In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00231-CV ___________________________
COLBY SKYLER GUY RIDEOUT, Appellant
V.
HALLIE FRAZIER RIDEOUT, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CL2024146
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Colby Skyler Guy Rideout challenges a protective order entered
against him for the protection of Appellee Hallie Frazier Rideout under Chapter 7B of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Raising two issues, Colby1 argues (1) that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision to
issue the protective order and (2) that the statutes underpinning the protective order
are unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Hallie and Colby were previously married and have a son together; they
divorced in October 2020.
In June 2021, Hallie moved from Cleburne to Granbury to “start over” with
her son. Shortly thereafter, Colby began attending Hallie’s church even though she
had told him that she “didn’t want him to come [into] that space.” Hallie asked him
to at least go to a different service, but Colby refused and continued to sit “caddy-
corner” from her in church and to repeatedly look back at her while she was trying to
worship. He also started attending a “Sunday school class that shared a wall with
[hers].”
Because the parties share the same surname, we refer to them by their first 1
names to avoid confusion. See, e.g., Est. of Meyers, No. 02-25-00189-CV, 2025 WL 3723746, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2 In August 2023, Hallie and Colby’s son began playing soccer. Colby drove
from Cleburne to Granbury to watch not only each game but also each 30-minute
practice session and always made it a point to sit right next to Hallie. Each time that
she got up to move because she felt uncomfortable, he picked up his chair to follow
her.
One night after the soccer team’s pictures were taken, Hallie took their son to
Sonic. According to Hallie, as she was trying to exit the parking lot, Colby blocked
her vehicle with his truck and angrily confronted her about failing to tell him about
the team pictures.
In October 2023, Hallie filed a motion to enforce Colby’s child-support
obligations because he had failed to make his required payments. In December 2023,
Hallie and Colby entered into a Rule 11 agreement that resolved the child-support-
enforcement motion and required them to communicate exclusively through
AppClose.2 The day after the Rule 11 agreement was signed, Colby sent Hallie a
message informing her that he was moving to the neighborhood “right behind” hers
in Granbury. After moving to Granbury, Colby joined Hallie’s gym, showed up at a
restaurant while she was eating, and shopped at the same grocery stores.
AppClose is a co-parenting communication app that “securely and 2
automatically” time-stamps, encrypts, and stores every message. See AppClose, https://www.appclose.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2026).
3 After Hallie and Colby began communicating on AppClose, Colby sent Hallie
numerous messages criticizing her parenting skills, telling her that she was a horrible
mother, and attacking her family. Hallie testified that Colby’s constant messaging
“ma[de her] feel really scared” and that the torrent of messages was unrelenting.
Hallie stated that she had asked Colby to stop messaging her so much but that he had
not heeded her request.
In January 2024, Hallie visited a different church in Granbury because Colby
had made her uncomfortable at her current one. Right after the service, she received
a message from Colby stating that her Jeep was really easy to spot from the highway at
the new church and that if she decided to start taking their son to a different church,
Colby would “follow [him] wherever he went.”3 This frightened Hallie because she
had not told anyone that she would be visiting the new church.
In March 2024, in lieu of probation for failing to pay child support, Colby
agreed to a list of permanent injunctions, including one forbidding him from coming
within 30 feet of Hallie without written consent. In May 2024, Colby stood within 30
feet of Hallie at one of their son’s baseball practices and repeatedly tried to talk to her.
Colby stayed well after the practice ended, continued to hang around their son, and
insisted that he walk Hallie and their son to her vehicle. When Hallie asked Colby to
say goodbye to their son at the baseball field and reminded him that he was not
Colby had possession of their son at the time. Hallie had visited the new 3
church by herself.
4 supposed to be within 30 feet of her, Colby refused to say goodbye and asserted that
Hallie had consented to his being within 30 feet of her by coming up to talk to him.
He then became agitated and “started getting in [Hallie’s] face and raising his voice.”
Hallie feared that Colby “was going to get physical.” One of her male friends
eventually walked Colby to his truck to deescalate the situation.
