Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.

252 F. Supp. 3d 140
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMay 18, 2017
Docket16-CV-4453 (NGG) (LB); 16-CV-5158 (NGG) (LB)
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs in the above-captioned related actions assert various claims against Face-book, Inc. (“Facebook”) based on their contention that Facebook has suppoi'ted terrorist organizations by allowing those groups and their members to use its social media platform to further their aims. The plaintiffs in the first action (the “Cohen Action”) are roughly 20,000 Israeli citizens (the “Cohen Plaintiffs”). (Cohen Am. Compl. (“Cohen FAC”) (Dkt. 17), No. 16-CV-4453.) The second action (the “Force Action”) is brought by victims, estates, and family members of victims of terrorist attacks in Israel (the “Force Plaintiffs” and, together with the Cohen Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”). (Force Am. Compl. (“Force FAC”) (Dkt. 28), No. 16-CV-5158.)

Before the court are Facebook’s motions to dismiss the operative complaints in both actions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) (as to the Cohen Action) and 12(b)(2) and (6) (as to the Force Action). (Cohen Def. Mot. to Dismiss (“Cohen MTD”) (Dkt. 23), No. 16-CV-4453; Force Def. Mot. to Dismiss (“Force MTD”) (Dkt. 34), No. 16-CV-5158.) Because of the substantial similarity in facts and the legal issues raised, the court addresses these motions together in this Memorandum and Order.

For the following reasons, the court GRANTS Facebook’s motions to dismiss the operative complaints in both the Cohen Action and the Force Action.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facebook’s Social Media Platform

• Facebook’s eponymous social media website allows users to create personalized webpages that contain information about themselves, including identifying information, photographs, videos, interests, recent activities, and links to content from other websites. (Cohen FAC ¶ 42; see also Force FAC ¶¶ 94-95, 522.) Once a user joins the website, they can engage with other Face-book users in a number of ways, including by adding those users as “friends” and providing feedback to content provided by other users by “sharing,” “liking” (i.e. applying a tag that is shared with other users), or commenting on that content. (Cohen FAC ¶ 42; Force FAC ¶ 523.) Additionally, users are able to view their contacts’ activities on the website, including both information posted by those contacts as well as their contacts’ interactions [146]*146with other users and content. (See Cohen FAC ¶ 42; ■ Force FAC ¶¶ 524, 527.)

Facebook users are also able to create “groups”' with other users, which allows multiple users to join a shared website' which has its own profile and information. (Cohen FAC ¶ 43; Force FAC ¶ 525-26.) Members of a group can view, interact with, and share content posted in these group forums. (Cohen FAC ¶ 43.)

Facebook collects data as to its users’ activities through the website, including but not limited to information regarding contacts and group associations, content that users post and interact with, and use of third party websites. (Cohen FAC ¶ 44; Force Compl ¶ 528.) Using proprietary algorithms, Facebook generates targeted recommendations for each user, promoting content,' websites, advertisements, users, groups, and events that may appeal to a user based on their usage history. (Cohen FAC ¶¶ 45-48; Force FAC ¶¶ 529-41.) In this way, Facebook connects users with other individuals and groups based on projected common interests, activities, contacts, and patterns of usage, (Cohen FAC ¶48; .Force FAC ¶¶ 530-33.) Facebook also presents users with content posted by other users, groups, and third parties (e.g., advertisers) that is likely to be of interest to them, again based on prior usage history. (Cohen FAC ¶¶ 53-55; Force FAC ¶¶ 534-41.)

B. The Plaintiffs

The Cohen Plaintiffs are 20,000 individuals residing in Israel who state that they, “have been and continue to be targeted by” attacks by Palestinian terrorist organizations. (Cohen FAC ¶ 4.) The Cohen Plaintiffs claim that they are “presently threatened with imminent.violent attacks that are planned, coordinated, directed, and/or incited by terrorist users of Face-book.” (Id. ¶ 5.) In particular, they claim to be threatened by an outbreak of violence by Palestinian groups — which they sometimes refer to as the “Facebook Intifada” — and their Complaint recounts 54 separate attacks by Palestinian terrorists and terror groups in Israel since October 1, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 11-16.)

Unlike the Cohen Plaintiffs, who claim to- be threatened only by potential future attacks,. the Force Plaintiffs are the estates of victims (and, in one case; the surviving victim) of past attacks by the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas and the family members of those victims. (Force FAC ¶¶5-18). The victims were U.S. citizens, most of whom were domiciled in Israel at the time of the attacks. (See id.) In their Complaint, the Force Plaintiffs describe the attacks that harmed them, providing a detailed timeline of the events and Hamas’s particular involvement in the attacks. (See generally id. ¶¶ 156-499.)

C, Allegations Against Facebook

Plaintiffs in the two , actions make substantially similar allegations. as to Face-book’s role in their alleged harms. Plaintiffs claim that Palestinian terrorists1 “use Facebook’s social media platform and Communications services to incite, enlist, organize, and dispatch would-be killers to ‘slaughter Jews.’ ” (Cohen FAC ¶ 18; see also Force FAC ¶ 362.) They further aver that Palestinian terrorist" groups and associated individuals use their Facebook pages for general and specific incitements to violence and to praise past terrorist attacks. (See Cohen Compl ¶¶ 23-36; Force FAC ¶¶ 111 — 15.) Plaintiffs allege that Facebook’s algorithms, used to con[147]*147nect users with other users, groups, and content that may be of interest to them, play a vital role in spreading this content, as Palestinian terrorist organizations are able to “more effectively disseminate [incitements to violence], including commands to murder Israelis and Jews, to those most susceptible to that message, and who most desire to act on.that incitement.” (Cohen FAC ¶ 56; see also Force FAC ¶¶ 530-41.)

Plaintiffs allege that Facebook is aware of the use of its platform by Palestinian terrorist organizations and their members but has failed to take action to deactivate their accounts or prevent them from inciting violence. (Cohen FAC ¶ 40; Force FAC ¶ 502-04.) In the case of Hamas, the Force Complaint alleges that Facebook allows that organization, its members, and affiliated organizations to operate Face-book accounts in their own names, despite knowledge that many of them have been officially named as terrorists and sanctioned by various governments. (See Force FAC ¶¶ 118-25.) Plaintiffs claim that Face-book’s approach to addressing this use of the platform has been piecemeal (intermittently deleting individual postings or banning users) and inconsistent (e.g., deleting offending posts from one individual without removing identical messages or .banning users without taking steps to ensure that the same person does not subséquently rejoin the website under a different moniker). (Id. ¶¶ 549-55; see also Cohen FAC ¶¶ 40, 61-62.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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252 F. Supp. 3d 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohen-v-facebook-inc-nyed-2017.