Clayborn, A. v. Drissel, H.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 13, 2026
• Docket: 2364 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Lazarus

Opinion

J-S44015-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

A.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : H.D. AND J.C. : No. 2364 EDA 2025 :

Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-60246

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2026

A.C. (Stepmother1), proceeding pro se, appeals from the order, entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, sustaining H.D.’s (Mother)

preliminary objections and denying and dismissing Stepmother’s custody

petition with prejudice. After review, we affirm.

This matter was initiated when Stepmother filed a custody petition

seeking shared legal and primary physical custody of K.D. (DOB 6/12) and

A.D. (DOB 10/14) (Children) on February 9, 2024, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

____________________________________________

1 While Stepmother and J.C. (Father) separated in 2022, Stepmother testified

at the August 8, 2025 hearing that they remained married. See N.T. Hearing, 8/8/25, at 7. J-S44015-25

5324(2).2 Stepmother lived with the Children for a period of at least 3 years,

from 2019 through 2022.

On August 4, 2025, Mother filed preliminary objections to Stepmother’s

complaint in custody and raised the issue of Stepmother’s standing. The trial

court held a hearing on August 8, 2025, at which time the trial court permitted

Stepmother, proceeding pro se, to speak on the record regarding her

relationship to Children. She stated the following:

I have remained a consistent stepparent to [Children], despite being blocked at every avenue. I was present for their first days of school. I was there for regular pick[-]ups from school, doctors’ visits, IEP evaluations, birthdays, holidays, extracurricular activities, and day-to-day care.

I provided emotional support by virtual schooling them during COVID; emotional care, like writing letters from the tooth fairy; taking them to birthday parties and trick-or-treating, sometimes even with [Mother] present. I was the one in our household that made Christmas happen for all seven kids [3] each year, and I continue to do so, even after the separation of [Father] and I.

Over the years, I’ve received personalized cards from [Children] and ongoing public affirmation of their love toward me and towards their siblings.

I’ve been active in their lives since 2016, when their father and I first began dating. I’ve supported their health and education. I’ve made dinners for them. I’ve had fun with them. I’ve kissed boo- boos, and I’ve loved them exactly how I love my biological children.

2 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2) provides that an individual “who stands in loco parentis to the child” may file an action for physical or legal custody.

3 Stepmother has four children of her own, two of whom are half-siblings to

Children and two of whom are step-siblings to Children.

-2- J-S44015-25

I’ve had love – I’ve had [Children]’s love, security, and trust. They call me [“]Mom [A.”] and even asked to call me [“]Mom[”], and often did.

N.T. Hearing, 8/8/25, at 35-36.

Stepmother marked and identified several exhibits but ultimately failed

to move to admit them into the record. Id. at 102-03. After the close of

testimony,4 on the record, the trial court found that Stepmother did not stand

in loco parentis to the Children, granted Mother’s preliminary objections, and

denied and dismissed Stepmother’s custody petitions. Id. at 103.

Stepmother filed a motion for reconsideration on August 11, 2025. On

August 13, 2025, the trial court issued two orders. The first reduced to writing

the oral order it announced at the hearing, granted Mother’s preliminary

objections as to Stepmother’s standing, and denied and dismissed

Stepmother’s custody petition with prejudice. The other denied Stepmother’s

motion for reconsideration. Stepmother filed a timely notice of appeal, and

both Stepmother and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Stepmother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by sustaining preliminary objections filed sixteen months after service in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(c)’s mandatory waiver provision, and by entering a written order dismissing [Stepmother]’s petition [“]with prejudice[”] when that language was never stated in the court’s oral ruling?

2. Whether the trial court violated [Stepmother]’s constitutional due-process rights as a self-represented, indigent, domestic- ____________________________________________

4 Father was not present to the testify at the hearing.The testimony indicates that the Children have not been in Father’s care since November of 2022, and that Father resides in Texas. See N.T. Hearing, supra, at 21, 93.