Hallie testified that Colby had been arrested in September 2024 for harassing
her. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a). Around the time of Colby’s arrest, Hallie filed an
application for a protective order. The trial court signed a temporary ex parte order
and set the application for hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court found that
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Colby had committed the offense of
stalking against Hallie and signed a final protective order preventing him from, among
other things, going within 200 feet of Hallie, her residence, or her place of
employment for two years. After a series of motions and countermotions, the trial
court signed an amended final protective order removing or striking language
restricting Colby’s ability to own or possess a firearm. Colby then appealed from the
amended order.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Colby contends that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s protective order. We disagree.
5 1. Standard of Review
When, as here, the trial court acts as factfinder, we review its findings under the
familiar legal- and factual-sufficiency standards. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex.
2000); see also Watts v. Adviento, No. 02-17-00424-CV, 2019 WL 1388534, at *3 n.3
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
a. Legal Sufficiency
We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence
challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of
law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to
prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn
v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018); Huskins v. Garcia, No. 02-21-00328-CV,
2022 WL 3905083, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In determining whether legally sufficient evidence supports the challenged finding, we
must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and
we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent.
Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible
from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658
(quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).
6 b. Factual Sufficiency
When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to
support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all
the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the
finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that
the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176
(Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). If reversing for factual
insufficiency, we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and
clearly state why the finding is factually insufficient—that is, why the evidence
supporting the finding is so weak or is so against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence that the finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly
demonstrates bias. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.
Findings of fact are the exclusive province of the factfinder. Bellefonte
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1986). Acting as factfinder,
the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be
given to their testimony. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761
(Tex. 2003). An appellate court must not substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder. Id.
7 2. Analysis
Hallie’s application for protective order was brought under Chapter 7B of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. When an application is filed under that chapter,
the trial court must find whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
applicant is the victim of sexual assault or abuse, indecent assault, stalking, or
trafficking. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7B.003(a). If the court finds that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has been the victim of stalking, “the
court shall issue a protective order that includes a statement of the required findings.”
Id. art. 7B.003(b); see id. arts. 7B.001(a)(1), .052.
As relevant here, a person commits the offense of stalking “if the person, on
more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is
directed at a specific other person, knowingly engages in conduct that” (1) constitutes
harassment under Penal Code Section 42.07; (2) causes the other person “to feel
harassed, terrified, intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or
offended”; and (3) would cause a reasonable person “to feel harassed, terrified,
intimidated, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended” under
the circumstances. Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a)(1), (2)(B), (3)(D); see Garza v. Renteria,
726 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). Under Penal
Code Section 42.07, the following conduct constitutes harassment if done “with intent
to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another”: (1) “send[ing]
repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy,
8 alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another” or (2) “track[ing] or
monitor[ing] the personal property or motor vehicle of another person, without the
other person’s effective consent.” Tex. Penal Code § 42.07(a)(7), (9).
As detailed above, Hallie presented evidence that Colby, among other things,
(1) had been arrested for harassing her, (2) had sent her repeated electronic
communications attacking her parenting skills and the members of her family, (3) had
refused to stop messaging her after she asked him to stop, and (4) had tracked or
monitored the location of her vehicle. Thus, Hallie presented credible evidence that
Colby had harassed her. See id. She also testified that Colby’s harassing conduct had
alarmed and frightened her. See id. § 42.072(a)(2)(B). And as the trial court pointed
out, Colby’s incessant messaging combined with his other behavior—such as trying to
sit next to Hallie at their son’s baseball practices even after she told him that it makes
her uncomfortable and his refusal to attend a different church (or even a different
service)—would cause a reasonable person to feel harassed, intimidated, and annoyed.
See id. § 42.072(a)(3)(D).
