DOYLE, Judge.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County sustaining Nicholas Elko’s (Licensee’s) appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.
On March 3, 1991, Licensee was stopped by Officer Theodore Dixon at approximately 5:06 a.m. after that officer initially observed Licensee’s vehicle proceeding east on 12th Street in McKeesport without benefit of headlights. Licensee acknowledged he had previously been drinking, and Officer Dixon smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Licensee’s breath and person. The officer administered field sobriety tests, noticed Licensee had a problem standing, and then placed him under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Officer Dixon testified that he read the implied consent warnings to Licensee and that these warnings included the explanation that chemical testing does not trigger entitlement either to an attorney or to remain silent, because those rights exist in a criminal case and do not pertain to the chemical test for blood-alcohol content. Officer L. Johnson, who assisted Officer Dixon at the scene, confirmed Dixon’s testimony that he read Licensee the implied consent warnings.
Licensee testified that he could not recall Officer Dixon reading to him from a “chemical testing warning card,” although he does remember the officer requesting him to submit to a blood-alcohol test and stating that if he did not do so his operating privilege would be suspended for one year. Licensee further testified that he asked to make a telephone call at the scene, but Officer Dixon disputes this.
Both Officer Dixon and Licensee stated that, at the scene, Licensee first agreed to submit to chemical testing before changing his mind. Licensee, however, decided to refuse [27]*27testing upon his arrival at the hospital allegedly after being denied the chance to make a telephone call.1 Thereafter, he was taken to the police station where Officer Dixon allowed him a telephone call. Licensee contacted his brother, “A.J.,” who arrived at the station approximately fifteen minutes later.
Licensee testified that, after consultation with “A.J.,” he consented to take a breathalyzer test. Officer Dixon testified he never offered Licensee the option of taking the breathalyzer; instead, he requested only chemical testing of Licensee’s blood and urine.2
The common pleas court found that, after Licensee was arrested, he was requested “to submit to chemical testing and was informed of his constitutional rights.” As the Department argues, however, there is no evidence in the record to establish that Licensee was made cognizant of his constitutional rights under Miranda.3 Rather, there was only Officer Dixon’s testimony, corroborated by the testimony of Officer Johnson, that Dixon read Licensee the implied consent warnings before Licensee consented and then refused to have his blood and urine tested. These warnings included the explanation that Licensee’s constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent did not pertain to the chemical test for alcohol. The common pleas court’s finding that Licensee was informed of his constitutional rights was, therefore, inaccurate.
Because Licensee was not given the Miranda warnings, this case is not one involving the kind of per se confusion which took place in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989). See [28]*28Department of Transportation v. McGarvey, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 358, 583 A.2d 39 (1990). Nonetheless, this court has held that where:
a licensee requests to speak to an attorney, or anyone else, prior to taking a chemical test, even though Miranda warnings have not been given it is incumbent upon the police to inform the licensee that he or she does not have the right to consult with an attorney, or anyone else, and that a citizen’s constitutional rights, although applicable to the criminal charges, do not apply under the implied consent law.
Id. at 364, 583 A.2d at 42. See also Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45-46 (1992), dismissed as having been improvidently granted, 531 Pa. 450, 613 A.2d 1203 (1992).
The sole issue we must consider is whether the common pleas court erred as a matter of law in sustaining Licensee’s appeal on the grounds that he was confused regarding his right to counsel.
Officer Dixon testified that he read Licensee the following warnings and explanation:
No. 1, please be advised that you are now under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance pursuant to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of your blood and urine, whichever type the officer chooses.
It is my duty as a police officer to inform you that your operating privilege will be suspended for one year if you refuse to submit to this chemical test.
I must also inform you that your constitutional rights as a defendant in a criminal case do not apply to the taking of a chemical test, and therefore you do not have a right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the chemical test or to have an attorney or anyone else present while you take the chemical test. Nor do you have a right [29]*29to remain silent when asked to take a chemical test, (emphasis added)
(N.T. p. 8).
