DAVID, Justice.
This case involves a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old who murdered his ten-year-old brother. Andrew Conley confessed to the crime and pleaded guilty to murdering his brother, Conner, while Conley was babysitting Conner. Following five days of sentencing testimony, including the testimony of twelve witnesses and one-hundred-and-fífty-fíve exhibits, the trial court judge sentenced Conley to life without parole. We hold that based on the age of Conley, the age of Conner, and the particularly heinous nature of the crime, a sentence of life without parole was appropriate. We hold that on the facts of this case, the sentence of life without parole is constitutional.
Facts and Procedural History
The undisputed facts are as follows. On Saturday, November 28, 2009, Conley was seventeen-and-a-half-year-old when he murdered his ten-year-old brother, Conner. The murder took place between 8:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. His mother and adoptive father were at work that evening until the early morning hours. As was not uncommon, Conley was responsible for watching Conner that evening. Conley’s mother told him he would have to find a babysitter for Conner if he wished to go out with his friends.
Conley wanted to go out that evening, so Conley drove Conner to their grandmother’s house in Rising Sun, Indiana, but she was not home. He next asked his uncle to watch Conner but was told no. After they returned home, Conley and Conner began wrestling.
[870]*870At some point, Conley got behind his brother and choked him in a headlock with his arm until Conner passed out. Conner was bleeding from the nose and mouth. Conner was still breathing. Conley drug Conner into the kitchen, retrieved a pair of gloves, and continued to choke Conner from the front, around his throat. Conley choked Conner for approximately twenty minutes total.
Conley next got a plastic bag from a drawer in the kitchen and placed it over Conner’s head. Conley used black electrical tape to secure the bag by wrapping the tape around Conner’s head. Conner was still alive. In fact, Conner’s last words were “Andrew stop.”
Conley then drug Conner’s body to the steps that lead to the basement, drug him down the steps by his feet, across the floor, and outside the home. Conley slammed Conner’s head on the concrete multiple times to ensure Conner was dead and then placed his body in the trunk of his car. Conley cleaned himself up and put on new clothes. He put the bloody clothes in his closet and hid the bloody gloves in a chair.
Conley next drove to his girlfriend’s house. While there they watched a movie, and he gave her a “promise ring.” Conley’s girlfriend testified at the sentencing hearing that Conley was “[h]appier than I’d seen him in a long time.” Conley spent two hours at his girlfriend’s house, while Conner’s body remained in the trunk of the car. After leaving his girlfriend’s house, Conley drove to an area behind the Rising Sun Middle School. Conley decided to drag Conner’s body into the woods and covered the body with sticks and vegetation.
Conley returned home during the early morning hours on Sunday the 29th when no one was home. He cleaned up the blood in the house. When his father returned home around 2:30 a.m., Conley was acting normal. Conley said that Conner was at his grandmother’s house and Conley also asked his father for some condoms.
Conley’s mother arrived home around 5:45 a.m., and Conley and his mother had popcorn, watched a movie together, and cracked jokes back and forth. His mother fell asleep. On two occasions that early morning, Conley went into his father’s bedroom and stood over him with a knife. Conley said he had the intent to kill his father, but he decided not to.
Later that same Sunday, Conley watched football with his father. Following football, Conley left home and drove to the park in Rising Sun where Conner’s body had been discarded, but he never went to the actual location. Instead, Conley spoke to two friends and told him that he had killed Conner. Thereafter, around 8:00 p.m., Conley drove his car to the Rising Sun Police Department and voluntarily reported he “accidentally killed his brother” or that he “believed” he had killed his brother.
The police contacted Conley’s parents, and after consulting with his parents and waiving his right to counsel, Conley confessed to intentionally killing his ten-year-old brother. Conley was charged with murder and ultimately pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement. The penalty phase of the trial was conducted from September 15 to 21. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Conley to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
We are confronted with four issues raised by Conley. The first issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Dr. James Daum. Dr. Daum’s testimony did not provide an opinion that Conley had any psychopathy, but [871]*871instead his testimony suggested Conley had traits of a person with such a diagnosis. The second issue is whether the trial court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. The third issue raised on appeal is whether Conley’s sentence was appropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finally, we address an issue that was first raised at oral argument,1 in which we had the parties amend their briefs to address whether the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a person under the age of eighteen who has been convicted of murder violated either the United States or Indiana Constitution.
