Collins v. State Board of Social Welfare

81 N.W.2d 4, 248 Iowa 369, 1957 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 423

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: February 5, 1957
• Docket: 49097
• Status: Published

Opinions

Hays, J.-

Two propositions are- presented on this appeal: (1) Constitutionality of section 239.5, Code, 1954, as amended by chapter 6, section 4, Acts 56th G. A.; and (2) the overruling of defendants’ special appearance.

Pearl B. Collins and her husband have six children, ages five to fifteen years. Both parents are physically incapacitated and unable to provide a reasonable subsistence for themselves and their children. For some time prior to July 1, 1955, Pearl Collins had been receiving monthly “Aid to Dependent Children” payments from the State Department of Social Welfare, State of Iowa, in accord with chapter 239, Code, 1954, and the regulations of the state department. Such payments, in accord with the public assistance standards, adopted by said department, were established at $293.26 per month, less $15 per month of outside income, and less a general budgetary limitation of $3 per month, making the total monthly grant or allowance $253.89. Due to the amendment -to section 239.5 by chapter 6, section 4, Acts 56th G. A., this award was reduced by the County Board to $175 per month. Appeal, as provided for by section 239.7, was taken to the State Board, where the reduced award was affirmed. From this finding appeal was taken to the district court.

In the district court, petitioner filed what is termed “Petition on appeal and for a Declaratory Judgment.” Count I asserts the limitation of award is unconstitutional; that the defendants’ action was arbitrary, legally fraudulent and an abuse of discretion. It asks that the State Board be required to pay recipient the sum of $277.89 per month. Count II further alleges that the amendment to section 239.5, chapter 6, section 4, Acts 56th G. A., violates section 30, Article III and section 6, Article I, of the Constitution of Iowa; and also the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It prays that the court find said amendment to be unconstitutional, and that the State Board in affirming the award by the County Board acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal manner.

As to Count I, defendants filed, in effect, a general denial. As to Count II, they filed a Special Appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the court. This was overruled. An answer was filed and after a hearing the trial court entered a decree declaring the amendment unconstitutional. It retained jurisdiction for such further relief as is appropriate. The defendants have appealed to this court. Only Count II is involved here.

I. The overruling of the Special Appearance is assigned as error.

The defendants are the State Board of Social Welfare, the individual members of said Board, and the Board’s secretary. The Special Appearance contains six propositions upon which lack of jurisdiction is based, however they all are predicated upon the claim that the action is against defendants in their official capacity; that they are employees of the State, and entitled to immunity from suit, the State never having consented thereto.

Assuming the question properly raised, we find no merit to the claimed error. The law is well settled, and conceded by appellee, that in the absence of specific consent by the State, it or its agencies may not be sued in an action to obtain money from the State or to interfere with its sovereignty or the administration of its affairs through proper agencies. 81 C.J.S., States, sections 214 and 216b (1) ; 49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, sections 92, 93 and 94; rule 9, R.C.P.; Wilson v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Comm., 133 Iowa 586, 110 N.W. 1045, 119 Am. St. Rep. 646; Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 207 Iowa 56, 222 N.W. 438; De Votie v. Cameron, 221 Iowa 354, 265 N.W. 637; Yoerg v. Iowa Dairy Industry Comm., 244 Iowa 1377, 60 N.W.2d 566. The rule is likewise well recognized that where no judgment or decree is asked against the State, but the suit is rather to require its officers and agents to perform their duty, there is no immunity recognized. McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa 489, 149 N.W. 593; Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237, 131 A.L.R. 335; and authorities last above cited. In the instant case, the trial court found, and we agree, that no judgment against the State is sought, the only claim being that the statute under which the defendants purport to act is unconstitutional and that they perform their duties according to law.

The fact that the suit is in the nature of a declaratory judgment does not alter the application of the foregoing rules. 81 C.J.S., States, sections 214 and 216; Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382; Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S.W.2d 437; Division XI, R.C.P.

