Justice MULLARKEY
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted the petition for certiorari filed by the City of Thornton and its insurer, CIRSA, (collectively referred to as the employer) to review a workers’ compensation decision of the court of appeals which upheld a determination by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that employee Kent Replo-gle’s mental impairment injury is compensa-ble until he attains maximum medical improvement and ordered the employer to pay temporary disability benefits until terminated by law. City of Thornton and CIRSA v. Replogle and the Industnal Claim Appeals Office, 873 P.2d 30 (Colo.App.1993). The employer is seeking review of the determination that Replogle is entitled to receive temporary disability benefits for more than twelve weeks.
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We hold that the statutory scheme limits only permanent disability benefits paid [783]*783for mental'impairment to twelve weeks, and does not similarly limit temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment. Although temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are not subject to the twelve-week time limit, they are limited by the conditions specified in section 8-42-105, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), concerning temporary total disability. Further, the employer is entitled to offset any temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment against any award of permanent disability benefits for mental impairment.
I.
The City of Thornton hired Replogle as a full time firefighter in 1981. On December 10, 1991, Replogle responded to an emergency call at an apartment complex. At the complex, Replogle discovered that a young boy with whom he was acquainted had been seriously injured in a pool accident. Police officers already at the scene were trying to resuscitate the boy. Shortly thereafter, Re-plogle carried the boy to an ambulance where he continued resuscitation efforts. On December 15, 1991, Replogle learned that the boy had died from injuries sustained in the December 10 incident.
After hearing of the boy’s death, Replogle had difficulty sleeping, was unable to concentrate, and experienced disturbing and traumatic flashbacks concerning his attempts to resuscitate the boy. He consulted two psychologists who concluded that Replogle was experiencing trauma from the boy’s death.
Replogle filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in which he alleged that he was suffering from post-incident traumatic stress. After a hearing, an ALJ concluded that Replogle suffered mental and emotional stress caused by his attempted rescue of the boy, and that the stress arose primarily from Replogle’s occupation and place of employment. The ALJ also held that the mental impairment was sufficient to render Replogle temporarily totally disabled and awarded continuing temporary total disability benefits “until terminated by law.”
The employer agreed that Replogle suffered a compensable injury due to mental impairment, but contended that his temporary total disability benefits were limited to twelve weeks. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and the court of appeals rejected the employer’s argument and affirmed the holding of the ALJ. The court of appeals held that the mental impairment provision did not contain any express limitation on awards for temporary disability benefits. Under this interpretation, Replogle was entitled to mental impairment benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement. We affirm the court of appeals’ holding that mental impairment benefits in this case for temporary total disability benefits may continue beyond twelve weeks.
II.
A.
The employer asks this court to hold that the ALJ, the ICAO, and the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted section 8-41-301(2)(b), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The employer argues that the statute limits all benefits recoverable by a claimant for injuries to a total of twelve weeks, including both temporary and permanent disability benefits. We disagree.
In interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, the supreme court must give meaning to all portions thereof and construe statutory provisions to further legislative intent. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991). The first goal of the court in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. To ascertain the legislative intent, courts must look to the statutory language in question. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39 (Colo.1992). Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretative rules of statutory construction. Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555 (Colo.1989). If the language is ambiguous or unclear, we may resort to the. legislative history to interpret the statutory language. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990). With these principles in mind, we will turn to the case before us.
[784]*784B.
Under the workers’ compensation statute, a worker suffering a disability is entitled to two general types of coverage: temporary disability benefits (sections 8-42-105 & 106, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)), and permanent disability benefits (section 8-42-107 & 111, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)).
Temporary disability benefits typically terminate when a claimant attains maximum medical improvement or when other statutorily specified conditions occur. See § 8-42-105(3) and § 8-42-106.1 When temporary disability benefits end, the claimant may become eligible for permanent disability benefits, which are determined pursuant to section 8-42-111, section 8 — 42-107(2) and section 8 — 42-107(8). Section 8 — 42-107(2) is a schedule defining the maximum length of time for which compensation will be awarded for particular injuries. See generally Duran v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 883 P.2d 477 (Colo.1994) (upholding constitutionality of scheduled benefits). Section 8-42-107(8) addresses permanent medical impairment for other injuries not covered under the schedule. This subsection outlines a complex calculation for determining the time period for which permanent medical benefits are available after maximum medical improvement has occurred. Although “medical impairment” is not specifically defined under the statute, it is a term used to describe permanent disability. See § 8-42-107. Indeed, that section often refers to “permanent medical impairment.”
Some confusion arises in this case because of the legislature’s usage of two very similar terms: “medical impairment,” discussed above, and “mental impairment,” a new term introduced by the 1991 statutory amendments. Section 8 — 41-301(2)(b), the mental impairment subsection, was added as part of a major revision to the Workers’ Compensation Act. See 1991 Sess. Laws p. 1294. Ch. 219, S.B.
