IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Coltin D. Herzog, FILED Appellant-Defendant Aug 07 2026, 9:18 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
August 7, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-3168 Appeal from the DeKalb Superior Court The Honorable Patrick L. Jessup, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 17D02-2405-MR-000002
Opinion by Judge Felix Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 1 of 17 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] During an arranged drug buy, minors Blake Boese and T.J. stole a bag of drugs
from Coltin Herzog’s minor brother Grayson Aronen, so Herzog chased after
the teens to recover the bag and stabbed Boese, killing him. Herzog was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to 28 years of incarceration.
Herzog now appeals and raises three issues for our review:
1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Herzog’s claim of self-defense; 2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in identifying mitigating factors; and 3. Whether Herzog’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [3] In May 2024, Herzog was on criminal probation in two separate causes for
burglary as a Level 4 felony and robbery as a Level 5 felony. On May 23, 17-
year-old T.J. messaged 16-year-old Aronen about buying drugs from him.
Herzog agreed to drive Aronen to meet T.J. to sell him the drugs at an address
located in “the trailer court,” 710 Janie Street in Auburn, Indiana. Ex. Vol. I at
103.
[4] At approximately 1:37 p.m., Herzog and Aronen arrived at the arranged
meeting location, and Aronen messaged T.J. that he had arrived. T.J. and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 2 of 17 Boese met Herzog and Aronen at Herzog’s vehicle and “hopped in,” Tr. Vol.
III at 196, to discuss the purchase. Boese was carrying an unloaded handgun in
his pocket. During the discussion, Herzog drove to the end of the street and
turned around before parking. After T.J. “noticed [he] didn’t have [his] wallet,”
Tr. Vol. III at 199, he and Boese exited the vehicle and walked “half of a
football field” away, id. at 210, where Boese gave T.J. the handgun.
[5] When Boese and T.J. returned to Aronen’s side of the vehicle, Boese “reached
through the [front passenger-side] window, and he tried to take” Aronen’s blue
bag of drugs, Tr. Vol. III at 200, which he had across his chest and “around his
neck,” id. at 201. After a struggle, the bag ripped, and Boese (who had the blue
bag in his hand) and T.J. “took off running . . . around the car.” Id. at 203.
During the struggle, Herzog, in an attempt to drive away, shifted the vehicle
into neutral, and it began to roll forward. However, Herzog “los[t] interest in
trying to drive away,” removed his knife from the center console, Tr. Vol. IV at
223, and chased Boese and T.J. when they ran away with the bag.
[6] Herzog caught up to Boese and T.J. when they stopped between rows of
trailers, and he swung his knife at T.J. without striking him. Boese started
running again, splitting up with T.J. At approximately 1:51 p.m., T.J. returned
to Boese’s trailer alone.
[7] Meanwhile, Boese ran north between the trailers toward 1108 Irene Street.
When Boese reached 1108 Irene Street, he “pound[ed] on the door” and yelled
for help, saying he had been stabbed. Tr. Vol. II at 213. When resident Alyssa
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 3 of 17 Bolen opened the door, she “saw two guys standing there. One guy was . . .
pretty much right by the door up on the porch, and then there was another one
at the bottom of the steps,” id., approximately “four, five, six feet from” Boese
and holding a blue bag, id. at 214. Bolen closed the door to ask another resident
for help, and when Kylie Desantie came out from her bedroom, Bolen reopened
the door and saw “the guy that was down on the ground take off running in a
different direction.” Id. at 216. Boese was bleeding heavily, and he told Bolen
he was stabbed by “Preston” and “wanted his mom.” Id. at 217. Bolen called
911 while Desantie began assisting Boese. Desantie “knew [Boese] was going
to die as soon” as she saw him. Id. at 234. “Blood [was] pumping out of”
Boese. Id. “He was panicked[,] scared[,] freaking out[,] super out of breath,”
id., and “[b]egging for his mom,” id. at 238. Boese told Desantie he had been
stabbed and then “just kind of fell in on top of” her. Id. at 234. After they fell,
Desantie looked toward the street and saw someone wearing a camouflage shirt
“messing with” a blue bag and running away. Id. at 235.
[8] Despite first responders’ efforts, Boese died from his injury on the sidewalk in
front of 1108 Irene Street. Boese’s mother walked up shortly thereafter and saw
him “dead, laying on the ground.” Tr. Vol. III at 56.
[9] After Herzog ran away from 1108 Irene Street with the recovered blue bag of
drugs, he returned to his vehicle where Aronen was waiting. Herzog drove
Aronen to Aronen’s friend N.N.’s house; gave Aronen “the bag, the knife,” and
Herzog’s bloody shorts; and “told [Aronen] to get rid of them.” Tr. Vol. IV at
207.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 4 of 17 [10] At N.N.’s house, Aronen was carrying a white bag with some drugs and told
N.N. and N.N.’s stepfather that “someone got robbed” in the “trailer park,” Tr.
Vol. III at 40, and that “they stabbed someone in the shoulder,” id. at 41. After
Aronen left, N.N. “checked [his] trash can,” id. at 50, and found “a bloody bag,
a bloody knife . . . THC, that white bag that [Aronen] left with, and bloody
shorts,” id. at 51. N.N. showed the items to his stepfather, who then took them
to “the trailer park” to find a law enforcement officer. Id. at 42.
[11] During the course of their investigation, law enforcement officers learned that
Aronen, Herzog, and Preston were brothers. Officers went to Herzog’s
residence to execute a search warrant. In the washing machine, officers found a
camouflage shirt “consistent with the description [they had] of the suspect[’s]
clothing.” Tr. Vol. III at 17. Both Herzog’s and Boese’s DNA were on the
shirt. The autopsy revealed that Boese sustained a stab wound to his chest that
penetrated his left upper lung, causing his lung to collapse.
[12] The State charged Herzog with murder. 1, 2 At trial, Bolen identified Herzog as
the person she saw at the bottom of the stairs. T.J. testified that he did not
remove the gun from his pocket after Boese gave it to him at any time during
his interactions with Herzog. T.J. also testified to many of the facts as stated
1 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). 2 In Cause 17D01-2502-MR-000001, the State charged Aronen with murder, assisting a criminal as a Level 5 felony, and obstruction of justice as a Level 6 felony. Aronen pled guilty to assisting a criminal as a Level 5 felony, and the other two charges were dismissed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 5 of 17 above. Herzog argued that he acted in self-defense. In support, Herzog
testified that he stabbed Boese at his vehicle when Boese moved toward him
with a gun in his hand. When Herzog stabbed Boese, Boese dropped the gun,
and T.J. picked it up, then T.J. and Boese ran away together before splitting up.
Seeing that T.J. and Boese split up, Herzog decided to chase after Boese who
was running away—despite the stab wound to his chest—with the bag of drugs.
Herzog saw Boese stop at 1108 Irene Street without the bag, so he looked for
the bag and found it under a vehicle parked at that address. Herzog did not call
911 to report the robbery or stabbing. Herzog admitted to taking his shirt off
and putting it into his washing machine at his residence.
[13] The jury found Herzog guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a Level 2 felony, a
lesser-included offense of murder, thereby rejecting his self-defense claim. The
trial court sentenced Herzog to 28 years executed at the Indiana Department of
Correction (“DOC”). This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision 1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut Herzog’s Self- Defense Claim
[14] Herzog challenges the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his claim of self-
defense. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence
rebutting the defendant’s self-defense claim, “the standard of review remains
the same as for any sufficiency of the evidence claim.” Turner v. State, 253
N.E.3d 526, 533 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind.
1999)). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 6 of 17 “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Hancz- Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].
Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the
evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226
N.E.3d at 783).
[15] “Self-defense is a legal justification for what would otherwise be criminal
conduct,” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 534 (citing Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670
(Ind. 2021)), and is “a complete bar to conviction,” id. (citing Hill v. State, 497
N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind. 1986)). “Once the defendant invokes self-defense, the
State has the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one element
of the justification.” Id. (citing Hill, 497 N.E.2d at 1064).
[16] Indiana’s self-defense statute provides that a “person is justified in using
reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person
from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful
force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). If a person “reasonably believes that [deadly]
force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person
or the commission of a forcible felony,” then the person “is justified in using
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 7 of 17 deadly force” and “does not have a duty to retreat.” Id. Importantly, to assert
self-defense, the person must have been “in a place where he had a right to be”
and must have “acted without fault.” Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541 (quoting
Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670). “A person who provokes, instigates, or participates
willingly in the violence does not act without fault for the purposes of self-
defense.” Id. (quoting Richardson v. State, 79 N.E.3d 958, 964 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017), trans. denied).
[17] Herzog contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut all
three elements of his self-defense claim. Assuming arguendo that Herzog
demonstrated all three elements to claim self-defense, he has not established
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut at least one of those
elements.
[18] Herzog’s arguments on appeal are essentially requests for us to credit Herzog’s
version of the events over the version presented by the State’s witnesses.
Herzog’s opportunity to make such an argument occurred during trial. On
appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility; instead,
we consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d
at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). For instance, Herzog argues that
he “did not provoke, instigate, or participate in the violence” because he
“attempted to leave the scene in his vehicle” and was merely responding to
Boese’s “actions and violence.” Appellant’s Br. at 16–17. The probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Boese did
not have the handgun when he and T.J. stole the drugs from Aronen, and T.J.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 8 of 17 never pulled it out of his pocket or aimed it at Herzog. After Boese and T.J. ran
away with the drugs, Herzog could have driven away, but he “los[t] interest” in
doing so and chased after them, Tr. Vol. IV at 223. Herzog’s decision to chase
the two minors shows a lack of fear and an initiation of violence that
culminated with his stabbing Boese. Herzog then asked Aronen to dispose of
evidence and never reported the incident to law enforcement. A reasonable
jury could conclude that Herzog was angry about the robbery, chased after
Boese and stabbed him to recover the stolen bag of drugs, and had Aronen
dispose of evidence. See Orozco v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1038, 1041–42 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020) (concluding defendant’s flight and disposal of murder weapon
supported jury’s rejection of self-defense claim), trans. denied. Considering only
the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict, the
State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Herzog’s claim that he acted
without fault. See Turner, 253 N.E.3d at 541.
[19] Although Herzog offered a different version of events during his testimony, the
jury was free to disbelieve his self-serving testimony that he stabbed Boese near
his vehicle when Boese came toward him with the handgun. See Norris v. Norris,
275 N.E.3d 505, 511 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146,
1149 (Ind. 2004)). The jury heard this testimony and clearly rejected it. Based
on the foregoing, we cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
rebut Herzog’s claim of self-defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 9 of 17 2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Identifying Mitigating Factors
[20] Herzog contends the trial court abused its discretion by not identifying certain
mitigating factors at sentencing. Our Supreme Court has explained the
standard of review for such a claim as follows:
We review a sentencing court’s decision about whether to find a mitigating factor for an abuse of discretion. Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838–39 (Ind. 1999). “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 838. Sentencing courts are “under no duty to deem mitigating every factor” advanced “simply because it [was] supported by some evidence in the record.” Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 952 (Ind. 1994). And “the sentencing judge is not obligated to explain why [they have] chosen not to make a finding of mitigation . . . . Moreover, the [sentencing] court is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant’s evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 847–48 (Ind. 2024) (alterations in original), cert.
denied.
[21] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found three aggravating factors: (1)
Herzog’s “history of criminal delinquent behavior,” Tr. Vol. V at 101; (2)
Herzog had violated probation in two other causes by committing the instant
offense; and (3) Herzog knowingly committed a crime of violence in the
presence of a minor who was not a victim of the offense. The trial court found
two mitigating factors: (1) Herzog was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 10 of 17 disorder; and (2) Herzog acted under strong provocation in committing the
offense. In weighing the mitigating value of Herzog’s acting under strong
provocation, the trial court considered that Herzog also benefited from the jury
verdict itself finding him not guilty of murder. Id. The trial court concluded the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.
[22] On appeal, Herzog asserts the trial court failed to consider or put enough
“emphasis” on the following ten circumstances he believes to be mitigators: (1)
he had autism, (2) he “had a poor childhood filled with abuse,” (3) he had
PTSD, (4) he “was a victim of a robbery,” (5) the “crime was unlikely to
reoccur,” (6) “the victim of the crime induced or facilitated the same,” (7)
“there was strong evidence presented as to Herzog’s self-defense claim,” (8) he
“acted under strong provocation,” (9) he was willing to pay restitution, and (10)
he accepted responsibility. 3 Appellant’s Br. at 22 (citing Tr. Vol. V at 76–151).
[23] First, Herzog misrepresents the record. The trial court expressly found that
Herzog’s PTSD was a mitigating factor and afforded it “some weight.” Tr. Vol.
V at 101. The trial court also found that Herzog acted under strong provocation
and that the additional proffered mitigating factors “roll[ed] up all under those
3 In support of this argument, Herzog attempts to cite to the whole sentencing hearing, see Appellant’s Br. at 22 (citing Tr. Vol. V at 76–151); however, he does not specifically direct our attention to any portion of the transcript where he presented these purported mitigating factors for the trial court’s consideration. Moreover, Volume V of the transcript ends at page 106, so Herzog cites to 45 pages that do not exist. We remind counsel that this court will not search the record to find a basis for a party’s argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 11 of 17 same facts, and [found] them within that same mitigator,” which it afforded
“little weight.” Id. We therefore cannot agree that the trial court “blatantly
ignor[ed] these obvious mitigating factors,” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Second, it is
not a viable appealable issue to claim that the trial court did not give enough
weight to a proposed mitigator. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491
(Ind. 2007).
