Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Company

317 S.W.2d 452, 1958 Mo. LEXIS 614
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedNovember 10, 1958
Docket46453
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 317 S.W.2d 452 (Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cohagan v. Laclede Steel Company, 317 S.W.2d 452, 1958 Mo. LEXIS 614 (Mo. 1958).

Opinion

STORCKMAN, Presiding Judge.

This is a personal injury action seeking the recovery of damages in the sum of $35,-000. At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of both defendants and the plaintiff has appealed.

On March 7, 1949, a shipment of steel purchased from the defendant, Laclede Steel Company, was delivered to the premises of Steel Sales Company in St. Louis. The original order for the steel had specified that delivery was to be made by railroad in a gondola freight car; but for some reason not shown by the evidence and not material to the action, delivery was made by the defendant, Park Transportation Company, using a motor tractor and trailer unit, which for convenience will sometimes be referred to as the truck. The steel consigned to Steel Sales Company consisted of strips 16 feet long, 1[4 inches wide and about %oth of an inch thick. Each strip weighed.about 15 pounds. The strips were in two bundles, one weighing 4,590 pounds and the other 4,994 pounds. The bundles were held together by steel wire wrapped around them in three places, at each end and in the middle. The wire was wrapped around twice and then tied by being twisted.

The truck driver drove the cargo of stedl to the usual unloading place on the premises of Steel Sales Company, got off the truck and stood on the dock nearby. Two regular warehouse employees of Steel Sales Company undertook to unload the bundles of steel strips by means of an overhead crane and other equipment belonging to Steel Sales. One of the employees got on the truck and placed hooks, attached by chains to the crane, under the wire wrappings at each end of the larger of the two bundles. Another employee of Steel Sales started the crane and had lifted the bundle of steel about a foot or a foot and one half above the truck bed when the wire wrapping around one end of the bundle broke. The plaintiff, also a warehouse worker employed by Steel Sales Company, was approaching the truck from the rear and was struck on the head by either the chain or the broken wire wrapping. His left eye was so severely injured that the sight of that eye was entirely lost.

The plaintiff contends that a submissible case was made as to each of the defendants. Essentially, the charges of negligence which the plaintiff seeks to establish are that (1) the “defendant, Laclede Steel Company, negligently manufactured and bundled the steel with defective wire,” (2) the defendants supervised and controlled the loading of the steel and negligently selected defective and insufficient blocks and failed to secure the bundle of steel on blocks, and (3) the defendant, Park Transportation Company, negligently undertook to lift the bundle of steel by hooking onto the wire bands around the bundle.

The appellant correctly contends that negligence does not become a question of law alone, unless the acts on which it's existence depends are of. such character that all reasonable men would concur. Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 339, 240 S.W.2d 921, 926 [6]. Further where a verdict is directed for the defendants at the end of plaintiff’s case, the appellant plaintiff is entitled to have the *454 evidence reviewed on appeal in the light most favorable to him.

Plaintiff contends the fact that the wire broke in these circumstances is proof that it was defective, but does not further particularize the nature of the flaw or defect. The wire was not produced nor is there any evidence of an examination to determine the nature of the alleged defect. In his printed argument the plaintiff states: “The evidence in this case is sufficient to support a finding that the wire broke due to a defect therein, and that defendant could have discovered the defect by reasonable tests and inspection.” The Missouri cases upon which the plaintiff chiefly relies in this respect are Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140, 156 A.L.R. 469, and McLeod v. Linde Air Products Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122. See also the second appeal in the Zesch case, 354 Mo. 1147, 193 S.W.2d 581. The first Zesch appeal, following McLeod, states the rule of decision in this fashion, 183 S.W.2d 145 [12]: “It is said that if the nature of a thing manufactured is such that, when lawfully used for the purpose for which it is manufactured, it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger and the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully, [citing cases] And given an article which may contain a latent imperfection making the article reasonably certain to be a thing of danger (though it is carefully manufactured), where it is shown that the imperfection could be disclosed by a test, it would seem reasonable that the manufacturer in the exercise of ordinary care would be under a duty to make the test.”

Thus the initial requirement of the rule is that the use being made of an article or product must be the purpose for which it was manufactured or, as stated in the McLeod case, the application being made of the thing must be its intended use. In the Zesch case, the abrasive cutting wheel which shattered and injured the plaintiff was designed for the purpose of cutting metal with its periphery or edge, but because of the thin construction of the wheel it was not designed to sustain grinding pressure on its sides. The issue was whether the plaintiff was using it properly; that is, whether he was cutting with its edge or was applying pressure to the sides of the wheel. In the case at bar, the use being made of the wire binder is not in dispute, but the question presented is whether there is substantial evidence in the record that such use is one .for which the wire wrapping was designed or intended.

The record is conclusive that the primary purposé of the wire binder was to hold together the more than 300 strips or pieces of steel in the bundle. There is no evidence of any agreement, express or implied, on the part of Laclede Steel to wrap the bundle with wire of such strength that it could be hooked into and be safely used as an anchor or handle for lifting the bundle of steel from the truck with an overhead crane. The “record of the Laclede Steel Company, sent to the Steel Sales Corporation,” presumably a confirmation of the order, has the notation “Type 5 Bundling,” but this term is not further explained in the record. Nor is there substantial .evidence of a custom or usage imposing a duty on Laclede Steel to recognize the attempted use as a proper or intended use.

Much of the testimony on this, as on other issues, is vague and indefinite and often contradictory. This may be accounted for, at least in part, by the fact that the case was tried more than eight years after the accident occurred. Park Transportation’s driver, George S. Connor, was the only witness who testified with respect to the loading of the steel at the La-clede Steel plant in Alton, Illinois. It was loaded on the truck by means of a crane owned by Laclede Steel Company and operated by its employees.

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Bluebook (online)
317 S.W.2d 452, 1958 Mo. LEXIS 614, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cohagan-v-laclede-steel-company-mo-1958.