J-A18025-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ALEX HATCHETT : : Appellant : No. 1678 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001129-2021
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED JULY 18, 2025
Alex Hatchett (“Hatchett”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (“trial court”)
following his open guilty plea to one count each of third-degree murder and
carrying a firearm by a prohibited person.1 Hatchett challenges the denial of
his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the discretionary
aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
On September 7, 2019, police officers responded to a shooting at South
52nd Street in Philadelphia, where they found Nasir Jackson (“Jackson”)
suffering from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest. Jackson was transferred
to a hospital, where he was later pronounced dead.
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 6105(a)(1). J-A18025-25
Police obtained video surveillance footage from surrounding businesses.
They observed the shooter exit a silver 2019 Nissan Altima and enter a corner
store. Upon exiting the store, the shooter pulled a firearm from his waistband
and shot Jackson. The footage showed the shooter returning to the Nissan
Altima, which police determined was an Enterprise rental car. They
subsequently established that Hatchett had rented the car the morning of the
shooting and returned it approximately twenty-five minutes after the
shooting. Police arrested Hatchett and the Commonwealth charged him with
numerous crimes.
Thereafter, Hatchett engaged in plea negotiations with the
Commonwealth. Hatchett agreed to enter a guilty plea to third-degree murder
and carrying a firearm by a prohibited person in exchange for the dismissal of
his remaining charges in the instant case. The parties also agreed that the
Commonwealth would not recommend an aggregate sentence of more than
thirty to sixty years in prison.2 The trial court accepted the plea and deferred
sentencing.
2 Notably, at the time of the discussions, Hatchett had an additional open murder case pending against him. The Commonwealth offered three plea options to resolve both cases: (1) a guilty plea to two counts of third-degree murder, and an agreement to aggregate the sentence to thirty to sixty years in prison; (2) a guilty plea to two counts of third-degree murder without any agreement as to sentence, but the Commonwealth would agree not to pursue life imprisonment; and (3) a guilty plea in the instant case and proceeding to trial in the additional murder case. Hatchett pled nolo contendere in the other murder case, but subsequently withdrew the plea.
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On June 13, 2023, prior to sentencing, Hatchett filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea in the instant case. After holding a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion. On March 1, 2024, the trial court sentenced Hatchett
to twenty to forty years’ incarceration for third degree murder, and a
consecutive term of ten to twenty years’ incarceration for carrying a firearm
by a prohibited person.
Hatchett filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
Hatchett filed the instant timely appeal.
On appeal, Hatchett presents three questions for our review:
1. Whether the court erred when it denied [Hatchett’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
2. Whether the court’s imposition of maximum and consecutive sentences for third[-]degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon was an abuse of discretion that does not consider [Hatchett’s] mitigating circumstances?
3. Whether the court’s sentence was an exercise of discretion for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as the court gave greater weight to victim impact testimony than to [Hatchett’s] individual characteristics and rehabilitative needs?
Hatchett’s Brief at vii (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Presentence Motion to Withdraw Plea
Hatchett contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 3-6.
Hatchett claims that he sought to raise defenses of misidentification and
failure to establish a motive, which he contends are fair and just reasons to
grant withdrawal of his plea. Id. at 3. He argues that the police did not
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identify the person who rented the vehicle or returned it, he was renting cars
from a car share and subletting them to third parties for cash, an investigating
officer identified another person as the shooter from video footage, and he
has no connection to Jackson to establish motive. Id. at 3-5.
We review a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d
35, 39 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1187
(Pa. Super. 2017). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (“At any time before the
imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion
of the defendant, … the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and
the substitution of a plea of not guilty[.]”). “An abuse of discretion is not a
mere error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice,
manifest unreasonableness and/or misapplication of law. By contrast, a
proper exercise of discretion conforms to the law and is based on the facts of
record.” Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Regarding the review required of a presentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea, we have explained:
“[T]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom, and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.” [Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019)] (quoting Commonwealth v. Widmer, [] 744 A.2d 745, 753 ([Pa.] 2000)). The trial court must be mindful that the law requires trial courts to grant presentence plea withdrawal motions liberally and make
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credibility determinations supported by the record. Id. “The trial courts in exercising their discretion must recognize that before judgment, the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that surround the right to trial – perhaps the most devastating waiver possible under our constitution.” [Islas, 156 A.3d at 1188] (quoting Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 262 (Pa. Super. 2013)[]). Finally, this Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we must discern whether the trial court acted within its permissible discretion. Norton, 201 A.3d at 121.
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2022).
There are several considerations that factor into a decision on a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea:
(1) there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; (2) trial courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will be granted; (3) such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the accused; and (4) any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.
Norton, 201 A.3d at 116 (quoting Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115
A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015)) (quotation marks omitted).
