J-S21016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : IAN CHARLES HOUGHTALING : : Appellant : No. 175 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000339-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2025
Appellant, Ian Charles Houghtaling, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, following his
open guilty plea to flight to avoid apprehension, recklessly endangering
another person (“REAP”), evading arrest, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
October 10, 2024, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the
aforementioned charges. On December 12, 2024, the court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of 30 to 72 months’ imprisonment. On
December 19, 2024, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion requesting ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5126, 2705, 5104.2(a), and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively. J-S21016-25
reconsideration of his sentence because the sentence is “in the high end of
the standard range.” (See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 12/1/24,
at 1). On December 20, 2024, the court denied Appellant’s motion. On
January 15, 2025, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and, that same
day, the court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal. On January 28, 2025, Appellant timely complied.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing [Appellant] to a total aggregate sentence of thirty (30) months to seventy-two (72) months of incarceration.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration without a hearing.
(Appellant’s Brief at 6).
In Appellant’s issues combined, he argues that the court erred and
abused its discretion by sentencing him in the high end of the standard range
for the three most serious charges, which the court imposed consecutively.
According to Appellant, his sentence reflects the “absolute highest range of
the standard range,” and he asserts that such a sentence was excessive and
unreasonable. (Id. at 12). Appellant further complains that the court erred
by denying his post-sentence motion without a hearing. As presented,
Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (considering challenge to
imposition of consecutive sentences as claim involving discretionary aspects
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of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary
aspects of sentencing).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910
(Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing
issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise
statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of
the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571
Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an
appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any
challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging
-3- J-S21016-25
on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264,
129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc)) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830
A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when
the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13.
Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose [a] sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion does not raise a substantial question. In fact, this Court has recognized the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.
Austin, supra at 808 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, a claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as to
the appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the
sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at
624. Bald allegations of excessiveness, however, do not raise a substantial
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question to warrant appellate review. Id. at 435, 812 A.2d at 627.
Instantly, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and included in his
brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. In his post-sentence motion, Appellant
argued that the court erred in sentencing him in the “high end of the standard
range.” (See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 12/1/24, at 1).
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J-S21016-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : IAN CHARLES HOUGHTALING : : Appellant : No. 175 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000339-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2025
Appellant, Ian Charles Houghtaling, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, following his
open guilty plea to flight to avoid apprehension, recklessly endangering
another person (“REAP”), evading arrest, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
October 10, 2024, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the
aforementioned charges. On December 12, 2024, the court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate term of 30 to 72 months’ imprisonment. On
December 19, 2024, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion requesting ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5126, 2705, 5104.2(a), and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), respectively. J-S21016-25
reconsideration of his sentence because the sentence is “in the high end of
the standard range.” (See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 12/1/24,
at 1). On December 20, 2024, the court denied Appellant’s motion. On
January 15, 2025, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and, that same
day, the court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal. On January 28, 2025, Appellant timely complied.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing [Appellant] to a total aggregate sentence of thirty (30) months to seventy-two (72) months of incarceration.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration without a hearing.
(Appellant’s Brief at 6).
In Appellant’s issues combined, he argues that the court erred and
abused its discretion by sentencing him in the high end of the standard range
for the three most serious charges, which the court imposed consecutively.
According to Appellant, his sentence reflects the “absolute highest range of
the standard range,” and he asserts that such a sentence was excessive and
unreasonable. (Id. at 12). Appellant further complains that the court erred
by denying his post-sentence motion without a hearing. As presented,
Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (considering challenge to
imposition of consecutive sentences as claim involving discretionary aspects
-2- J-S21016-25
of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary
aspects of sentencing).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910
(Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing
issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise
statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of
the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571
Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an
appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any
challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging
-3- J-S21016-25
on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Commonwealth v.
Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264,
129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc)) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830
A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when
the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13.
Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to impose [a] sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge to the exercise of this discretion does not raise a substantial question. In fact, this Court has recognized the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.
Austin, supra at 808 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, a claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as to
the appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the
sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at
624. Bald allegations of excessiveness, however, do not raise a substantial
-4- J-S21016-25
question to warrant appellate review. Id. at 435, 812 A.2d at 627.
Instantly, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and included in his
brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. In his post-sentence motion, Appellant
argued that the court erred in sentencing him in the “high end of the standard
range.” (See Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 12/1/24, at 1).
Appellant did not expressly challenge the court’s imposition of consecutive
sentences for some of the crimes at issue either in his post-sentence motion
or at the sentencing hearing. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the imposition of
consecutive sentences is waived. See Evans, supra. Even if properly
preserved, Appellant’s challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences
does not raise a substantial question warranting our review. See Mouzon,
supra; Austin, supra.
Likewise, Appellant’s bald excessiveness challenge as raised in his post-
sentence motion does not raise a substantial question for our review. See
Mouzon, supra.2 On the grounds alleged, Appellant has failed to invoke this
Court’s jurisdiction to review his sentencing claims. See id.; Evans, supra.
Based on the above, the court did not err in declining to hold a hearing on
Appellant’s post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(2)(b) (stating
____________________________________________
2 Although Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 662, 980 A.2d 605 (2009) in support of his argument, that case is easily distinguishable. In Dodge, the court imposed what amounted to a de facto life sentence for non-violent offenses. See id. at 1202. Here, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 30 to 72 months’ imprisonment for multiple offenses, with eligibility for drug treatment services.
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trial court shall determine whether hearing or argument on post-sentence
motion is required); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Comment (stating there is no
requirement that oral argument be heard on every post-sentence motion).
Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/21/2025
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