Teller v. Tonopah & G. R. R.

155 F. 482, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5270
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
DecidedAugust 30, 1907
DocketNo. 17
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 155 F. 482 (Teller v. Tonopah & G. R. R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Teller v. Tonopah & G. R. R., 155 F. 482, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5270 (circtedpa 1907).

Opinion

ARCHBARD, District Judge

(specially assigned). This is a bill to prevent the consummation by the defendant company, of which the complainant is a stockholder, of a projected agreement, by which it is proposed to guarantee the bonds of the Goldfield & Bullfrog Railroad to the amount of $1,250,000, in exchange for 51 per: cent.- of the capital stock of that company, of the face value of $637,500. The charge is that the bargain is an unfair one, having been brought about by the directors of the defendant company with a syndicate of which they are members, formed to promote the construction of the railroad, the imputation being that they have taken advantage of their, official position to favor themselves and their associates personally.- ' .The defendant company’s railroad runs from a-point on the .-Southern Pacific [483]*483Railroad, about 100 miles, through Tonopah to Goldfield, both in the state of Nevada, the part to the one place having first been built, and then the part to the other as an independent matter, and the two amalgamated ; and the road about which there is this controversy is an extension of 79 miles beyond the end of the existing line to the newly developed mining region, bearing the euphonious name of Bullfrog, which has recently come into prominence. The complainant holds 22% shares of stock (7 preferred and 15% common, together of the par value of $2,240) out of a total of 21,500 shares, and stands alone in his opposition to the agreement, which was ratified by the rest of the stockholders at a meeting of the company, although it is said that one or two others while not joining in the suit are in sympathy with it. But, notwithstanding this disparity, he is entitled to maintain the bill on his own account, if he is right with regard to the subject of it. Neither does it matter that he was offered an interest in the first syndicate proposed, which he declined, and subsequently wanted to get into the present one, after which he began these proceedings; although it cannot be said to inspire confidence in the good faith of them. Nor is it to prejudice him that there was a previous bill by which, upon much the same grounds, he opposed and undertook to prevent the consolidation of the original railroad to Tonopah with the extension to Goldfield, which he now acknowledges was imperative, and has proved immensely profitable; the exchange of stock for bonds which he forced —the one paying 17 per cent, and upwards, and the other 6 — discrediting his efforts if not suggesting an undue inclination to litigate.

The position of the complainant is that the Bullfrog extension was so manifestly a paying proposition from the start, and so absolutely necessary to the business of the company, that the directors should either have seen to it that the company built the road itself, instead of lending its credit to others to do so, or if that was not practicable, and it was to be built by a syndicate in which the directors were interested, that the company should get all the stock instead of merely a half of it, the enterprise being financed upon the company’s guaranty. The facts are not exactly so, to say nothing of the use made of them. But that is not material. The ability of the company to build on its own account is asserted on the strength of the large returns received from the operation of its road, and the $350,000 of bonds in its treasury expressly reserved for the acquisition of new and additional property out of the issue authorized to take up those of the underlying companies. The credit of the company also, it is claimed, if effective for the benefit of others, was equally available in its own behalf; in which connection it is pointed out that the members of the syndicate have only been called on to pay 25 per cent, of their subscriptions, the rest of the money to build — some $600,000 — having been obtained on the syndicate agreement without more. The complainant is even inclined to think that, if for any reason it could not raise the money on its own obligations, the directors who are men of large means should have got it for the company on their personal credit. These are somewhat novel ideas — some of them — but they are not necessarily to be rejected upon that ground. Upon examination, however, they will be found to be altogether untenable, both legally and financially.

[484]*484It: is not necessary to take much time over the suggestion that there was any duty on the part of the directors to raise money .for the company personally. There might be exigencies, when they would see fit to do so, but they were not bound to. And as to the financing of the project, in the interest of the company, outside of this, the fact is, as appears from the evidence, that a number of financial institutions were approached in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, in the effort to do so, but without success. No one indeed could be expected to advance money on the mere project to build, particularly in a new and undeveloped mining region of uncertain stability, such ^ as Bullfrog then was. It is possible that the $350,000 of treasury bonds were available and could have been marketed. But the road cost nearly a million dollars, and called for cash, and the balance could hardly have been made up out of income. Nor was a second mortgage to be thought of, the company being already heavily bonded. Besides that, the stockholders were opposed to using the money of the company to build the extension, if they did not actually vote against it. The only thing left was a friendly syndicate, such as was formed, and the case is thus brought down to the fairness of the arrangement proposed to be made with it.

The exact proposition to the company was that the syndicate would build and equip at their own cost and expense the extension from Goldfield to Bullfrog, a distance of 79 miles, according to the location and survey which had been adopted, making it equal in all respects to the road operated by the defendant company; and when so completed, equipped, and paid for, without any liens or incumbrances, excepting a first mortgage for $1,250,000 to secure 6 per cent. 15-year bonds, and capital stock of the same amount, all of which stock and bonds were to be acquired by the syndicate, thereupon, upon the company undertaking to guarantee the bonds, the syndicate agreed to turn over 51 per cent, of the stock, reserving to themselves the benefit of the balance. Or, in other words, without any risk except the contingent liability which it assumed by its guaranty — the road being all built and paid for — for the mere loan of its name the company was to get stock of the face value of $637,500, putting it in control, the guaranty simply enabling the syndicate to float the bonds and get back the money which they had put into the enterprise, with whatever profits there might be above that. Looking at it practically, the fairness of this seems hardly open to question.

The complainant does not object, if a syndicate is the only alternative, to the general arrangement which is so outlined. He recognizes that it would be disastrous if the extension to Bullfrog is not secured and incorporated into the company’s railroad system, and that a guaranty of the bonds may be necessary to get this. But he wants all the stock in exchange, and not simply a part of it. He seems to think that not only the directors, but their associates, can be made to take all the risk and forego ány of the benefits, and that he and his fellow stockholders, who have advanced nothing, and assumed no responsibility, are entitled to all of them, and this, upon the principle that a trustee can take no advantage to himself out of his position. There is no question of the principle, but it is not ap

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Bluebook (online)
155 F. 482, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 5270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/teller-v-tonopah-g-r-r-circtedpa-1907.