Co-Op Cab Company v. Singleton

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Co-Op Cab Company v. Singleton

19 S.E.2d 541, 66 Ga. App. 874, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 320

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 20, 1942

Docket29278.

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 19 S.E.2d 541 (Co-Op Cab Company v. Singleton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Co-Op Cab Company v. Singleton, 19 S.E.2d 541, 66 Ga. App. 874, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 320 (Ga. Ct. App. 1942).

Pincite

Opinions

MacIntyre, J.

The petition sought damages against the taxicab company for injuries to person and reputation alleged to have been received as a result of the driver of the cab raping the plaintiff during the continuance of the relationship of carrier and passenger by virtue of the contract of carriage. The judge overruled the demurrer to the petition and the defendant excepted.

The liability of common carriers to their passengers is not to be determined by the principles which control in defining their liability to third persons (who are not passengers), because the common carrier of passengers owes to the passenger an additional duty of carrying her safely to the point of her destination in accordance with the contract under which she entered the company’s taxicab. Brunswick & Western R. Co. v. Moore, 101 Ga. 684, 686 (28 S. E. 1000); Michie’s Carriers, 2044, §§ 2574-2576, note and cit. The principles of law which are applicable in litigation growing out of the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant do not fully define the rights, liability and duties of common carriers and their passengers. In this case, if we applied the principles applicable to master and servant or principal and agent in an action by a passenger against the carrier for a tort of its servant committed on the passenger during the continuance of this relation, we would ignore the high degree of care imposed on common carriers in the transportation of persons. Id. If the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant’s taxicab at the time she was raped by the driver of the cab, as alleged in the petition, she would be entitled to recover, for she was entitled, by virtue of her contract of passenger carriage, not only to be protected against the negligent acts *876 of the company’s agent resulting from the omission to perform its duties to its passengers, but she was likewise entitled to be protected against the wanton and wilful act.of violence wrongfully-committed on her person by the servant of the company during the continuance of the relation instituted by her contract with the company. Brunswick & Western R. Co. v. Moore, supra; McBride v. Ga. Ry. & El. Co., 125 Ga. 515, 518 (54 S. E. 674); Metts v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 52 Ga. App. 115, 116 (182 S. E. 531); Yellow Cab Co. v. Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364, 368 (126 S. E. 269); Hames v. Old South Lines Inc., 52 Ga. App. 420 (183 S. E. 503); Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322 (187 S. E. 715); Cole v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 480 (31 S. E. 107); Mason v. Nashville &c. Ry. Co., 135 Ga. 741, 759 (70 S. E. 225); Thompson v. Wright, 109 Ga. 466, 469 (34 S. E. 560). The action here is one ex delicto, and is based on a duty imposed by law in consequence of a contractual relationship between the parties. We therefore think the judge properly overruled the demurrer to the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, J., concurs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

MacIntyre, J.

The petition sought damages against the taxicab company for injuries to person and reputation alleged to have been received as a result of the driver of the cab raping the plaintiff during the continuance of the relationship of carrier and passenger by virtue of the contract of carriage. The judge overruled the demurrer to the petition and the defendant excepted.

The liability of common carriers to their passengers is not to be determined by the principles which control in defining their liability to third persons (who are not passengers), because the common carrier of passengers owes to the passenger an additional duty of carrying her safely to the point of her destination in accordance with the contract under which she entered the company’s taxicab. Brunswick & Western R. Co. v. Moore, 101 Ga. 684, 686 (28 S. E. 1000); Michie’s Carriers, 2044, §§ 2574-2576, note and cit. The principles of law which are applicable in litigation growing out of the relationship of principal and agent or master and servant do not fully define the rights, liability and duties of common carriers and their passengers. In this case, if we applied the principles applicable to master and servant or principal and agent in an action by a passenger against the carrier for a tort of its servant committed on the passenger during the continuance of this relation, we would ignore the high degree of care imposed on common carriers in the transportation of persons. Id. If the plaintiff was a passenger in the defendant’s taxicab at the time she was raped by the driver of the cab, as alleged in the petition, she would be entitled to recover, for she was entitled, by virtue of her contract of passenger carriage, not only to be protected against the negligent acts *876 of the company’s agent resulting from the omission to perform its duties to its passengers, but she was likewise entitled to be protected against the wanton and wilful act.of violence wrongfully-committed on her person by the servant of the company during the continuance of the relation instituted by her contract with the company. Brunswick & Western R. Co. v. Moore, supra; McBride v. Ga. Ry. & El. Co., 125 Ga. 515, 518 (54 S. E. 674); Metts v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 52 Ga. App. 115, 116 (182 S. E. 531); Yellow Cab Co. v. Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364, 368 (126 S. E. 269); Hames v. Old South Lines Inc., 52 Ga. App. 420 (183 S. E. 503); Locke v. Ford, 54 Ga. App. 322 (187 S. E. 715); Cole v. Atlanta & West Point R. Co., 102 Ga. 474, 480 (31 S. E. 107); Mason v. Nashville &c. Ry. Co., 135 Ga. 741, 759 (70 S. E. 225); Thompson v. Wright, 109 Ga. 466, 469 (34 S. E. 560). The action here is one ex delicto, and is based on a duty imposed by law in consequence of a contractual relationship between the parties. We therefore think the judge properly overruled the demurrer to the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, J., concurs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

19 S.E.2d 541, 66 Ga. App. 874, 1942 Ga. App. LEXIS 320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/co-op-cab-company-v-singleton-gactapp-1942.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack