J-S79037-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : AARON GILL : : Appellant : No. 3654 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 24, 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010593-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 19, 2017
Appellant, Aaron Gill, appeals from the judgments of sentence entered
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following the revocation
of his probation. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On November 4, 2010, [Appellant] entered into a negotiated guilty plea in CP-51-CR-0010593-2010 to (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent Bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv) and (ii) Criminal Conspiracy in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). [Appellant] was sentenced to eleven and a half (11½) to twenty three (23) months’ confinement, and one (1) year of probation, with immediate parole. On June 14, 2012 [Appellant] entered into a non−negotiated guilty plea in MC-51-CR-0050330-2011, to Possessing an Offensive Weapon in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 908(a). [This] offense took place while on this [c]out’s probation. At a subsequent Violation of Probation “VOP”) hearing, this [c]ourt found [Appellant] to be in violation of J-S79037-17
its probation and sentenced [Appellant] to a new eight (8) years of probation [at 10593-2010]. On July 6, 2013, [Appellant] was again arrested while on this [c]ourt’s probation, and on June 7, 2016, [Appellant] was found guilty of: (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent Bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv); (ii) Possession of a Firearm Prohibited in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1); (iii) Theft by Unlawful Taking of Movable Property in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a); (iv) Possessing Instruments of a Crime in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a); and (v) Simple Assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a). The Honorable Judge Scott O'Keefe in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced [Appellant] to serve a total term of incarceration of two and a half (2½) to five (5) years, followed by five (5) years of probation. Following a VOP hearing on October 24, 2016, this [c]ourt found [Appellant] to be in violation of its probation, revoked [Appellant’s] probation, and sentenced him to a term of four (4) to eight (8) years of incarceration in [10593-2010] to be served consecutively to the two and a half (2½) to five (5) years imposed by Judge O'Keefe. On October 28, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of VOP Sentence. On November 23, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On January 3, 2017, this [c]ourt issued an order directing [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 23, 2017, [Appellant] filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal alleging that this [c]ourt erred by imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive and unreasonable under Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code and was disproportionate to the conduct at issue. (Trial Court Opinion, filed April 10, 2017, at (1-2).
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WAS NOT THE SENTENCE OF FOUR TO EIGHT YEARS
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INCARCERATION FOR [APPELLANT]’S PROBATION VIOLATION EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues his sentence following revocation is manifestly
excessive and too severe. Appellant concedes his recent conduct deserves a
punitive sanction, but it was simply insufficient to warrant an eight-year
sentence for a second violation, especially when that new sentence runs
consecutive to a previously imposed sentence. Appellant claims his
probation violation is unquestionably a serious matter, and he received an
appropriate punishment for his new offense. Appellant asserts the additional
four to eight years’ incarceration for the revocation sentence, however, is
grossly disproportionate and inconsistent with the protection of the public,
the gravity of the underlying offense and his rehabilitative needs. Appellant
submits the court was certainly entitled to sentence Appellant for his
probation violation, but it imposed a grossly excessive sentence that was
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.1 Appellant concludes, this Court
should vacate and remand for a more appropriate and reasonable revocation
sentence in accordance with the sentencing code of this Commonwealth. As
argued, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim
____________________________________________
1 Appellant preserved his issue in his post-sentence motion for reconsideration, filed October 28, 2016.
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that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of
sentencing).
When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is
limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the
judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1031, 1033-34 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(en banc) (explaining appellate review of revocation sentence includes
discretionary sentencing challenges). Challenges to the discretionary
aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to
reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). Objections to the discretionary
aspects of sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the
sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence imposed at
that hearing. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super.
2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003). “This failure
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cannot be cured by submitting the challenge in a Rule 1925(b) statement.”
Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 275, (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 580 Pa. 695, 860 A.2d 122 (2004).
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a
separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial
question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002);
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an appellant separately set forth
the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal furthers the purpose evident
in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial
court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing
decision to exceptional cases.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103,
112 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 745, 964 A.2d 895 (2009),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009).