-3- J-S44015-25

violence survivor by excluding properly marked and identified exhibits used throughout the hearing, thereby preventing full evidentiary review of [Stepmother]’s in loco parentis claim, in violation of Williams v. Yohe, 131 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super. 2016), and the fairness principles codified in Kayden’s Law (Act 8 of 2024; 23 Pa.C.S.[A]. §§ 5328 and 5329.1)?

3. Whether the trial court’s opinion relied on factual mischaracterizations unsupported by the record—including fabricated references to the children’s alleged “dislike” of [Stepmother] and improper reliance on post-separation conduct—in contravention of C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018)?

4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying in loco parentis standing despite unrebutted evidence of six years of cohabitation, daily caregiving, and parental acquiescence, contrary to T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001)?

5. Whether the cumulative effect of procedural and substantive errors—including acceptance of waived objections, exclusion of [Stepmother]’s exhibits, misapplication of standing law, judicial bias toward a pro se litigant, and failure to apply Kayden’s Law’s trauma-informed protections—constituted custody gamesmanship and a systemic breakdown of due process, requiring reversal and remand for recognition of standing and a full custody hearing on the merits in compliance with state and federal constitutional safeguards?

6. Whether the trial court’s conduct—including dismissive treatment of Stepmother’s claims, exclusion of marked exhibits, refusal to apply trauma-informed custody procedures, and failure to ensure an impartial forum—violated [Stepmother]’s due process rights and requires reassignment to a neutral judge on remand?

7. Whether the trial court erred by engaging in a best-interest analysis and issuing findings about the children’s needs after denying Stepmother standing, contrary to Pennsylvania law requiring standing to be decided first?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8 (reordered for ease of disposition; footnote omitted).

Stepmother’s first issue consists of two arguments: (1) that the trial

court erred by sustaining Mother’s preliminary objections sixteen months after

-4- J-S44015-25

Stepmother filed her custody petition; and (2) that the trial court erred by

dismissing Stepmother’s petition with prejudice after not stating on the record

that dismissal would be with prejudice.

Stepmother avers that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.5(a)

requires a challenge to standing or jurisdiction in a custody action be brought

within 20 days of service of the complaint. According to Stepmother, because

Mother filed her preliminary objections more than 20 days after the filing of

her custody petition, these claims are “waived forever.” Appellant’s Brief, at

20. However, Stepmother has waived this argument by failing to raise it with

the trial court and by failing to raise it in her Rule 1925(b) statement. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)

(“Issues not included in the Statement and/or raised in accordance with the

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). Therefore, Stepmother’s

argument regarding the untimeliness of Mother’s preliminary objections is

waived.5 ____________________________________________

5 Stepmother’s argument, if not waived, is meritless. Stepmother claims Rule 1915.5 contains language that it does not. Compare Appellant’s Brief at 18- 19 (“Rule 1915.5(c) is mandatory and absolute: ‘Unless preliminary objections are filed within the time provided by subdivision (a), they shall be deemed to be waived’”), with Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(c) (“There shall be no discovery unless authorized by special order of court.”). Further, the cases Stepmother cites in support of a 20-day deadline were decided prior to the 2020 amendment to Rule 1915.5(c). See Appellant’s Brief, at 19 (citing M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2017) and M.O. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Prior to 2020, Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5 included a (Footnote Continued Next Page)

-5- J-S44015-25

Turning to the second argument contained in Stepmother’s first issue,

Stepmother claims that the trial court erred when it entered its order

dismissing her petition with prejudice because, in doing so, it materially

departed from its oral ruling, wherein it did not specify whether dismissal

would be with or without prejudice. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22-23. Further,

Stepmother claims that dismissals for lack of standing are not adjudications

on the merits and, therefore, must be without prejudice. See id. at 23 (citing

Commonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309 (Pa. Super. 2016)).

Stepmother has likewise failed to preserve this issue by raising it with

the trial court prior to her appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302; see also id. at

1925(b)(4)(vii). Stepmother did not raise this argument in her motion for

reconsideration or in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Therefore, the claim is

waived on appeal.

