Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer

99 P.3d 570, 209 Ariz. 241, 442 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 112
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 7, 2004
DocketCV-04-0263-AP/EL
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 99 P.3d 570 (Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer, 99 P.3d 570, 209 Ariz. 241, 442 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 112 (Ark. 2004).

Opinions

OPINION

McGREGOR, Vice Chief Justice.

¶ 1 In November 1998, the voters of Arizona adopted the Citizens Clean Elections Act (the Act), later codified as Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 16-940 to 16-961 (Supp.2003). In June 2004, a group known as No Taxpayer Money for Politicians filed initiative petition signature sheets seeking to qualify Proposition 106 for the 2004 general election ballot. The plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the Secretary of State from [243]*243certifying Proposition 106. Following a hearing, the superior court concluded that Proposition 106 violated the “separate amendment rule”1 of Article 21, Section 1, of the Arizona Constitution because it incorporates two separate constitutional amendments. For that reason, the court ordered that the matter not be certified and placed on the ballot. On August 12, 2004, we entered an order affirming the judgment of the superior court, with this opinion to follow.

I.

¶ 2 Whether an initiative violates the separate amendment rule presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Hohokam Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 204 Ariz. 394, 397 ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 836, 839 (2003).

A.

¶ 3 The Arizona Constitution includes two provisions often loosely referred to as adopting a “single subject rule.” The first, Article 4, Part 2, Section 13, sets out the rule that applies uniquely to statutes enacted by the legislature.2 That provision states:

Every Act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.

Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 13.

¶ 4 The purpose of this single subject provision is to prevent surprise and the evils of surreptitious or hodgepodge legislation, including the practice known as logrolling. Taylor v. Frohmiller, 52 Ariz. 211, 215-16, 79 P.2d 961, 963 (1938). Although this provision does not require that the “title of the act should be a complete index to the legislation contained therein,” id. at 216, 79 P.2d 961, the title of an act “should not be so meager as to mislead or tend to avert inquiry as to the context thereof....” Dennis v. Jordan, 71 Ariz. 430, 439, 229 P.2d 692, 697-98 (1951). To allow the legislature freedom to act, while enforcing the command of this provision, our interpretation of the single subject rule must be not “so narrowly technical on the one side so as to substitute the letter for the spirit, or so foolishly liberal on the other as to render the constitutional provision nugatory____” Taylor, 52 Ariz. at 217, 79 P.2d at 964. Under this provision, we construe legislation liberally in favor of its constitutionality. See White v. Kaibab Rd. Improvement Dist., 113 Ariz. 209, 212, 550 P.2d 80, 83 (1976).

¶ 5 The constitutional language also directs that “if any subject shall be embraced in an Act which shall not be expressed in the title, such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.” Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 13. Thus, if one portion of a statute violates the single subject rule, “only that part which is objectionable will be eliminated and the balance left intact.”3 State v. Coursey, 71 Ariz. 227, 236, 225 P.2d 713, 719 (1951); see also Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 522, 1 P.3d 706, 712 (2000) (stating that unconstitutional provision of act was severable from remainder of act).4

[244]*244B.

¶ 6 In contrast, the Arizona Constitution establishes a stricter test for determining whether a proposal involves more than one constitutional amendment. See Ariz. Const. art. 21, § 1 (Article 21). In language distinguishable from that used to describe the single-subject rule, the constitution provides:

If more than one proposed amendment shall be submitted at any election, such proposed amendments shall be submitted in such manner that the electors may vote for or against such proposed amendments separately.

Ariz. Const. art. 21, § 1.

¶ 7 The clear import of this provision is that voters must be allowed to express their separate opinion as to each proposed constitutional amendment. The separate amendment rule of Article 21 differs from the single-subject rule of Article 4 in two important respects. First, although statutes comply with the single-subject rule if they “embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith,” Article 21 includes no reference to matters “connected with” a proposed constitutional amendment. Simply showing that several sections of a proposed amendment relate to the same general subject as that expressed in the title of the proposed amendment does not satisfy the requirements of Article 21. Instead, Article 21 requires that each proposed amendment “shall be” presented in a manner that allows the voters to consider and vote for or against each amendment separately.

¶ 8 Second, unlike the single-subject provision of Article 4, Article 21 does not permit the court to sever an offending provision from a multiple-proposal constitutional amendment. See Taxpayers Prot. Alliance v. Arizonans Against Unfair Tax Schemes, 199 Ariz. 180, 182 ¶ 7, 16 P.3d 207, 209 (2001) (holding that court has no authority to sever sections of a proposed amendment to the constitution). Instead, if a proposal includes more than one amendment, the entire proposal falls within the constitutional prohibition.

¶ 9 The distinctions between Article 4 and Article 21 reflect the unique position and importance of the Arizona Constitution in state governance. The constitution provides a statement of basic principles that inform and define the foundation of the state’s laws. See Miller v. Heller, 68 Ariz. 352, 357, 206 P.2d 569, 573 (1949) (“The constitution of this state, second only to the constitution of the United States, is the supreme law of Arizona.”); see also Cecil v. Gila County, 71 Ariz. 320, 322, 227 P.2d 217, 218 (1951) (stating that the Arizona Constitution is basic law); see also John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 Ariz. St. L.J.

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Clean Elections Institute, Inc. v. Brewer
99 P.3d 570 (Arizona Supreme Court, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
99 P.3d 570, 209 Ariz. 241, 442 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 28, 2004 Ariz. LEXIS 112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clean-elections-institute-inc-v-brewer-ariz-2004.