A substantial question exists “only when the appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)
inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Sierra,
supra at 913. A claim of excessiveness can raise a substantial question as
to the appropriateness of a sentence under the Sentencing Code, even if the
sentence is within the statutory limits. Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at
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624. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247 (Pa.Super.
2006) (stating defendant raised substantial question with respect to claim
that revocation sentence was excessive in light of underlying technical
probation violations). An allegation that the sentencing court failed to
consider a specific mitigating factor, however, generally does not raise a
substantial question. Commonwealth v. Berry, 785 A.2d 994 (Pa.Super.
2001) (holding claim that sentencing court ignored appellant’s rehabilitative
needs failed to raise substantial question).
“In general, the imposition of sentence following the revocation of
probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, which,
absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321 (Pa.Super. 2006). Following the
revocation of probation, the court may impose a sentence of total
confinement if any of the following conditions exist: the defendant has been
convicted of another crime; the conduct of the defendant indicates it is likely
he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or, such a sentence is
essential to vindicate the authority of the court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9771(c). The Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed
following a revocation of probation. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893
A.2d 735 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 588 Pa. 788, 906 A.2d 1196
(2006). “[U]pon sentencing following a revocation of probation, the trial
court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed
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originally at the time of the probationary sentence.” Commonwealth v.
Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa.Super. 2001).
Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general
principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). “[T]he
court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time
of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a
lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence….”
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475 (2010). Rather, “the record as a whole
must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts of the crime
and character of the offender.” Id.
After a thorough of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable
law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Rayford A. Means, we
conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. In its opinion, the trial court
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the question presented.
(See Trial Court Opinion at 1-7) (finding: in 2010, Appellant was originally
convicted of robbery and criminal conspiracy; robbery and conspiracy
offenses both carried maximum sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment;
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court’s recent resentence of 4-8 years’ imprisonment is within statutory
limits; since Appellant’s original conviction in 2010, he has further engaged
in unlawful behavior and was convicted of new, more serious offenses;
Appellant’s continued criminal conduct and progression toward more violent
offenses indicates lenient sentence would fail to ensure Appellant received
rehabilitation he needs; while on probation, Appellant participated in another
robbery, brandished gun, and severely beat victim; Appellant’s commission
of increasingly violent offenses while on probation shows he is danger to
community; confinement is necessary to vindicate authority of revocation
court and protect public; before imposing new sentence, revocation court
considered need to protect public, gravity of Appellant’s conduct, and
Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; court considered ample information
concerning Appellant’s background; Appellant has been on revocation court’s
probation since 2010; revocation court is aware of unique facts of
Appellant’s case; court’s familiarity with Appellant’s past criminal conduct
and progression of criminal behavior rendered court sufficiently informed;
court’s sentence reflects unique nature of Appellant’s character,
rehabilitative needs, and probation violations). The record supports the
courts rationale. Therefore, Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary
aspects of his sentence merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 12/19/2017
-9- Circulated 11/30/2017 03:29 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA COUNTY FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-:51-CR-0010593-2010 Fl LED v. APR 10 20� 3654 EDA 2016 Criminal Appeals Unit First Judicial District of PA AARON GILL
MEANS,J. April 7, 2017
OPINION CP-!11-CR-0010593-2010 Comm. v. GWI, Aaron Opinion
HISTORY II lI IIIIIII II I IIIII II II 7931183401
On November 4th, 2010, Aaron Gill, Defendant, entered into a negotiated guilty plea in CP-
51-CR-0010593-2010 to (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat oflmminent Bodily Injury in violation
of 18 Pa. C.S. § 3701 §§ (a)(l)(iv) and (ii) Criminal Conspiracy in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 903
§§ (a)(l). Defendant was sentenced to eleven and a half (11 �) to twenty three (23) months
confinement, and one (1) year of probation, with immediate parole. Dkt. CP-51-CR-0010593-
2010, at 4.