We hold that this warning is adequate to meet the guidelines enunciated by this Court in the recently decided case of Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sorg, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 82, 606 A.2d 1270 (1992) petition for allowance of appeal denied, 531 Pa. 657, 613 A.2d 561 (1992). In Sorg, we articulated guidelines to be covered in statements by the police in situations where no Miranda warnings are given, but where there is, nevertheless, an overt manifestation of confusion by the licensee. We did not, however, mandate that there must be a verbatim recitation of the information set forth in Sorg, only that certain subject matter should be covered.
Sorg indicates that the police should tell a licensee who overtly manifests confusion over his constitutional rights:
1. That the right to counsel is a constitutional right and applies only to criminal proceedings, not to civil proceedings.
2. That the request to submit to chemical testing is not a criminal proceeding, that it is a civil proceeding, but the licensee’s refusal to submit to the testing may be introduced in evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
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DOYLE, Judge.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County sustaining Nicholas Elko’s (Licensee’s) appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.
On March 3, 1991, Licensee was stopped by Officer Theodore Dixon at approximately 5:06 a.m. after that officer initially observed Licensee’s vehicle proceeding east on 12th Street in McKeesport without benefit of headlights. Licensee acknowledged he had previously been drinking, and Officer Dixon smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Licensee’s breath and person. The officer administered field sobriety tests, noticed Licensee had a problem standing, and then placed him under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Officer Dixon testified that he read the implied consent warnings to Licensee and that these warnings included the explanation that chemical testing does not trigger entitlement either to an attorney or to remain silent, because those rights exist in a criminal case and do not pertain to the chemical test for blood-alcohol content. Officer L. Johnson, who assisted Officer Dixon at the scene, confirmed Dixon’s testimony that he read Licensee the implied consent warnings.
Licensee testified that he could not recall Officer Dixon reading to him from a “chemical testing warning card,” although he does remember the officer requesting him to submit to a blood-alcohol test and stating that if he did not do so his operating privilege would be suspended for one year. Licensee further testified that he asked to make a telephone call at the scene, but Officer Dixon disputes this.
Both Officer Dixon and Licensee stated that, at the scene, Licensee first agreed to submit to chemical testing before changing his mind. Licensee, however, decided to refuse [27]*27testing upon his arrival at the hospital allegedly after being denied the chance to make a telephone call.1 Thereafter, he was taken to the police station where Officer Dixon allowed him a telephone call. Licensee contacted his brother, “A.J.,” who arrived at the station approximately fifteen minutes later.
Licensee testified that, after consultation with “A.J.,” he consented to take a breathalyzer test. Officer Dixon testified he never offered Licensee the option of taking the breathalyzer; instead, he requested only chemical testing of Licensee’s blood and urine.2
The common pleas court found that, after Licensee was arrested, he was requested “to submit to chemical testing and was informed of his constitutional rights.” As the Department argues, however, there is no evidence in the record to establish that Licensee was made cognizant of his constitutional rights under Miranda.3 Rather, there was only Officer Dixon’s testimony, corroborated by the testimony of Officer Johnson, that Dixon read Licensee the implied consent warnings before Licensee consented and then refused to have his blood and urine tested. These warnings included the explanation that Licensee’s constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent did not pertain to the chemical test for alcohol. The common pleas court’s finding that Licensee was informed of his constitutional rights was, therefore, inaccurate.
Because Licensee was not given the Miranda warnings, this case is not one involving the kind of per se confusion which took place in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989). See [28]*28Department of Transportation v. McGarvey, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 358, 583 A.2d 39 (1990). Nonetheless, this court has held that where:
a licensee requests to speak to an attorney, or anyone else, prior to taking a chemical test, even though Miranda warnings have not been given it is incumbent upon the police to inform the licensee that he or she does not have the right to consult with an attorney, or anyone else, and that a citizen’s constitutional rights, although applicable to the criminal charges, do not apply under the implied consent law.
Id. at 364, 583 A.2d at 42. See also Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45-46 (1992), dismissed as having been improvidently granted, 531 Pa. 450, 613 A.2d 1203 (1992).