A fair and just reason exists where the defendant makes claim of innocence that is at least plausible. Stated more broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. Trial courts have discretion to assess the plausibility of claims of innocence.
Garcia, 280 A.3d at 1023 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The “fair-and-just reason” determination for the presentence withdrawal
of a guilty plea must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Norton, 201
A.3d at 122 n.7. “[W]e are not creating any per se rules regarding what
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constitutes a fair and just reason[.] … Rather, when ruling on a presentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a court should carefully exercise its
discretion in accordance with the law.” Id.
Our review of the record reveals the following. In his presentence
motion to withdraw, Hatchett stated that he “feels he has a good defense of
mistaken identity as to the charges,” and wished to proceed to trial. Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 6/13/2023, at 1 (unnumbered). In the memorandum
of law in support of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Hatchett
supplemented his misidentification defense by claiming that the surveillance
cameras were unable to show who took or returned the rental car.
Memorandum of Law, 8/3/2023, at 2 (unnumbered). Additionally, Hatchett
noted that he was making money by renting cars and then subletting them to
people for cash. Id. at 3 (unnumbered). Finally, Hatchett also claimed that
there was no motive for the killing and that there was no connection between
Hatchett and the victim. Id. at 4 (unnumbered).
At the hearing regarding his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Hatchett
failed to claim that he was innocent. In contrast to his pleadings, Hatchett
indicated he was attempting to plead a justification defense. N.T., 8/4/2023,
at 30 (stating “the Nasir Jackson case is the one that I was trying to go
justifiable with”). Instead, Hatchett stated that he was claiming innocence in
his other murder case. Id. Hatchett also attempted to claim that he was
under duress by his family to plead guilty. Id. at 29-30.
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The trial court found that Hatchett failed to establish a fair and just
reason to withdraw his plea. Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/2024, at 4. The trial
court noted that Hatchett did not declare his innocence but instead presented
conflicting defenses—justification and misidentification—he would have raised
at trial. Id. at 4-5. The trial court noted Hatchett would have known about a
justification defense at the time he pled guilty. Id. at 4. The trial court also
pointed out that the Commonwealth had plenty of evidence to rebut a
misidentification defense. Id. at 5. Finally, the trial court found that the
record does not support Hatchett’s claim that he was coerced into pleading
guilty. Id. at 5.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that
none of Hatchett’s proffered reasons established a fair and just reason to
withdraw his plea. Hatchett baldly provides conflicting defenses he would
have raised at trial, without evidentiary support. See Norton, 201 A.3d at
120 (stating bare assertions of innocence do not compel a trial court to grant
a presentence motion to withdraw). In fact, the record is devoid of any
assertion by Hatchett of his actual innocence. Pointedly, during the guilty plea
colloquy, Hatchett accepted the factual basis of the plea. N.T., 4/14/2023, at
41-46; Written Plea Colloquy, 4/14/2023, at 2. Hatchett explicitly stated, “I
agree to that, those things happened.” N.T., 4/14/2023, at 46; see also id.
(where the trial court asked Hatchett if he was pleading guilty because he was
in fact guilty of the charges, and Hatchett responded “[y]es”). Moreover,
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Hatchett acknowledged that by pleading guilty, he was “giving up the right to
defend my case.” Written Plea Colloquy, 4/14/2023, at 7.
Hatchett also confirmed in both his oral and written colloquies that he
was not being coerced and that he was pleading guilty of his own free will.
N.T., 4/14/2023, at 48-49; Written Plea Colloquy, 4/14/2023, at 2; see also
Motion to Withdraw Plea, date, at 1 (unnumbered) (conceding that his plea in
open court was “made freely and voluntarily, with no coercion, threats or
promises, and that [Hatchett] admitted that he wished to plead guilty”). The
law is clear that Hatchett is bound by his statements made during the plea
colloquy. See Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480 (Pa. Super.
2018).
Thus, the record plainly supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Hatchett presented insufficient reasons for it to grant his requests to withdraw
his guilty plea.3 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hatchett’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea, and
his first claim is without merit.
Discretionary Aspects of Sentencing
3 Because Hatchett failed to present a fair and just reason for withdrawing his
plea, we need not consider whether the withdrawal of the guilty plea would have substantially prejudiced the Commonwealth. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1293 n.9 (declining to address prejudice to Commonwealth because defendant failed to assert a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea).
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Hatchett’s final two claims challenge the discretionary aspects of his
sentence.4 “A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be
considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to pursue such a
claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 311 A.3d 12, 18 (Pa.
Super. 2024) (citation omitted). To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, an
appellant must satisfy a four-part test:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (2) the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), and (4) the appellant raises a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 312 A.3d 366, 376-77 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation
and brackets omitted). A substantial question is determined on a case-by-
case basis and exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McCain, 176
A.3d 236, 240 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Here, Hatchett preserved his claim in a post-sentence motion and timely
appealed to this Court. Further, Hatchett’s brief contains a Rule 2119(f)
concise statement wherein he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
4 We note that when a defendant enters an open guilty plea, he may challenge
the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 A.3d 970, 972 (Pa. Super. 2020).
