Clark v. Clark

2001 UT 44, 27 P.3d 538, 423 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2001 Utah LEXIS 81, 2001 WL 604165

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: June 5, 2001
• Docket: 20000276
• Status: Published

Opinions

DURHAM, Justice:

1 1 Defendant Ceeil E. Clark (Cecil) seeks certiorari review of the court of appeals' memorandum decision in favor of plaintiff Linda Kay Clark (Linda). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding of an unsolemnized marriage pursuant to section 30-1-4.5 of the Utah Code and reversed the trial court's granting of Cecil's motion for relief from judgment due to lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

12 Linda and Cecil had an eighteen-year solemnized marriage, which ended in divorce on August 27, 1985. Just a few months after the divoree was granted, Linda and Cecil resumed living together in late October or early November 1985. They continued to live together for a period of eleven years until August 1996. From December 1995 until June 1996, Linda resided in a separate apartment. She moved back in with Cecil, however, in June 1996, and they continued to live together until August 28, 1996, when a final separation occurred.

13 In October 1996, Linda brought this action against Cecil to establish an unsolem-nized marriage, obtain a divorcee, and divide marital assets. Cecil, however, delayed in providing discovery in the matter, even after two motions to compel. Therefore, Commissioner Lisa A. Jones held a hearing on April 17, 1997, and ruled that Cecil's failure to provide discovery would result in his pleadings being stricken and a default judgment entered against him if complete discovery was not forthcoming.

1 4 On May 15, 1997, in response to Commissioner Jones' ruling, Linda submitted a set of findings of fact and conclusions of law, declaration of marriage, and decree of divoree, which were placed in the record, unsigned. On the same day, Linda filed a motion for entry of decree and findings and a notice to submit for decision. Commissioner Jones stayed Linda's motion on June 30, 1997, and ordered that records sought by Linda be delivered to Linda's counsel the following day. The next day, July 1, 1997, Commissioner Jones certified the case for trial for determination of, among other things, whether an unsolemnized marriage existed, and to consider Cecil's contempt for "violation of restraint on assets." To expedite matters, Commissioner Jones suggested, in her minute entry, that the district court hold a bifurcated hearing to determine the marriage issue, noting that "the statutory limit on establishment of a marriage is loom-i 3 ing.

15 On the date of trial, August 18, 1997, the district court found in a minute entry that "the statutory requirements have been met and a common-law marriage existed up to August of 1996 when the parties separated." However, the findings of fact and conclusions of law were not entered at that time.

T6 The record indicates that counsel for Linda prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were sent to opposing counsel on August 26, 1997. The documents had to be revised, however, based on changes requested by Cecil's counsel. The revised copies were sent for approval to Cecil's counsel on September 10, 1997, but Geeil did not give approval. Thereafter, as no objection had been filed, counsel for Linda transmitted the documents to the court, which entered the findings and declaration of marriage on September 29, 1997. The findings specified that the Clarks' unsolemnized marriage had ended on August 28, 1996.

T7 After the findings and declaration of marriage were entered, Cecil moved the court for relief from the judgment,¹ claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the court order establishing a common law marriage was not entered within one year following the termination of the Clarks' relationship as required by section 30-1-4.5. Subsection two provides in relevant part that "tlhe determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship described in subsection (1), or within one year following the termi-mation of that relationship." - Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5(2) (1998) (emphasis added). The district court granted Cecil's motion, concluding that it was without jurisdiction to enter the order later than one year after the termination of the relationship. Both parties appealed to the court of appeals. ~

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18 "On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same standard of review used by the court of appeals." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(8)(a) (1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah 1996); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n. 2 (Utah 1992)). We review the court of appeals' decision for correctness. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 88, ¶ 4, 978 P.2d 460 (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995)). The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. See Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Audit. Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997).

ANALYSIS

I. ADJUDICATION REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 30-1-4.5

19 Subsequent to oral argument to the court of appeals in this case, we decided In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074, which construed subsection two of section 30-1-4.5 as "requir[ing] only the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship." Id. at 180 (emphasis in original). Gonzalez raised the question of whether the legislature intended the unusual language of section 830-1-4.5 to be construed contrary to conventional statutes of limitation that limit the period to commence an action, not the period within which a court must reach final judgment. See id. at 124. We ruled that "(tlhe legislature should not be deemed to have created such a potentially unfair rule without clear and convincing language evidencing its intent to do so ...." Id. (noting that "the ambiguities created in this statute appear to be the result of nothing more than inartful drafting"). Therefore, we turned to the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute. See id. at 128 ("When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose." (citing Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 1999 UT 18, ¶ 25, 974 P.2d 1194).

