Opinion
KAUFMAN, J.
We granted review in this case to determine whether a showing of “good cause” for discovery of peace officer personnel records, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b),1 requires an affidavit based on the affiant’s personal knowledge of the averments set forth therein. We hold that personal knowledge is not a requirement under section 1043, subdivision (b).
Factual and Procedural Background
On the evening of December 2, 1987, real party in interest (hereafter defendant) Howard Kennedy was arrested and charged with resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148) and exhibiting a knife (Pen. Code, § 417). Defendant [79]*79subsequently filed a motion for discovery of all prior complaints of excessive force or violence involving the two arresting officers, Harris and Dickson. The motion was based on the police reports of the incident and a declaration of defendant’s attorney.
Officer Harris’s report stated in substance as follows; On the evening in question, he and Officer Dickson responded to a report of an individual brandishing a knife. The alleged victim of the assault identified defendant as the assailant. The officers ordered defendant to place his hands on a fence, step back and spread his legs. Defendant placed his hands on the fence but refused to step back. When Officer Dickson began a patdown search, defendant became agitated and removed his hands from the fence. Officer Dickson then pushed defendant against the fence and ordered him to leave his hands there. When defendant again removed his hands, both officers grabbed him by the wrists and ordered him not to resist. As soon as they released him, however, defendant turned as if to walk away, whereupon both officers again attempted to grab his arms. Defendant then swung his fist at Officer Harris but missed. In response, Officer Harris struck defendant with, in his own words, a “closed left fist in the side of his face causing him to lose balance.” Officer Dickson then wrestled defendant to the ground, Officer Harris joined in, and the three “wrestled around” until Officer Harris was able to place handcuffs on defendant. A supplemental police report filed by the backup officer states that both the alleged victim and his friend, referred to in the police report as “independent witnesses,” were of the opinion that the officers “used the correct amount of force necessary. . . .”
The declaration of defendant’s attorney in support of the motion stated, in pertinent part, as follows: “The requested documents and records are relevant to a defense of the charges. . . . []¡] I am informed and believe based upon information contained in the police report as well as from [defendant], that Officers Harris and Dickson . . . used excessive, unreasonable and unnecessary force to arrest [defendant] and that said excessive force was beyond the scope of the duties of said arresting officers so as to make said arrest illegal and otherwise improper, [fl] A material and substantial issue in the trial of this matter will be the character, habits, customs and credibility of the officers. [If] I am informed and believe, and thereon allege that Officers Dickson and Harris grabbed [defendant] and handcuffed him. Officers Dickson and Harris then grabbed [defendant] by the hair and threw him down to the ground. One officer then stepped on [defendant’s] head, while the other twisted his arm behind his back.”
Counsel’s declaration continued: “I believe that other complaints of use of excessive force by the officer[s] may have been filed by members of the [80]*80public resulting in investigation and related reports to which the prosecution has sole access; that such complaints would tend to show or will lead to evidence which will show a tendency or propensity on the part of the arresting officer[s] herein to engage in the use of unlawful and excessive force in the execution of arrests.” The declaration further alleged on information and belief that the records sought were within the possession, custody or control of the City of Santa Cruz Police Department (City).
At the hearing on the motion, the municipal court judge ruled that defendant had made a sufficient showing of good cause to justify an in camera hearing, pursuant to the provisions of sections 1043, subdivision (b) and 1045, subdivision (b), to determine whether the materials sought were relevant to the pending litigation. The court further ruled that any disclosure would be limited to the name, address and phone number of any prior complainants and witnesses and the date of any prior incidents. The court explicitly declined to disclose any documents, records or copies of reports, as well as any information relating to disciplinary proceedings or investigations of the police department.2
In so ruling, the court expressly rejected the City’s contention that counsel’s declaration in support of the motion was inherently inadequate because the allegations were based on “information and belief.” While acknowledging that City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1669 [236 Cal.Rptr. 155] supported the City’s position, the court held that the better rule and the overwhelming weight of authority, including two cases decided after City of Santa Cruz, i.e., Larry E. v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 25 [239 Cal.Rptr. 264] and Jalilie v. Superior Court (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 487 [240 Cal.Rptr. 662], held that allegations on information and belief may establish good cause for discovery under section 1043, subdivision (b). In any event, the court observed that ignoring counsel’s declaration, the “police reports, standing on their own, are satisfactory justification for the motion in this case.”