Thus, considering the entire record and applying the applicable standard of
review, we conclude that the credible evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Hallie had been the victim of stalking
was not so weak that the finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly
demonstrates bias. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635. Accordingly, the evidence supporting
the trial court’s protective order is factually sufficient—and, by extension, legally
9 sufficient.4 See id.; see also S.B. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 654 S.W.3d 246,
252 (Tex. App.—Austin 2022, pets. denied) (“Evidence that is factually sufficient to
support a trial court’s finding necessarily satisfies the legal-sufficiency standard.”).
We overrule Colby’s first issue.
B. Constitutional Complaint
In his second issue, Colby contends that the statutes underpinning the
protective order are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to him. Specifically,
he asserts that (1) because Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure—
which incorporates Penal Code Section 47.072—authorizes the issuance of a
protective order even in the absence of a showing that the defendant “represents a
credible threat to the safety” of the applicant and (2) because Penal Code Section
46.04(c) makes it a criminal offense for a person who is subject to a Chapter 7B
4 Colby argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s protective order because (1) Hallie “admitted her allegations of family violence were ‘not true’ and asked the trial court to remove any family[-]violence finding” from the protective order and (2) because the trial court’s decision to amend the protective order to remove language restricting Colby’s right to possess a firearm “show[s] that there was no ‘concern’ about [his] firearm possession and therefore no physical threat.” But this argument ignores the language of Article 7B.003(b), which, as noted, requires a trial court to issue a protective order if it finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant was the victim of stalking. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7B.003(b). No family-violence or ongoing-physical-threat finding is necessary. See id.; see also id. art. 7B.052 (providing that a trial court “shall issue a protective order . . . if, in lieu of a finding that family violence occurred . . . , the court finds that . . . probable cause exists to believe” that a stalking offense was committed and “the nature of the scheme or course of conduct engaged in by the defendant in committing the [stalking] offense indicates the defendant is likely in the future” to engage in conduct prohibited by the stalking statute (emphasis added)).
10 protective order to possess a firearm, the statutory scheme violates his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 7B.003,
.052(b); Tex. Penal Code §§ 46.04(c), 47.072; see also U.S. Const. amend. II. We
disagree.
1. Standard of Review
When evaluating the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that it complies
with both the United States and Texas Constitutions. EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar,
601 S.W.3d 744, 754 (Tex. 2020). The party challenging a statute’s constitutionality
bears a “high burden” to show that it is unconstitutional. Id. (quoting Patel v. Tex.
Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015)).
There are two types of challenges to a statute’s constitutionality: facial
challenges and as-applied challenges. Lund v. Giauque, 416 S.W.3d 122, 127 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); see Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893
S.W.2d 504, 518 & n.16 (Tex. 1995). A facial challenge asserts that a statute, by its
terms, always operates unconstitutionally. Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera, 445 S.W.3d 698,
702 (Tex. 2014); In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 655 (Tex. 2005) (to prevail
on a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, a party “bears the heavy
burden” of showing that the statute “is unconstitutional in every possible
application”). An as-applied challenge asserts that a statute, while generally
constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to the claimant because of his particular
circumstances. Tenet Hosps., 445 S.W.3d at 702; Lund, 416 S.W.3d at 127.
11 We review a constitutional challenge de novo as a question of law. Philipp v.
Methodist Hosps. of Dall., No. 05-21-00350-CV, 2022 WL 2448118, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas July 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610,
615 (Tex. 2011)); Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Live Oak Brewing Co., 537 S.W.3d
647, 654 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, pet. denied). Nevertheless, “the determination [of
a statute’s constitutionality] will in most instances require [us] to consider the entire
record, including evidence offered by the parties.” Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 87.
2. Analysis
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Thus, it confers “an individual right to keep
and bear arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799
(2008); United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2012). But this right is not
unlimited. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2799, 2816.
We have previously rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the firearm
restrictions in a Chapter 7B (formerly Chapter 7A)5 protective order. See Wargocz v.
