TYSON, Judge.
James and Charlotte Coker, Robert and Rebecca Darconte, and Donald and Bonita Shoe (collectively, “plaintiffs”) appeal order granting judgment on the pleadings to DaimlerChrysler Corporation (“defendant”). We affirm.
I. Background
On 8 May 2001, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against defendant as owners of model years 1995 through 2000 minivans manufactured by defendant. These minivans did not include a brake shift interlock device (“BSI”). Plaintiffs sought damages to install BSIs, to compel defendant to both notify its customers of the lack of BSIs and [388]*388install-them, treble damages, attorneys’ fees, compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest, and costs of suit.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint defines a BSI as “a device that prevents a vehicle with an automatic transmission from being moved out of ‘park,’ which keeps the transmission from being engaged, until the driver depresses the brake pedal.” Plaintiffs assert the BSI ensures that “the vehicle is not . inadvertently moved into reverse or drive, whether by a driver or a passenger, including a child who may attempt to move the transmission lever while playing in the vehicle.”
Plaintiffs allege defendant promoted its minivans to be the “safest in the world” and emphasized their vehicles go “beyond government requirements to ensure that the best available safety devices are used to protect its customers.” Plaintiffs argue defendant intentionally failed to disclose to its customers that its minivans for the years stated did not include BSIs. Plaintiffs assert defendant declined to include BSIs despite both its own safety leadership team recommending them and that BSIs were becoming an industry standard. Plaintiffs also allege defendant continued to market its minivans as “the safest in the world” even without installing BSIs.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sought recovery for: (1) violations of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“NC UDTPA”); and (2) common law fraud and demanded: (1) compensation for their “ascertainable loss” which “includes the cost of installing the BSI in Chrysler minivans and/or the difference in value between minivans with the BSI and those without it;” and (2) defendant “to install the BSI in the minivans of Plaintiffs and Class members.”
Plaintiffs expressly excluded from their amended complaint any allegation of personal injury or property damage. Plaintiffs also did not allege: (1) they had already installed the BSIs and were seeking reimbursement compensation; (2) they sold, or attempted to sell, their vehicles at a diminished price; (3) they have ever “inadvertently moved [their vehicles] into reverse or drive;” or (4) their vehicles have been damaged by any “inadvertent” shifting into reverse or drive.
On 15 April 2003, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court designated this case as a complex business matter under Rules 2.1 and 2;2 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice, and referred it to the North Carolina Business Court (“Business Court”). On 20 April 2003, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the plead[389]*389ings under Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs filed a “motion” and memorandum in opposition. Following oral argument, the Business Court concluded: (1) plaintiffs lack standing to bring the action since they have suffered no injury in fact; (2) the economic loss rule bars plaintiffs’ claims; and (3) plaintiffs’ claims are preempted and barred by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It entered an “Opinion and Order” on 5 January 2004 granting defendant’s motion and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs appeal.
II. Issue
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
HI. Abandoned Assignments of Error
Plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned assignment of error number three, regarding preemption by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle and Safety Act of 1966, and number four, preemption under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2004). These assignments of error are dismissed.
IV. Standard of Review
Plaintiffs argue the Business Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings when it concluded: (1) plaintiffs lack standing; and (2) plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the economic loss doctrine.
Under a motion for judgment on the pleadings:
[t]he trial court may consider, “only the pleadings and exhibits which are attached and incorporated into the pleadings” in ruling on the motion. Helms v. Holland, 124 N.C. App. 629, 633, 478 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1996) (citing Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 78, 318 S.E.2d 865, 867, disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 558 (1984)). “ ‘No evidence is to be heard, and the trial judge is not to consider statements of fact in the briefs of the parties or the testimony of allegations by the parties in different proceedings.’ ” Helms, 124 N.C. App. at 633, 478 S.E.2d at 516 (quoting Minor, 70 N.C. App. at 78, 318 S.E.2d at 867).
Davis v. Durham Mental Health/Development Disabilities/Substance Abuse Area Auth., 165 N.C. App. 100, 104, 598 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2004).
[390]*390The purpose of Rule 12(c) is “to dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of merit.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2003). Judgment on the pleadings is proper when all of the material issues of fact are admitted in the pleadings, and only questions of law remain. Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499.