The City thereupon petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel the municipal court to vacate its order. The superior court denied [81]*81the petition. The City then petitioned the Court of Appeal. The latter, after soliciting and receiving opposition, issued a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the municipal court to vacate its original order and to enter a new and different order denying the motion. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed its earlier holding in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 1669, that averments in an affidavit on information and belief cannot satisfy the good cause requirements of section 1043, subdivision (b).
We granted review to resolve a widening conflict among the Courts of Appeal over an issue of ongoing statewide importance. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Discussion
A. The Statutory Background
Notwithstanding contrary decisions in one Court of Appeal and the views of the dissenters here, we find the statutory scheme clear, the statutory language quite plain and the legislative intent manifest.
In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as “Pitchess motions” (after our decision in Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305]) through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.83 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.4 The Penal Code [82]*82provisions define “personnel records” (Pen. Code, § 832.8) and provide that such records are “confidential” and subject to discovery only pursuant to the procedures set forth in the Evidence Code. (Pen. Code, § 832.7.) Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 set out the procedures for discovery in detail. As here pertinent, section 1043, subdivision (a) requires a written motion and notice to the governmental agency which has custody of the records sought, and subdivision (b) provides that such motion shall include, inter alia, “(2) A description of the type of records or information sought; and [¶] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that such govern[83]*83mental agency identified has such records or information from such records.”
A finding of “good cause” under section 1043, subdivision (b) is only the first hurdle in the discovery process. Once good cause for discovery has been established, section 1045 provides that the court shall then examine the information “in chambers” in conformity with section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as he or she is willing to have present), and shall exclude from disclosure several enumerated categories of information, including: (1) complaints more than five years old, (2) the “conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint . . .” and (3) facts which are “so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.” (§ 1045, subd. (b).)
In addition to the exclusion of specific categories of information from disclosure, section 1045 establishes general criteria to guide the court’s determination and insure that the privacy interests of the officers subject to the motion are protected. Where the issue in litigation concerns the policies or pattern of conduct of the employing agency, the statute requires the court to “consider whether the information sought may be obtained from other records . . . which would not necessitate the disclosure of individual personnel records.” (§ 1045, subd. (c).) The law further provides that the court may, in its discretion, “make any order which justice requires to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.” (§ 1045, subd. (d), italics added.) And, finally, the statute mandates that in any case where disclosure is permitted, the court “shall. . . order that the records disclosed or discovered shall not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.” (§ 1045, subd. (e), italics added.)
As statutory schemes go the foregoing is a veritable model of clarity and balance. Section 1043 clearly requires a showing of “good cause” for discovery in two general categories: (1) the “materiality” of the information or records sought to the “subject matter involved in the pending litigation,” and (2) a “reasonable belief’ that the governmental agency has the “type” of information or records sought to be disclosed. (§ 1043, subd. (b).)
The relatively low threshold for discovery embodied in section 1043 is offset, in turn, by section 1045’s protective provisions which: (1) explicitly “exclude from disclosure” certain enumerated categories of information (§ 1045, subd. (b)); (2) establish a procedure for in camera inspection by the court prior to any disclosure (§ 1045, subd. (b)); and (3) issue a forceful directive to the courts to consider the privacy interests of the officers whose [84]*84records are sought and take whatever steps “justice requires” to protect the officers from “unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression.” (§ 1045, subds. (c), (d) & (e).)
The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant’s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense. The relatively relaxed standards for a showing of good cause under section 1043, subdivision (b)—“materiality” to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief’ that the agency has the type of information sought—insure the production for inspection of all potentially relevant documents. The in camera review procedure and disclosure guidelines set forth in section 1045 guarantee, in turn, a balancing of the officer’s privacy interests against the defendant’s need for disclosure. As a further safeguard, moreover, the courts have generally refused to disclose verbatim reports or records of any kind from peace officer personnel files, ordering instead (as the municipal court directed here) that the agency reveal only the name, address and phone number of any prior complainants and witnesses and the dates of the incidents in question. (See Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 828-829 [133 Cal.Rptr. 325]; Carruthers v. Municipal Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 439, 441 [168 Cal.Rptr. 33].)
