Cohn v. Kingsley

49 P. 985, 5 Idaho 416, 1897 Ida. LEXIS 34
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 9, 1897
StatusPublished
Cited by36 cases

This text of 49 P. 985 (Cohn v. Kingsley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohn v. Kingsley, 49 P. 985, 5 Idaho 416, 1897 Ida. LEXIS 34 (Idaho 1897).

Opinions

QTTAKLES, J.

The controlling question in this case is, Is the act of March 12, 1897, regulating the fees and compensation of county and precinct officers, valid? Section 15, article 3, of' the constitution, is as follows: “No law shall be passed except by bill, nor shall any bill be put upon its final passage until the •same, with the amendments thereto, shall have been printed, [421]*421for the use of the members: nor shall any bill become a law unless the same shall have been read on three several days in each House previous to the final vote thereon; provided, in case of urgency, two-thirds of the House where such bill may be pending may, upon a vote of the yeas and nays, dispense with this provision. On the final passage of all bills they shall be read at length, section by section, and the vote shall be by yeas and nays upon each bill separately, and shall be entered upon the journal; and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members present.'” It is contended by the appellant that the provisions of said section of the constitution were not complied with by the legislature in the passage of said act. The respondent contends that the presumption is that the legislature complied with all of the provisions of the constitution, and that the court cannot go back of the enrolled bill for the purpose of ascertaining whether the provisions of the constitution were followed or not. Hpon this question there is some conflict of authority, but the gTeat weight of authority and the soundest reasoning support the rule that the court not only may, but it is the imperative duty of the court, when this issue is before it, to look to the journals of the legislature, and see if, in passing the statute in question, the legislature have proceeded in the manner provided by the constitution. By the terms of said section of the constitution, supra, six things must be done in the passage of a law, to wit: (1) The introduction of the proposed law by bill, necessarily in writing; (2) the printing of the bill, with the amendments thereto; (3) the reading of the bill on three several days, in each House, previous to a final vote thereon; (4) the reading of the bill on its final passage, section by section; (5) a vote on the final passage, by yeas and nays; (6) the concurrence of a majority of the members present. These provisions are mandatory, and it is the imperative duty of the legislature to obey them. As we said in the case of Dunbar v. Board of Commissioners (decided at the present term), ante, p. 407, 49 Pac. 409, the duty of supporting the constitution of the state is imposed upon all public officers by the solemn obligations of the official oath, which obligations cannot be discharged by disobeying, ignoring, and setting at naught the plain provisions of the con[422]*422stitution, but only by obedience thereto. In construing said section of tbe constitution, it is necessary to inquire into- the extent of the application of the proviso which we find therein, viz.: “In ease of urgency, two-thirds of the House where such bill may be pending may upon a vote of the yeas and nays dispense with this provision.” A careful reading of the section shows that that part of the section which precedes the proviso consists of three separate clauses disjunctively stated. The first clause relates to the introduction of the bill, the second to the printing of the bill, the third to the reading on three several days. We are of the opinion, from the context, from the conditions which the framers of the constitution thought might arise, and from the apparent object which they had in view, that said proviso applies, and was only intended to apply, to the last clause preceding the proviso. It was not intended to authorize the legislature to dispense with the introduction of the proposed law by bill, nor was it intended to authorize the legislature to dispense with printing the bill. The framers of the constitution evidently intended by said provision to put it in the hands of the legislature, in ease of necessity to act promptly, to pass a bill in one, instead of not less- than six, days, and we can imagine a case where such urgency would exist. For instance, an insurrection should take place, and in order to quell it an appropriation should be promptly made, or the executive should be given some power not then given by existing law, or it should be necessary to forthwith enlarge the militia. The object of requiring the printing and three several readings on separate days is a good one. It was to insure the rights and interests of the people against hasty and inconsiderate legislation.

The people, in making and adopting the constitution, were not content with requiring the printing and reading one time only of bills, but have absolutely required that all bills shall be read on three several days in each House; and these several readings cannot be dispensed- with, except “in case of urgency, two-thirds of the House where such bill may be pending may upon a vote of the yeas and nays dispense with this provision.”

The history of the passage of the act in question, first known-as “Senate bill No. 2,” afterwards as “Substitute Senate bill [423]*423No. 2,” as shown by the journals of both Houses, is briefly as follows:

In the Senate: “January 7. Senate bill No. 2, introduced by Senator Thomas A. Davis, read for the first time, and referred to the committee on judiciary. January 11. Judiciary reported, and recommended that the bill be printed. January 20. Bill reported printed. Same day, Senate bill No. 2, by Davis, was read the second time by title and referred to committee on engrossment. January 22. Taken from committee on engrossment, and referred to general calendar for action of the committee of the whole. January 23. Senate bill No. 2 made a special order of business for Monday, January 27, at 2:35 o’clock P. M. January 26. Committee of the whole, having the bill under consideration, reported progress, and further consideration postponed for one week. February 2. The committee of the whole reported progress, and asked leave to sit again. February 8. Consideration by the committee of the whole. The committee reported progress, and recommends that the bill retain its place on the calendar, and asked and was granted leave to sit again. On motion of Senator Joseph C. Kieh, Senators Ballentine (of Blaine), Keller, and Davis (of Oneida) were appointed a special conference committee on Senate bill No. 2, and as such to report at 2 o’clock P. M. to-morrow, and the further consideration of the bill postponed until that hour. February 10. Thomas A. Davis of the special conference committee on Senate bill No. 2, informed the Senate that the House had passed a resolution to confer with a like committee from the Senate on said matter, and asked further time, which was granted. February 15, Committee reported, and submitted a substitute for Senate bill No. 2, and recommended the passage of the same. Substitute for Senate bill No. 2, introduced by conference committee: ‘An act regulating the fees and eom-•pensation of the various county and precinct officers within the state of Idaho.’ Bead the first time by title, under suspension of section 15, article 3, of the constitution, and Senate rules, by unanimous consent, and referred to committee on public printing. February 17. Substitute for Senate bill No. 2 reported back, printed and placed on the calendar. February 24. The committee of the whole reported progress in consideration of [424]*424substitute Senate bill No. 2, and asked and was granted Have to sit again.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
49 P. 985, 5 Idaho 416, 1897 Ida. LEXIS 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohn-v-kingsley-idaho-1897.