COMISKEY, District Judge.
This action was brought to combat an attempt by the Louisiana Department of Welfare to make a 10%' reduction in Aid to Dependent Children grants because of an unexpected rise in ADC recipients and a limited ADC budget. According to Garland L. Bonin, the Commissioner of Public Welfare, the sudden rise in the ADC case load resulted from the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d [338]*3381118 (1968). This ruling had the effect of compelling Louisiana to make ADC payments to families previously excluded from receiving such grants under the man in the house policy, pursuant to which payments had been withheld from families in which the parent and a member of the opposite sex were not married but either lived together as man and wife and maintained a common household, or had continuous intimate relations even if they did not maintain a common household.
Plaintiffs, two Negro mothers receiving grants under the Aid to Dependent Children program, brought this suit in the United States District Court soon after Bonin’s announcement of the 10% cut. The suit was brought as a class action on behalf of plaintiffs, their children, and all other persons similarly situated. The defendants in this case are Garland L. Bonin, the Commissioner of Public Welfare of the Louisiana State Board of Public Welfare; Camille Adams, the Chairman of the Louisiana State Board of Public Welfare; John J. McKeithen, the Governor of the State of Louisiana; Doris Culver, the Director of the Orleans Parish Department of Public Welfare; and Lawrence Morel, Howard Gruenberg, J. Grady Madden, Mary Lou Winters, Joseph D. Hair, Jr., John D. Sittig and Matt Milam, Jr., who are members of the Louisiana State Board of Public Welfare. Robert H. Finch, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, has also submitted a brief as amicus curiae, after being invited to do so by this Court.
In their original complaint, plaintiffs asked (1) that a three-judge court be convened; (2) that declaratory judgments be rendered in their favor declaring that the proposed 10% reduction in ADC grants and Act No. 9, Schedule 9, Item 13, Louisiana Legislative Acts, Regular Session, 1968, which prohibits reductions in Old Age Assistance grants, are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are invalid under Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23); and (3) that the defendants be temporarily and permanently enjoined from reducing the amount of the payments to ADC recipients. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to ask that the Court render a declaratory judgment declaring that Act No. 9, Schedule 9, Item 13 and the 10% reduction in ADC grants are violative of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Subsequently, in a supplemental complaint, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23), will compel a state participating in the ADC program to increase payments to ADC recipients after July 1, 1969.
A temporary restraining order was granted enjoining the defendants from putting the proposed 10% reduction into effect, which order has been extended to this date.
I. HAS THERE BEEN A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ?
Plaintiffs’ first contention is that defendants are violating their right of equal protection of law because only ADC grants are being reduced, while payments under other assistance categories are not being reduced. Title 46 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes establishes these five general categories of public assistance: (1) Aid to the Needy Blind (ANB); (2) Disability Assistance (DA) (aid to the permanently and totally disabled) ; (3) Old Age Assistance (OAA); (4) Aid to Dependent Children (ADC); and (5) General Assistance (GA). Except for the General Assistance category, all of these State public assistance programs are funded in large measure with federal funds under the Social Security Act.
Act No. 9 of the Louisiana Legislative Acts, Regular Session, 1968, was an appropriations act concerning the Department of Public Welfare for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1968, and ending June 30, 1969. The portion of this [339]*339Act, Schedule 9, Item 13, attacked by plaintiff reads in part as follows:
“Provided further that Old Age Assistance regular maximum grants of $89.00 and $83.00 shall not be cut or reduced by any amount, unless such cut or reduction is approved by the Legislature.”
Plaintiffs contend that the favoring of Old Age Assistance over the other categories of public assistance is a violation of equal protection of laws. Plaintiffs also argue that the decision by the Louisiana Department of Welfare to reduce payments to ADC recipients while not reducing payments made to the non OAA public assistance recipients — the blind, the disabled, and the general assistance recipients — also deprives plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws.
Plaintiffs’ argument under the Equal Protection Clause is centered upon the contention that the legislative act in question and the 10% reduction in ADC grants constitute unreasonable discriminations against needy children. The plaintiffs also raise the point that they are being discriminated against because they are mostly Negroes, but this point can be better discussed together with plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants have violated Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Plaintiffs contend that in order for Act No. 9 and t¡he 10'%- reduction to be constitutionally permissible, they must be rationally related to the purpose of the Social Security Act’s provisions on public assistance. The Social Security Act contains provisions on four categories of public assistance: Old Age Assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. It is plaintiffs’ belief that the purpose of all of these four categories can be summed up in one word: need. Thus, plaintiffs argue that the original statutes setting up these four categories of assistance all stated that they were enacted for the purpose of furnishing financial assistance to needy individuals.
