Columbus Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harris

127 F.2d 38, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3799
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 10, 1942
DocketNo. 9076
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 127 F.2d 38 (Columbus Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Columbus Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Harris, 127 F.2d 38, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3799 (6th Cir. 1942).

Opinion

HICKS, Circuit Judge.

As its name implies, the Columbus Outdoor Advertising Company (herein called the Columbus Company) was engaged in outdoor display advertising. Its capitalization was 200 shares of common stock owned by four shareholders, as follows: Thomas L. Kaplin, of record, 67 shares; Thomas L. Kaplin, beneficially, 64 shares; Wilbur Richard Ortman, 40 shares; Lillian R. Hood, 15 shares; Frank Mitchell, 14 shares.

Following negotiations with Ortman, the Vice-President and Secretary of the Columbus Company, Kaplin, a man of large experience and some financial means, purchased his stock in the Columbus Company about 1935 and became its President and General Manager. In the latter part of December 1936, Kaplin bought for $37,500 the entire capital stock, 250 shares, of the H. W. Gantner Company (herein called the Gantner Company), a competing concern.

On February 1, 1940, Kaplin gave to appellee, Emanuel J. Harris, an option, in writing, to purchase not less than 25 nor more than 50 shares of the stock of the Gantner Company, the option to be exercised at any time before January 2, 1941. The consideration for the option was Harris’s agreement to give Kaplin two shares of the common stock of the Collingwood Realty Company (herein called the Collingwood Company) for each share of the Gantner Company which Harris should elect to acquire, and to perform legal services for Kaplin of the reasonable value of not more than $200.

In December, 1940, Harris, having performed the legal service required of him by the option, orally and in writing notified Kaplin that he would exercise his option to acquire 50 shares of the Gantner Company stock and tendered to Kaplin 100 shares of the Collingwood Company stock, and demanded of Kaplin that he deliver a proper certificate for 50 shares of the Gantner Company

Kaplin admitted the execution of the option but did not deliver the certificate for the 50 shares of the Gantner Company stock. He claimed that he was unable to do so because the Columbus Company, through Ortman and Hood, who constituted a majority of its board of directors, had set up a claim to all the Gantner Company stock, and that Ortman and Hatzo, [40]*40who constituted a majority of the board of the Gantner Company, would not transfer the certificates on the Gantner Company stock book from Kaplin to Harris. This adverse claim was based on the contention .that Kaplin had bought all of the Gantner Company stock for the Columbus Company and was holding it in his name, constructively at least, as trustee for the Columbus Company.

Confronted with this situation, Harris, the appellee, filed his bill against Kaplin for specific performance and sought to restrain Kaplin from transferring the optioned shares to any other person and to restrain the Gantner Company, the Columbus Company, Hood, and Ortman, who was Vice-President and Secretary of the Columbus Company, and also Secretary of Gantner Company, and Hatzo, who was Assistant Secretary of the Gantner Company, from in any way attempting to cancel the certificate of stock in the Gantner Company held by Kaplin and from setting up any claim thereto in any other court or cause.

The bill also sought a decree specifically ordering the Gantner Company and Ortman, as its Secretary, to transfer and issue to Harris a certificate for the optioned stock and to cause the books and records of the Gantner Company to show that Harris was the record owner and holder thereof.

On application of appellee, the court granted a restraining order. A full hearing was had upon the motion of appellee for a temporary injunction and at its conclusion the parties stipulated that the case should be submitted upon its merits upon the record then made.

The court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree sustaining the bill and granting the relief sought. Hence this appeal by the Columbus Company, the Gantner Company, Ortman, Hood and Hatzo. Kaplin did not appeal.

We think the decree was correct.

There, are three contentions presented by appellants, — first, that appellee’s suit was not brought in good faith; second, that the court, sitting in equity, has no jurisdiction; and third, that Kaplin, being an officer and director of the Columbus Company, was precluded from purchasing for himself the stock of the Gantner Company, and that his purchase must be regarded, under the doctrine of constructive trusts, as having been made for the Columbus Company.

The first proposition is based upon the fact, (1) that Harris and Kaplin married sisters; and (2) that they and their wives were stockholders in the Collingwood Company. We think that the relationship between Harris and Kaplin created no more than an ill-founded suspicion that Harris brought his suit in bad faith.

The attack upon the equity jurisdiction of the court is without merit. Appellee had no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. As between appellee and Kaplin, it is extremely doubtful whether appellee could have been pecuniarily compensated in a suit at law for Kaplin’s breach. The Gantner Company stock was not listed on any exchange, it had no market value and was not for sale, and there was no substantial basis upon which damages could be computed. See Hyer v. Richmond Trac. Co., 168 U.S. 471, 483, 18 S.Ct. 114, 42 L.Ed. 547; Mutual Oil Co. v. Hills, 9 Cir., 248 F. 257, 260; Goodisson v. North American Sec. Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 178 N.E. 29. It is obvious that as between appellee and all other parties he had no remedy except in equity. The machinery of the law was not designed either to remove the cloud upon appellee’s title caused by the claim of the Columbus Company, or to compel the Gantner Company to transfer the optioned stock to him. Mechanics’ Bank v. Seton, 1 Pet. 299, 26 U.S. 299, 304, 7 L.Ed. 152; Hubbard v. Bank of United States, Fed.Cas. page 777, No. 6,815.

We think the finding of the District Court, that the purchase by Kaplin of the Gantner Company stock was made for himself in good faith and not in derogation of his fiduciary relationship to the Columbus Company and its stockholders, is sustained by the evidence.

There are in the record copies of the minutes of three meetings of the board of directors of the Columbus Company. The first was held on December 4, 1936, at which all directors,- Kaplin, Ortman and Hood, were present. According to the-minutes, this meeting was especially called “for the purpose of discussing the purchase of the Gantner Company by Mr. Kaplin.” The minutes continue as follows:

“Mr. Kaplin explained in detail his purchase arrangement and also explained in order for him to conclude the purchase of [41]*41The H. W. Gantner Company it will be necessary that The Columbus Outdoor Advertising Company take a five year lease on the Gantner property on South High Street at a monthly rental of $150.00. Mr. Kaplin reports that an inspection of the property shows that it is well suited for our purpose and is a reasonable rental for the premises.
“Mr. Ortman made a motion to approve this, which motion was seconded by Mrs. Hood, and unanimously carried.
“There being no further business, motion was duly made and seconded and unanimously carried that the directors’ meeting be adjourned.

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Bluebook (online)
127 F.2d 38, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 3799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbus-outdoor-advertising-co-v-harris-ca6-1942.