Cole v. Garner

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 8, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-4239
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHANNON MICHELE COLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-4239 (RDM)

JENILLE GARNER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, bring this suit against a host of Defendants alleging a wide

range of illegal activity linked to Plaintiff Shannon Cole’s November 2025 arrest for theft in

Hamilton County, Tennessee. See generally Dkt. 1 (Compl.); Dkt. 1-2 at 7–8 (Shannon Cole

Decl.). Five of those Defendants—themselves also proceeding pro se—have moved to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. See Dkts. 8, 15. Plaintiffs, for their part,

have moved for an extension of time and for alternative service as to one other Defendant, see

Dkt. 14, and have filed an affidavit seeking a default judgment against several additional

Defendants whom Plaintiffs claim to have served, see Dkt. 17. For the reasons explained below,

the Court will GRANT the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, GRANT in part

and DENY in part the motion for extension/alternative service, and DECLINE to enter a default

judgment because Plaintiffs have neither demonstrated that they have properly effected service

nor established that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the allegedly defaulting Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ pleadings are far from a model of clarity, but their allegations appear to result

from a dispute between Shannon Cole and Jenille Garner, both residents of Tennessee. See Dkt. 1 at 51; Dkt. 1-1 at 4–9; Dkt. 1-8 at 1; Dkt. 15 at 1. Jenille Garner was originally Shannon

Cole’s “closest friend [and] confidant,” Dkt. 1 at 51 (Compl.), but their relationship soured

following a landlord/tenant dispute concerning a property in Hixson, Tennessee that Jenille

Garner and her husband Michael Garner had rented to Jay Escue and Julia Swanson—Shannon

Cole’s son-in-law and daughter. Id. at 24 (Compl.); Dkt. 1-2 at 7 (Shannon Cole Decl.). That

disagreement resulted in civil litigation in Tennessee, in which Shannon Cole served as a witness

for the tenants. Dkt. 1 at 20 (Compl.). Plaintiffs allege that, in retaliation for her testimony, the

Garners and the other Defendants orchestrated Shannon Cole’s arrest “for the explicit purpose of

removing, intimidating, or silencing her as a witness in that civil lawsuit.” Id.

The specific impetus for that arrest resulted from an unrelated quarrel between Shannon

Cole and her neighbors Edgar “Buddy” Johnson III, Sherry Johnson, and Edgar Johnson IV. The

Johnsons owned a black “doodle-type” dog named “Lala,” and Shannon Cole believed that they

were neglecting the dog by leaving her outdoors without shelter, food, or supervision for long

periods of time. Dkt. 1-2 at 6 (Shannon Cole Decl.); Dkt. 1 at 50 (Compl.). After Lala escaped

from the Johnsons’ house and was found in the Cole family’s garage, Shannon Cole declined to

return the dog to the Johnsons and attempted (ultimately unsuccessfully) to locate another family

to adopt her while concealing the dog from the Johnsons (who had reported Lala as stolen). Dkt.

1-2 at 7 (Shannon Cole Decl.). Jenille Garner, at the time still on good terms with the Plaintiffs,

was aware of Shannon Cole’s activities and the two communicated about various stratagems to

deceive the Johnsons in a long-running text conversation. See generally Dkt. 1-5. After they fell

out, however, Jenille Garner spoke with the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department, showed

them the text thread, and told them that Shannon Cole was in possession of the dog. Dkt. 1-1 at

4–8. Plaintiffs allege that Jenille Garner contacted law enforcement “as a premeditated

2 distraction to conceal her own criminal activity” related to the landlord/tenant dispute, and that

she misled the Sheriff’s Deputies “through intentionally distorted narratives.” Dkt. 1 at 51

(Compl.).

Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputies went to Shannon Cole’s house on November 24,

2025. Dkt. 1-1 at 8. They found Lala inside the residence (despite Shannon Cole’s attempt to

conceal the dog’s identity by dyeing her fur to disguise distinctive white markings), took

possession of the dog, and arrested Shannon Cole for theft. Id. at 8–9. Shannon Cole was

transported to the Hamilton County Jail and Detention Center for processing and held in custody

for approximately 11 hours before being released. Dkt. 1-2 at 8 (Shannon Cole Decl.). Her

Tennessee criminal prosecution for the offense is, apparently, ongoing. See, e.g., Dkt. 20 at 2

(discussing a March 10, 2026, court appearance in Shannon Cole’s criminal case).