Plaintiffs go to great lengths to show that the four categories listed above are so closely related that they are in effect merely different parts of the same program. Thus, plaintiffs assert that these four categories of public assistance “are in conception, purpose and operation but one program with four groups of beneficiaries * * 1
The plaintiffs then argue that since the four categories are so closely related and since their purpose is identical, the defendants deprived plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws when they prohibited reductions in Old Age Assistance grants alone and when they cut ADC grants without making similar cuts in payments to the blind and disabled public assistance recipients (plaintiffs do not center their attention upon the General Assistance category because it is not financed by Federal funds under the Social Security Act). Plaintiffs say that the purpose of the Social Security Act’s provisions on all four categories is need, and there is no rational distinction between plaintiffs’ needs and the needs of the other recipients of public assistance. Thus plaintiffs argue, “The essence of complainants’ claims that Louisiana has deprived them of equal protection of the law is that there is no relevant constitutional distinction between the need of the indigent aged, the need of the indigent blind, or the need of the indigent disabled, on the one side, and the need of the indigent child on the other.” 2
But the fact that all of these programs are designed to relieve need is not remarkable. It is obvious that the purpose of any public assistance program is to relieve need. But this does not mean that actions done in connection with one public assistance program must be judged in [340]*340terms of what is being done in relation to all other public assistance programs.
Furthermore, the relief of need as such is not the only statutory purpose of the non-ADC programs in question. Although the first purpose listed in the Social Security statutes setting up Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, is to enable the states to furnish assistance to needy individuals, there are other purposes listed in these statutes. Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 301 says that funds appropriated for Old Age Assistance are also to be used for the purposes of furnishing medical, assistance to certain aged individuals who are not recipients of old age assistance and of encouraging the states to help old age assistance recipients to attain or retain capability for self-care. There are similar provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 1201, which deals with Aid to the Blind, and 42 U.S.C. § 1351, which is concerned with Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled.
But even more important is the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 601, which sets out the purposes for which appropriations for ADC are to be used, is different from the corresponding statutes relative to the other three categories, in that the relief of need as such is not listed as a statutory purpose. 42 U.S.C. § 601 provides:
“For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, there is authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part. The sums made available under this section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State plans for aid and services to needy families with children.”
Thus, the primary purpose of ADC appropriations, unlike appropriations for the other three categories, is not simply to enable the states to furnish assistance to needy children. True, these funds are to be used for this purpose, but the enabling of states to furnish assistance to needy children is only a means to the real primary purpose: “the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives * * * to help maintain and strengthen family life * * It is not enough that dependent children be given simply financial assistance; the chief purpose of the Social Security Act section on dependent children is to see that such children are raised by their parents or relatives in a family atmosphere. Plaintiffs point out that in 1935, when the Social Security Act was enacted, the primary statutory purpose of ADC was simply to enable states to furnish financial assistance to needy children. But we must consider the Social Security Act as it exists today, not as it was written thirty-four years ago.
Furthermore, we cannot agree with plaintiffs that the four categories of public assistance found in the Social Security Act “are in conception, purpose and operation but one program with four groups of beneficiaries * * 3 Although the four categories may have some common provisions and objectives, each category is embodied in a separate title of the Social Security Act.4 Each of these titles is different from the others. Each [341]*341title calls for a state plan for one category only, which state plan is to be independent of the plans under the other titles: A state plan for each category must be approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare if it meets the requirements of its title. Section 404(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) provides that if the Secretary disapproves of a state plan on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, he must withhold federal payments to the state for that category or limit payments to parts of that particular state plan not affected by the disapproval. There is nothing in Section 404(a) which would authorize the consequences of nonconformity of this plan to be applied to any other plan.