II. The assignment of error dealing with the constitutionality of the amendment in question presents the real question on appeal.

In 1943 the legislature enacted the “Aid to Dependent Children Act”, chapter 130, Acts 50th G. A. (chapter 239, Code, 1954). The title of chapter 130 states “An Act to provide a program of uniform state wide aid to dependent children; * * *.” It is administered on the county level by the County Board of Social Welfare in accordance with regulations adopted by, and under the supervision of, the State Department of Social Welfare.

Section 239.1 defines various terms used therein. A “dependent child” means “a needy child under the age of sixteen years, or under the age of eighteen years found to be regularly attending school, who has been deprived of parental support and care by reason of death, continued absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity or unfitness of either parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle or aunt, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their home.” “Assistance” means “money payments with respect to a dependent child or children, including funeral expenses.” “Becipient” means “the person to whom money payments with respect to a dependent child or children are made.”

Section 239.2 states that “Assistance shall be granted under this chapter to any needy dependent child who: 1. Is living in a suitable family home maintained by one or more of the persons referred to in subsection 4 of section 239.1.”

Section 239.5 provides, so far as material here, as follows: “The county board shall, on the basis of actual need, fix the amount of assistance necessary for any dependent child, subject to the approval of the state department, with due regard to the necessary expenditures of the family and the conditions existing in each case, taking into consideration any other income or resources of any child claiming assistance under this chapter and any private resources found to be available to such child. Such assistance when granted shall be sufficient, when added to all other income and support available to the child, to provide such child with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.” As amended by section 4, chapter 6, Acts 56th G. A., there was added following the word health: “provided, however, that no family shall receive a grant hereunder in excess of one hundred seventy-five dollars ($175.00) per month.”

Appellee contends said amendment violates Article I, section 6, Constitution of Iowa, in that it discriminates against her children by depriving them of the equal protection of the law allowed to other children who reside in families of lesser size but are otherwise similarly situated. Article I, section 6, is as follows: “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”

That chapter 239, Code, 1954, constitutes class legislation is not denied nor could it well be viewed otherwise. No claim is made nor are we concerned with any constitutional question as to said chapter, more specifically with section 239.5 thereof, as it was prior to said amendment. The claim is that a law which had uniform operation, within the purview of Article I, section 6, Constitution of Iowa, prior to said amendment, now lacks uniformity as a result thereof.

In approaching the question it should be stated that as to paupers and indigent persons there is no' common-law or constitutional duty resting upon the State to provide support, the obligation being a moral rather than a mandatory one. Thus whatever right appellee may have is purely statutory, chapter 239, Code, 1954, as amended. It is a right which may be extended, diminished, conditioned or abrogated by the legislature, and one who asserts rights to assistance thereunder must comply with all reasonable and nondiscriminatory conditions therein imposed. Michel v. State Board of Social Welfare, 245 Iowa 961, 65 N.W.2d 89; Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066.

The books are replete with cases dealing with the above constitutional provision, both here and elsewhere. The general rule is that if there is any reasonable ground for the classification and it operates equally upon all within the same class, there is uniformity in the constitutional sense. Knudson v. Linstrum, 233 Iowa 709, 8 N.W.2d 495; Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N.W.2d 15. In Cook v. Hannah, 230 Iowa 249, 252, 297 N.W. 262, 264, it is said: “If the law operates upon every person within the relation or circumstances provided for in the Act, the requirement of uniformity is met.”

The general rule is well stated in Haynes v. Williams, Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 141, 166 N.W. 938, 940, L.R.A. 1918D 233, as follows: “It is elementary that legislation which, ip. carrying out a public purpose for the common good, is limited by reasonable and justifiable differentiation to a distinct type or class of persons is not for that reason unconstitutional because class legislation, if germane to the object of the enactment and made uniform in its operation upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies; but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one portion and denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary subelassifieation, it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.” The power to classify includes a like power to sub-classify. Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 412, 35 N.W.2d 66, 78.