I. Testimony of Dr. James Daum
A sentence of life without parole (LWOP) is subject to the same statutory standards and requirements as the death penalty. Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 613 (Ind.2007). Before a life-without-parole sentence can be imposed, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (2008). The trial court must determine if the State has proven the existence of an alleged aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, but also that the mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances. Id. § 35-50-2-9(1). The penalty phase of an LWOP trial requires introduction of evidence with the burden on the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1121 (Ind.2004). The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion. Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (Ind.1997). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind.2001). The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing of abuse. Goodner, 685 N.E.2d at 1060.
In the defendant’s presentation to the court, Dr. Connor testified that he diagnosed Conley as having schizoaffective disorder, the bipolar type, and a sleep disorder. Dr. James Daum was called by the State in rebuttal during the penalty phase of the trial to rebut the testimony of defendant’s expert, Dr. Connor, that Conley did not “fit the psychotic personality.” In preparation for his testimony, Dr. Daum reviewed statements by Conley, Conley’s parents, Conley’s girlfriend, and police reports. Dr. Daum also reviewed cell phone records, all of the statements Conley made to the police, and reports submitted by the three psychologists who evaluated Conley, two of which were appointed by the court, and one retained by the defendant. Dr. Daum testified Conley had evidence of psychopathy. The trial court ruled Dr. Daum was not able to testify as to his opinion whether Conley was a psychopathic personality. The specific line of questioning is as follows:
QUESTION: And are psychopathic personalities difficult to rehabilitate?
WATSON: Objection. Objection, Your Honor. I believe it’s improper for any of these folks to render opinion on rehabilitation. That’s unnecessary speculation, Your Honor, that my client (indiscernible)
COURT: Okay. That objection is sustained. And I will also note-I do not believe that this witness has rendered [872]*872an opinion of psychopathy. I believe this witness has only testified regarding characteristic thus far. Okay? Objection is sustained.
Furthermore, the trial court would later explain in announcing his sentence,
Examinations were conducted by Court appointed experts, Dr. Don Olive and Dr. George Parker, following Defendant's filing of an insanity plea. Defendant was also examined by Dr. Edward Conner, defense expert and State’s expert, Dr. James Daum did not examine the Defendant but reviewed other records and reports. Dr. Olive concluded that Defendant was suffering from a major depressive order of at least moderate severity; personality disorder, either antisocial personality or borderline personality disorder. Dr. Connor’s diagnosis is that Defendant is suffering from schizoaffective disorder — bipolar type. Dr. Parker diagnosed Defendant with depression with psychotic features. Dr. Daum indicated that Defendant exhibited some characteristics of a psychopath. Dr. Daum, however, was not able to render a specific diagnosis because he did not personally examine the Defendant. All experts agree that Defendant, Andrew Conley, understood the wrongfulness of his actions and is criminally responsible. As to Conley’s mental state at the time of the offense, Dr. Connor stated “his executive functioning was not suspended and he was able to make rational decisions.”
In Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955-956 (Ind.1994), this court held only evidence relevant to the charged statutory aggravators can be admitted and considered in capital cases so as to avoid disproportionate sentences in violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution. When a sentence of life without parole is sought, courts must limit the aggravating circumstances eligible for consideration to those specified in statute. Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Ind.2006). The only evidence relevant to the court is evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 957. We disagree with defense counsel’s characterization that the State used Dr. Daum’s testimony to speak of Conley’s future dangerousness in violation of Bivins. Dr. Daum testified only on rebuttal, for the purpose of rebutting the defense expert Dr. Connor, that defendant did not “fit the psychotic personality.” In fact, the trial court expressly stated on objection, “Counsel, I’m taking this as rebuttal of Dr. Connor.... Not this witness rendering his own opinion as to psychopathy.” Dr. Daum’s testimony was based on Conley’s preferred mitigating circumstance of his mental health.
In addition to challenging the substance of the testimony, defense counsel also challenges the relevance of Dr. Daum’s testimony. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. Again, Dr. Daum’s testimony was offered to rebut the testimony of Dr. Connor that Conley did not “fit the psychotic personality.” Rebuttal evidence “is limited to that which tends to explain, contradict, or disprove evidence offered by the adverse party.” Schwestak v. State, 674 N.E.2d 962, 964 (Ind.1996) (quoting Isaacs v. State, 659 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Ind.1995)). Defense counsel couches its argument as if Dr. Daum proffered an opinion on Conley’s psychopathy. Dr. Daum did no such thing. Dr. Daum’s testimony was limited to explaining and contradicting evidence offered by Conley relating to his mental health. We certain[873]*873ly can find no abuse of discretion on the trial court’s behalf in allowing this testimony.