Even more damaging to plaintiffs’ argument was the enactment of Title XVT of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381-§ 1385, in 1962. Up until that time it was impossible to have a common plan for any of the four categories. But then Congress enacted Title XVI, which authorized states, at their option, to have a single plan for public assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled, in lieu of the three separate plans under Titles I, X, and XIV, the titles dealing with aid to these individuals. But it is most significant that while Congress considered the three adult categories similar enough to permit the estates to adopt a common plan for them, it did not include Aid to Dependent Children in Title XVI, so that states must still keep the ADC plan and program separate, even if they combine the other three categories into one plan.
The Court has accepted a brief from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare on the nature of the Social Security Act and certain sections therein and certain HEW regulations issued pursuant thereto. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare states in this brief that except for certain express statutory exceptions in the Social Security Act,
“[E]ach title of the Social Security Act stands on its own. Insofar as the State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits, it may exercise its powers independently for each of its programs. It may have one standard of need for the aged, another for the blind, and a third for ADC. Similarly, it may have different levels of payment for each program, and changes for one program may be made independently of changes, or lack of changes, in another program.”
******
“Louisiana’s reduction in ADC payments without a corresponding reduction in its other financial assistance programs does not violate the Social Security Act or the Federal regulations.” 5
This Court places great weight on the construction given to the Social Security Act by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which federal agency has the responsibility of carrying out and administering its provisions. “The interpretation expressly placed on a statute by those charged with its administration must be given weight by courts faced with the task of construing the statute.” Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1278, 14 L.Ed. 2d 179 (1965)
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in showing that ADC is sufficiently closely related to the three adult public assistance categories in question so as to warrant comparing actions taken in the ADC program to actions taken under the three adult categories under the Equal Protection Clause. An opposite holding could lead to the undesirable result of forcing a state to withhold benefits from [342]*342recipients under one public assistance program because it is unable to give the same benefits to recipients in all its public assistance programs.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the actions in one public assistance category must be judged in terms of other public assistance categories under the Equal Protection Clause, we do not believe that the plaintiffs have proved that Act No. 9, Schedule 9, Item 13, Louisiana Legislative Acts, Regular Session, 1968, or the 10% reduction of ADC grants are violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Act No. 9, Schedule 9, Item 13 prohibits the reduction of Old Age Assistance regular maximum grants of $89.00 and $83.00 unless such reduction is approved by the Legislature. No other public assistance category enjoys the benefit of such a provision.
The Supreme Court has set out guidelines by which acts are to be judged under the Equal Protection Clause. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-464, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1349, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957), the Supreme Court said:
“The rules for testing a discrimination have been summarized as follows:
“ ‘1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.’ Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369.”
We do not think the plaintiffs have “carr[ied] the burden of showing that” the prohibition against reductions in OAA grants contained in Act No. 9 “does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.” Morey v. Doud, supra, 354 U.S., at 464, 77 S.Ct., at 1349. The Legislature may well have believed that the aged are most vulnerable of those in need because of their physical and mental disabilities and deterioration brought on by age, their lack of employability, their inability to provide for themselves in case of need, and because of other similar reasons. While we do not necessarily agree or disagree with the Legislature’s decision to provide only OAA recipients with this safeguard against reduction of their grants, we cannot say that this provision is so lacking in any reasonable basis as to be purely arbitrary.
Likewise, we cannot say that the 10 %■ reduction in ADC grants by the defendants is utterly without a rational basis. We are convinced that the 10%. cut was due solely to lack of state funds to satisfy the increase of recipients in the ADC category. The evidence presented does not show that 10% reduction in ADC grants was ordered for any reason other than the purpose of living within the amount allotted for the ADC category. — • an amount which had to be divided among a larger number of recipients. The Supreme Court recognized the right of the states to determine the allocation of the funds devoted to a particular program by the amount of funds available for such a program in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-319, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2134, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), when it said:
“There is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of [343]*343benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.”
Since the number of recipients suddenly increased only in the ADC category, the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare officials may well have concluded that it would have violated the rights of the blind and disabled to cut their grants when there was no similar increase in the number of recipients covered by these programs. Certainly, blind and disabled individuals are also extremely vulnerable because of their lack of employability and the difficulties which such persons must encounter in caring for themselves.