The sole issue we must consider is whether the common pleas court erred as a matter of law in sustaining Licensee’s appeal on the grounds that he was confused regarding his right to counsel.
Officer Dixon testified that he read Licensee the following warnings and explanation:
No. 1, please be advised that you are now under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance pursuant to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of your blood and urine, whichever type the officer chooses.
It is my duty as a police officer to inform you that your operating privilege will be suspended for one year if you refuse to submit to this chemical test.
I must also inform you that your constitutional rights as a defendant in a criminal case do not apply to the taking of a chemical test, and therefore you do not have a right to consult with an attorney or anyone else prior to taking the chemical test or to have an attorney or anyone else present while you take the chemical test. Nor do you have a right [29]*29to remain silent when asked to take a chemical test, (emphasis added)
(N.T. p. 8).
We hold that this warning is adequate to meet the guidelines enunciated by this Court in the recently decided case of Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sorg, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 82, 606 A.2d 1270 (1992) petition for allowance of appeal denied, 531 Pa. 657, 613 A.2d 561 (1992). In Sorg, we articulated guidelines to be covered in statements by the police in situations where no Miranda warnings are given, but where there is, nevertheless, an overt manifestation of confusion by the licensee. We did not, however, mandate that there must be a verbatim recitation of the information set forth in Sorg, only that certain subject matter should be covered.
Sorg indicates that the police should tell a licensee who overtly manifests confusion over his constitutional rights:
1. That the right to counsel is a constitutional right and applies only to criminal proceedings, not to civil proceedings.
2. That the request to submit to chemical testing is not a criminal proceeding, that it is a civil proceeding, but the licensee’s refusal to submit to the testing may be introduced in evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
3. That the licensee does not have a right to contact an attorney or anyone else before taking the test nor does he have the right to remain silent as to the testing procedures; that is, licensee must affirmatively agree to submit to the chemical testing.
Id. at 91, 606 A.2d at 1275 (footnote omitted).
When we compare the warnings and explanation given in this case with the warnings and explanation in Sorg, the only missing elements are the omission by Officer Dixon of the words “civil proceeding” and of a statement that Licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may be introduced in evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
[30]*30With respect to the absence of the term “civil proceeding,” Licensee was told that his “constitutional rights as a defendant in a criminal case do not apply to the taking of a chemical test.” Therefore, by implication, the information that the chemical test was civil rather than criminal in nature was communicated, and, we repeat, rote adherence to the language in Sorg is unnecessary.
We turn now to the absence of any statement from Officer Dixon that Licensee’s refusal to take the chemical test could be introduced in a subsequent criminal proceeding. In Sorg, we attempted to make definitive guidelines for the police and set forth an appropriate all-inclusive set of statements which the police could follow to make certain the licensee is provided with information enabling him to make a knowing and conscious refusal. We did this so that a licensee is not prejudiced by a lack of knowledge in either the possible civil proceeding for revocation of a license or the possible criminal proceeding. Sorg provides a guide, but the necessity for the statement that a refusal will be admissible in a criminal proceeding is certainly more relevant to an attack on the validity of a criminal proceeding than it is to the issue of a license revocation. We conclude, therefore, that the inclusion of such a statement, while advisable, is not essential to a knowledgeable decision on whether to submit to a chemical test and may even be an inaccurate statement of the law, or at least an incomplete explanation of the law. See Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152, 615 A.2d 308 (1992) where the Supreme Court held that the chemical tests authorized by Section 1547(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code4 violate the Fourth [31]*31Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when the results are offered as evidence in a criminal trial. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Commonwealth v. Danforth, 530 Pa. 327, 608 A.2d 1044 (1992), a civil appeal concerning the sufficiency of the implied consent warning where Miranda rights were given, did not even suggest, let alone hold, that such information was necessary for a proper implied consent warning.
Having concluded that Licensee’s warning concerning the absence of a right to consult with counsel was in accordance with the law, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is reversed.
ORDER
NOW, April 13, 1993, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.