BISTLINE, Justice.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether a prison policy which prohibits an inmate’s access to the law library passes constitutional muster. The district judge held that a ten-day restriction on access to a law library, applicable only to those prisoners who receive disciplinary detention, is facially invalid because it abridges the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. We affirm.
Respondent Andrew Coleman is incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). On October 3, 1985, he was confined to thirty days in disciplinary detention for possessing a homemade knife in his cell. In October 1985, it was the policy of the ISCI not to allow an inmate physical access to the law library for his first ten days of detention. Coleman pursued a habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenged the ten-day restriction of access to the library as unconstitutional.
The writ was denied by Magistrate Willis. On appeal to the district court, Judge Bail held that the ten-day ban on the use of the penitentiary law library by inmates in disciplinary detention violated the constitutional right of access to the courts. The state appeals.
The seminal case involving prisoners’ access to the courts is Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), where the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
Id., at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (footnote omitted). The Court based its decision on the proposition that without access to the courts inmates would be unable to bring habeas corpus and civil rights actions which are of fundamental importance in our constitutional scheme “because they directly protect our most valued rights,” Id., citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).1 As Professor Palmer noted, prior to Bounds:
[mjany of the practices which have prevailed in prisons through the country have amounted to impairments of the inmates’ rights of access to the courts. Disciplinary actions for inmates’ pursuing legal remedies, censorship or wholesale confiscation of a prisoner’s legal documents and other such practices have been common in many of America’s prison systems.
J. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners § 7.2, at 87 (2d ed. 1977).
The State initially argues that the district court erred in holding that the ten-day ban on access to the library was unconstitutional — without there being a concomitant grant of any affirmative relief, namely, access to the library. (Coleman’s initiating petition for the writ was prepared by an inmate law clerk.) It is well-established that a habeas corpus petition must demonstrate not only that some statute, procedure or action was unconstitutional, but also that the petitioner was adversely affected — or prejudiced — by the constitutional violation. Thigpen v. Smith, 603 F.Supp. 1519 (S.D.Ala.1985) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977); [903]*903Daniels v. Maggio, 669 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir.1982); Ashley v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 258, 260 n. 4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309, 314 (5th Cir.1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873, 99 S.Ct. 207, 58 L.Ed.2d 186 (1978)). However, a prison policy can be found to be facially unconstitutional even though specific relief, i.e., library access in this instance, need not be awarded. Here the district judge first determined that the restriction was unconstitutional, but concluded that Coleman was not prejudiced where a writ was filed on his behalf. We see no merit in the State’s overly technical challenge.
Because the regulation here involved restricts a fundamental constitutional right, the ten-day ban on access to the courts must be examined with strict scrutiny. Just as fundamental first amendment rights can be restricted by reasonable time, place and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), the fundamental right of access to the courts can be reasonably restricted so long as the legitimate interests of penal administration outweigh the extent to which the right of access is burdened. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (ban against attorney-client interviews conducted by law students constitutes an unjustifiable restriction on the right of access to the courts).
In the instant case, however, the state has utterly failed to demonstrate what legitimate penological interests are furthered by the ten-day restriction. Simply put, we are unable to weigh the legitimate interests of the restriction against the extent to which the right of access to the courts has been burdened because the state has failed to advance any rationale for the ban. As the district judge stated: “The ISCI has shown no compelling reason to deny access to the law library to those serving disciplinary detention.” R. at 35.
The following colloquy occurred during oral argument:
THE COURT [Chief Justice Shepard]: As appellant it’s your responsibility, of course, to provide a record to this Court, right?
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: That’s correct.
******
THE COURT: But let’s stay with my question. What did Judge Bail have before her as evidence as to a rationale for the rule, and what does this Court have before it as, in the record, as a rationale for the rule? I’m inclined to say nothing in either case. Am I wrong? COUNSEL: Other than the statements of the state’s counsel at the show cause hearing, there is nothing.
THE COURT: Where are those contained in the record?
COUNSEL: Unless there was ... They were referred to in Judge Bail’s order. Um, I don’t know that a transcript was prepared and sent ...
THE COURT: Why was not a transcript prepared?
COUNSEL: Pardon?
THE COURT: Why was not a transcript prepared?
COUNSEL: I don’t know.
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BISTLINE, Justice.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether a prison policy which prohibits an inmate’s access to the law library passes constitutional muster. The district judge held that a ten-day restriction on access to a law library, applicable only to those prisoners who receive disciplinary detention, is facially invalid because it abridges the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. We affirm.
Respondent Andrew Coleman is incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). On October 3, 1985, he was confined to thirty days in disciplinary detention for possessing a homemade knife in his cell. In October 1985, it was the policy of the ISCI not to allow an inmate physical access to the law library for his first ten days of detention. Coleman pursued a habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenged the ten-day restriction of access to the library as unconstitutional.
The writ was denied by Magistrate Willis. On appeal to the district court, Judge Bail held that the ten-day ban on the use of the penitentiary law library by inmates in disciplinary detention violated the constitutional right of access to the courts. The state appeals.
The seminal case involving prisoners’ access to the courts is Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), where the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
Id., at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (footnote omitted). The Court based its decision on the proposition that without access to the courts inmates would be unable to bring habeas corpus and civil rights actions which are of fundamental importance in our constitutional scheme “because they directly protect our most valued rights,” Id., citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).1 As Professor Palmer noted, prior to Bounds:
[mjany of the practices which have prevailed in prisons through the country have amounted to impairments of the inmates’ rights of access to the courts. Disciplinary actions for inmates’ pursuing legal remedies, censorship or wholesale confiscation of a prisoner’s legal documents and other such practices have been common in many of America’s prison systems.
