Coleman v. Yates

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Arkansas
DecidedMarch 31, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-00080
StatusUnknown

This text of Coleman v. Yates (Coleman v. Yates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coleman v. Yates, (E.D. Ark. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS DELTA DIVISION

GREGORY ANDRE COLEMAN, PLAINTIFF Reg. # 35489-001

v. 2:22CV00080-BSM-JTK

YATES DEFENDANT

ORDER Gregory Andre Coleman (“Plaintiff”) is in custody at Forrest City Low Correctional Institution (“FCI-Forrest City”). (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff sued FCI—Forrest City Warden Yates alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id.). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which was granted. (Doc. Nos. 8, 9). I. Screening The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires federal courts to screen prisoner complaints seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that: (a) are legally frivolous or malicious; (b) fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (c) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A(b). An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Whether a plaintiff is represented by counsel or is appearing pro se, his complaint must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780 F .2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir.1985). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In reviewing a pro se complaint under ' 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

II. Plaintiff’s Complaint Plaintiff sued FCI-Forrest City Warden Yates alleging violations of his federally protected rights. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff says he has a history of medical problems in connection with an earlier gunshot. (Id. at 7). In documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he says he is “unable to receive the proper medical treatment [he] requires in order to keep [his] leg from being amputated.” (Id. at 11). Plaintiff believes he is not receiving “appropriate chronic care for a serious medical condition that the BOP is well informed about.” (Id. at 17). III. Discussion Defendant Yates is a federal actor, which means Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs fall under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau

of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). “[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suit brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006). A claim under Bivens is the same as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “except that the former is maintained against federal officials while the latter is against state officials.” Sanchez v. U.S., 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Generally, case law analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims applies to Bivens cases. See Ibrahim v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A. Plaintiff’s Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Claim May Proceed Under Bivens.

In determining whether Plaintiff’s allegations may proceed under Bivens, the first question is whether his case is “the type for which a Bivens remedy is available.” Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 2019). The United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied cause of action under Bivens on only three occasions. (Id. at 497-98). The three cases in which the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens claim included: the ground-breaking Bivens case itself, 403 U.S. 388 (allegedly unlawful arrest and warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (failure to treat prisoner’s asthma in violation of the Eighth Amendment); and Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (sex discrimination in violation of Fifth Amendment due process rights). In a more recent case, the Supreme Court warned that while “Bivens is well-settled law in its own context . . . expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants . . . .” Id. (internal citation omitted). “[F]or almost 40 years, [the Supreme Court] [has] . . . rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under Bivens.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020). Instead, “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Id. at 742 (internal citation omitted).

Courts now undertake a two-step analysis to determine if an implied cause of action under Bivens exists. Farah, 926 F.3d at 498. The first step is to ascertain whether the case presents “one of ‘the three Bivens claims the [Supreme] Court has approved in the past’ or whether, instead, allowing the plaintiffs to sue would require us to extend Bivens to a new ‘context.’” Id. If the claim presented is not one that has been previously recognized, courts consider whether “special factors counsel[] hesitation” in extending Bivens to the claims at hand. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was denied proper medical care. A plaintiff may pursue a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim in a Bivens action. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.

14 (1980). B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. This prohibition gives rise to the government’s duty to provide medical care to prisoners. “The government has an ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Allard v. Baldwin, 779 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). It follows that the “Eighth Amendment proscribes deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners.” Robinson v. Hager, 292 F.3d 560, 563 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). “A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Schuab v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir.

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Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Davis v. Passman
442 U.S. 228 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Carlson v. Green
446 U.S. 14 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Hartman v. Moore
547 U.S. 250 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Schaub v. VonWald
638 F.3d 905 (Eighth Circuit, 2011)
McRaven v. Sanders
577 F.3d 974 (Eighth Circuit, 2009)
Parrish v. Ball
594 F.3d 993 (Eighth Circuit, 2010)
John Allard v. Tonia Baldwin
779 F.3d 768 (Eighth Circuit, 2015)
Ziglar v. Abbasi
582 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Ecclesiastical Washington v. Larry Denney
900 F.3d 549 (Eighth Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Coleman v. Yates, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coleman-v-yates-ared-2023.