B. Application of the Statutory Standards
1. The Materiality of the Requested Information
It is against this statutory backdrop that the Court of Appeal’s holding that defendant failed to establish good cause for discovery must be evaluated. In determining the question of “good cause,” however, we do not operate in a decisional vacuum. We have previously held that the Legislature, in adopting the statutory scheme in question, “not only reaffirmed but expanded” the principles of criminal discovery articulated by this court in the landmark case of Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531. (People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 679, fn. 19, 680 [214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446].)
These principles were applied in Pitchess to permit the discovery of police personnel records. As we explained, a criminal defendant’s right to discovery is based on the “fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535.) Pitchess made it clear that “an accused . . . may compel discovery by demonstrating that the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial.” (11 Cal.3d at p. 536.) In contrast [85]*85to the detailed showing required by some civil discovery statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985, 2036), the requisite showing in a criminal matter “may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery” other than a mere desire for all information in the possession of the prosecution. (11 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537.) The information sought must, however, be “requested with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” (Id. at p. 538.)
Pitchess involved an arrestee who asserted self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer. The defendant sought discovery of records of prior complaints against the officers concerning the officers’ propensity for violence. We held that the information was material, noting that the information could be used to cross-examine the officers at trial and was “unquestionably relevant and admissible” as character evidence of the officers’ tendency to engage in violence. (11 Cal.3d at p. 537; see § 1103.)
We recently returned to the issue of “materiality” for discovery of police records in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658. Memro involved an arrestee who alleged that his confession to a murder had been coerced. He sought discovery of records of prior complaints of violence against the interrogating officers. Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. (38 Cal. 3d at p. 684.) Counsel’s declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. (Id. at p. 682.) Discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a “habit or custom” of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. (Id. at p. 681; see § 1105.) Hence, we concluded that “counsel’s allegations sufficiently ‘set forth the materiality’ of the requested information. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)” (Id. at p. 682.)
Applying these same principles to the case at bar, we are similarly persuaded that defendant here has sufficiently demonstrated the materiality of the requested records and information. Defendant is charged with resisting arrest. (Pen. Code, § 148.) The police reports make clear that considerable force was used to effect the arrest. Counsel’s declaration asserts that the officers used excessive force “so as to make said arrest illegal and otherwise improper.” The declaration sets forth, on the basis of information and belief, a specific factual scenario to support that assertion. Counsel avers that she seeks the information relating to prior complaints of excessive force against the arresting officers to “show a tendency or propensity on the part of the arresting officers[s] herein to engage in the use of unlawful and excessive force in the execution of the arrests.”
[86]*86Viewed in conjunction with the police reports, counsel’s averments establish a plausible factual foundation for an allegation of excessive force, put the court on notice that the officers’ alleged use of excessive force will likely be an issue at trial, and articulate a valid theory as to how the information sought might be admissible. (See §§ 1103, 1105; Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p.537; People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 681-682.) Defendant has plainly demonstrated the materiality of the requested information in satisfaction of section 1043, subdivision (b).
2. The Statute Does Not Require Personal Knowledge of the Material Facts
The Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that counsel’s declaration was inadequate to establish good cause for discovery because it was not based on counsel’s personal knowledge of the material facts and averments.5 This conclusion was unwarranted.
Section 1043 contains no requirement of “personal knowledge” on the part of the affiant. (See People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676.) Indeed, an overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeal have permitted discovery under section 1043, subdivision (b), based on affidavits containing averments on information and belief. (See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [206 Cal.Rptr. 82]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 523, 527 [169 Cal.Rptr. 877]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].)
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 1669, held that a showing of materiality under section 1043, subdivision (b) requires the personal knowledge of the affiant. The court’s holding was based on the following reasoning: An affidavit, the court noted, is generally presumed to be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. Accordingly, an affidavit on information and belief is an “anomaly,” a “contradiction in terms.” Since section 1043, subdivision (b) expressly requires an “affidavit” to show that the information sought is material to the [87]*87pending litigation, it must implicitly require that such a showing be based on personal knowledge.
It is a nice but wholly specious syllogism that the Court of Appeal constructs, for it rests on false assumptions. It assumes, incorrectly, that an affidavit cannot contain allegations on the basis of information and belief (or hearsay) and that an affidavit which does has no legal significance. Of course, it is true that an affidavit is normally presumed to state matters personally known to the affiant and lacks evidentiary value, in a variety of civil contexts, when based on information and belief, or hearsay. (See, e.g., Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 201 [151 Cal.Rptr. 721] [an affidavit in support of a petition for writ of mandate must be based on personal knowledge].)
