Colin R. Dickey v. County of Fresno, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01829
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 COLIN R. DICKEY, Case No. 1:25-cv-01829 JLT EPG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 13 v. (Docs. 62, 65) 14 COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Colin R. Dickey, a state prisoner, alleges in this civil rights action that the defendants 18 obtained his conviction and death sentence in violation of the U.S. Constitution. He alleges 19 among other things that prosecutors presented false testimony at his trial and withheld evidence 20 that he could have used to impeach a crucial witness. He was partially vindicated in 2023, when 21 the Ninth Circuit vacated his death sentence but left his conviction in place. See generally Dickey 22 v. Davis, 69 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2023). 23 The defendants move to dismiss. (Docs. 62, 65.) As explained in this order, those 24 motions are GRANTED with leave to amend. Dickey could pursue a potentially viable civil 25 rights claim, but his current allegations and legal claims are too broad. They imply that he was 26 wrongfully convicted, contrary to the circuit court’s 2023 opinion and the Supreme Court’s 27 opinion in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 28 /// 1 ALLEGATIONS 2 Marie Caton and Louis Freiri were found dead at home in Fresno, California, in 3 November 1988. (See Doc. 59 at 11–13.) One suspect, a man named Richard Cullumber, 4 attempted to flee the city a few days later, but he died by his own hand at the end of a high-speed 5 chase. (Id. at 15–16.) A $5,000 reward prompted one of Cullumber’s former roommates, 6 Richard Buchanan, to come forward a few months later. (See id. at 5.) He claimed that Dickey 7 had confessed to being in the home with Cullumber and the two victims at the time of the 8 murders. (See id.) 9 Dickey was arrested and detained. (See id.) Police then went on a search for evidence to 10 support the case against him at a preliminary probable cause hearing. (See id.) Both the Fresno 11 County District Attorney’s Office and the Fresno City Police Department participated in the 12 investigation. (Id.) A prosecutor named Kenneth Hahus was eventually assigned to the case. 13 (See id. at 29.) Hahus met with Buchanan about a dozen times over the next several months, both 14 before and after the preliminary hearing. (See id. at 35–36.) Buchanan was himself facing drug 15 charges. (See id. at 30–31.) So in an effort to secure Buchanan’s testimony, Hahus helped 16 arrange for the charges against Buchanan to be dropped. (See id.) Investigators also did several 17 favors for Buchanan, some of them quite valuable. (See id. at 32.) In the end, Buchanan received 18 perks worth about $5,600. (Id.) 19 Hahus secured Dickey’s conviction at trial. He relied heavily on Buchanan’s testimony. 20 (See id. at 32–33, 35–36.) The two of them mislead the jury about how often they had spoken 21 before the trial, how spontaneous (or rather, how practiced) Buchanan’s testimony was, and his 22 incentives to lie or embellish. (See id.) Hahus did not disclose evidence about Buchanan’s 23 incentives to the defense, either. (See id. at 30.) 24 Dickey was found guilty of two robbery counts, one burglary count, and two homicide 25 counts, as well as the charged felony-murder and multiple-murder special circumstances, leading 26 to a sentence of death. (See id. at 5, 46–47.) He challenged his conviction and sentence on 27 appeal and in habeas corpus proceedings in both state and federal court. See 69 F.4th at 634–35. 28 Many years later, in 2023, the Ninth Circuit conditionally granted his petition for a writ of habeas 1 corpus, but only in part. Id. at 648. It vacated the special-circumstances findings and the death 2 penalty, but it affirmed the district court’s decision not to grant habeas relief related to the 3 convictions themselves, i.e., with respect to the “guilt phase” of the trial. See id. at 645–48. 4 Dickey then filed this federal civil rights action. (Doc. 1.) The case is currently 5 proceeding on his first amended complaint against the County of Fresno, the City of Fresno, 6 Hahus, and several individual investigators and detectives. (Doc. 59.) The City, the County, 7 Hahus, and one of the other individual defendants (Douglas Stokes) have moved to dismiss under 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motions are fully briefed. The court took them 9 under submission without hearing oral arguments. (See Docs. 62, 65, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78.) 