Plaintiffs—Shannon Cole, her husband Tony Minh Cole, and her daughter Chloe Cole—

then filed this civil suit in December 2025. See generally Dkt. 1 (Compl). They named as

Defendants the Garners, the Johnsons, Matt McAdoo (an attorney who had represented the

Garners in the landlord/tenant dispute), the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department, including

Deputy “L. Brooks,” the Hamilton County Detention Center, Carlos Bail Bonding (whose

identity is not clear from the complaint, but who the Court presumes is a bail bondsman in

Tennessee), the Hamilton County General Sessions Court, Hamilton County General Sessions

Judge Lila Statom (who, at least at one point, appears to have been presiding over Shannon

Cole’s criminal case), and fifty unnamed Doe Defendants. See id. at 1–2 (Compl.). Plaintiffs’

precise claims and causes of action are difficult to parse, but they invoke a variety of

constitutional and statutory provisions and recount the events leading up to Shannon Cole’s

arrest, her conditions of confinement when in custody, and her subsequent prosecution. See id.

3 at 41–43 (Compl.). They seek over $80 million in compensatory damages as well as injunctive

and declaratory relief related to Shannon Cole’s ongoing criminal prosecution. Id.

On January 12, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an affidavit representing that Shannon Cole had

effected service on all Defendants either by employing process servers or through certified mail.

Dkt. 12 at 1. That same day, however, Plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking an extension of the

deadline to complete service on Defendant Matt McAdoo, after the certified mail sent to his

office’s listed address was returned as undelivered by the United States Postal Service, which

indicated that there was no certified recipient at that address. See Dkt. 14. Plaintiffs requested

that the Court extend the deadline to serve McAdoo and/or authorize alternative service

“including service by email, publication, or service to his known private residence or clients.”

Id. at 1.

The Garner and Johnson Defendants, proceeding pro se, filed motions to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. See Dkts. 8, 15. The Court directed Plaintiffs to

respond to those motions, see Dkts. 9, 18, and Plaintiffs opposed the motions, see Dkts. 16, 19.

The Court also entered a minute order directing Plaintiffs to show cause why their complaint

should not be dismissed without prejudice for noncompliance with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8, Min. Order (Jan. 16, 2026), which Plaintiffs (briefly) addressed in their opposition

to the Garners’ motion to dismiss, see Dkt. 19 at 4. While the motions to dismiss were being

briefed, Plaintiffs also filed a further affidavit representing that Shannon Cole had effected

service (via certified mail) on Carlos Bail Bonding and the Hamilton County governmental

Defendants and that the deadline for those Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the

complaint had passed. Dkt. 17 at 3. Plaintiffs, accordingly, requested that the Court enter a

default judgment against those Defendants. Id. at 1.

4 II. ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The Court begins with the two pending motions to dismiss. Both motions seek to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which authorizes a

defendant to move to dismiss a suit for lack of personal jurisdiction.1 Dkt. 8 at 1; Dkt. 15 at 1.

To determine whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident persons such as the

Garners and Johnsons, the Court engages in a two-part inquiry. GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v.

BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). First, the Court must determine whether

it has personal jurisdiction by reference to the law of the forum state, here the District of

Columbia. United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see Fuld v. Palestine

Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 11 (2025) (“[F]ederal courts ordinarily follow state law in

determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” (citation modified)). Second, if the

first step is satisfied, the Court must assess “whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the

constitutional requirements of due process.” GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347. The

plaintiff—who bears “the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over the defendant,” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y., 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir.

1990)—may carry that burden either by asserting general jurisdiction, “extend[ing] to any and all

claims brought against a defendant,” or specific jurisdiction, requiring that “[t]he plaintiff’s

claims . . . arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” Ford Motor Co. v.

Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358–59 (2021) (citation modified).

1 Because the Court will grant the Garner Defendants’ and the Johnson Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, it need not address the alternative arguments raised in those motions.