It is decidedly not true, however, that an affidavit upon information and belief is an anomaly in the law, bereft of legal significance. On the contrary, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, “the value of averments on information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized.” (Berger v. United States (1921) 255 U.S. 22, 34 [65 L.Ed. 481, 486, 41 S.Ct. 230].) Indeed, there are numerous exceptions to the general rule prohibiting affidavits on information and belief, either where the facts to be established are incapable of positive averment, or where expressly permitted by statute. (See generally 3 DeMeo, Cal. Deposition & Discovery Practice, § 15.01(29), p. 15.01-44; 3 Am.Jur.2d, Affidavits, §§ 22, 23, pp. 482-485.) As this court explained in Brown v. Happy Valley Fruit Growers (1929) 206 Cal. 515, 520-521 [274 P. 977], ‘“Whenever the statute, either in express terms or by implication, requires a person to make a statement which from the very nature of things can only be made on information and belief, an affidavit in that form meets the demands of the statute.’”
Thus, courts have long held that affidavits on information and belief may be sufficient in a variety of contexts where the facts would otherwise be difficult or impossible to establish. (See, e.g., Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. at pp. 33-34 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 485-486] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support a motion for disqualification of a trial judge]; Blackman v. MacCoy (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 873, 879-880 [338 P.2d 234] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support disqualification motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 170]; Brown v. Happy Valley Fruit Growers, supra, 206 Cal. at pp. 520-521; [affidavit on information and belief adequate to support change of venue motion]; Davis-Heller-Pearce Co. v. Ramont (1924) 66 Cal.App. 778, 780 [226 P. 972] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support motion to quash service]; People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [132 Cal.Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557] [police officer’s [88]*88affidavit based on informant’s statements sufficient for issuance of search warrant].)
Moreover, the Legislature may expressly authorize the use of affidavits on information and belief to support a particular pleading or motion. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30 [affidavit on information and belief adequate for denial of allegations in complaint]; Code Civ. Proc., § 446 [affidavit on information and belief sufficient for verification of pleadings]; Code Civ. Proc., § 482.040 [affidavit on information and belief adequate to support application for writ of attachment].)
Of course, the Legislature may also preclude the use of affidavits on information and belief by expressly requiring allegations based on “personal knowledge.” (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d) [affidavits in support of motion for summary judgment “shall be made ... on personal knowledge”]; see generally 2 Cal. Civil Procedure Before Trial (Cont.Ed.Bar 1978) § 23.42, p. 36.)
Thus, it is simply incorrect to suggest that a statute which requires the filing of an “affidavit” necessarily implies a requirement of personal knowledge on the part of the affiant. On the contrary, it is a common legislative as well as judicial practice to allow the filing of affidavits on information and belief. Those courts which have granted motions for discovery of police personnel records on the basis of such motions, both before (see In re Valerie E. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 213, 217-219 [123 Cal.Rptr. 242, 86 A.L.R.3d 1163]; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 828; Hinojosa v. Superior Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 692, 696-697 [127 Cal.Rptr. 664]) and after the enactment of section 1043 (see Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 490; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1122-1123, Arcelona v. Municipal Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at p. 527), have most assuredly not relied on a “legal anomaly.”
Moreover, it is fair to assume that the Legislature was aware of such cases when it enacted section 1043; if its intent was truly to abrogate the use of affidavits on information and belief and to require affidavits based on personal knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that it would have done so explicitly. (People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 679, fn. 19.) It obviously knew how. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).) We decline to redraft the statute to impose such a burdensome requirement where the Legislature has conspicuously failed to do so.
We need not speculate, however, as to the Legislature’s intentions in this regard. The legislative history of section 1043 reveals that the Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement of personal knowledge.
[89]*89As originally introduced in the Senate and later modified in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the initial drafts of section 1043 (Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.)) differed from the final version in one significant respect. The Senate Bill as amended provided as follows: “(b) Such motion shall include: [¶] . . . (2) A description of the particular records or information sought; and [¶] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth in full detail and upon personal knowledge the materiality thereof to the issues in litigation, and stating that such governmental agency identified has the records or information from such records if any exist in its custody and control.” (Sen. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, italics added.)6
The italicized language was subsequently deleted, however, by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice and replaced by the language of the current statute, which of course requires only that the affidavit set forth the “materiality” of the requested records to the “subject matter” of the litigation. (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978.) A committee staff report accompanying the Assembly amendments explained that the original language was “dropped because it required more than the petitioner could likely show at that stage in the proceeding. The purpose of discovery is to find detail. If the petitioner already had the particulars of the records he would not need to use discovery.” (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1978, italics added.)
Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that the notion of requiring a showing of materiality based on “personal knowledge” and “full detail” of the relevant facts was considered and expressly rejected by the legislative draftsmen. The legislative history, the case law background, and the statutory language all point to the same conclusion: the “materiality” component of section 1043, subdivision (b) may be satisfied by affidavits based on information and belief.
3. The Statute Does Not Require Personal Knowledge of Particular Prior Complaints
As noted earlier, in addition to a showing of materiality, section 1043, subdivision (b) also requires a “description of the type of records or [90]*90information sought” and affidavits “stating upon reasonable belief” that the governmental agency “has such records or information from such records.” (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal construed this provision to hold that the affiant must demonstrate personal knowledge of the particular items sought to be disclosed. Since counsel’s declaration stated only a “belie[f]” that other complaints of excessive force “may have been filed,” the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant’s motion failed to establish good cause for discovery. That conclusion was erroneous.
The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.3d 180, 187 [185 Cal.Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902].) In determining such intent we look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. (Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501 [247 Cal.Rptr. 362, 754 P.2d 708]; Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897 [226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909].)
The language of section 1043, subdivision (b) is clear and unambiguous. The statute expressly provides that a motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records shall include a description “of the type of records or information sought,” as well as a statement “upon reasonable belief’’'’ that the governmental agency “has such records or information.” (§ 1043, subd. (b), italics added.) As previously discussed, it is a common legislative practice to provide for the filing of affidavits on less than personal knowledge. That is precisely what the Legislature chose to do here; we are not at liberty to second-guess that decision.
Moreover, it is manifest that a showing of “reasonable belief” does not require personal knowledge, but may be premised upon a rational inference from known or reasonably assumed facts. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “reasonable” as “fair, proper, just, . . . rational.” (Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1138.) Black’s further defines “belief” as a “[c]onviction of the mind, arising not from actual perception or knowledge, but by way of inference, or from evidence or information derived from others.” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 141, italics added.) “The words ‘reasonably believes’ . . . denote the fact that the actor believes that a given fact or combination of facts exists, and that the circumstances which he knows . . . are such as to cause a reasonable man so to believe.” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 1138; accord Ballantine’s Law Dict. (3d ed. 1969) p. 1060 [A reasonable belief is “a belief begotten by attendant circumstances fairly creating it, and honestly entertained.”].)
It is equally apparent that the statute, in calling for a description of the “type” of records sought to be disclosed, does not require the affiant to prove the existence of particular records. The dictionary defines “type” as [91]*91“a kind, class or group. . . .” (Webster’s New World Dict. (2d ed. 1974) p. 1538.) Clearly, an affidavit which describes the information sought as consisting of prior “complaints of excessive force” by specific officers, as counsel’s declaration here alleged, has specified a class, group or “type” of information within the plain meaning of the statute.
Case law lends additional support to this interpretation. Prior to the enactment of section 1043, the Courts of Appeal had overwhelmingly rejected the notion that defendants seeking discovery of police records of citizen complaints must demonstrate knowledge of prior complaints. (See, e.g., Caldwell v. Municipal Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 377, 380 [129 Cal.Rptr. 834] [“Even though the defense has not been able to point to specific prior acts of violence, the official records desired to be examined were identified with reasonable particularity and the pertinence to the defense of the requested information was demonstrated.”]; accord In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pp. 217-219; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 828; Hinojosa v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at pp. 696-697.)
Caldwell, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 377, relied principally on In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 213. In the latter case the defendant—charged with battery against two police officers—moved for the production of all records involving complaints against the officers for unnecessary and excessive acts of violence or racial prejudice. Counsel’s declaration in support of the motion stated in part that he was “informed and believes” that unspecified persons had “. . . made [such] complaints.” (Id. at p. 217.) The trial court denied the motion “because defense counsel could not state with any certainty that there had in fact been any prior complaints.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant claimed that although she could not identify the specific “content of the material sought, her motion for discovery was not a mere ‘fishing expedition’ since she could identify the type of material desired.” (Ibid., original italics.)