This Court reviews such a grant by determining “whether the moving party has shown that no material issue of fact exists upon the pleadings and that he is clearly entitled to judgment.” Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 532, 571 S.E.2d 52, 57 (2002) (citing Garrett v. Winfree, 120 N.C. App. 689, 463 S.E.2d 411 (1995)). “All factual allegations in the non-movant’s pleadings are deemed admitted except those that are legally impossible or not admissible in evidence.” Governor’s Club, Inc. v. Governors Club Ltd. P'ship, 152 N.C. App. 240, 247, 567 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2002) (citing Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 359 S.E.2d 792 (1987)), aff’d per curiam, 357 N.C. 46, 577 S.E.2d 620 (2003).
Here, neither party asserts any issue of material fact exists based on the pleadings considered by the Business Court. Rather, defendant argues whether the Business Court properly concluded as a matter of law: (1) plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims under the NC UDTPA and common law fraud; and (2) the economic loss doctrine bars plaintiffs’ claims. See Creek Pointe Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Happ, 146 N.C. App. 159, 164, 552 S.E.2d 220, 224-25 (2001) (whether a complainant has standing is a question of law), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 161, 568 S.E.2d 191 (2002).
Our review of the Business Court’s order is de novo. Fuller v. Easley, 145 N.C. App. 391, 395, 553 S.E.2d 43, 46 (2001); Falk Integrated Tech., Inc. v. Stack, 132 N.C. App. 807, 809, 513 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1999). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [court].” In re Appeal of the Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)).
V. Standing
“Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court’s proper exercise of subject matter jurisdiction.” Street v. Smart Corp., 157 N.C. App. [391]*391303, 305, 578 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2003) (internal quotation omitted). “Standing refers to whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy such that he or she may properly seek adjudication of the matter.” American Woodland Indus., Inc. v. Tolson, 155 N.C. App. 624, 626, 574 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2002) (citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 61, 579 S.E.2d 283 (2003). It requires “ ‘that the plaintiff have been injured or threatened by injury or have a statutory right to institute an action.’ ” Bruggeman v. Meditrust Co., L.L.C., 165 N.C. App. 790, 795, 600 S.E.2d 507, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Baby Boy Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 541, 345 S.E.2d 404, 410, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986)). “If a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.” Estate of Apple v. Commer. Courier Express, Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16 (citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 632, 613 S.E.2d 688 (2005). “The ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing contains three elements: (1) ‘injury in fact’...; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 52 (2002) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992)), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 628 (2003); Beachcomber Props., L.L.C. v. Station One, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 820, 823, 611 S.E.2d 191, 193 (2005). Whether standing exists most often turns on whether the party has alleged an “injury in fact” in light of the applicable statutes or case law. Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 52 (citations omitted). As the party invoking jurisdiction, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the elements of standing. Id.
A. Iniurv in Fact
An injury in fact is required for both standing and to support claims under the NC UDTPA and fraud. An injury in fact is “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . .” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 364) (emphasis supplied). To be imminent, an injury must “proceed with a high degree of immediacy, so as to reduce the possibility of deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, n.2. The injury in fact must be “distinct and palpable — and conversely that it not be abstract or conjectural or [392]*392hypothetical.” In re Ezzell, 113 N.C. App. 388, 392, 438 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
B. Scope of Review
Plaintiffs argue three theories as evidence that they have suffered “injuries in fact.” First, they contend their loss is the future “cost of installing the brake shift interlock in Chrysler minivans and/or the difference in value between minivans with the brake shift interlock device and those without it.” Second, plaintiffs assert they are at “a heightened risk of injury” due to their minivans not including a BSI. Third, they assert their “injury in fact” occurred upon their purchase of the vehicles.
Under our review of the Business Court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ amended complaint, we consider the same allegations and arguments present at the trial level and properly presented here. Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 417, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (the pleadings have a binding effect as to the underlying theories of the case); Parrish v. Bryant, 237 N.C. 256, 259, 74 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1953) (“The theory upon which a case is tried in the lower court must prevail in considering the appeal and interpreting the record and determining the validity of the exceptions.”); see also Davis, 165 N.C. App. at 104, 598 S.E.2d at 240 (under a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings, the trial court considers only the pleadings before it).
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint fails to allege their last two arguments on appeal: (1) “heightened risk of injury;” and (2) any injury in fact upon purchase of their vehicles. State v. Hunter, 305 N.C. 106, 112, 286 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1982) (“The theory upon which a case is tried in the lower court must control in construing the record and determining the validity of the exceptions.”)
