Collier v. Batts

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedJuly 16, 2021
Docket2:18-cv-02369
StatusUnknown

This text of Collier v. Batts (Collier v. Batts) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Collier v. Batts, (W.D. Tenn. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

HENRY WAYNE COLLIER,

Petitioner,

v. No. 2:18-cv-02369-MSN-tmp

WARDEN, FCI GILMER,

Respondent.

ORDER DENYING PETITION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241, CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner, Henry Wayne Collier,1 applied for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“§ 2241 Petition”). (ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed a response in opposition. (ECF No. 9.) For the reasons below, this Court DENIES the § 2241 Petition. PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Petitioner’s Federal Criminal Case and Collateral Challenges On May 8, 2007, and October 2, 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to three counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and one count of aggravated bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. See United States v. Collier, Case Nos. 1:07-00055-WO-1, 1:07-cr-00119-WO- 1, 1:07-cr-00120-WO-1, 1:07-00307-WO-1 (M.D.N.C. 2007). At sentencing, the district court

1. Collier is a federal prisoner, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) register number 06769-058. At the time Collier filed this habeas petition, he was housed at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Memphis, Tennessee. The Government is now housing him at the FCI Gilmer in Glenville, West Virginia. applied the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on three prior qualifying felony convictions. (Case No. 1:07-cr-00119-WO-1, ECF No. 21.) Petitioner was sentenced to 220 months in prison under the advisory sentencing guidelines. (Id., ECF No. 17.) In 2016, Petitioner filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking relief under Johnson v.

United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which was denied. (ECF No. 18, ECF No. 29.) II. Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition Petitioner now petitions pro se under § 2241, relying on Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016) and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), to challenge his career offender enhancement. (Civ. No. 18-2369, ECF No. 1 at PageID 4–5, ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 8–16.) Collier alleges that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is “vague and unconstitutional” under the holding of Dimaya. (Id. at PageID 5.) The Warden responds that Collier has failed to show that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” for relief or that he is entitled to relief under § 2241. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 33.) STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court is authorized to issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)

when a prisoner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Federal prisoners may obtain habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 only under limited circumstances. The “savings clause” in § 2255 provides as follows: An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). “Construing this language, courts have uniformly held that claims asserted by federal prisoners that seek to challenge their convictions or imposition of their sentence shall be filed in the sentencing court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that claims seeking to challenge the execution or manner in which the sentence is served shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the prisoner’s custodian under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461

(6th Cir. 2001) (“Section 2255 is the primary avenue for relief for federal prisoners protesting the legality of their sentence, while § 2241 is appropriate for claims challenging the execution or manner in which the sentence is served.”); Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The rule was simple: § 2255 for attacks on a sentence, § 2241 for other challenges to detention”). In this case, Collier is attacking the imposition of his sentence. Habeas relief is not available to him unless relief under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Collier has the burden of demonstrating that the savings clause applies. Charles, 180 F.3d at 756. “The circumstances in which § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective are narrow[.]” Peterman, 249 F.3d at 461. “[T]he § 2255 remedy is not considered inadequate or ineffective simply because § 2255 relief has already been denied, or because the petitioner is procedurally barred from

pursuing relief under § 2255, or because the petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or successive motion to vacate.” Charles, 180 F.3d at 756 (citations omitted). In Wright, 939 F.3d at 703, the Sixth Circuit states: A federal prisoner who has already filed a § 2255 motion and cannot file another one cannot access § 2241 just because a new Supreme Court case hints his conviction or sentence may be defective. Rather, the prisoner must also show that binding adverse precedent (or some greater obstacle) left him with “no reasonable opportunity” to make his argument any earlier, “either when he was convicted and appealed or later when he filed a motion for postconviction relief under section 2255[.]” [In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 1998)]. Otherwise, § 2255 is simply not inadequate or ineffective to test his claim. And nothing in this court’s later precedents gainsays this principle. A prisoner can obtain relief under § 2241 only if he is “actually innocent” of the crime of which he has been convicted. Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 804–05 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Charles, 180 F.3d at 757 (“No circuit court has to date permitted a post-AEDPA petitioner who was not effectively making a claim of ‘actual innocence’ to utilize § 2241 (via § 2255’s ‘savings

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Collier v. Batts, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collier-v-batts-tnwd-2021.