Adelsberger v. Sheehy

59 S.W.2d 644, 332 Mo. 954, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 408
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedApril 20, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by124 cases

This text of 59 S.W.2d 644 (Adelsberger v. Sheehy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adelsberger v. Sheehy, 59 S.W.2d 644, 332 Mo. 954, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 408 (Mo. 1933).

Opinion

FRANK, P. J.

Action by Frhnk Adelsberger, plaintiff to recover damages "for personal injuries. The trial below resulted in a judgment -for plaintiff in the sum of $10,000 and defendant appealed. Plaintiff died since the appeal and the cause was revived in the name •of Catherine Adelsberger, administratrix of liis estate.

Plaintiff ’ was injured in a collision between two automobiles at the intersection of Magnolia and Nebraska Avenues in the city of S’t. Louis. Appellant concedes its liability to plaintiff for the injuries he received but contends that the damages awarded are grossly excessive; ' due -to the--fact that the court by plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1 authorized the jury to- award: damages for permanent injuries, when; in-fact,'there was no evidence "tending to show that any of the injuries'received by plaintiff-'were permanent.

Respondent contends'"that plaintiff’s injuries permanently aggra•vated his-heart'klisea.se, while appellant insists that the evidence does not support this contention.

*957 Plaintiff was working for the American Car and Foundry Company as a press punch operator. The collision in which he was injured occurred shortly after noon on Saturday, July 14, 1928. He returned to work on the following Monday and thereafter lost only four days work between the date of the injury and the date of the trial which occurred-sixteen months after the injury.

The petition alleges and the evidence shows that plaintiff was afflicted with a heart condition known as “aortic insufficiency” prior to the time he was injured. The contention is that the injury permanently aggravated his heart condition. Dr. Sigoloff, plaintiff’s physician and witness, testified that in cases of aortic insufficiency the left ventricle has two volumes of blood to take care of, the blood entering from the left auricle and the blood returning through the defective aortic valve; that in order to overcome this condition, the left ventricle increases in size and thickness to take care of the increased volume of blood; that when it does so, the heart has reached a state of compensation; that aortic insufficiency of the heart will not affect one if the heart is fully compensated until after the muscle weakens, then the chamber enlarges and there is a state of ruptured or failing compensation, in which we get signs of failure of the heart; that plaintiff was in that condition when he was examined just prior to the trial. Dr. Sigoloff further testified that it was possible for a state of ruptured compensation to be caused by physical shock such as one receives in an accident.

It is plaintiff’s position that although he was afflicted with aortic insufficiency of the heart prior to his injury, his heart was fully compensated and was not giving him any trouble, but the injury he received in the collision caused a state of ruptured compensation and thereby produced the condition he was in at the time oE the trial. The evidence does not support this contention. Dr. Sigoloff examined plaintiff on the day he was injured and found he was afflicted with a heart trouble known as aortic insufficiency, a progressive and incurable disease. He did not testify that plaintiff’s heart had reached a state of compensation prior to his injury. Neith°r did he testify that the heart was in a state of ruptured compensation when he examined him on the day of and after the injury.' While Dr. Sigoloff testified that it was possible for a state of “ruptured compensation” to be caused by physical shock such as one receives in an injury, he did not testify that such a thing happened in this case. In other -words, he testified as to what could possibly happen in a given case, but he did not venture an opinion one way or the other as to what effect, if any, plaintiff’s injuries had upon his heart condition which he had prior to’his injury.

Plaintiff testified that he had heart trouble before the injury but it did not bother him; that he did not have shortness of breath before he was injured; that some short time after the accident he noticed *958 heavy breathing; that his present condition was such that if he exerted himself he was very nervous, and short of breath; that exertion tired him very much and his heart caused shortness of breath, discomfort and pain at times; that he was not in that condition prior to the injury, and had not been treated for heart trouble prior thereto.

Plaintiff himself and Dr. Sigoloff were the only witnesses who testified on behalf of plaintiff.

Pursuant to a court order Dr. Jacobson examined plaintiff about a week prior to the trial. Defendant called Dr. Jacobson as a witness. Respondent contends that his evidence tends to show that plaintiff’s injuries permanently aggravated his heart condition. The testimony upon which respondent relies follows:

“Q. . . . I will ask you if, in your opinion, given the history of the ease, whether the alleged injuries aggravated it or increased it in any way? A. It no doubt aggravated it.
“Q. Now, just what do you mean by that? A. That the excitement and the condition of the heart at the time caused it to be aggravated.
“Q. "Would that be just of a temporary character? A. That I would not state.”

While Dr. Jacobson testified that the excitement produced by the collision no doubt aggravated plaintiff’s heart condition, he declined to say that such aggravation was “just of a temporary character.” It clearly appears from other testimony of Dr. Jacobson that his reason for declining to say the aggravation was temporary was because he had no opinion on that subject. He examined plaintiff about one week before the trial. He testified that from his examination of plaintiff he believed that his heart was in a diseased condition before the injury; that from what he found upon his examination, and from the history of the case, plaintiff’s condition could have been caused from trauma or from other causes, but he did not arrive at any opinion or judgment about the matter one way or the other.

Dr. Bristow was called as a witness by defendant. Without going into his evidence in detail, it will be sufficient to state that he testified that plaintiff’s injuries could not have permanently aggravated the condition of his heart.

It is clear that a jury could not except by pure guess and speculation, find from the testimony of the three doctors that plaintiff’s injuries permanently aggravated his heart condition because neither of them so testified.

It is true that plaintiff testified that his heart did not give him any trouble before the injury, but some short time after the injury the symptoms of heart trouble manifested themselves. As a matter of course, plaintiff would know how he felt before and shortly after the injury, but no layman would be competent to say what caused a heart condition. • The medical testimony is that aortic in *959 sufficiency of the heart is a progressive and incurable disease; that one may have the disease for years and not suffer any pain or inconvenience therefrom until the muscles begin to weaken from overwork, and then signs of heart failure appear; that it gradually weakens the system and there is practically no way to stop it after it starts.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Powel v. Chaminade College Preparatory, Inc.
197 S.W.3d 576 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2006)
McGill v. Frasure
790 P.2d 379 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 1990)
Phillips v. Lively
708 S.W.2d 369 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1986)
Pfeffer v. Kerr
693 S.W.2d 296 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1985)
Yoos v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis
645 S.W.2d 177 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1982)
Hill v. Barton
579 S.W.2d 121 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1979)
Burchett v. Burchett
572 S.W.2d 494 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1978)
State v. Banister
512 S.W.2d 843 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1974)
Griggs v. AB Chance Company
503 S.W.2d 697 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1973)
State v. Williams
481 S.W.2d 1 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1972)
Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Company
451 S.W.2d 48 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1970)
Smith v. Seven-Eleven, Inc.
430 S.W.2d 764 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1968)
Pate v. St. Louis Independent Packing Company
428 S.W.2d 744 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1968)
Wheaton v. Reiser Company
419 S.W.2d 497 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1967)
Madison v. Dodson
412 S.W.2d 552 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1967)
Grissom v. Handley
410 S.W.2d 681 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1966)
Stephens v. Guffey
409 S.W.2d 62 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1966)
Hinrichs Ex Rel. Hinrichs v. Young
403 S.W.2d 642 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1966)
James v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.
402 S.W.2d 364 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1966)
State v. Olinger
396 S.W.2d 617 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1965)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 S.W.2d 644, 332 Mo. 954, 1933 Mo. LEXIS 408, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adelsberger-v-sheehy-mo-1933.