[24] Additionally, Herzog does not argue that the evidence supporting his ten
allegedly mitigating factors is significant or clearly supported by the record.
Appellant’s Br. at 22. Herzog thus fails to support his challenge with cogent
reasoning, as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See Russell, 234 N.E.3d at
847 (citing Carter, 711 N.E.2d at 838–39). Based on the record and briefing
before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in identifying
mitigating factors.
3. Herzog’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
[25] Finally, Herzog argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)
and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to
independently review and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Tillett v.
State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 366 (Ind. 2026) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). That
authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to
revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,” we
conclude “that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” Id. (quoting App. R. 7(B)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 12 of 17 [26] The defendant bears the burden of producing compelling evidence that “his or
her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Tillett, 278
N.E.3d at 366 (alteration omitted) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073,
1080 (Ind. 2006)). A defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’” that the sentence
is inappropriate based on both the nature of his offense and his character, Lane v.
State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis in original) (quoting Connor v.
State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), but “to the extent the evidence
on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be
all the stronger to justify relief,” id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).
[27] Whether a sentence is inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
other factors that come to light in a given case.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366
(quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)). “We generally
defer to the trial court’s decision,” id. (citing Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
876 (Ind. 2012)), but “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators
found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). “Our role
is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ which means we exercise our authority only in
‘exceptional cases.’” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Russell, 234 N.E.3d at
856).
[28] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without
regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 489. When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the
advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 13 of 17 Here, Herzog was convicted of and sentenced on one Level 2 felony. “A
person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen
and one-half (17 ½) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5 (emphasis added). On his Level 2
felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Herzog to 28 years executed at the
DOC.
[29] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor
we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the
offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’
offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.”
T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway
v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26,
2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint,
regard, and lack of brutality.” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting Stephenson v.
State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).
[30] Herzog and Aronen arranged to sell drugs to Boese and T.J., both of whom
were minors. When Boese and T.J. tried to steal the drugs, Herzog chased after
them with a knife and stabbed Boese in the chest. Rather than render aid to
Boese or call for help, Herzog fled with the recovered drugs and asked Aronen
to dispose of evidence for him. Herzog left Boese to die on a stranger’s
sidewalk in considerable pain and “[b]egging for his mom,” Tr. Vol. II at 238.
Boese’s mother—who suspected something was wrong after T.J. returned to her
house without Boese—walked to the marked crime scene and “saw [her] son
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 14 of 17 dead, laying on the ground.” Tr. Vol. III at 56. Nevertheless, Herzog argues
that the nature of the offense warrants revision because “he stabbed [Boese]
only one time.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Regardless of how many times Herzog
stabbed Boese, the fact remains that Herzog killed Boese and caused significant
damage to others. Nothing about the nature of the offense suggests Herzog
showed any restraint, regard, or lack of brutality.
[31] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad
consideration of a defendant’s qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing
Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on
reh’g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or
persistent examples of good character,” Tillett, 278 N.E.3d at 366 (quoting
Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).
[32] Herzog was 21 years old when he killed Boese. Herzog has two prior adult
convictions stemming from two separate causes—burglary as a Level 4 felony
and robbery as a Level 5 felony. Herzog was on probation in both causes when
he agreed to participate in a drug deal that resulted in him killing Boese. While
Herzog was incarcerated pending trial in this cause, he committed more than
ten violations in the DeKalb County Jail, including harassment and disorderly
conduct. The presentence investigation report identifies Herzog as being “in
the HIGH risk category to reoffend.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 243.
[33] Herzog argues that his familial support and mental health issues support
revising his sentence. The record shows that Herzog suffers from mental health
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 15 of 17 issues, including PTSD. However, a finding of mental illness alone does not
make a sentence inappropriate. See Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1271–
72 (Ind. 2023). We still must look at the individual’s entire character, and
Herzog’s “‘history of criminal conduct’ weighs against relief,” id. at 1272
(quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494).
[34] Based on the nature of Herzog’s offense and his character, we cannot say that
Herzog has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his
offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232
N.E.3d at 126–27.
Conclusion [35] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Herzog’s self-defense
claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in identifying mitigating
factors, and Herzog’s sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).
We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.
[36] Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Justin R. Wall Wall Legal Services Huntington, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 16 of 17 Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Brandyn L. Arnold Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3168 | August 7, 2026 Page 17 of 17