In her second issue, Stepmother argues that the trial court erred in

excluding the exhibits she marked and identified throughout the custody

hearing. Stepmother avers that, because Mother’s exhibits were admitted

while hers were not where she “believed that marking constituted

admission[,]” she was “deprived of justice through procedural confusion.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 35-36.

20-day deadline; the current version, effective since October 1, 2020, does not. Compare Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a) (current version), with Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a) (prior version effective until Sept. 30, 2020).

-6- J-S44015-25

Stepmother has, however, waived this issue for failure to properly

develop it. See Pa.R.A.P 2119(a) (argument section of brief must contain

“discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). Stepmother

cites only two cases in support of her argument: Williams v. Yohe, 131 A.3d

1036 (Pa. Super. 2016) and In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. 2010).

We have determined that Williams v. Yohe, 131 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super. 2016)

does not exist; there is no case at that reporter citation, and our search of the

parties’ names only uncovered a case by the name of Danielle Marie Yohe

v. Michael Craig Williams from the Tenth Judicial District in Florida. While

In re Ullman does exist, Stepmother cites it for a proposition for which it

does not stand. Stepmother cites it in support of the proposition that “[w]hen

a misunderstanding—not neglect—causes a procedural omission, courts must

act to prevent prejudice.” Appellant’s Brief, at 36. In re Ullman, however,

contains no discussion of a procedural mistake being overlooked when caused

by a misunderstanding as opposed to neglect. See generally, id.6 Therefore,

6 Based upon our review of Stepmother’s brief and the cases cited therein, we

suspect she used generative artificial intelligence in drafting it. See Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 2026 WL 194332, at *3 n.4 (Pa. Super. Jan. 14, 2026) (discussing generative artificial intelligence “hallucinations,” wherein program makes up cases that do not exist). While we may liberally construe materials filed by pro se litigants, they are still subject to the same rules as represented litigants. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa 2014). Therefore, all litigants using generative artificial intelligence must ensure that the citations in their briefs are to real cases, or they risk waiving them for failure to cite to “pertinent” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

-7- J-S44015-25

given the lack of proper discussion and citation of authority, this argument,

too, is waived.

Stepmother’s third and fourth issues, which we analyze together for

ease of disposition, both challenge the trial court’s standing determination.

Stepmother argues, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it ignored or

gave insufficient weight to her testimony showing she assumed a parental role

toward the Children and discharged paren tal duties, improperly relied on

post-separation conduct, and applied the wrong legal standard. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 27-34, 36-38, 44-49.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Issues of standing generally raise pure questions of law for which we employ de novo review of a trial court’s decision. [A] challenge to asserted in loco parentis status in a particular context typically involves a fact-intensive inquiry[] and may implicate mixed questions of law and fact. Where factual findings and credibility determinations are at issue, we will accept them insofar as they are supported by the record.

See Int. of K.N.L., 284 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2022) (internal citations omitted).

At a basic level, “[s]tanding relates to the capacity of an individual to

pursue a particular legal action, and requires the petitioning litigant to be

adversely affected, or aggrieved, in some way.” Id. at 136. Traditionally,

this requirement is met “where an individual demonstrates [that she] has a

substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation that [is] direct and

immediate, rather than remote, and which distinguishes [her] interest from

the common interest of other citizens.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

-8- J-S44015-25

Pennsylvania statute confers standing to seek custody upon individuals

who stand in loco parentis to a child. See Hale v. Hale, 345 A.3d 1234, 1239

(Pa. Super. 2025); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2). The phrase in loco

parentis specifically “refers to a person who puts [herself] in the situation of

a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental

relationship without going through the formality of a legal adoption.” Int. of

K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 144. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further explained

that “[t]he foundational elements of in loco parentis status, upon which all

other considerations may rise or fall, include the assumption of a parental role,

and the discharge of parental duties.” Id. (citing C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d at

