of the

opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary because a

lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the defendant.

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725(3).

“When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the

sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the

overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975

A.2d 1128, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2009). “We cannot re-weigh the sentencing

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factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing court.”

Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa. Super. 2009).

When the sentencing court imposes a sentence within the sentencing

guidelines, this Court must affirm the sentence imposed unless the case

involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2), (3). Further, where

the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI report, we can assume the

sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory

factors. See Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

In the Anders brief, Attorney Pass describes the discretionary

sentencing claim that Lane wished to raise. Attorney Pass explains that during

the sentencing hearing, the trial court referenced the existence of unidentified

mitigating factors, but the record is unclear to what extent those supplemental

mitigation factors factored into the sentence imposed. Attorney Pass

acknowledges that the court ordered a mental health evaluation and

treatment as part of the sentence, but notes that the record doesn’t reveal

whether Lane’s mental health conditions were considered with respect to the

length of the term of incarceration. Attorney Pass points out that Lane

frequently experienced violence in her family and the neighborhoods in which

she grew up, resulting in depression and anxiety. He observes that, given

Lane’s age at the time of the murder (twenty-three years old) and her inability

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to establish an effective coping mechanism, continued mental health

treatment was warranted. Attorney Pass additionally points out that Lane had

no prior record of violence, and the offense in this case was directed against

a paramour which would be unlikely to recur against another person after an

extended period of treatment.

Nonetheless, Attorney Pass indicates his belief that Lane’s discretionary

sentencing challenge is frivolous. Initially, he points out that the trial court

was undoubtedly aware of the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

on the life of the victim and on the community, as it involved a sudden and

unexpected loss of life for which great pain and grief will continue to be

experienced by the victim’s family and friends. Attorney Pass further indicates

that the trial court, in recognizing that Lane accepted responsibility by

pleading guilty and sparing the victim’s family the ordeal of a trial, decided to

impose a sentence of incarceration close to, but below, the statutory

maximum penalty. Attorney Pass notes that, because the standard range of

the sentencing guidelines called for a minimum sentence of eight and one-half

to 20 years in prison, a sentence of seventeen to thirty-four years for third-

degree murder may seem high where the prior record score is one. However,

Attorney Pass asserts that the factual summary underlying Lane’s plea would

support a conviction for first-degree murder. With that in mind, he argues

that imposing a minimum sentence of incarceration three years under the top

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of the standard range of the guidelines and a maximum sentence six years

below the statutory maximum is not clearly unreasonable or excessive.

As far as an individualized sentence, Attorney Pass submits that the

sentencing court had substantial evidence regarding Lane’s character and

rehabilitative needs. Attorney Pass maintains that “[i]t is foolhardy to

presume the sentencing court did not consider the evidence in front of it and

referenced by the parties based upon the level of explicit reference made

thereto by that court.” Anders Brief at 20-21. Accordingly, Attorney Pass

asserts that there is no basis in law or fact to support a claim that the trial

court abused its discretion when imposing Lane’s sentence, and her

discretionary sentencing claim is frivolous.

The trial court considered Lane’s discretionary sentencing issue and

determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:

[Lane] specifically refers to the lack of reference as to why a lesser sentence of incarceration would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. In this case, the seriousness of the crime is self-evident in the taking of the life of a 39-year-old woman with three daughters and extended family whose testimony regarding the impact of the murder is of record. In addition, [Lane] contends that the maliciousness of the shooting, which she contends was less than the ordinary, usual or run of the mill third-degree murder because only one shot was fired and no other crime was committed, is a relevant factor that should have been addressed. This argument is misplaced. Clearly the summary of the evidence, though not specifically acknowledged by [Lane], established that [she] followed the victim out of the home and shot the victim while she was seated in her car, clearly indicating that the victim was attempting to leave the scene.

In addition, while there were mitigating factors which were specifically acknowledged, in [Lane’s] personal history consisting

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of exposure to violence as a child and in her history with the victim, there is no strong evidence that indicates that the shooting that day was a product of that history. The summary of the evidence was that “on or around the time of her murder[,] Kia Reynolds was attempting to end the relationship with [Lane].” In addition, the summary of the evidence indicates that [Lane] had written a “Valentine’s Day card” to [Reynolds] stating, “[t]o bullets do us part.” These facts were not disputed.

In addition, it is noted that while the mitigation expert testified extensively regarding [Lane’s] history of exposure to violence, intimate partner violence and “hot cognition” as influencing her conduct, her testimony and report fail to address how these factors lead to [Lane] shooting [Reynolds] as she sat in her car, leaving the scene, and why [Lane] elected to shoot Reynolds, rather than protect her from possibly driving drunk, as she claimed was her motive in following her from the home after [Lane] was allegedly attacked.

****

In this case, the record as a whole, consisting of the [PSI] report, which was substantially unchallenged; the expert mitigation testimony and her report; the victim impact statements and testimony; the circumstances of the shooting; and, [Lane’s] acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse, were all considered in arriving at a sentence that was less that the maximum sentence. Accordingly, there was no error or abuse. of discretion in the sentence procedure or the sentence imposed.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/13/24, at 8-9 (citation and unnecessary capitalization

omitted, paragraph formatting added).

Based upon our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial

court in imposing sentence. Because Lane’s sentence falls within the standard

range of the sentencing guidelines, we must affirm unless the case involves

circumstances where the application of the sentencing guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). On the record before

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us, we find no circumstances which would render the application of the

guidelines clearly unreasonable. The Commonwealth’s factual presentation at

the plea indicated that Reynolds was attempting to end the relationship with

Lane. On the date of the murder, Lane followed Reynolds out of the home,

then shot her in the head through the passenger side door window while

Reynolds was attempting to leave the area in her locked vehicle.

Moreover, because the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI report,

we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information

regarding Lane’s character and weighed those considerations along with

mitigating statutory factors when fashioning her sentence. Furthermore, the

trial court specifically noted that it considered, inter alia, the PSI report, the

expert mitigation testimony and expert report, the victim impact statements

and testimony, the circumstances of the shooting, Lane’s acceptance of

responsibility, and her expression of remorse. See Trial Court Opinion,

11/13/24, at 9. Additionally, the trial court clearly considered Lane’s mental

health needs, as it ordered her to undergo a mental health evaluation and to

receive treatment. See N.T., 2/22/23, at 23-24. Thus, on the record before

us, we conclude that Lane’s discretionary sentencing issue is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.

We have also conducted a full examination of the proceedings and

conclude that there are no additional non-frivolous issues to be raised on

appeal. In particular, we find no non-frivolous issues regarding the legality of

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the sentence imposed or the validity of Lane’s guilty plea. Accordingly, we

grant counsel’s application to withdraw, and affirm the judgment of sentence.

Application to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 05/09/2025

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