Coleman v. Merritt

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided August 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-01566·Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 TRAVIS CLINTON COLEMAN , 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01566-JCC-BAT 10 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 11 C. MERRITT, et al., SUMMARY JUDGMENT 12 Defendant.

13 Plaintiff Travis Clinton Coleman, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 14 civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkts. 1, 4, 5. Presently pending before the Court is 15 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 47. After reviewing the relevant record, for the 16 reasons below, Defendants’ motion (Dkt. 47) is granted and Plaintiff’s remaining claims – 17 contained in Count I – are dismissed with prejudice. As all other claims were previously 18 dismissed (Dkt. 45) and no claims remain in this action, the Clerk is directed to close the case. 19 BACKGROUND 20 In his unverified complaint, Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial detainee at the King County 21 Correctional Facility (“KCCF”) at the time he filed his complaint and at the time of the events 22 that give rise to his claims. Dkt. 5. Plaintiff’s complaint names the following as Defendants: C. 23 Merritt, Corrections Officer, KCCF; L. Arias, Corrections Officer, KCCF; G. Robinson, 1 Corrections Officer Supervisor, KCCF; R. Prioleau, Classifications Staff, KCCF; R. Kintner, 2 Classifications Staff Supervisor, KCCF; I. Idiong, Classifications Staff, KCCF; Hurt, 3 Classifications Staff, KCCF. Dkt. 5. Plaintiff’s complaint originally alleged three causes of 4 action – Counts I, II, and III. Id. On February 12, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

5 complaint. Dkt. 36. By order dated May 13, 2025, the Court granted the motion to dismiss with 6 respect to Counts II and III and dismissed those claims without prejudice but denied the motion 7 to dismiss with respect to Count I. Dkt. 45. Accordingly, currently, Count I is the only count 8 remaining in this action and Defendants Merritt, Arias, and Robinson are the only remaining 9 Defendants. 10 In Count I of his complaint Plaintiff alleges “the three named officers” used excessive 11 force against him. Dkt. 5 at 6-7. Construing the complaint liberally, the Court understands 12 Plaintiff to be referring to Defendants Merritt, Arias and Robinson in this count. Id. Plaintiff 13 alleges that on August 10, 2024, after being transported from the hospital after undergoing a 14 “spinal fusion of C/5 C/6”, he was removed from the stretcher/rolling bed and “violently

15 assaulted and stripped naked.” Id. Plaintiff alleges the following: 16 The group of them pushed me to the back of the cell, tried to ram my knees into the bench. I stepped up to avoid injury. Then they yanked me down backwards. I landed on 17 my feet at which point one of them kicked my left foot forward causing me to do the splits at which point the three of them fell on top of me, hyperextending my left leg 18 directly in front of me, with my right curled back behind, smashing my torso flat, directly with my hyperextended left leg. I went into shock and could not feel my left leg and could not breath. They then violently contorted my body, stripping me naked, which I 19 feel constitutes sexual assault. My naked body was exposed and smashed into the floor of the unwashed cell. I observed hair, what appeared to be dried feces, and food particles 20 and pieces all over the floor. The form of the incident they filled out saying “observed or reported injuries” they check “no,” despite my being SEVERELY injured. I was not able 21 to get up for several minutes and may have lost consciousness when my head was slammed into the floor next to my leg. I was given no socks or shoes and didn’t receive 22 any sandals or slippers for 4 days. I was also not given toilet paper or any food for 18+ hours, until I was relocated and fed breakfast the next day. 23 Id. 1 Plaintiff alleges medical staff observed the assault but provided no medical care 2 and later partially documented his severe leg and ankle injuries. Id. Plaintiff alleges his 3 leg turned bloody black, blue, and purple, that hardened torn muscle and possibly tendon 4 could be felt down the back of his thigh and he was peeing blood. Id.

5 Plaintiff states he believes the events alleged in his complaint “happened” because 6 there is almost no surveillance and he was told the “hole” where he was moved is not 7 recorded, only monitored. Id. at 11. As relief he asks the county to “rectify their policies 8 to create accountability” and for legal counsel to help with “PDRs” as well as 9 $800,000.00 for medical expenses and suffering. Id. He states he feels his safety is at 10 severe risk. Id. 11 The Court notes that on February 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of 12 address with the Court indicating that he had been released from custody. Dkt. 38. 13 Defendants now move for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the remaining 14 claims – contained in Count I. Dkt. 47. Plaintiff has filed a letter in opposition to the

15 motion. Dkt. 56. Defendants have filed a reply. Dkt. 57. 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW 17 A. Summary Judgment 18 Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, discovery, and disclosure materials on 19 file, and any affidavits, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 20 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party is 21 entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient 22 showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the 23 burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is no genuine issue of 1 fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for 2 the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 3 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if 4 there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to

5 resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 6 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 8 doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. The mere existence 9 of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is not sufficient. Triton 10 Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). 11 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

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