There is sharp conflict between the parties hereto as to the basic classification of the Act. Appellants contend it is the family; appellee says it is the dependent child.

Section 239.1(4), Code, 1954, defines a “dependent child” as “a needy child under the age of sixteen years, or under the age of eighteen years found to be regularly attending school, who has been deprived of parental support and care by reason of death, continued absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity or unfitness of either parent, and who is living with his father, mother, * * * or aunt, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their home.”

Section 239.2 states: “Assistance shall be granted under this chapter to any needy dependent child who: 1. Is living in a suitable family home * * * referred to in subsection 4 of section 239.1.”

Section 239.5 covers the granting of assistance and the amount thereof. It provides: “* * * The county board shall, on the basis of actual need, fix the amount of assistance necessary for any dependent child, subject to the approval of the state department, with due regard to the necessary expenditures of the famity and the conditions existing in each case * # *. Such assistance when granted shall be sufficient * * * to provide such child with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health.” (Italics added.)

We think it clear that under the provisions of said chapter the classification adopted by the legislature is the needy child which is diversified from all needy children by limiting it to the needy child who is residing in the home of a relative. It is a proper and reasonable classification. Meredith v. Ray, 292 Ky. 326, 166 S.W.2d 437.

Under the record it appears that the State Board in the administration of the Act and to insure a uniform statewide program for aid to dependent children (section 239.18, Code, 1954) has established a standard schedule of amounts necessary for the minimum of subsistence, which amounts are based upon a need-per-child basis. Such appears to be in conformity with the directives found in section 239.5. It is conceded that in the instant case each child involved meets the requirements of section 239.2, and that the minimum requirement per child is the amount prescribed by the State Board in its standard schedule. Under the chapter, prior to the amendment, each child received such amount, irrespective of the number in the home. Under the chapter, as amended, each child may receive the minimum amount without regard to the number in the home, up to the point where the sum total of such allowances reaches $175, at which point additional assistance to that home terminates. Stating it another way, under the amendment assume the minimum amount per child, situated as are the children here involved, is $47 per month. Each child receives this amount, provided the total amount paid to any one recipient does not exceed $175. If in excess of this amount, the payment to such recipient is on a prorata basis per child in the home. However, if the instant children should be distributed among the homes of the various relatives named in section 239.1(4), and nothing in the chapter seems to prohibit such distribution, each of the involved children would be entitled to the minimum allowance.

The amendment on its face appears to be, and was, we think, intended as an economy measure. In effect it is a sub-classification of the original classification, i.e., dependent children, based solely upon the number of children in the home, with no consideration as to need, a circumstance completely disconnected with the basic classification and the purpose and reason therefor. See Keefner v. Porter, 228 Iowa 844, 293 N.W. 501. We think the amendment is clearly discriminatory between dependent children as defined in section 239.1(4), and is purely arbitrary and unreasonable in view of the announced purpose of the Act.

We are aware of the presumptions that are indulged in; the burden a petitioner must assume; and the rule that all reasonable grounds upon which a statute may be held valid must be overcome, which prevail in all questions involving the constitutionality of a statute. Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 289 N.W. 702; Peverill v. Board of Supervisors, 201 Iowa 1050, 205 N.W. 543; Berg v. Berg, 221 Iowa 326, 264 N.W. 821; Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Hoegh, 246 Iowa 9, 65 N.W.2d 410. Giving cognizance to such rules and viewing the instant amendment in the light thereof, we reluctantly feel called upon to declare the amendment in question to be in conflict with section 6, Article I, Constitution of Iowa, and of no force and effect.

The decree of the trial court should be and is affirmed.— Affirmed.

Wennerstrum, Smith, Thompson, Larson, and Peterson, JJ., concur. Garfield, J., Bliss, C. J., and Oliver, J., dissent.