10 STANDARD OF DECISION 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits motions to dismiss for “failure to state a 12 claim upon which relief can be granted.” A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests a complaint’s “legal 13 sufficiency,” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001), that is, whether it is based on 14 “a cognizable legal theory” and includes “sufficient facts” to support that theory, Mendiondo v. 15 Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court’s task is to 16 decide whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 17 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 18 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This is a “context-specific task.” Id. at 19 679. The court must draw on its “judicial experience and common sense,” id., and accept “all 20 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 21 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 22 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014)). 23 HECK BAR 24 The defendants argue first that Dickey cannot pursue his § 1983 claims at all, citing Heck 25 v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (See Docs. 62 at 6–8; 65 at 7–9.) The Supreme Court’s 26 holding in Heck is part of a larger legal doctrine separating civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. 27 § 1983 from habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255 and equivalent state laws. See 28 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79–82 (2005). The Court established a relatively narrow rule 1 in Heck: if a plaintiff’s success in a § 1983 claim would necessarily imply that a conviction or 2 sentence is unlawful, then that claim can move forward only if the conviction or sentence was 3 previously invalidated in a state or federal habeas proceeding. See id. at 80 (citing Heck, 512 4 U.S. at 479–82, 486–87). Conversely, if the conviction or sentence has been invalidated, then a 5 plaintiff is free to pursue a § 1983 claim that implies that the conviction or sentence is invalid. 6 See id. at 81–82. 7 Dickey’s death sentence was invalidated in a federal habeas petition, as summarized 8 above. For that reason, he may pursue a claim under § 1983 even if it implies that his death 9 sentence was invalid. See, e.g., Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2014). The 10 defendants argue otherwise, but they do not wrestle with the fact that Dickey successfully 11 challenged his death sentence. (See, e.g., Docs. 62 at 7–8; 65 at 7–9). In the case they cite, the 12 plaintiff did not argue that his incarceration was harsher as a result of his death sentence, as 13 Dickey does. See Phillips v. Chappell, No. 17-0875, 2018 WL 9875249, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14 15, 2018). 15 Dickey’s conviction, by contrast, has not been invalidated. So he may not pursue a claim 16 under § 1983 if it would imply necessarily that his conviction is invalid. He does not limit his 17 allegations and his claims to his capital sentence and its consequences. Some of his allegations 18 imply unambiguously that he is innocent of the charges against him. That is true, for example, of 19 his assertion that the murders occurred on November 8, i.e., contrary to prosecutors’ allegations 20 that he committed the murders on November 7. (See Doc. 59 at 12–15.) Some of his legal 21 theories also imply that he should not have been convicted at all, nor detained before trial. (See 22 id. at 48–50.) His allegations target his death sentence specifically at some points, such as those 23 about the harsh practical consequences of a capital sentence. (See, e.g., id. at 46–47.) But it is 24 impossible to disentangle his broad allegations about an unlawful and unconstitutional 25 prosecution from his narrower claims about his capital sentence, at least as he has presented them 26 in his current complaint. 27 Dickey portrays this lawsuit differently in his opposition to the pending motions. He 28 argues that his claims “are not based on the mere fact of his being imprisoned.” (Doc. 73 at 10.) 1 His object is not to prove that he should always have been free, he says, but rather to prove only 2 that he “would have received a noncapital sentence.” (Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).) He may not 3 modify his complaint by making arguments in an opposition brief. See Schneider v. California 4 Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); Apple Inc. v. Allan & Assocs. Ltd., 445 5 F. Supp. 3d 42, 59 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The court construes his arguments as a proposal to pursue 6 more limited allegations and legal claims in a second amended complaint. 7 It would ordinarily be appropriate to grant this request straightaway. Rule 15 creates a 8 very liberal standard for amendments. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 9 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). An amendment would not be appropriate, however, if it would 10 lead to an exercise in futility. See id. The defendants make additional arguments in their pending 11 motions that might show an amendment would be futile, at least in part. The Court considers 12 those arguments next. 13 ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 14 Hahus argues he is absolutely immune to Dickey’s claims for damages under section 15 1983. (Doc. 65 at 5–7.) Prosecutors are absolutely immune to some § 1983 claims. See Van de 16 Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009). Their immunity depends on whether their 17 allegedly unlawful conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 18 process.” Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). In other words, courts 19 take a “functional approach to immunity.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). The 20 defendant who asserts absolute immunity must “show that such immunity is justified for the 21 function in question.” Id. 22 The Supreme Court has not drawn bright lines between conduct that is “intimately 23 associated with the judicial process” and other conduct. The dividing line is easiest to see in the 24 contrasts between a few examples of the conduct that falls on either side of it. For example, 25 prosecutors are immune to claims about preparing and filing charging documents, but not to 26 claims that they falsely certified the truth of any statements within those documents. See Kalina 27 v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997). Any witness could have made the certification, but only 28 an advocate acting as an officer of the court could have prepared and filed the case. See id. at 1 130. Investigative work is another example. Prosecutors are immune to claims about the work 2 they do “in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses” as they prepare for trial, but not 3 about the work they do “in searching for the clues and corroboration” that might give them 4 probable cause to pursue an arrest. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Police 5 detectives can investigate crimes, collect evidence, and recommend an arrest, and they enjoy only 6 qualified immunity. See id. at 273–74. As a final example, the Supreme Court has said that 7 prosecutors are absolutely immune to claims about their presentation of the state’s case to the 8 court and jury at trial. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. But it has said that they are not necessarily 9 immune to claims about any statements they make in other places and before other audiences, 10 such as in press conferences. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 278. 11 Dickey alleges Hahus acted unlawfully in three related ways. First, he alleges Hahus met 12 with Buchanan many times before the trial—and even before the preliminary probable cause 13 hearing—to discuss Buchanan’s potential testimony. (See Docs. 59 ¶¶ 24, 140–43; 74 at 9–10.) 14 Although Dickey does not make the allegation expressly, his complaint implies that Hahus helped 15 Buchanan come up with lies about Dickey’s involvement in the murder, i.e., that he helped to 16 manufacture false evidence. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 140–43.) Hahus has not demonstrated that he is 17 entitled to absolute immunity for all of this conduct. Some of the Buchanan interviews might 18 have been in preparation for the trial, conducted with a goal of presenting a compelling case to 19 the jury. But some might also have served a more fundamental, investigative purpose, as they 20 happened earlier in the process. “Witness interviews may serve either an investigative or an 21 advocacy-related function, as may other methods of gathering or manufacturing evidence prior to 22 trial.” Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 2005). Hahus is not immune to the 23 claims that he used the interviews with Buchanan to create false evidence long before the trial 24 began, when probable cause was in question. A police detective could have done the same thing 25 and would be entitled to qualified immunity at most. See id. at 639–40; KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 26 1105, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2004) Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 Second, Dickey alleges Hahus helped ensure that charges against Buchanan would be 28 dropped in exchange for his testimony, at one point even appearing at a hearing in Buchanan’s 1 case. (See Docs. 59 ¶¶ 120, 123–25; 74 at 10.) As explained above, charging decisions are the 2 bread and butter of a prosecutor’s work, and prosecutors are absolutely immune to claims about 3 those decisions. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. But Dickey does not allege that Hahus is liable for 4 deciding not to prosecute Buchanan. Dickey alleges instead that Hahus helped Buchanan avoid 5 charges as a favor, as part of his broader effort to buttress a false narrative in Dickey’s case. It is 6 not necessarily a prosecutor’s job to suggest to a potential witness that a charge might disappear if 7 he cooperates. A police detective, too, can promise to put in a good word with the district 8 attorney and can appear at a hearing. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276 (rejecting assertion of absolute 9 immunity based on claims that prosecutors helped find and retain an expert who was willing to 10 give helpful testimony against the plaintiff). “[P]rosecutors are not performing a prosecutorial 11 function when they undertake a role that could be fulfilled by someone other than a prosecutor[.]” 12 Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1283 (9th Cir. 2026). 