Brewer, No. 02-17-00178-CV, 2018 WL 4924755, at *6–9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
5 Prior to January 1, 2021, the statutes currently codified in Chapter 7B were in Chapter 7A, which was repealed and reenacted in Chapter 7B in a nonsubstantive revision. See Act of May 21, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 469, art. 1, § 1.02, art. 3, § 3.01, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 1065, 1066, 1151; see also Caldwell v. State ex rel. Zimmerman, No. 03-22-00464-CV, 2024 WL 3906789, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 23, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
12 Oct. 11, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).6 And we have also rejected a facial Second
Amendment challenge to Penal Code Section 46.04. See Ex parte Huell, 704 S.W.3d
246, 248–50 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2024, no pet.).7 As those opinions make clear,
the core right protected by the Second Amendment is the right of responsible, law-
abiding citizens to carry a firearm outside the home, and someone—like Colby—
found to have committed a stalking offense cannot be considered a law-abiding,
responsible citizen. See Huell, 704 S.W.3d at 249; Wargocz, 2018 WL 4924755, at *7.
Accordingly, to withstand Colby’s Second Amendment attack, the challenged statutes
must merely satisfy intermediate—not strict—scrutiny. See Wargocz, 2018 WL
4924755, at *7. Thus, to the extent that they reasonably fit a substantial statutory
objective, they pass constitutional muster. See id. at *8 (citing Chapman, 666 F.3d at
228).
In Wargocz, we recognized that Chapter 7B reasonably fit the substantial
statutory objective of protecting stalking victims and allowing them to seek protection
The appellant in Wargocz raised only an as-applied challenge. See 2018 WL 6
4924755, at *6. But our rejection of the appellant’s as-applied challenge necessarily implies that any facial challenge to Chapter 7B’s constitutionality would likewise fail. See City of South Padre Island v. Surfvive, No. 13-20-00536-CV, 2022 WL 2069216, at *8 n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 9, 2022), review denied, 678 S.W.3d 727 (Tex. 2023) (mem. op.).
Although the appellant in Huell had been convicted of possessing a firearm 7
under Penal Code Section 46.04(a), see 704 S.W.3d at 247, we framed the appellant’s complaint as a challenge to Section 46.04 as a whole, and our reasoning is equally applicable to Section 46.04(c), see id. at 248–50.
13 from their stalkers. See id. at *8–9. And by prohibiting stalkers subject to protective
orders from possessing firearms, Penal Code Section 46.04 works in conjunction with
Chapter 7B to achieve this statutory objective. Because the challenged statutes
reasonably fit a substantial statutory objective, they are not facially unconstitutional.8
See id. at *8 (citing Chapman, 666 F.3d at 225). And because we have already
determined that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that Colby had stalked Hallie, his as-applied
challenge also fails. See Netaji v. Roberts, No. 03-19-00840-CV, 2021 WL 5312489, at
*11 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 12, 2021) (mem. op.) (“Our analysis of whether the
stalking and harassment statutes are unconstitutional as applied to
[appellant] . . . dovetails with a legal sufficiency analysis concerning whether there was
8 Citing the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in United States v. Rahimi, Colby argues that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional because they allow for the restriction of a stalker’s right to keep and bear arms even in the absence of a finding that he “‘represents a credible threat to the safety’ of another.” See 602 U.S. 680, 699, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1901–02 (2024). But in Rahimi, the Supreme Court actually upheld a federal law temporarily disarming persons subject to restraining orders. See id. at 697– 98, 144 S. Ct. at 1901. Because the federal statute at issue in Rahimi bars a person subject to a protective order from possessing a firearm only if the order contains an explicit finding “that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety” of a protected person, the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on whether an individual found by a court to pose such a threat could be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment. See id. at 685–86, 702, 144 S. Ct. at 1894, 1903. But by holding that a person explicitly found to pose such a threat can be temporarily disarmed, the Supreme Court did not—as Colby suggests—hold that such a finding was a prerequisite to disarmament under the Second Amendment. See id. at 702, 144 S. Ct. at 1903 (recognizing the limited nature of the court’s holding).
14 any evidence that his conduct constituted stalking to support issuance of the
protective order.” (internal quotations omitted)).
We overrule Colby’s second issue.
III. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Colby’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s protective
order.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice
Delivered: May 14, 2026