Our review of plaintiffs’ assertion of an injury in fact is limited to their sole argument in the amended complaint and before the Business Court, “the cost of installing the brake shift interlock in Chrysler minivans and/or the difference in value between minivans with the brake shift interlock device and those without it.” Plaintiffs cannot assert a new and different theory here. Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934) (“An examination of the record discloses that the cause was not tried upon that theory, and the law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount [on appeal].”); see also State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190, 195, 473 S.E.2d 3, 6 (1996) (“[I]t is well settled in this juris[393]*393diction that [a party] cannot argue for the first time on appeal [a] new ground . . . that he did not present to the trial court.”), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 848, 539 S.E.2d 647 (1999); see also Anderson, 356 N.C. at 417, 572 S.E.2d at 102 (the pleadings have a binding effect as to the underlying theories of the case).
C. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries in Fact
Plaintiffs argue they have suffered injuries in fact due to the future “cost of installing the brake shift interlock in Chrysler minivans and/or the difference in value between minivans with the brake shift interlock device and those without it.” Plaintiffs rely heavily on Coley v. Champion Home Builders Co. as authority to support their allegation that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. 162 N.C. App. 163, 590 S.E.2d 20, disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 542, 599 S.E.2d 41 (2004).
In Coley, the plaintiffs purchased a mobile home from the defendant, a mobile home manufacturer. 162 N.C. App. at 165, 590 S.E.2d at 21. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development required “all mobile home manufacturers to designate in their consumer manual at least one method to support and anchor their mobile homes.” Id. at 164-65, 590 S.E.2d at 21. The defendant set forth in its consumer manuals and instructed “retailers of its mobile homes to inform purchasers that the homes are safe and secure when installed with the soil anchor tie-down system . . . .” Id. at 165, 590 S.E.2d at 21. The defendant made these recommendations and instructions despite knowing “the soil anchor tie-down system [was] defectively designed and [did not] safely secure a mobile home in high winds.” Id.
The plaintiffs in Coley brought suit against the defendant for unfair and deceptive trade practices under Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes, deriving from the misrepresentation. Id. at 164, 590 S.E.2d at 21. They argued the defendant should pay “the costs [the plaintiffs] . . . incurred to purchase and install the defective soil anchor/tie-down system or . . . the costs [to] retro-fit their tie-down system to one that provides a safe and reliable method to secure the homes . ...” Id. at 166, 590 S.E.2d at 22. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), due to the plaintiffs not making a “sufficient allegation of actual injury . . . .” Id. at 165-66, 590 S.E.2d at 22.
[394]*394On appeal, this Court determined:
The soil anchor tie-down system specified for use with their mobile homes is “defective and unreasonably dangerous in that it does not meet the minimum resistance standards set forth by federal and state regulations.” As a result of this defect, plaintiffs are exposed to the risk of personal injury and property damage during high winds. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that Champion has led plaintiffs to believe that their homes are safe and secure when the soil anchor tie-down system is in use. Plaintiffs have been damaged by purchasing a system that does not meet HUD standards, and they will incur expenses to procure a replacement system to properly secure their homes.
Id. at 165, 590 S.E.2d at 21-22. “When viewed in the light most favorable to [the] plaintiffs,” this Court determined the complaint set forth “a sufficient allegation of actual injury to state a claim ....” Id. at 167, 590 S.E.2d at 22.
Coley is readily distinguishable from the facts at bar. First, federal safety regulations do not require use of BSIs in vehicles for the years at issue. Second, defendant never specifically claimed nor warranted that its minivans were equipped with BSIs. Third, plaintiffs present no allegations or argument that defendant’s vehicles are defective without BSIs. Fourth, plaintiffs admit they did not request, contract for, or even know about BSIs when purchasing their vehicles. Fifth, plaintiffs received exactly what they contracted for, a minivan without a BSI. Sixth, none of plaintiffs ever purchased a BSI or sold their vehicle at a diminished value. Based on these distinguishing factors, Coley does not compel reversal of the Business Court’s order under Rule 12(c).
Plaintiffs cite as persuasive authority Angelino v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Case No. GIC 785729 (Ca. Super. Ct., Dec. 11, 2002), Bell v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Case No. CV003457 (Ten. Cir. Ct., June 4, 2002), and Solarz v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Case No. 2033 (Penn. CCP, Mar. 13, 2002). All three cases are factually similar and involve the same alleged injury issue. See Trust Co. v. R.R., 209 N.C. 304, 308, 183 S.E. 620, 622 (1935) (although we are not bound by decisions from other jurisdictions, we may find their analysis and conclusions persuasive in deciding the issue).