907–08). The assumption of the parental role, however, must originate with

a legal parent’s assent, be it through encouragement or acquiescence. Int.

of K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 144. The time frame relevant to an in loco parentis

analysis is “when the party developed the relationship with the child with the

acquiescence of encouragement of the natural parent.” Id. at 145. While the

test is “stringent” to “prevent intrusion into fundamental parental rights” by

“those who are merely strangers,” our Supreme Court has cautioned it must

not be interpreted “so rigidly or absolutely as to deny one acting in loco

parentis an opportunity to be heard[.]” Id. at 138–39. With those principles

in mind, we turn to the merits of Stepmother’s position.

Applying the foregoing analysis here, we conclude the trial court did not

err in its standing determination. The trial court considered the evidence put

forward by Stepmother insufficient, explaining that Stepmother “failed to

-9- J-S44015-25

provide clear or specific examples[,] such as managing the Children’s daily

routines or participating in significant decision-making[,]” that Stepmother’s

statements “lack[ed] the necessary specificity and do not reflect the level of

parental responsibility required[,]” and that Stepmother had not “offered

insights into how she co-parented with Father or what specific role she played

alongside him in the [Children’s] upbringing.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/25,

at 10.

Based upon a comprehensive review of the record, and mindful of the

appropriate standard and scope of review, we conclude that the trial court

correctly determined Stepmother did not stand in loco parentis to the Children.

While Stepmother’s testimony indicates she played a significant role in the

Children’s lives during her time with them, it is insufficient to show that she

assumed the role of a parent. See Hale, 345 A.3d at 1240 (finding in loco

parentis status where petitioner “undertook numerous shared parental

obligations” such as providing “independent input regarding [child’s] medical

providers, education, and general welfare”); see also A.C. v. E.K., 331 A.3d

939, 947 (Pa. Super. 2025) (petitioner seeking in loco parentis status failed

to establish that he and child’s biological mother lived as a “family unit” and

co-parented). Therefore, we find Stepmother’s third and fourth issues to be

without merit.

Stepmother’s fifth and sixth issues both claim that the trial court took

various actions that, when taken together, violated her right to due process.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 17, 20, 24-25, 41, 49, 53-61. These issues are

- 10 - J-S44015-25

waived, however, due to Stepmother’s failure to cite controlling authority.

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, again, Stepmother cites numerous cases which

do not support the proposition she cites them for. For example, Stepmother

cites Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595 (Pa. 2013) and

Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431 (Pa. 2011) in support of the position

that the cumulative effect of a trial court’s errors can constitute a violation of

due process, yet neither Roney nor Paddy provide support, even implicitly,

for such a position. See Appellant’s Brief at 17, 20, 25, 41, and 61. Further,

Stepmother again cites to Williams v. Yohe, a case which does not exist.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 41 (“As this [C]ourt reaffirmed in Williams v. Yohe,

131 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super 2016), ‘[p]rocedural equality is the cornerstone of

due process.’”). In addition to Yohe, Stepmother points to Commonwealth

v. Lyons, 574 Pa. 373 (2003), which also does not exist. 7 Therefore,

Stepmother’s arguments regarding the trial court’s alleged cumulative errors

are waived.

Stepmother’s final argument is that the trial court erred by making a

best-interest determination after finding that Stepmother did not have

standing. See Appellant’s Brief, at 50-53. While the trial court did briefly

opine on whether awarding Stepmother a form of custody would be in the

Children’s best interests, because it had already determined that Stepmother

7 While we found three Pennsylvania cases decided in 2003 with the caption

Commonwealth v. Lyons, none stand for the proposition Stepmother cites it for or appear at the reporter citation she provides.

- 11 - J-S44015-25

lacked standing, and because of our affirmance of that determination, the trial

court’s best-interest analysis is superfluous and, at most, mere dicta. See

Trial Court Opinion, 8/8/25, at 14. This issue, therefore, is also without merit.

Accordingly, as all of Stepmother’s issues are either waived or without

merit, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/13/2026

- 12 -