Coleman v. IEH Autoparts LLC

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 27, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-03507·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CHANTÉ COLEMAN, Plaintiff, 24-CV-3507 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND IEH AUTOPARTS LLC, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under the court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that her employer discriminated against her. She sues IEH Auto Parts LLC. By order dated May 9, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using the court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form.

She has checked the box on the form to indicate that she is asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and in section of the form that requires her to specify her disability or perceived disability, Plaintiff has written “1995.” (ECF 1, at 4.) She has checked off boxes to indicate that her employer terminated her employment, did not accommodate her disability, retaliated against her, and harassed her or created a hostile work environment. (See id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges, For two years I worked with Autoplus but transfer from NJ to New York due to domestic viol[e]nce partner[.] When I entered Auto Plus in New York I was working with an employee who was training me[.] For one day I realise later on she disagree to give me the information to perform the job so I struggled to complete task as the time went by Auto Plus took action on me and that lead me to be fired after Kayla made a hostile work enviro[n]ment. Auto Plus agreed to whatever Kayla would tell them. Auto Plus asked me to go back to where I came from after them knowing why I came to that facilities from a previous write up I had receive due to my situation. Auto Plus denied me to have a personal leave of absence. I was bullied the 4 months I was there until I was fired.1 (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a Notice of Right to Sue from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which is dated February 21, 2024. (See id. at 9.) Plaintiff does not specify the relief she is seeking. DISCUSSION Because Plaintiff checked off the box to assert claims under the ADA, the Court understands the complaint as attempting to assert claims under that statute. “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A person is disabled under the ADA if the person has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Other federal employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, protect against discrimination based on other protected characteristics, such as race, color, sex, national origin, and age. These federal antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106,

1 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless other indicated. 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Coleman v. IEH Autoparts LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Coleman v. IEH Autoparts LLC (Coleman v. IEH Autoparts LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Kinneary v. City of New York
601 F.3d 151 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)