Clear Fork Coal Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

229 F.2d 638, 48 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 947, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4911
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 6, 1956
Docket12487_1
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 229 F.2d 638 (Clear Fork Coal Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clear Fork Coal Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 229 F.2d 638, 48 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 947, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4911 (6th Cir. 1956).

Opinion

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

The taxpayer, Clear Fork Coal Company, has filed its petition for the review of a decision of the Tax Court of .the United States holding that there are deficiencies in the company’s income tax for the year 1947 in the amount of $1,-365.87 and for the year 1948 in the amount of $32,802.40.

The basis of the tax court’s decision was that, during the years in question, the petitioner’s mine,- No: 4, was in a “development stage”- and nob in- a “producing status” within the meaning of section 29.23(m)-15 of Regulations 111 of the Internal Revenue Bureau. This regulation provides: “(a) All expenditures in excess of. net receipts from minerals sold shall be charged to capital *639 account recoverable through depletion while the mine is in the development stage. The mine will be considered to have passed from a development to a producing status when the major portion of the mineral production is obtained from workings other than those opened for the purpose of development, or when the principal activity of the mine becomes the production of developed ore rather than the development of additional ores for mining.”

The tax court held that the driving by the petitioner of entryways in 1947 and 1948 was for the development of additional ore for mining; that, in consequence, its mine (No. 4) during those two years was in the development stage within the meaning of the section of the regulation just quoted; and that, accordingly, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not err in determining that expenditures made by the taxpayer in those years, in excess of net receipts from coal sold, should be charged to Clear Fork Coal Company’s capital account and be recoverable through depletion. The petitioner has contended throughout, and now contends, that during 1947 and 1948 its mine, No. 4, continued to be in the production stage and was erroneously held to be in a development status.

As found by the tax court, the petitioning Kentucky corporation, beginning m the year 1905, opened five mines located in Logan Mountain in the Cumberland Range. Its No. 4 mine was opened in 1944 in the so-called Jellico Seam, located within a thirty to forty square mile area in Southeastern Kentucky and Northeastern Tennessee. Other mining companies had mined in the Jellico Seam; and the operators of petitioner were aware of the nature and quality of its coal, its thickness and ceiling conditions.

Some two years prior to the opening of its No. 4 mine in 1944, petitioner bored holes and made geological surveys to determine the condition of the Jellico Seam in the immediate area. It was thus determined that the seam varied in thickness from thirty-two to thirty-eight inches. Above the seam was a layer of soft shale twenty-four to forty inches thick and over that a six-inqh rider seam of coal and then a layer of sandstone. With this information at hand, the petitioner made plans for developing and working this mine by the “room and pillar” method. In this method of mining coal, headings or entryways are driven into the seam so as to expose the main body of coal, and rooms are then turned off at right angles to the entryways.

In its findings of fact, the tax court engaged in detailed statement, which is summarized in a footnote. 1

*640 In our judgment, the finding of the tax court was clearly erroneous to the effect that the cost of driving the entryways and accompanying airways, includ *641 ing the mining and removing of coal therefrom, was substantially greater than that of the mining and removing of comparable quantities of coal from rooms. John L. Sheppherd, a mining engineer of 31 years experience, and Roscoe J. Langford, also of wide experience in the field of mining, both testified that the cost of producing coal from headings or airways and the cost of producing coal from rooms was approximately the same in the mine in controversy. Their reasonable explanation was that, although mining in the headings and airways requires removal of the top up to the sandstone, the expense of that operation was more than compensated from the fact that the airways did not have to be kept clear of roof fall. They said further that, in mining rooms, the process of backing machinery out of the rooms is expensive; and that it was more expensive to bring mining supplies to the working places in the rooms than to bring up supplies in mining in headings and airways.

It is true that the government’s only witness, Edward J. Mahan, who had never actually worked for a coal company in any capacity, testified that it was more expensive to mine headings and airways than to mine rooms. The reason for his opinion was not logical. Seemingly, it rested upon the thought that mining costs were necessarily greater in the headings and airways, inasmuch as the petitioner was losing money in such work. His error in relying upon such reasoning seemed to stem from the erroneous premise that Clear Fork made a profit in room mining, when, as a matter of fact, it did not. It lost money every year Mine No. 4 was operated, and finally suspended operations in 1951 because the mine was a losing proposition. The figures in evidence show that, in 1948, when petitioner did no room mining at all, it cost slightly less to produce a ton of coal from Mine No. 4 than it did in 1949 when the bulk of petitioner’s mining, consisted of room mining.

The United States Tax Court considered that the driving of entryways 1-West and 2-South, and their maintenance for entry to and removal of coal lying to the southwest of 1-South, became a necessity and those entryways had to be driven and established before petitioner’s projected plan for room mining of the main body of coal could be accomplished. The tax court said further that the entryways were the only means for opening up, for the mining of coal along cross-entryways 1-Left, 2-Left, 3-Left, 4-Left and other cross-entryways, which might be driven from 2-South or from any extension thereof. The court said that “they were part and parcel of the facilities constructed or developed for the subsequent mining of such coal, and being main entryways, they could not be utilized for the room mining of the coal adjacent to them until the areas beyond had been worked.” The tax court reasoned : “To do otherwise, would have resulted in cave-ins and the closing not only of these main entryways but the mine beyond. In the driving of these entryways, the production of the coal removed was of secondary importance. The primary objective was the construction or setting up of the facilities for the subsequent mining and removing of the main body of the coal by the room and pillar and the retreat methods of mining.” It was pointed out that, in 1949 and 1950, except for the extension of 2-South and the driving of cross-entryways for various distances, the petitioner’s entire activity was that of room mining along cross-entryways; and that, in 1951, Mine No. 4 was closed as an unprofitable operation.

*642 In connection with the reasoning of the tax court, it should be observed that during 1947 petitioner produced more than 23,000 tons of coal from Mine No. 4, which was nearly 5,000 tons more than it had produced from that mine in 1946 when it was mining rooms by the retreat method.

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Bluebook (online)
229 F.2d 638, 48 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 947, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clear-fork-coal-company-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca6-1956.