Finally, we recognize that Dr. Daum’s testimony was given before the trial court and not a jury. We presume the trial judge is aware of and knows the law and considers only evidence properly before him or her in reaching a decision. Emerson v. State, 695 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind.1998). The risk of prejudice is quelled when the evidence is solely before the trial court. Id. In this case, the trial court never mentioned Dr. Daum’s testimony as a basis for repudiating any of Conley’s proffered mitigators. Furthermore, the trial court recognized that it was not permitted to consider any aggravator other than the victim’s age. Dr. Daum did not offer an opinion on Conley’s psychopathy, or future dangerousness, and the trial court did not find such to be the case. We hold the trial court exercised proper discretion in permitting Dr. Daum’s limited testimony.
II. Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Defense counsel next argues the trial court improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. When imposing a sentence of life without parole, the trial court’s sentencing statement
(i) must identify each mitigating and aggravating circumstance found,
(ii) must include the specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance,
(in) must articulate that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence, and
(iv) must set forth the trial court’s personal conclusion that the sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender and this crime.
Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 613-14 (Ind.2007) (quoting Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1122-23 (Ind.2004)). Additionally, before the trial court may impose a sentence of life without parole, “it must find that the State has proven the existence of an alleged aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt and must find that ‘any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.’ ” Id. (citing I.C. § 35-50-2-9(0(2». This Court gives “great deference to a [trial] court’s determination of the proper weight to assign to aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Id. This Court will “set aside the court’s weighing only upon the showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.” Id. The determination that a circumstance is mitigating is within the trial court’s discretion, and the trial court is not obligated to explain its reasoning. Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind.2000). The trial court is not required to give the same weight as the defendant would give to the preferred mitigating circumstances. Id.
One permissible aggravating factor is the age of the victim. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(12). An aggravating factor is the murder victim being less than twelve years of age. In this case, the State alleged as its aggravating factor Conner’s young age when he was murdered. Conley does not deny that Conner was only ten years old when he died. The legislature’s decision to include age as an aggravator reflects the legislature’s policies of both increased protection of young children and a harsher punishment for those who prey on them. Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 432-33 (Ind.1997). Because the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt one aggravating factor, and because only one aggravating factor is nec[874]*874essary, we now turn to the second prong, the issue of mitigators.
Conley raised a number of mitigating factors. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c). The trial court weighed five mitigating factors. The trial court gave some weight to four of the mitigators. The trial court gave no weight to two of the mitigators.
Conley was seventeen-and-a-half-years-old when he murdered Connor. This is a mitigating factor. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(7). The trial court gave this “some” weight, but found that he functioned in the normal range of intelligence and had an above average verbal IQ of 118. We find no abuse of discretion in the weight assigned to this mitigating circumstance. Conley was nearly eighteen years of age and functioned at a normal intelligence level.
Conley had no criminal history. This is a mitigating factor. I.C. § 35-50-9 — 2(c)(1). Again, the trial court gave this “some” weight but noted Conley admitted to smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol. We believe the trial court properly weighed this factor. See Krempetz, 872 N.E.2d 605 (Ind.2007); Losch v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (Ind.2005). In Losch, the trial court noted the defendant’s lack of any adult criminal convictions would be a substantial mitigating factor, but were properly given only minimal weight when it was taken into account that the defendant continuously used marijuana since age thirteen and stole money from his family. 834 N.E.2d at 1014. Similarly, in Krempetz, the defendant had no adult convictions, but that was discounted because of defendant’s drug use and stealing. 872 N.E.2d at 614. Again, we find no abuse of discretion in the weight assigned by the trial court. Conley’s lack of criminal history was offset by his actual criminal behavior of smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol.
The next proffered mitigator was Conley’s mental or emotional health. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2). The trial court gave limited weight to Conley’s mental or emotional disturbance when he carried out the murder. The trial court must consider several factors in determining what weight to give to evidence of mental illness. Krempetz, 872 N.E.2d at 615. The trial court must consider “(1) the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on functioning; (3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime.” Id. (citing Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678, 685 (Ind.1997)). In this case, all three doctors who testified confirmed that Conley “understood the wrongfulness of his actions and is criminally responsible.” The trial court noted inconsistencies in Conley’s statements. Conley told some doctors he suffered from hallucinations but denied that to another. Conley told Dr. Parker he used gloves during the murder because he could not handle touching Conner and placed a bag over Conner’s head to avoid looking at him. Conley told police he used gloves and the bag to. lessen fingerprints and blood.
Conley’s story was also inconsistent when he told Dr. Parker that no one knew of his suicide attempts, but Conley told Dr. Olive his parents knew. The trial court also noted Conley’s mother testified that Conley’s cuts in a claimed suicide attempt were superficial, and no electrical breakers tripped in another alleged suicide attempt of placing a space heater in a bathtub. In another example, Conley denied to all three doctors to ever being sexually molested, but the week before trial Conley told Dr. Conner he had been. We find no [875]*875abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing of this factor.
Conley also argues no weight was given to his lack of capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct. In fact, the trial court found just the opposite, that Conley indeed did have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, and thus gave no weight to the mitigator. The trial court relied, in part, on the testimony of defense expert Dr. Conner, who concluded that “at the time of the crime his executive functioning was not suspended and he was able to make rational decisions.” Krem-petz is on point in giving minimal weight to defendant’s mental condition when (1) there was no evidence defendant had an inferior intellect, (2) defendant was able to fully function on a daily basis, (3) defendant accepted full and complete responsibility for his commission of the offense of murder by entering a plea of guilty, (4) defendant self medicated with marijuana, and (5) the doctor testified that defendant was manipulative and deceptive. 872 N.E.2d at 615. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.
Finally, the statute provides for “other circumstances appropriate for consideration.” I.C. § 35 — 50—2—9(c)(8). The trial court next gave “some” weight to Conley’s cooperation with authorities, reasoning the crime would be easily discovered regardless of Conley’s confession. However, the trial court gave no weight to Conley’s remorse as a mitigating factor, finding it to be “superficial given the horrendous nature of the crime.”
Judge Humphrey gave a detailed appraisal of each mitigating circumstance as he weighed them against the sole aggravator of Conner’s youth. We find the trial court was within its sound discretion in ultimately concluding that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors. We find the trial court’s sentencing statement, spanning thirty pages, was detailed and explained its rationale for awarding weight, or affording no weight, to each and every mitigating circumstance proffered by Conley. Again, the standard of review is a manifest abuse of discretion. Covington v. State, 842 N.E.2d 345, 348 (Ind.2006). We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
It is also appropriate to discuss the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Miller v. Alabama, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. The Court’s opinion discusses “two strands of precedent reflecting our concern with proportionate punishment.” Id. at 2463. The first strand of precedent the Supreme Court refers to is the Graham and Roper line of cases, respectively providing that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for juveniles, and prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who committed nonhomicide offenses. Id. at 2458. The most fundamental take away from Graham was that “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of parole.” Id. This strand, the Supreme Court writes, is focused on the sentencer taking into account youth. “By removing youth from the balance — by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult — these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.” Id. at 2466.
The second strand of precedent references the body of law that has held mandatory death sentences violate the Eighth [876]*876Amendment. In these cases, the Supreme Court noted it was especially important that the sentencer have the opportunity to consider the “mitigating qualities of youth.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2467 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)). These two strands lead us to find that imposing a mandatory life-without-parole upon a juvenile precludes the sentencer from taking into account the defendant’s youth and various issues related to defendant’s youth, such as a “failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at 2468. The Supreme Court further wrote that they would require a sentencer “to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 2469. We hold that Judge Humphrey did just that in the present case. Finally, we note the Supreme Court mentioned Indiana as being one of fifteen jurisdictions where life without parole for juveniles was discretionary, and therefore not unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2472 n. 10.
III. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
A sentence authorized by statute can be revised where it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis is not to determine “whether another sentence is more appropriate” but rather “whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). It is not a matter of second guessing the trial court sentence. Sentence review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is very deferential to the trial court. Felder v. State, 870 N.E.2d 554, 559 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). The burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.2006).
Therefore, when reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to “leaven the outliers” rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the “correct” result. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.2008). We do not look to determine if the sentence was appropriate; instead we look to make sure the sentence was not inappropriate. King, 894 N.E.2d at 268.
The nature of the offense is a crime of unimaginable horror and brutality. While babysitting his little brother, a nearly eighteen-year-old murdered his ten-year-old brother, with his bare hands. Conley was in a position of trust over his brother. He murdered his little brother in the very place Conner should have felt the safest. Conner was choked from behind until he passed out, bleeding from the mouth and nose. Conner was still alive as Conley drug him into the kitchen, put on gloves, and for a second time choked Conner. The choking went on for approximately twenty minutes. Conner was still alive. Conley placed a bag over Conner’s head. Conner ultimately died due to this asphyxiation. Conley drug Conner’s body down a set of stairs, slamming the head on concrete to ensure Conner was dead. Conner’s dying words were “Andrew stop.”