110 As we explained in Gonzalez, the Utah Legislature enacted section 30-1-4.5 with the aim of preventing welfare fraud by giving Utah's Office of Recovery Services an avenue to prevent exclusion of a common law spouse's income when applying for government benefits. See Gonzales, 2000 UT 28 at ¶ 21, 1 P.3d 1074 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Norman Angus, Director of State Social Services Admin., 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 17, 1987) (Sen. Recording No. 75)). The one-year adjudication requirement was an apparent attempt "to protect the parties to a putative marriage from fraud or mistake due to long delays in adjudication." Id. (emphasis in original). It seems "the Legislature was concerned with situations in which the couple never intended to be married but where, years later, most likely at the time one of them dies, [someone not a party to the marriage] is trying to prove the existence of such a marriage." Id. at 1% 21-22 (citing Floor Debate, remarks of Sen. Lyle Hillyard, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 19, 1987) (Sen. CD No. 81B)).

1 11 Therefore, the legislative purpose giving rise to the one-year adjudication requirement has nothing to do with a case such as this where an individual attempts to establish an unsolemnized marriage in order to divide marital assets. See id. at 124 (noting that legislative purpose is unrelated to case where individual attempts to establish unso-lemnized marriage to claim insurance benefits). We further explained that a statute of limitation not tolled by the filing of an action created potential unfairness and would be subject to constitutional challenge, because "an action filed in a timely manner could still fail the limitation period due to delays in discovery or a court's crowded docket." Id. We specifically relied on our obligation to construe statutes to avoid potential unconstitutionality. See id. at 130. The construction urged by the intervenor in Gonzalez would have raised questions of equal protection, due process, and separation of powers, all of which were avoided by our reading. If, indeed, we misconstrued legislative intent, it is to be expected that the legislature will tell us so. Therefore, under Gonzales, an action to establish an unsolemnized marriage is timely if filed within one year of the termination of the relationship. Id.

IL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF UNSOLEMNIZED MARRIAGE

112 Cecil challenges the court of appeals' affirmance of the trial court's finding that Linda had met the statutory requirements of section 80-1-4.5. Section 80-1-4.5(1) sets forth the following requirements to establish an unsolemnized marriage:

(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties who:

(a) are capable of giving consent;

(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;

(c) have cohabited;

(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and

(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (1998).

1113 Cecil argues that Linda failed to meet her burden of proving the following statutory requirements: (1) existence of a contract and consent of Cecil; (2) mutual assumption of marital rights, duties, and obligations; and (3) holding themselves out as, and acquisition of a reputation as, husband and wife. See id. § 30-1-4.5(1), (1)(a), (d), (c). In addition, Cecil claims that Linda failed to establish cohabitation for the period October 1, 1985 through August 28, 1996. See id. § 30-1-4.5(1)(c).

114 Cecil argues there was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support the trial court's findings. His challenge involves a review of the trial court's application of statutory requirements to factual findings and is a mixed question of law and fact. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). We apply the same standard used by the court of appeals: a trial court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, and the trial court's application of the statute to those findings will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See id.; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

115 We agree with the court of appeals that there was considerable evidence adduced at trial on which the trial court could base its findings. First, there was ample evidence that Cecil consented to an unsolem-nized marriage and that the Clarks mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations. Cecil and Linda filed joint income tax returns; established joint checking and credit accounts; jointly purchased real estate holdings, including a shared residence; jointly purchased vehicles and other personal belongings together; shared household expenses; and slept in the same bed. Civen the substantial amount of evidence showing the parties both consented to a marital relationship, the court of appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's findings.