In Angelino, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant alleging unlawful business practices, unfair and fraudulent business [395]*395practices, and fraud for the lack of BSIs. On the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the California Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud and unlawful business practices for lack of actual loss or injury. The court allowed the claim for unfair and fraudulent business practices because California’s statute did not require plaintiffs’ showing actual loss or injury in fact to sustain their claim.
In Bell, the matter before the Tennessee Circuit Court was the plaintiffs’ requested class certification. The plaintiffs in Bell filed a complaint against the defendant for fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act due to the lack of BSIs in the defendant’s vehicles. The court briefly considered the issue of whether the plaintiffs suffered a legally cognizable issue. The Bell court concluded the plaintiffs “stated a sufficient a [sic] ‘legally cognizable injury’ to satisfy class certification.” The court cited Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1977) as authority that loss in value is a legal injury. Our review of Vance shows the plaintiff in that case actually suffered monetary damages due to the defendants’ fraud and misrepresentations prior to filing his complaint. Like the plaintiffs in Bell, plaintiffs here had not realized any monetary loss and solely alleged a potential future injury.
In Solarz, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant for breach of implied warranties, breach of express warranty, breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (“UTPCPA”). The complaint alleged one of the plaintiffs’ daughter knocked the gear selector from “park” into “drive” on a minivan manufactured by defendant, causing it to roll down the street. The Solarz plaintiffs requested the defendant install a BSI pursuant to warranties received with the minivan. The defendant refused. The class included other owners of similar minivans who alleged future injuries of diminution of value and installation costs. On review of the defendant’s “preliminary objections” to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court determined each plaintiff alleged sufficient “ascertainable losses” to satisfy the UTPCPA. However, the court noted a UTPCPA claim “does not fail as a matter of law even where damages are not easily quantified or where a claim has failed to quantify the damages suffered.” The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining claims that alleged solely future injuries of diminution of value and installation costs for lack of any actual injury or damages.
Angelino, Bell, and Solarz are each distinguishable from the facts at bar due to differing facts and the underlying case law and statutes. [396]*396The Angelino court allowed the claim for unfair and state fraudulent business practices because California’s statute did not require a showing of actual loss or injury in fact. Case No. GIC 785729 (Ca. Super. Ct., Dec. 11, 2002). We are not persuaded the legal precedent in Vance the Bell court cites to find a “legally cognizable injury” supports that determination and Bell is not controlling here. Case No. CV003457 (Ten. Cir. Ct., June 4, 2002). In addition, the issue in Bell arose during a class certification hearing, not during a hearing for judgment on the pleadings.
Finally, the Solarz court concluded future expenses caused by a lack of a BSI were an “ascertainable loss.” However, the court acknowledged Pennsylvania’s UTPCPA did not require quantifiable damages and it also dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining claims for lack of damages. These courts considered the injury in fact issue from the perspective of satisfying the elements of the claims asserted and not standing. Here, the injury in fact alleged is the same for both standing and the claims plaintiffs asserted. Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 51-52 (standing); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 (2003) (unfair and deceptive trade practices); Davis v. Sellers, 115 N.C. App. 1, 10, 443 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1994) (common law fraud), disc. rev. denied, 339 N.C. 610, 454 S.E.2d 248 (1995).
After reviewing plaintiffs’ arguments, numerous citations to authority, and their pleadings in a light most favorable to them under Rule 12(c), plaintiffs have not alleged a legally sufficient injury in fact to survive defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mabrey, 144 N.C. App. at 124-25, 548 S.E.2d at 187-88. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint demanded
damages in an amount sufficient to repair and/or install brake shift interlock [sic] on each vehicle, Chrysler to install the brake shift interlock in the minivans of the Plaintiffs and Class members, and to provide appropriate notice to all Class members of the dangers in the minivans in the absence of the brake shift interlock.
Plaintiffs did not allege in their amended complaint, before the business court, or here “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical....” Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 52. Plaintiffs do not assert or allege they incurred expenses or were damaged by: (1) installing a BSI on their vehicles; or (2) selling their vehicles and realizing a loss due to the absence of [397]*397BSIs. In addition, plaintiffs specifically disclaimed and the amended complaint contains no allegations of personal injuries or damage to personal property by plaintiffs.