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in imposing an excessive sentence without considering his mitigating
circumstances. This raises a substantial question for our review. See
Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating
that an “excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the
court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”)
Our standard of review when a defendant raises a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of sentencing is well established:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 350 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). Further, we conduct our review mindful of the following directives
by our General Assembly:
(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
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(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court.
(d) Review of record.--In reviewing the record the appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)-(d). If the trial court was presented with a presentence
investigation report, “it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate
sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so
informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Miller,
275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted); see also Rhoades,
8 A.3d at 919 (“where the sentencing court had the benefit of a pre[]sentence
investigation report, we can assume the sentencing court was aware of
relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors”) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
Hatchett argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an
excessive sentence. Hatchett’s Brief at 6. Hatchett states that the imposition
of consecutive sentences was punitive, especially given the failure to consider
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his mitigating factors. Id. at 7. Hatchett highlights that he faced significant
adversity in his young life, as his father passed away when he was seven and
his mother was an addict, who was unable to care for her children. Id. at 8.
Hatchett also described an incident where he broke his kneecap while riding a
bike and was prescribed Percocet pills for recovery, and he contends that this
is what started his drug addiction. Id. Further, he describes losing many
loved ones to violence throughout his life. Id. at 8-9. Hatchett also contends
that the trial court exhibited bias because it gave greater weight to the victim
impact testimony rather than considering his individual characteristics and
rehabilitative needs. Id. at 8-9. Finally, Hatchett points out that he had no
documented history of violence before the instant case, and that all his prior
arrests were solely drug related. Id. at 9.
The record reflects that when imposing Hatchett’s sentence, the trial
court considered his prior record score, the presentence investigation report,
a mitigation report, and letters from Hatchett’s family and friends. N.T.,
3/1/2024, at 4-5, 26. Further, the trial court considered his rehabilitative
needs and everything presented during the history of the case. Id. at 25, 27-
28. The court weighed these factors against the circumstances of the crime
and the danger it posed to the public. Id. at 26, 28 (noting that eleven bullets
were fired at a defenseless person in a “brazen assassination” on a public
street).
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The trial court also noted the impact on the community, stating that
“this kind of outrageous firing of a gun on a public street in an attempt to
assassinate somebody, 11 rounds on a public street, is exactly the kind of
conduct that is the most difficult that the City of Philadelphia has to deal with.”
Id. at 27. The trial court further stated that it had “grave concerns about the
public given the brazen assassination that occurred in this case, the
overwhelming evidence of [Hatchett’s] guilt, and his unwillingness to accept
responsibility.” Id. at 26. Finally, the trial court indicated that Hatchett had
shown “no remorse whatsoever” and that it would consider all these factors in
its sentencing decision. Id. at 27.
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that Hatchett’s sentence for
possession of a firearm by a prohibited person was a departure from the
sentencing guidelines, but stated it considered two aggravating factors in its
decision: Hatchett’s behavior during the hearing and the conduct displayed in
this case. Id. at 28. The trial court highlighted “outrageous comments made
by [Hatchett]” at the hearing, and indicated Hatchett had a “lack of regard”
and “complete contempt” for the law. 5 Id. at 26, 29. The court stated that it
“take[s] those into account and consider[s] them also to be factors that justify
a departure above the guidelines.” Id. at 29. Likewise, the trial court stated
5 During the sentencing hearing, Hatchett asked if he was in a probate court
and attempted to appoint the trial court judge as a trustee to his estate. N.T., 3/1/2024, at 24-25.
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that it ordered the sentences to run consecutively “to demonstrate the
magnitude of this offense, the outrageousness of [Hatchett’s] conduct, and
[Hatchett’s] outrageous performance here during this sentencing hearing.”
Id. at 30.
We find no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
when sentencing Hatchett. The trial court considered the mitigating factors
Hatchett claims it ignored. See N.T., 3/1/2024, at 4-5, 26; Trial Court
Opinion, 9/6/2024, at 8 (noting it “explicitly took into account the mitigation
report submitted by the defense”); see also Rhoades, 8 A.3d at 919.
Further, the trial court indicated that in fashioning the sentence, it considered
everything presented during the history of Hatchett’s case, as well as the
sentencing guidelines and statutory factors. Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/2024, at
7. The trial court also noted the aggravated circumstances. Id. at 8. The
trial court was well within its discretion to determine that the risk Hatchett
presented to the public at large outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
See Baker 311 A.3d at 19 (noting that “the weight accorded to the mitigating
factors of aggravating factors presented to the sentencing court is within the
court’s exclusive domain”). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Date: 7/18/2025
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