13 Third, Dickey alleges Hahus knew about, but did not disclose, favors that Buchanan 14 received from others, such as food, housing, and cash. (See Docs. 59 ¶¶ 129–30; 74 at 10.) The 15 complaint does not allege that Hahus learned about these favors early in the case, before the 16 probable cause hearing, for example, or that he violated some disclosure obligation that was 17 independent of his role as a trial lawyer. The complaint implies instead that Hahus’s disclosures 18 fell short as the case was ramping up for trial, then presented false testimony about the favors 19 during the trial. (See Doc. 59 ¶ 130.) Prosecutors are absolutely immune to claims that they 20 “maliciously initiated a prosecution, used perjured testimony at trial, or suppressed material 21 evidence at trial.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). For these reasons, 22 Hahus has shown that he would be absolutely immune to Dickey’s current allegations about his 23 failure to disclose these other favors. But it is possible that Dickey could clarify his allegations in 24 a further amended complaint, and it is possible a clarification could show Hahus is not absolutely 25 immune. In short, Hahus’s assertion of absolute prosecutorial immunity does not show that an 26 amendment would be futile. 27 MONELL CLAIMS 28 The County argues Dickey does not state a claim against it under Monell v. Department of 1 Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Doc. 65 at 9–12.) The Supreme Court decided in Monell 2 that a municipal government like Fresno County can be liable under § 1983, but not simply 3 because one of its employees acted unlawfully. See 436 U.S. at 692. Plaintiffs who sue 4 municipalities under § 1983 must ultimately prove the municipality itself acted unlawfully—that 5 it had a policy amounting to deliberate indifference for the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Jones 6 v. City of N. Las Vegas, 168 F.4th 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2026). Dickey is pursuing two such 7 theories of unconstitutional actions. 8 First, he alleges there was a longstanding practice within the Fresno district attorney’s 9 office not to disclose evidence that must be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 10 (1963) and other similar cases. (See Doc. 74 at 22–23 (summarizing allegations).) A claim like 11 this can succeed only if the County had “actual or constructive notice” of the allegedly 12 unconstitutional state of affairs, so “a plaintiff must typically provide evidence of ‘a pattern of 13 similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.’” Jones, 168 F.4th at 1140–41 (quoting 14 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). In other words, the County’s liability “may not 15 be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 16 1996). “[I]t must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency 17 that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Id. Dickey’s complaint 18 includes allegations about several cases that were similar to his, in addition to other allegations 19 about the surrounding circumstances. (See Doc. 59 ¶¶ 155–56, 167–83.) These allegations could 20 suffice at this early stage to show that a claim under Monell is plausible. See Est. of Osuna v. 21 County of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (collecting authority on the 22 types of allegations that suffice to show a Monell claim based on custom and practice is 23 plausible). They suggest strongly that an amendment would not be an exercise in futility. 24 Second, Dickey alleges the County ratified Hahus’s unconstitutional actions. (See Doc. 25 74 at 25–26 (summarizing allegations.).) To prevail in a claim of this type, the plaintiff must 26 ultimately demonstrate that the person who ratified the unconstitutional actions made a 27 “conscious, affirmative choice.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992). The 28 responsible official must have selected the allegedly unconstitutional course of action “from 1 | among various alternatives,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986), or 2 | alternatively, must have approved a subordinate’s decision “and the basis for it,” City of St. Louis 3 | v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Dickey alleges here that a supervisor approved 4 | prosecutors’ decision to dismiss the case against Buchanan in an effort to secure his testimony. 5 | (See, e.g., Doc. 59 § 117.) He does not allege, however, that supervisors approved of Hahus’s 6 | allegedly unconstitutional efforts to manufacture evidence or to withhold evidence in violation of 7 | Brady and other similar cases. For these reasons, Dickey could not pursue a ratification theory 8 | based on his current allegations. But he could potentially fill these gaps with amendments. In 9 | any event, it is not clear that a further amendment would be futile. 10 CONCLUSION 11 The motions to dismiss (Docs. 65, 74) are GRANTED with leave to amend. Any second 12 || amended complaint must be filed within thirty days. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: _ June 12, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28