On June 141h, 2012 the Defendant entered into a non-negotiated guilty plea in MC-51-CR-
0050330-2011, to (i) Possessing an Offensive Weapon in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 908 §§ (a).
These offenses took place while on this Court's probation. At a subsequent Violation of Probation
("VOP") hearing, this Court found Defendant to be in violation of its probation and sentenced
Defendant to a new eight (8) years of probation. Dkt. CP-51-CR-0010593-2010, at 2.
1 On July 6th, 2013, Defendant was again arrested while on this Court's probation, and on
June 7t11, 2016, the Defendant was found guilty of: (i) Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent
Bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701 §§ (a)(l )(iv); (ii) Possession of a Firearm Prohibited
in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §6105 §§ (a)(l); (iii) Theft by Unlawful Taking of Movable Property in
violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §3921 §§ (a); (iv) Possessing Instruments of a Crime in violation of 18
Pa.C.S. § 907 §§ (a); and (v) Simple Assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701 §§ (a). The
Honorable Judge Scott O'Keefe in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced the
Defendant to serve a total term of incarceration of two and a half (2 Y2) to five (5) years, followed
by five (5) years of probation. Dkt. C P-51-CR-009451-2013, at 1·2.
Following a VOP hearing on October 24th, 2016, this Court found Defendant to be in
violation of its probation, revoked Defendant's probation, and sentenced him to a term of four (4)
to eight (8) years of incarceration in CP-51-CR-0010593-2010 to be served consecutively to the
two and a half (2 Yi) to five (5) years imposed by Judge O'Keefe: N.T. 10/24/2016, at 5:14-21.
On October 28th, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of VOP Sentence.
Def.'s Motion for Reconsideration of VOP Sentence. On November 23rd, 2016, the Defendant
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Def.'s Notice of Appeal. On
January 3rd, 2017 this Court issued an order directing the Defendant to file a Concise Statement of
Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 23rd, 2017 Defendant
filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal alleging that this Court erred by
imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive' and unreasonable under Section 9721 of the
sentencing code and was disproportionate to the conduct at issue. Def.'s Stmnt. of Errors
Complained of on Appeal.
2 I. LEGAL ISSUES
Because this case involves a Violation of Probation, the only grounds for appeal are that:
(i) the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose a sentence, or (ii) that the sentence imposed was illegal
or excessive. Commonwealth v. Infante, 585 Pa. 408, 419, 888 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. 2005) (holding
that "the scope of review in an appeal following a sentence imposed after probation revocation is
limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the legality of the sentence imposed
following revocation").
A. Jurisdiction
It is clear that this Court had jurisdiction to impose a sentence upon the Defendant. The
original charges were felony matters, which occurred in the City of Philadelphia, and were tried
before a duly elected judge. The subsequent Violations of Probation also occurred in the city of
Philadelphia. Dkt. .CP-51-CR-0025523.;2010. Therefore, lack- of jurisdiction cannot serve as
grounds for appeal in this matter. See generally, Commonwealth v. Bethea, 574 Pa. 100, 828 A.2d
1066 (2003).
B. Legality ofSentencing
The imposition of sentence following the revocation of probation "is vested within the
sound discretion of the trial court, which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed
on appeal." Commonwealth v. Smith, 669 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996); see also
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013). A sentencing court has not
· abused its discretion "unless the record· discloses that · the judgment exercised was manifestly
3 unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will." Commonwealth v. Smith, 673
A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996); see also Commonwealth v. Wallace, 870 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2005).
In sentencing the Defendant, a trial Court is required to "consider the general principles
and standards of the Sentencing Code." Commonwealth v. Russell, 460 A.2d 316, 322 (Pa. Super.
1983); Commonwealth v. Forbes, No. 3671.EDA 2015, 2017 WL 87144 (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10,
2017). Section 9721 expresses these general principles in the following manner:
the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
42 Pa.C.S. A. § 9721(b). In addition, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(c) permits the trial court to impose a
sentence of total confinement in order to vindicate its authority.