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Justice MULLARKEY
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted the petition for certiorari filed by the City of Thornton and its insurer, CIRSA, (collectively referred to as the employer) to review a workers’ compensation decision of the court of appeals which upheld a determination by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (ICAO) and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that employee Kent Replo-gle’s mental impairment injury is compensa-ble until he attains maximum medical improvement and ordered the employer to pay temporary disability benefits until terminated by law. City of Thornton and CIRSA v. Replogle and the Industnal Claim Appeals Office, 873 P.2d 30 (Colo.App.1993). The employer is seeking review of the determination that Replogle is entitled to receive temporary disability benefits for more than twelve weeks.
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We hold that the statutory scheme limits only permanent disability benefits paid [783]*783for mental'impairment to twelve weeks, and does not similarly limit temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment. Although temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are not subject to the twelve-week time limit, they are limited by the conditions specified in section 8-42-105, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), concerning temporary total disability. Further, the employer is entitled to offset any temporary disability benefits paid for mental impairment against any award of permanent disability benefits for mental impairment.
I.
The City of Thornton hired Replogle as a full time firefighter in 1981. On December 10, 1991, Replogle responded to an emergency call at an apartment complex. At the complex, Replogle discovered that a young boy with whom he was acquainted had been seriously injured in a pool accident. Police officers already at the scene were trying to resuscitate the boy. Shortly thereafter, Re-plogle carried the boy to an ambulance where he continued resuscitation efforts. On December 15, 1991, Replogle learned that the boy had died from injuries sustained in the December 10 incident.
After hearing of the boy’s death, Replogle had difficulty sleeping, was unable to concentrate, and experienced disturbing and traumatic flashbacks concerning his attempts to resuscitate the boy. He consulted two psychologists who concluded that Replogle was experiencing trauma from the boy’s death.
Replogle filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in which he alleged that he was suffering from post-incident traumatic stress. After a hearing, an ALJ concluded that Replogle suffered mental and emotional stress caused by his attempted rescue of the boy, and that the stress arose primarily from Replogle’s occupation and place of employment. The ALJ also held that the mental impairment was sufficient to render Replogle temporarily totally disabled and awarded continuing temporary total disability benefits “until terminated by law.”
The employer agreed that Replogle suffered a compensable injury due to mental impairment, but contended that his temporary total disability benefits were limited to twelve weeks. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office and the court of appeals rejected the employer’s argument and affirmed the holding of the ALJ. The court of appeals held that the mental impairment provision did not contain any express limitation on awards for temporary disability benefits. Under this interpretation, Replogle was entitled to mental impairment benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement. We affirm the court of appeals’ holding that mental impairment benefits in this case for temporary total disability benefits may continue beyond twelve weeks.
II.
A.
The employer asks this court to hold that the ALJ, the ICAO, and the court of appeals incorrectly interpreted section 8-41-301(2)(b), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The employer argues that the statute limits all benefits recoverable by a claimant for injuries to a total of twelve weeks, including both temporary and permanent disability benefits. We disagree.
In interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, the supreme court must give meaning to all portions thereof and construe statutory provisions to further legislative intent. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991). The first goal of the court in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. To ascertain the legislative intent, courts must look to the statutory language in question. Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39 (Colo.1992). Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to interpretative rules of statutory construction. Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555 (Colo.1989). If the language is ambiguous or unclear, we may resort to the. legislative history to interpret the statutory language. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990). With these principles in mind, we will turn to the case before us.
[784]*784B.
Under the workers’ compensation statute, a worker suffering a disability is entitled to two general types of coverage: temporary disability benefits (sections 8-42-105 & 106, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)), and permanent disability benefits (section 8-42-107 & 111, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.)).
Temporary disability benefits typically terminate when a claimant attains maximum medical improvement or when other statutorily specified conditions occur. See § 8-42-105(3) and § 8-42-106.1 When temporary disability benefits end, the claimant may become eligible for permanent disability benefits, which are determined pursuant to section 8-42-111, section 8 — 42-107(2) and section 8 — 42-107(8). Section 8 — 42-107(2) is a schedule defining the maximum length of time for which compensation will be awarded for particular injuries. See generally Duran v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 883 P.2d 477 (Colo.1994) (upholding constitutionality of scheduled benefits). Section 8-42-107(8) addresses permanent medical impairment for other injuries not covered under the schedule. This subsection outlines a complex calculation for determining the time period for which permanent medical benefits are available after maximum medical improvement has occurred. Although “medical impairment” is not specifically defined under the statute, it is a term used to describe permanent disability. See § 8-42-107. Indeed, that section often refers to “permanent medical impairment.”