J. Palmer, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners § 7.2, at 87 (2d ed. 1977).
The State initially argues that the district court erred in holding that the ten-day ban on access to the library was unconstitutional — without there being a concomitant grant of any affirmative relief, namely, access to the library. (Coleman’s initiating petition for the writ was prepared by an inmate law clerk.) It is well-established that a habeas corpus petition must demonstrate not only that some statute, procedure or action was unconstitutional, but also that the petitioner was adversely affected — or prejudiced — by the constitutional violation. Thigpen v. Smith, 603 F.Supp. 1519 (S.D.Ala.1985) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 1736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977); [903]*903Daniels v. Maggio, 669 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir.1982); Ashley v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 258, 260 n. 4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Lockett v. Blackburn, 571 F.2d 309, 314 (5th Cir.1978) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873, 99 S.Ct. 207, 58 L.Ed.2d 186 (1978)). However, a prison policy can be found to be facially unconstitutional even though specific relief, i.e., library access in this instance, need not be awarded. Here the district judge first determined that the restriction was unconstitutional, but concluded that Coleman was not prejudiced where a writ was filed on his behalf. We see no merit in the State’s overly technical challenge.
Because the regulation here involved restricts a fundamental constitutional right, the ten-day ban on access to the courts must be examined with strict scrutiny. Just as fundamental first amendment rights can be restricted by reasonable time, place and manner restrictions that are content-neutral, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), the fundamental right of access to the courts can be reasonably restricted so long as the legitimate interests of penal administration outweigh the extent to which the right of access is burdened. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) (ban against attorney-client interviews conducted by law students constitutes an unjustifiable restriction on the right of access to the courts).
In the instant case, however, the state has utterly failed to demonstrate what legitimate penological interests are furthered by the ten-day restriction. Simply put, we are unable to weigh the legitimate interests of the restriction against the extent to which the right of access to the courts has been burdened because the state has failed to advance any rationale for the ban. As the district judge stated: “The ISCI has shown no compelling reason to deny access to the law library to those serving disciplinary detention.” R. at 35.
The following colloquy occurred during oral argument:
THE COURT [Chief Justice Shepard]: As appellant it’s your responsibility, of course, to provide a record to this Court, right?
COUNSEL FOR THE STATE: That’s correct.
******
THE COURT: But let’s stay with my question. What did Judge Bail have before her as evidence as to a rationale for the rule, and what does this Court have before it as, in the record, as a rationale for the rule? I’m inclined to say nothing in either case. Am I wrong? COUNSEL: Other than the statements of the state’s counsel at the show cause hearing, there is nothing.
THE COURT: Where are those contained in the record?
COUNSEL: Unless there was ... They were referred to in Judge Bail’s order. Um, I don’t know that a transcript was prepared and sent ...
THE COURT: Why was not a transcript prepared?
COUNSEL: Pardon?
THE COURT: Why was not a transcript prepared?
COUNSEL: I don’t know.
Thus, as the State concedes, the record is barren of anything establishing the legitimate penological interests served by the ten-day ban on access to the library. As a result, we can only conclude that there are no such interests.
“Where the government seeks to deprive persons of fundamental rights, it must prove to the Court that the law is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest.” Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law, at 448 (2d ed. 1983). Without a factual backdrop setting forth the legitimate penological interests, if any, served by the ten-day ban, we cannot, and will not, weigh the competing interests which are usually presented in cases where a prisoner’s right of access to the courts is restricted. E.g., Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.1986). The State has not only failed to demonstrate that the ten-day ban furthers a legitimate penological concern, but it has also failed, more [904]*904fundamentally, to establish a factual basis as a necessary predicate therefor.
Nor is it dispositive that in the instant case the prisoner was able to file his writ with the assistance of an inmate paralegal. A prison must provide inmates with access to an adequate law library or, alternatively, assistance from persons trained in the law. Bounds, supra; see also Lindquist v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.1985). The State has failed to establish that each and every inmate who becomes subject to the ten-day bar will receive the assistance from law clerk inmates, as happened here. As the district court stated: “In fact, access to an inmate clerk may depend on access to the library.”2 R. at 35. Thus, we reject the State’s argument that the arbitrariness of the ten-day ban is overcome simply because the respondent was fortunate enough to receive help from an inmate law clerk.
The State also contends that the ten-day ban is constitutionally permissible because inmates in detention are “in the same position as those inmates who are illiterate, uneducated or do not speak English. None of these inmates can directly make use of the books and materials in the law library.” App.Br. at 7. This argument is without merit. If the State’s reasoning were adopted, the government could outlaw every citizen’s fundamental right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), on the basis that some couples are unable to conceive.
Furthermore, prison officials may not constitutionally prevent inmate paralegals from assisting those inmates who are illiterate, blind, or for some other reason require assistance in preparing their writs or other legal matters. Johnson v. Avery, supra, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed. 2d 718 (1969). As the district court noted, supra, inmates in detention are not guaranteed the assistance of inmate paralegals on request. Simply because some inmates may choose not to exercise their rights does not mollify the unconstitutional character of the ten-day restriction.
Accordingly, we uphold and affirm the district court’s judgment that a blanket denial of access to the library is a violation of the constitutional right of access to the courts. No costs or attorney fees on appeal.
HUNTLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.