The sole remedy plaintiffs seek is for possible future expenses not yet incurred. Plaintiffs’ “damages” are a hypothetical and an unsubstantiated diminution of value allegedly caused by a purported “defect” and the cost of “supposed” remedial measures. Plaintiffs admit none of these alleged “damages” are realized. Plaintiffs have not suffered a “concrete and particularized” injury in fact that is “actual or imminent.” Id. Their claims are too speculative and illusory to show a legal injury in fact. In re Ezzell, 113 N.C. App. at 392-93, 438 S.E.2d at 484-85.
Our holding is consistent with the great majority of other jurisdictions which have considered identical claims. Ziegelmann v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 649 N.W.2d 556, 565 (N.D. 2002) (trial court did not err in dismissing complaint for failure to plead a legally cognizable injury); Bowers v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 01 CV 877 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Dec. 23, 2002) (dismissing case because the plaintiff did “not make any allegation that he sold his vehicle at a reduced value, or incurred costs to ‘fix’ the problem”); Ingram v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 01-3684 (Fla. Cir. Ct., May 7, 2002) (dismissing case because the plaintiff failed to “allege compensable losses, injuries, or damages”); Cox v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. LACV080519 (Iowa Dist. Ct., June 5, 2002) (dismissing claims because plaintiff failed to allege any legally cognizable damages); Seim v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. CI01-384 (Neb. Dist. Ct., July 22, 2002) (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant and denying class certification because the plaintiffs failed to allege damages); Marsh v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., Docket No. MON-L-892-01 (N.J. Super. Ct., May 6, 2003) (dismissing case because the plaintiffs failed to allege any tort injury or ascertainable loss); Oltmans v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., CV-2001-03236 (N.M. Dist. Ct., July 24, 2003) (dismissing case for failure to allege legally cognizable damages); BP Painting, Inc., et al. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., CIV. 01-350 (S.D. Jud. Ct., Yankton County, Mar. 27, 2003) (the plaintiffs’ “claim . . . that their vehicle might malfunction and cause injury in the future ... is too speculative to constitute a legally cognizable tort injury”). These great majority of cases represent the better reasoned approach and are consistent with North Carolina’s requirement of injury in fact. Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 52.
[398]*398VI. Arguments Raised by Dissenting Opinion
Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s assertions otherwise, we have addressed all issues properly before us on appeal and applicable to the issue at hand: whether plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices and fraud. Plaintiffs did not argue statutory standing for their claim of unfair and deceptive trade practices either before the Business Court or this Court. None of the arguments presented by the dissenting opinion concerning N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1 as a “creature of statute” were asserted by plaintiffs. It is not the role of this Court to fabricate and construct arguments not presented by the parties before it. In re Appeal of Mount Shepherd Methodist Camp, 120 N.C. App. 388, 390, 462 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1995) (Appellate review is “limited to the . . . arguments presented in the briefs to this Court.”); Crockett v. Savings & Loan Assoc., 289 N.C. 620, 632, 224 S.E.2d 580, 588 (1976) (“[Appellate review is limited to the arguments upon which the parties rely in their briefs.”); N.C.R. App. P. 28(a) (2004) (“Review is limited to questions so presented in the several briefs”).
The dissenting opinion further addresses the Business Court’s consideration of the economic loss doctrine. We specifically decline t-o address this issue in light of our holding that plaintiffs lack standing to assert either fraud or unfair and deceptive trade practices claims.
VII. Conclusion
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the elements of standing. Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. 113, 574 S.E.2d at 51 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs fail to show they have been “injured or threatened by injury or have a statutory right to institute an action.” Bruggeman, 165 N.C. App. at 795, 600 S.E.2d at 511 (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs failed to assert a present injury in fact and do not meet the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing to assert causes of action. Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 114, 574 S.E.2d at 52 (quotation omitted). Without standing, “a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.” Estate of Apple, 168 N.C. App. at 177, 607 S.E.2d at 16 (citations omitted).
The Business Court properly determined defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Rule 12(c). Affordable Care, Inc., 153 N.C. App. at 532, 571 S.E.2d at 57; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c). In light of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider the [399]*399other issues addressed by the Business Court and the parties. The Business Court’s order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judge ELMORE concurs.
Judge HUDSON dissents.