Clark v. United States

162 Ct. Cl. 477, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 169, 1963 WL 8560
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1963
DocketNo. 90-58
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 162 Ct. Cl. 477 (Clark v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Clark v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 477, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 169, 1963 WL 8560 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff sues for the salary of which he alleges he has been deprived by reason of his unlawful discharge from his position in the Civil Aeronautics Administration, then a part of the Department of Commerce.

The case was before us heretofore on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We held in an opinion reported in 145 Ct. Cl. 374, that, although plaintiff had been transferred from the classified civil service to an “excepted” position, i.e., one not protected by the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 652, and Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 863, he, nevertheless, was entitled to restoration to his former or a corresponding or higher position in the classified civil service upon the termination of his assignment to the foreign service, and that since that restoration had been denied him because [479]*479he had been discharged for canse, he was entitled to maintain this snit. We remanded the case to a Commissioner for a report on the facts necessary for a determination of the question of whether plaintiff’s discharge was arbitrary or capricious, or was for a cause that will promote the efficiency of the service. The Commissioner has now reported, to. which exceptions have been taken by both sides, briefs have been filed, and oral argument has been heard.

For some twenty-odd years prior to May 9,1954, plaintiff had been an employee of the Government, for a part of the time, at least, in Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce, with competitive civil service status. On that date he was transferred from his position as Chief of the Technical Assistance Division of the International Division of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Grade GS-14, to an excepted position as Chief of the Civil Aviation Mission, with headquarters in Santiago, Chile.

On October 5, 1956, after an investigation made by the ICA,1 United States Operations Mission, an agency of the State Department, in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Administration (hereinafter referred to as CAA), charges were preferred against plaintiff by the CAA substantially as follows:

1. That he did not perform his duties in accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement between the CAA and the Foreign Operations Administration, dated June 10, 1954. (The FOA had entered into an agreement with the CAA relative to carrying out overseas missions in which both the State Department and the Department of Commerce were to participate.)

2. That he had embarrassed the American Embassy and the USOM by submitting to the Chilean Foreign Office directly, instead of through the ICA, a request to import a personal automobile, duty-free.

3. That he had left an official car at his residence which was used by his family while he was absent on official business from the Chilean mainland for five or six weeks.

[480]*4804. That be kept Government property at bis residence.

5. That he attempted to have official purchases shipped through the Chilean Air Force instead of through established USOM channels.

Charge 1 was supplemented by five specifications as follows:

(a) When he made reports to the CAA in Washington, he did not at the same time send copies to the ICA, United States Operations Mission.

(b) He contacted a Chilean associate in an attempt to import a personal car duty-free, instead of going through the ICA, United States Operations Mission.

(c) He requested additional technical personnel without going through the ICA, United States Operations Mission.

(d) He attempted to secure a Chilean license for the automobile he was using by applying directly to the Chilean Air Force, instead of going through the ICA, United States Operations Mission.

(e) He loaned an automobile to the Chief of the Santiago Airport without securing the permission of the United States Operations Mission to do so.

Plaintiff was given five days in which to answer the charges. On October 10,1956, he did so in detail.

First. He states that in the two years of his assignment at Santiago, Chile, he had received no complaints about his conduct or the performance of his duties, and that the charges were, therefore, wholly unexpected and came as a distinct shock, especially in view of his faithful and efficient service with the Government for 23 years.

Second. He denies that he failed to furnish to the ICA, United States Operations Mission, copies of his communications with the CAA on technical matters, and states that he had instructed his administrative assistant to always forward copies of such correspondence, although he admits this might not have been done in all instances, through unintentional oversight or clerical error.

Third. He denied having attempted to import a second personal automobile duty-free through Señor Cruz, a Chilean associate. He said he tried to obtain permission of the American Embassy in Santiago to import a replacement for [481]*481the car he had brought with him to Chile, which had been damaged beyond repair. He said he did question Señor Cruz, who was assigned to his office as legal adviser, concerning an interpretation of an executive order of the Chilean Government authorizing the importation of personal vehicles, but that he had not undertaken through him to obtain permission of the Chilean Government for such importation.

Fourth. He denies having requested additional technical assistance without prior clearance from the I'CA, United States Operations Mission. He says he merely inquired as to the availability of such assistance as a preliminary to a possible request therefor, but that no such request was made.

Fifth. He admits having attempted to secure a Chilean license for the automobile he used for official purposes, this having been suggested to him by the liaison officer assigned to his office by the Chilean Director of Aeronautics, in order to facilitate the movement of the vehicle and to provide ready access to Government and military installations and facilities. He says he requested the registration of the same in the name of the United States Operations Mission.

Sixth. He says he did assign a vehicle to the Air Traffic Control Specialist of the United States Operations Mission for use at the airport, and told him that when he had no use for it himself, he might allow it to be used by others for official purposes.

Seventh. He says that if his request to import a car, duty-free, caused any embarrassment to the United States Embassy at Chile, he was not aware of it, and for enlightenment in the matter he referred the Personnel Officer, to whom his letter was addressed, to the then Ambassador to Chile, and to the Counselor of the Embassy, and to two council attaches, and to the Air Force attache.

Eighth. He denies ever having used a Government vehicle for other than Government purposes. He admitted leaving a Chevrolet carry-all at the garage at his home while he was on an official trip to Easter Island, and he admits that his wife used it “on a few marketing trips,” since no other transportation was available.

[482]

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Bluebook (online)
162 Ct. Cl. 477, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 169, 1963 WL 8560, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/clark-v-united-states-cc-1963.