T16 Second, there was sufficient evidence establishing that Linda and Cecil held themselves out and had acquired a reputation as husband and wife. For example, Linda retained her married name of "Clark," and both Linda and Cecil routinely introduced each other as husband and wife. Furthermore, at least two witnesses, including a neighbor and a former daughter-in-law, believed the Clarks were married. Those witnesses made that assumption because the Clarks were the "(Clark children's] mom and dad" and because the Clarks "acted like a husband and wife would act." Again, the court of appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's finding that the Clarks held themselves out and had a reputation as husband and wife.

{17 Finally, there was ample evidence supporting the trial court's finding of cohabitation. In his attempt to overturn the trial court's factual findings on this point, Cecil claims that during the period from October 1985 until August 28, 1995, he and Linda lived together "off and on." Cecil, however, cites to nothing in the record to support his assertion. Further, even though the parties had a brief separation during December 1995 until June 1996, the record shows that during that time, Cecil stayed overnight at Linda's apartment, sent her cards expressing his love and affection for her, and contributed to her expenses including car repairs and rent. Cecil also argues that both Cecil and Linda had intimate relationships with other people, which evidence refutes the trial court's finding of cohabitation. Essentially, Cecil only asserts his own view of the evidence, and claims the court of appeals erred in failing to reweigh the evidence in his favor. We disagree. The court of appeals was correct in affirming this finding.

118 We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court's factual findings show that Linda met each of the required elements for establishment of an unsolemnized marriage; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the statute. The court of appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's ruling that an unsolemnized marriage was established.

III. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

119 Cecil challenges the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's granting of Cecil's motion for relief from judgment. In reviewing the trial court's interpretation of section 80-1-4.5, the court of appeals applied a correctness standard, see Clark v. Clark, 2000 UT App 54, 2000 WL 383244181 (mem.), and we apply the same standard. Relying on In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 30, 1 P.3d 1074, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order establishing an unsolemnized marriage because Linda filed her petition well within one year of the termination of the marriage. See Clark, 2000 UT App 54, 2000 WL 33244181.

120 We note that in Gonzalez we did not decide the issue of whether the requirement of section 30-1-4.5(2) requiring only the filing of an action, would apply to an action involving a divorce. See 2000 UT 28 at 129 n. 7, 1 P.8d 1074. We distinguished Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct.App.1995), where the court of appeals held that, in a case involving a divorce, a petition for establishment of marriage must be brought and decided within a year of the relationship's termination. See Gonzales, 2000 UT 28 at ¶ 29 a. 7, 1 P.3d 1074 (citing Bunch, 906 P.2d at 920-21). In this case, however, unlike Gonzales, Linda petitions for both establishment of an unsolemnized marriage and a divorce. Therefore, now that the issue is squarely before us, we expressly overrule Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, and hold that Gonzales applies equally to actions to establish a marriage and to actions where establishment is sought in order to obtain a divorce.

{21 In the instant case, because the trial court found that the Clarks' unsolemnized marriage terminated on August 28, 1996, the statute of limitation began running on that date. Therefore, Linda's filing of her action in October 1996 was well within the statutory period. As we noted in Gonzalez, we did not, and still do not, believe that the legislature meant to place the burden of crowded court dockets and other matters completely beyond the petitioner's control, solely on the petitioner. See Gonzales, 2000 UT 28 at ¶ 24, 1 P.3d 1074.

22 In fact, the procedural history of Linda's action against Cecil clearly demonstrates the unfairness of a statute of limitation not tolled by the filing of an action. Linda filed her action in October 1996, within two months of the termination of the marital relationship. However, Cecil delayed discovery for at least two months, even ignoring two motions to compel. During that time Linda diligently attempted to obtain an order establishing an unsolemnized marriage. The trial was held and findings were made within one year of the termination date. However, due to further delays caused at least in part by Cecil, the final order was not entered until later than one year past the termination date of the unsolemnized marriage.

Based on our precedent in Gonzalez and our review of the merits, we affirm the court of appeals' decision in all respects.

1 . As the court of appeals notes in its memorandum decision in this matter, although Cecil termed his motion a motion to dismiss, "it is properly considered as a motion under Rule 60(b)(4) [motion for relief from void judgment] and we treat it accordingly." Clark v. Clark, 2000 UT App 54, n. 3 2000 WL 33244181 (mem.) (citing Grossen v. DeWitt, 1999 UT App 167, 16, 982 P.2d 581; In re Baby Boy Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah Ct.App.1995)).