This was a drawn out crime. Conner suffered unimaginable horror. Conley had opportunities to stop murdering his brother with his own hands. Conley had a number of opportunities to stop his actions and get medical help for Conner. Instead, he continued. This was not a nearly instantaneous death by a bullet. This was death by the hands of the person in charge of protecting Conner. The brutal nature of this crime does not move this Court to believe the sentence is inappropriate.
Defendant claims he should be given leniency due to his alleged mental illness. [877]*877Following five days of testimony and one-hundred-fifty-five exhibits, the trial court determined that Conley’s mental health was not as dire or disturbed as the defendant claimed. Instead, the evidence suggests a hardened character. Speaking with his parents following the murder of his brother, Conley went about a normal day, even asking his father for a condom. Conley seemed happy. This is in line with the doctors who testified at the trial. While Conley may have had some mental or emotional disturbance, he still retained the mental capacity to control his conduct. Conley visited with his girlfriend, even giving her a promise ring, while Conner lay dead in the trunk of the car. Conley watched football the following day. It was not until after Conley was told to go pick Conner up from his grandmother’s house, that the reality began to set in. Conley had no escape, no way of avoiding what he had done. The sentence of life without parole was appropriate in light of the defendant’s character and the nature of this offense.
IY. Constitutional Implications of LWOP for a Seventeen-Year-Old
The constitutionality of statutes is reviewed de novo. State v. Moss-Dwyer, 686 N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind.1997). Such review is “highly restrained” and “very deferential,” beginning “with [a] presumption of constitutional validity, and therefore the party challenging the statute labors under a heavy burden to show that the statute is unconstitutional.” Id. at 111-12. The United States Supreme Court has held it is cruel and unusual punishment for an individual under the age of eighteen to be sentenced to life without parole for a non-homicide crime. Graham v. Florida, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). As we mentioned above, the Supreme Court recently decided Miller v. Alabama, holding a mandatory sentencing scheme of life-without-parole for juveniles is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.2
In order to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Supreme Court “look[s] beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2021 (internal quotations omitted). “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion). The applicability of what is cruel and unusual punishment changes “as the basic mores of society change.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008).
We first note that Conley was born on May 14, 1992, and he murdered his brother on November 28, 2009. He was seventeen years, six months, and two weeks old. He pleaded guilty on September 13, 2010, and was sentenced on October 15, 2010, at the age of eighteen years and five months. Our review of other states reveals that the overwhelming majority provide for the possibility of LWOP sentences to individuals under the age of eighteen.3 These [878]*878decisions have been made by the legislature. The legislature has made a policy decision that this is what we want to do. The Eleventh Circuit has written, “the death penalty is not required to deter juveniles from committing murder because a life without parole sentence is deterrence enough, particularly for a juvenile.” Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1223 (11th Cir.2011). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that it was cruel and unusual punishment to sentence an individual under the age of eighteen to death. However, Roper recognized that life without parole was still a viable sentence for juveniles, noting the LWOP sentence was a severe enough sanction to not need the death penalty for juveniles. 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. The implication of Roper, then, is that a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of homicide is constitutional. Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1222 (11th Cir.2011). Recent opinions have been handed down by Nebraska,4 and Missouri 5 upholding as constitutional an LWOP sentence to a juvenile who commits murder under the United States Constitution and their state constitutions.
As other states have held, and we agree, defendant’s Roper and Graham analysis is flawed because “Roper expressly and Graham implicitly recognize that life without parole is not cruel and unusual punishment for a minor who is convicted of a homicide.” Missouri v. Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 376-77 (Mo.2010). As Justice Zel Fischer wrote,
In Roper, the Court responded to the argument that the possibility of the death penalty was necessary to deter minors from committing homicides by noting that the punishment of life without parole is a severe enough sanction to serve as deterrence. 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. In Graham, the Court recognized that a line existed “between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual.” 130 S.Ct. at 2027 (internal citations omitted). Defendants who commit nonhomicide offenses, therefore, are “categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murders.” Id. Even defendants who commit crimes that cause serious bodily harm to another individual cannot be compared to murders with regard to the severity and irrevocability of their crimes. Id. By illustrating the differences between all other juvenile criminals and murderers, the Court implies that it remains perfectly legitimate for a juvenile to receive a sentence of life without parole for committing murder. 130 S.Ct. at 2027. The chief justice further notes that there is “nothing inherently unconstitutional about imposing sentences of life without parole on juvenile offenders.” 130 S.Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Andrews, 329 S.W.3d at 377.