For the foregoing reasons, we therefore hold that neither Act No. 9, Schedule 9, Item 13, Louisiana Legislative Acts, Regular Session, 1968, nor the 10'%' reduction in ADC grants, deprived the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Plaintiffs next contend that Act No. 9 and the 10% reduction in ADC grants discriminate against the plaintiffs because they are mostly Negroes. Such racial discrimination, say the plaintiffs, is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and they claim that it also violates Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which provides:
“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
Plaintiffs point to Louisiana’s past policies in the ADC program as evidence that Act No. 9 and the 10%. reduction in ADC grants are racially discriminatory. Plaintiffs specifically point to the “suitable home” law and the ‘ man in the House” policy. The “suitable home” law, LSA-R.S. 46:233 provided that “no assistance shall be granted to a child living with its mother, if the mother has had an illegitimate child after receiving assistance from the Department of Public Welfare, unless and until proof satisfactory to the parish board of public welfare has been presented showing that the mother has ceased illicit relationships and is maintaining a suitable home for the children.” Ninety-five per cent of the children disqualified under the suitable home law were Negroes. In 1962, the “suitable home” law was rescinded, but Louisiana’s “man in the house” policy remained in effect until after the Supreme Court struck down a similar Alabama policy in King v. Smith, supra, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128 (1968). Under the “man in the house policy”, a family was disqualified from receiving ADC grants if the parent and a member of the opposite sex either lived together as man and wife and maintained a common household, or had continuous intimate relations even if they did not maintain a common household. It was the sudden increase in eligible recipients as a result of the abandonment of the “man in the house” policy which resulted in the 10%- cut in ADC grants.
Plaintiffs point out that the ADC recipients are overwhelmingly Negro (80%) 6 and contend that the ADC program is being discriminated against as a whole because it is identified as a Negro program.
We first consider plaintiffs’ contention that the portion of Act No. 9 prohibiting cuts in Old Age Assistance grants is a racially discriminatory provision because of what plaintiffs refer to as the “whiteness” of the Old Age Assistance category.7 However, an examination of the relevant statistics reveals that as of March, 1968, only 52% of OAA recipients were white, while Negroes constituted [344]*34448'% of old age assistance recipients.8 While it is true that there is a far greater percentage of Negroes receiving assistance under the ADC program, we cannot accept plaintiffs’ contention that OAA is a “white” program because 52% of its recipients — no more than a bare majority — are white.
We do not think that the plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing of racial discrimination in the prohibition of Act No. 9 so as to warrant our declaring it void either under the Equal Protection Clause or under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Plaintiffs also argue that the 10% cut in ADC grants was motivated by racial discrimination. Plaintiffs’ reference to Louisiana’s “suitable home” law and the “man in the house” policy does present some circumstantial evidence that the 10% reduction could have been the result of racial discrimination. But, again, this evidence is easily outweighed by another glance at the statistics.9 For the non-OAA categories which the defendants are allegedly favoring can also be identified as “Negro” programs. Only 39% of the Aid to the Needy Blind recipients are white, while 61% are Negro. Only 46% of the recipients of Disability Assistance grants are white, while 54% are non-white. Even in the General Assistance program, which is entirely funded by the State of Louisiana and which has not been as much the object of plaintiffs’ attacks as the other non-ADC categories, is only 43% white and 57% Negro. From all of the evidence submitted at this time, we hold that the plaintiffs have failed to carry the burden of proving discrimination in favor of a white group of recipients against a Negro group of recipients. Although it is true that a greater percentage of the ADC recipients are Negro, this does not alter the fact that a majority of the recipients in all the non-OAA categories are Negroes.
We also reiterate our stand taken earlier in this opinion that the plaintiffs have not shown that either Act No. 9 or the 10% cut in ADC grants was completely without a reasonable basis so as to be purely arbitrary. Nor have they shown that ADC is closely enough related to the other public assistance programs in question so as to require equal treatment to the recipients of each of these categories.
PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENT UNDER SECTION 402(a) (23) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Plaintiffs next launch a statutory assault on the 10% reduction in the ADC grants, arguing that this cut was in violation of Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23), which statute provides:
“A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must * * * provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.” (Emphasis added.)