5 Here, the Court can dispense with the discussion of D.C. law and proceed directly to the

question of due process. Because the Garners and Johnsons represent (consistent with the

complaint) that they are residents of Tennessee, Dkt. 8 at 1–2; Dkt. 15 at 1, and Plaintiffs do not

contend otherwise, see Dkts. 16, 19, Plaintiffs’ only available option is to demonstrate that the

Garners or Johnsons are subject to the Court’s specific personal jurisdiction, see Fuld, 606 U.S.

at 12 (“General jurisdiction lies in the forum where the defendant is domiciled or fairly regarded

as at home.” (citation modified)). “Under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, specific personal

jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff shows ‘minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum

establishing that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.’” Adler v. Lloyd, 496 F. Supp. 3d 269, 276 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting GTE New

Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1347)).

Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden on either point. First, the complaint does not

allege that any of the Garners or Johnsons have any connection to the District of Columbia

whatsoever, let alone contacts amounting to “purposefully avail[ing] [themselves] of the

privilege of conducting activities within the [District].” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359

(citation modified). Second, even if some of the Garners or Johnsons had engaged in some

(unmentioned) activities within the District, there is no alleged “affiliation between the forum

and the underlying controversy.” Id. (citation modified). Plaintiffs’ claims, which concern an

arrest and criminal prosecution (in Tennessee) for the theft of a dog (in Tennessee), that is

alleged to have been orchestrated in retaliation for Shannon Cole’s testimony in civil litigation

(in Tennessee) involving a landlord/tenant dispute (in Tennessee), has no discernable nexus to

the District of Columbia.

6 Plaintiffs’ oppositions to the motions to dismiss also fail to identify any qualifying link

between the Garner and Johnson Defendants, the District of Columbia, and this litigation. In

their opposition to the Johnsons’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs primarily argue that the Court may

exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction over any Defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 because

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants are engaged in an enterprise under the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Dkt. 16 at 1–3. But

even assuming (simply for the sake of argument) that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the

existence of a RICO enterprise and have otherwise satisfied the pleading requirements for

bringing a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1965, Plaintiffs’ theory would still fail because section

1965(b)’s provision for nationwide service of process in RICO cases requires that the Court first

“have personal jurisdiction over at least one of the participants in the alleged multidistrict

conspiracy and the plaintiff must show that there is no other district in which a court will have

personal jurisdiction over all of the alleged co-conspirators.” FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Markets,

Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Although Plaintiffs assert that

“one or more RICO defendants are properly before the Court,” Dkt. 16 at 2, they fail to explain

how any of the Tennessee-based Defendants named in their complaint are properly subject to the

Court’s personal jurisdiction.2 Nor have they attempted to demonstrate that no other federal

district court—such as the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee,

which covers the locations discussed in their complaint—could exercise personal jurisdiction

over all of the Defendants.

2 For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ references to conspiracy jurisdiction are unavailing. Plaintiffs have not established that any purported member of their alleged conspiracy has engaged in any case-related activities in the District of Columbia.

7 In Plaintiffs’ second opposition to the motions to dismiss, they do assert in a conclusory

fashion that Defendants have “minimum contacts” with the District and that their conduct has

created a “substantial connection” with the District. Dkt. 19 at 2. But Plaintiffs do not identify

what those purported forum-related contacts are or offer any basis for the Court to credit their

unsupported, conclusory assertions. Plaintiffs’ brief might perhaps be read as suggesting that the

Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because their conduct allegedly has affected

Plaintiffs’ “federal rights.” Id. But even accepting that generous reading of their brief, the fact

that Plaintiffs have alleged that this case involves “the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, concerns this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, not its

personal jurisdiction over Defendants. The fact that Plaintiffs may be entitled to have their case

heard in federal court rather than state court does not empower them to force Defendants to

litigate the matter in the District of Columbia, rather than in federal court in Tennessee or

another qualifying forum.

The Court will therefore grant the Garners’ and Johnsons’ motions to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction.

B. Service

The Court next considers the pending service-related requests. First, the Court will

decline to enter Plaintiffs’ requested default judgment against Carlos Bail Bonding and the

Hamilton County governmental Defendants (the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department and its

employees, the Hamilton County Detention Center, the Hamilton County General Sessions

Court, and Judge Lila Statom). See Dkt. 17. As far as the Court can discern, Plaintiffs have not

served these Defendants in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, which authorizes

“[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and not a party [to] serve a summons and complaint.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ filings, however, suggest that Shannon Cole 8 herself—a party to this litigation—served the Defendants at issue via certified mail, which is not

permitted by Rule 4. Dkt. 12 at 1; Dkt. 17 at 3; see Johnson-Richardson v. Univ. of Phoenix, 334

F.R.D. 349, 357 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[Rule 4] does not permit a party . . . to personally serve a

summons and complaint, even if the party is permitted to do so under the relevant state law.”).