The Missouri opinion further notes that there are many cases prior to Roper and Graham that hold a life without parole sentence for a juvenile homicide offender would not violate the Eighth Amendment, and the following post-Roper cases continue to hold a life without the possibility of [879]*879parole sentence for a juvenile homicide offender continues to be constitutionally permissible: State v. Pierce, 223 Ariz. 570, 225 P.3d 1146, 1147 (Ariz.Ct.App.2010) (stating that in Roper, “[t]he [Supreme] Court expressly intimated that a natural life sentence for a juvenile who committed murder is not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual”); State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 958 A.2d 1214, 1236 (2008) (“The courts are in consensus, however, that the United States Supreme Court clearly has signaled that [a life without parole] sentence [for a juvenile offender] does not violate the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”); Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 641 (Del.2008) (concluding that “the United States Supreme Court, in Roper, would not have recognized a sentence of life without parole as an acceptable alternative to death as a punishment for juveniles who commit intentional Murder in the First Degree, if such a sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment.”). And we further underscore our analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Alabama and note it deals solely with the issue of mandatory sentencing schemes requiring life-without-parole for juveniles. In fact, as the Supreme Court specifically noted Indiana was one of fifteen states where life without parole was discretionary. As they wrote,
According to available data, only about 15% of all juvenile life-without-parole sentences come from those 15 jurisdictions, while 85% come from the 29 mandatory ones. See Tr. Of Oral Arg. In No. 10-9646, p. 19; Human Rights Watch, State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP), Oct. 2, 2009, online at http://www. hrw. org/news/2009/10/02/ state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-withut-parole (as visited June 21, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). That figure indicates that when given the choice, sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely. And contrary to The Chief Justice’s argument, see post, at 2462, n. 2, we have held that when judges and juries do not often choose to impose a sentence, it at least should not be mandatory. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295-296, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion) (relying on the infrequency with which juries imposed the death penalty when given discretion to hold that its mandatory imposition violates the Eighth Amendment).
Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2472 n. 10. Our holding that the life without parole sentence is not unconstitutional is not altered by Miller.
We now turn to the state constitutional analysis. The Indiana Constitution can provide more protections than the United States Constitution provides. Justice v. State, 552 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Our Constitution provides in pertinent part “Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Ind. Const, art. 1, § 16. “The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Ind. Const, art. 1, § 18. Although the language is not the same as the United States Constitution, the protections are the same.
“The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments proscribes atrocious or obsolete punishments and is aimed at the kind and form of the punishment, rather than the duration or amount.” Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind.2000). The punishment will be deemed cruel and unusual under Article 1, Section 16 “if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, but rather constitutes only purpose[880]*880less and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[Ljife imprisonment ■without parole does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Id.
Conley correctly points out that he is only the fourth juvenile sentenced to a life-without-parole sentence, following Daniel Boyd,6 sentenced in 1997 for killing a sixty-five-year-old man; Larry Newton,7 sentenced for the 1994 murder of a Ball State student; and Greg Dickins,8 sentenced in 2001 after shooting a police officer. Life without parole is reserved for use in only the most heinous of crimes that so shock our conscience as a community. If retribution was the goal, as Conley has stated, life without parole would be far more frequently used in Indiana. We hold that life without parole is not an unconstitutional sentence under the Indiana constitution under these circumstances.
Conclusion
The heinous facts of this crime are difficult to comprehend. A seventeen-and-a-half-year-old caring for his ten-year-old brother murdered the defenseless child with his bare hands. After disposing of the body, Conley acted as if nothing was out of the ordinary. He took steps to cover up the crime and hid his brother’s body in a park. The aggravating factor was clearly established and uncontrovert-ed. The judge was within his discretion in weighing the mitigating factors in the manner in which he did. Ultimately, we find no abuse of discretion in Judge Humphrey’s analysis of those factors and ultimate sentence of life without parole. Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Daum. Finally, the imposition of life without parole to a convicted murderer under the age of eighteen in Indiana is in line with the rest of the nation in holding such a sentence is constitutional. We affirm Conley’s sentence of life without parole.
DICKSON, C.J., and MASSA, J., concur.
RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which SULLIVAN, J., concurs.