Upon revocation of probation, a sentencing court possesses the same sentencing options that it
had at the time of initial sentencing. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(b); Rg. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 441
A.2d 1218 (Pa.,1982); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 870 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2005). The trial court may
impose total confinement if one of three conditions is met:
1. defendant has been convicted of another crime; n. the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or iii. such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.
42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(c).
In the instant case, Defendant was originally convicted in CP-51-CR�OOI0593�2010 of (i)
Robbery by Inflicting Threat of Imminent bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701 §§
4 (a)(l)(iv) and (ii) Criminal Conspiracy of Engaging in Robbery by Inflicting Threat oflmminent
bodily Injury in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 §§ (a)(l). Under the Robbery provision, any person
who " inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear
of immediate bodily injury" is "guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced
to imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) years, or to pay a fine not exceeding twenty five thousand
dollars ($25,000), or both ... " Id.; and 18 Pa.C.S. § 1101 (2), 1103. The charge of Conspiracy is of
the same grade and degree as the underlying Robbery offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 905. As such, this
Court's sentence of four (4) to eight (8) years of confinement falls within the statutory limits.
The facts are clear that since his original conviction, Defendant engaged in further unlawful
behavior and was convicted of new, and more serious, offenses. Defendant's continued
involvement with criminal activity and his progression toward more violent offenses shows that a
more lenient sentence would fail to ensure that Defendant receives the rehabilitative programming
he needs. Commonwealth v. Forbes, No. 3671 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 87144 (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10,
2017). While on probation for CP-51-CR-0010593-2010, Defendant participated in another
robbery, this time brandishing a gun. N.T. 10/24/2016, at 3:14-17. Defendant chased the victim
"into a library and beat him to a pulp, and then went through his pockets and robbed him." N.T.
10/24/2016. at 3: 11- 14. This Court is deeply unsettled by the fact that Defendant's criminal
conduct has escalated to include deadly weapons. The fact that the Defendant has been wholly
unable to behave within the confines of the law, and that he committed new, increasingly violent
offenses, while on probation, evidences that he is a danger to the community and that a period of
confinement is necessary both to vindicate the authority of this Court and to protect the public.
Before imposing a sentence of total confinement, this Court carefully considered the need to
5 protect the public, the gravity of the Defendant's conduct and its potential impact of the
community, and the Defendant's rehabilitative needs. Id.
Although this Court's comments a sentencing were brief, it's clear from the record that this
Court received and considered ample information regarding Defendant's background.
Section 9721 (b) directs the trial court to consider certain factors and place the reason for its sentence on the record, Our Supreme Court recently held, following revocation, a sentencing court need not undertake lengthy discourse regarding its punishment or specifically mention the statutes in question.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 28 (Pa. 2014)).
Our case law requires the sentencing court [be] informed of comprehensive information to
make the punishment fit not only the crime but also the person who committed it. Commonwealth
v. Carillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 726 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here, Defendant has been on this Court's
probation since 2010. This Court is sufficiently aware of the unique facts of the case, as Defendant
has appeared for multiple violations of probation for matters involving violent conduct with deadly
weapons, during that time formulated an individually tailored punishment within the statutory
maximum. This Court's familiarity with Defendant's past criminal conduct and the progression of
his criminal behavior rendered the Court sufficiently informed such that its sentence reflected the
unique nature of the Defendant's character and his direct probation violations. Commonwealth v.
Forbes, No. 3671 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 87144 (Pa. Super. Ct Jan 10, 2017).
Accordingly, because this Court imposed a sentence within the statutory maximum and
considered Defendant's background, rehabilitative needs, and new offenses, it did not impose an
illegal or excessive sentence.
6 II. CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasons, the judgment of this Court should not be disturbed.
BY THE COURT:
�{/.� MEANS, J