Moreover, even if Plaintiffs do succeed in effecting service on these Defendants in

compliance with Rule 4, the Court may not enter a default judgment against a party who fails to

appear until the Court first “satisf[ies] itself that it has personal jurisdiction . . . [over] an absent

defendant.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005). For similar reasons to those

discussed above, the complaint offers no grounds for the Court to conclude that any of the

Defendants at issue—all of whom are located in Tennessee—have any contacts with the District

of Columbia, or that Plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of or relate to” any such contact. Ford Motor

Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (citation modified).

The Court will also deny Plaintiffs’ request to authorize alternative service of Defendant

Matt McAdoo. See Dkt. 14. The Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs’ solitary (unsuccessful)

effort to serve McAdoo via certified mail (which, in any event, appears to have been

noncompliant with Rule 4 for the same reasons as Plaintiffs’ other attempts to effect service by

certified mail) justifies resort to alternative methods of service at this time.3 Plaintiffs have not

established that they have made diligent efforts to serve McAdoo in compliance with Rule 4, or

3 At times, Plaintiffs have also requested that the Court direct the U.S. Marshals to effect service on Defendants. See, e.g., Dkt. 19 at 3. The Court declines to do so. Plaintiffs are not proceeding in forma pauperis, and their conclusory and speculative assertions that they face unspecified safety risks in effecting service on some/all of the Defendants are insufficient to relieve Plaintiffs of their obligation to serve Defendants in compliance with Rule 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). That is particularly so where, as here, the Court has serious doubts as to whether Plaintiffs’ complaint states a plausible claim to relief, and where the basis for the Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Defendants is unclear.

9 that D.C. or Tennessee law authorizes their suggested alternative methods of service. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (authorizing service “following state law for serving a summons in an action

brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

service is made”).

The Court will, however, grant Plaintiffs’ request for an extension of time to effect

service on Matt McAdoo, as well as the other Defendants whom Plaintiffs have failed to serve in

compliance with Rule 4. The Court will allow Plaintiffs until July 6, 2026, to file proof of

service.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Garners’ motion to dismiss, which is captioned as a

“Supplemental Clarification in Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,” Dkt. 19 at 1,

invites the Court to consider that filing “as either an interpretive memorandum or a permissible

amendment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),” id. at 4. The Court will not construe Plaintiffs’

“Supplemental Clarification” as an amended complaint. To the extent that Plaintiffs do seek to

amend their complaint, they, like other pro se litigants, must comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and the Court’s local rules and standing order. See Jarell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp.

237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Accordingly, if Plaintiffs do move to amend their complaint, they must

comply with Rule 10 (which requires stating claims in numbered paragraphs), Rules 8 and

12(b)(6) (which require that a complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted with

sufficient clarity to place the defendants and the court on notice regarding the plaintiff’s theory

of relief), and with the Court’s standing order (which requires that an amended pleading include

a redline comparison between the original and amended filing). See Dkt. 3 at 3.4

4 Because this opinion solely deals with the pending motions related to service and personal jurisdiction, the Court does not decide whether Plaintiffs’ current complaint merits dismissal

10 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Johnson Defendants’ motion

to dismiss, Dkt. 8, and the Garner Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, are GRANTED. It is

further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for extension and for alternative service, Dkt. 14, is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs shall file proof of service of all Defendants,

in compliance with Rule 4, on or before July 6, 2026. Failure to do so may result in the

dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: May 8, 2026

under Rule 8, see Min. Order (Jan. 16, 2026), or Rule 12(b)(6), or for failing to comply with Rule 10(b)’s requirement that that “a plaintiff break[] his or her complaint down into a series of discrete factual allegations” contained in numbered paragraphs, Matthews v. McDonough, No. 21-cv-1607, 2023 WL 4174319, at *1 (D.D.C. June 26, 2023) (collecting cases). The Court notes, however, that it is far from clear that Plaintiffs’ current complaint can withstand scrutiny under the governing rules.