Some confusion arises in this case because of the legislature’s usage of two very similar terms: “medical impairment,” discussed above, and “mental impairment,” a new term introduced by the 1991 statutory amendments. Section 8 — 41-301(2)(b), the mental impairment subsection, was added as part of a major revision to the Workers’ Compensation Act. See 1991 Sess. Laws p. 1294. Ch. 219, S.B. 91-218. The mental impairment subsection allows both permanent and temporary disability benefits to be awarded upon a finding of mental impairment. Section 8-41 — 301(2)(b) provides:
The mental impairment which is the basis of the claim must have arisen primarily from the claimant’s then occupation and place of employment. Notwithstanding any other provision of articles 40 to 47 of this title, where a claim is by reason of mental impairment the claimant shall be limited to twelve weeks of medical impairment benefits which shall be in an amount not less than one hundred fifty dollars per week and not more than fifty percent of the state average weekly wage, inclusive of any temporary disability benefits. This limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime of violence.
§ 8 — 41—301(2)(b) (emphasis added).
“Mental impairment,” under the statute, is defined as:
... a disability arising from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside of a worker’s usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in similar circumstances.
§ 8-41-301(2)(a), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).
The employer claims that the clause “inclusive of any temporary disability benefits” in subsection 301(2)(b) quoted above limits temporary disability benefits for mental impairment to twelve weeks. It puts particular emphasis on the introductory “notwithstanding” phrase. We disagree with the employer’s analysis. In our view, it improperly [785]*785construes “medical impairment benefits” and fails to treat the statute as a whole.
Initially, we note that “mental impairment” and “medical impairment” are not synonymous. Rather, both are terms of art in the Workers’ Compensation Act. By the express terms of section 8-41-301, mental impairment is a condition eligible for medical impairment benefits. Mental impairment qualifies for both temporary and permanent disability benefits. See § 8 — 41—301(2)(b) and (2)(d). Medical impairment, as discussed above, is used only to describe permanent disability benefits.
The overall scheme of the Act provides different limitations of coverage for permanent disability benefits and for temporary disability benefits. Section 8-42-107(2) limits the time period for which permanent medical impairment benefits are available according to the type of injury. The rationale for such a limitation on permanent medical impairment benefits, as both parties have agreed, is to limit costs. According to its legislative history, the 1991 amendment also was adopted as a cost control measure to limit mental impairment benefits for permanent disability to twelve weeks.2
However, the 1991 amendment does not limit mental impairment benefits for temporary disability. This was no drafting error, and the reason for this omission is apparent when the Act is read as a whole. No special limitation was needed in the 1991 amendment because temporary disability benefits are limited elsewhere in sections 8-42-105 and 8-42-106. Once “maximum medical improvement” for a temporary disability occurs, then temporary disability payments end. Thus, in this case, once Replogle attains maximum medical improvement for his mental impairment, his temporary disability payments will end.
This separate and distinct treatment of the two types of benefits available for mental impairment is consistent with the statutory treatment of temporary and permanent benefits for other types of disability. The closest analogy is that, under the 1991 amendment, mental impairment is treated like a scheduled award. Under the scheduled list for permanent medical impairment, coverage is limited to a specific number of weeks for a particular injury such as blindness, deafness, or loss of a limb. Similarly, coverage for permanent mental impairment is limited to a specific number of weeks. Compare § 8-41-301(2)(b) (medical impairment benefits for mental impairment) with § 8 — 42—107(2) (scheduled awards for permanent partial disability benefits). Temporary disability benefits are limited in that they normally cease when an employee reaches maximum medical improvement, see, e.g., section 8-42-106 (temporary partial disability). Temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are subject to the same limitation of maximum medical improvement under section 8-42-105(3) (temporary total disability).
Contrary to the employer’s contention, the 1991 amendment providing that claimants are limited to twelve weeks of permanent disability benefits attributable to mental impairment “inclusive of any temporary disability benefits” does not limit temporary and permanent disability benefits to a total of twelve weeks. Rather, this language means that the dollar amount of any temporary disability benefits which the claimant receives for any mental impairment must be offset against the weekly dollar amounts authorized for permanent disability benefits under section 8-42-301.3
[786]*786Finally, had the legislature intended to impose the twelve-week limitation on both temporary and permanent disability benefits resulting from mental impairment, it could have done so expressly in the 1991 amendment as it did in another context. Section 8-42-107.5, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), which was enacted as part of the same bill in 1991, specifically places a limitation on the combination of temporary and permanent disability payments by use of the word “and”:
No claimant whose impairment rating is twenty-five per cent or less may receive more than sixty thousand dollars from combined temporary disability payments and permanent partial disability payments.
§ 8-42-107.5 (emphasis added). See 1991 Sess. Laws p. 1311. Ch. 219, S.B. 91-218. Section 841-301(2)(b), on the other hand, has no such language.
III.
In summary, we find that separate and distinct limitations on both temporary and permanent disability benefits for mental impairment are imposed by the statutory scheme. Permanent disability benefits for mental impairment (also known as medical impairment benefits) are limited by the 1991 amendment to twelve weeks. Temporary disability benefits for mental impairment are limited by maximum medical improvement. As Replogle concedes, the temporary disability benefits will be used as an offset if permanent benefits also are awarded.
For these reasons, we affirm the holding of the court of appeals.