Even a cursory glance at this statute reveals without any doubt whatsoever that it does not go into effect until July 1, 1969. Section 402(a) (23) clearly says that the State does not have to adjust the needs of ADC recipients or the máximums payable to them until that time. Plaintiffs argue that the legislative history of the statute shows that the purpose of the long period between the date the law was signed (January 2, 1968) and the date on which it goes into effect was to give the states time to make the necessary studies of cost-of-living changes and to legislate accordingly. But from this interpretation of the legislative history, which may well be correct, plaintiffs draw the dubious [345]*345conclusion that “the lack of explicit federal compulsion to do less than maintain grants at their 1967 levels until that date * * *. Indeed, § 402(a) (23) provides an affirmative compulsion on Louisiana to actively work towards the July 1, 1969 increases, and not to lower the grants in the process.” 10
We cannot agree with this reasoning. It may be true that the purpose of the long delay between the signing of the act and the date of its effectiveness was to give the states time to study the cost-of-living changes and to legislate pursuant thereto. But it simply does not follow that there is an “affirmative compulsion” on the states to actively work toward the July 1, 1969 increases and not to lower the grants before that date. In the absence of any legislative history indicating a contrary conclusion, we simply read the statute as it was written. And it is obvious that “by July 1, 1969” can only mean that the new state plans must go into effect as of that date and not before. We see nothing in the statute itself or in the legislative history to indicate otherwise.
Furthermore, in his brief as amicus curiae, referred to above, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare construes Section 402(a) (23) to mean that the states do not have to comply with this section until July 1, 1969:
“ * * * [W] e believe that, in its proper application, section 402(a) (23) should be interpreted as it reads, to carry out the intent of its words, and not some more remote and speculative purposes.
“Louisiana has until July 1, 1969, to comply with the adjustment requirements of section 402(a) (23).
“Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act requires that a State ADC plan must provide that ‘by July 1, 1969’ certain prescribed actions will have been taken. On their face, these words are satisfied if the State has complied by that date. Nothing is said about what the States may do or not do before that date.” 11
As we said before, we have considerable respect for the Secretary’s interpretation of the Social Security Act, since he is charged with the responsibility of administering its provisions. “When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965).
We agree with the Secretary of HEW that at this time Louisiana has not violated Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act.
PLAINTIFFS’ CONTENTION THAT A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED ON THE MEANING OF SECTION 402(a) (23) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
In a supplemental complaint, plaintiffs asked that this Court render a declaratory judgment declaring that Section 402(a) (23), discussed above, requires and compels a state participating in the ADC program to increase payments to recipients by the cost-of-living increase referred to in the statute.
Plaintiffs argue that a declaratory judgment on the meaning of this statute, which, as we have already held, does not go into effect until July 1, 1969, is necessary because the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare is short of the funds needed to increase the ADC payments by that time, and there is a real danger that it will not increase payments on July 1.
In this connection, plaintiffs also want this Court to hold that HEW regulation § 233.20(a) (2) (ii), 34 Fed.Reg. 1394, dated January 15, 1969, is incon[346]*346sistent with Section 402(a) (23) of the Social Security Act and consequently is invalid. § 233.20(a) (2) (ii) provides:
“A State Plan for * * * AFDC * * * must, as specified below:
“In the AFDC plan, provided that by July 1, 1969, the State’s standard of assistance for the AFDC program will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such standards were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted * * *. In the event the State is not able to meet need in full under the adjusted standard, the State may make ratable reductions in accordance with subparagraph (3) (viii) of this paragraph * * (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs object to the Regulation’s statement that payments may be ratably reduced despite the new cost-of-living increases even after July 1, 1969.
The plaintiffs’ argument may well be correct, but we believe that the time has not yet come for us to rule on this point. Louisiana’s current welfare appropriation, as set out in Act 9, Louisiana Legislative Acts, Regular Session, 1968, is in effect only until June 30, 1969, the day before the deadline set in Section 402(a) (23). As of now the Louisiana Legislature has not enacted a new appropriations law for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1969, the date Section 402(a) (23) goes into effect. We cannot say at this time whether or not Louisiana will devote additional funds to ADC for the new cost-of-living increases in the new appropriations bill. We certainly cannot tell what Louisiana will do after July 1 from an appropriation bill which expires on June 30.
For these reasons, we conclude that this point is not yet ripe for adjudication by means of a declaratory judgment. However, we will retain jurisdiction over this case for the purpose of passing on this point if it is necessary at all after Louisiana enacts its new welfare appropriations law.
Clerk will prepare a judgment in accordance with this opinion.