The Court of Appeal agreed. Its reasoning is particularly pertinent to the question before us and bears full recitation: “In the present case, defendant did not have the names of any prior citizen complainants and was not aware of any complaints made against the police officers involved herein. However, proof of the existence of the sought material is not a prerequisite to the granting of a discovery motion. (Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 812, 817 [112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353]; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75-76 [346 P.2d 407].) A requirement of such proof would, in many cases, deny the accused the benefit of relevant and material evidence. Defendant should not be required to produce the names of specific citizen complainants. Ordinarily, an accused would never be in a position to know what complaints, if any, had been filed against certain police officers in the com[92]*92munity. To make such a showing a condition precedent to production would make an accused’s rights ‘dependent upon the highly fortuitous circumstance’ (see People v. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98 [338 P.2d 428]) of the accused’s detailed knowledge as to the contents of the police officers’ personnel files. [¶] In the present case defendant showed more than a ‘mere desire for the benefit of all information’; she clearly specified the exact material sought, i.e. all information regarding citizen complaints for excessive force against the two police officers involved in her arrest. This was sufficient to justify discovery.” (In re Valerie E, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pp. 218-219.)
It is fair to assume that the Legislature was cognizant of the courts’ holdings in Valerie E. and its progeny that the defendant need prove only the “type of material desired,” not the “existence of the sought material.” (In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pp. 217, 219, second italics added; People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 679, fn. 19.) In expressly requiring a description of only the “type” of information requested rather than the “particular” records, it would appear that the Legislature intended to codify the preexisting case law. (§ 1043, subd. (b).)
We need not infer the Legislature’s intentions in this regard, however. As was the case with respect to the materiality component of good cause, the legislative history of section 1043 demonstrates rather conclusively that the statute means precisely what it says. As noted earlier, one of the early drafts of the bill required “(2) A description of the particular records or information sought.” (Sen. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, italics added.) This requirement was deleted in the Assembly, however, and replaced by the current provision requiring only a description of the “type” of information sought. (Assem. Amend, to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978.) A committee staff" report explained the purpose of the amendment as follows: “If the petitioner already had the particulars of the records he would not need to use discovery.” (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1978, italics added.)7
Thus, both the legislative history and the decisional background of section 1043, subdivision (b) support the interpretation which we adopt and which is otherwise clear from the statutory language. In requiring only a “reasonable belief” that the governmental agency has the “type” of information sought, the statute says what it means and means precisely what it says.8
[93]*93It is readily apparent, moreover, that defendant has met his burden in this regard. Counsel’s statement of “belief” that the City “may” have other complaints of excessive force against the officers in question constitutes a rational inference from the facts of the pending litigation.9 The police reports state that one of the arresting officers struck defendant with a closed fist and that both officers subsequently wrestled him to the ground. Counsel’s affidavit avers that the officers continued to apply unnecessary and excessive force even after defendant was handcuffed and subdued. While the recited facts do not, of course, establish that the force used was in fact excessive, it is altogether fair and rational, on the basis of such facts and averments, to entertain a “reasonable belief” or inference that the same officers may have been accused of the use of excessive force in the past, and that such information may be found in their personnel records.
As noted above, a “reasonable belief” is simply a “conviction of mind . . . arising by way of inference” (Black’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 141, italics added), a “belief begotten by attendant circumstances, fairly creating it, and honestly entertained.” (Ballantine’s Law Dict., supra, at p. 1060, italics added.) Defendant’s substantive allegations plainly meet this standard.
Defendant, in short, has satisfied the criteria for discovery under section 1043, subdivision (b), and is entitled to a determination of relevance pursuant to the provisions of section 1045.
Conclusion
The City advances one proposition that is beyond dispute. In enacting sections 1043 and 1045 the Legislature clearly intended to place [94]*94specific limitations and procedural safeguards on the disclosure of peace officer personnel files which had not previously been found in judicial decisions. (See Arcelona v. Municipal Court, supra, 113 Cal.App.3d at pp. 530-531 [“The scope of disclosure of verbatim reports of internal investigations . . . once generally permitted under established Pitchess principles ... is now circumscribed under the statutory scheme.”]; see also 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 42.2, p. 1527 [“Evid. C[ode] § 1045 places certain limitations on criminal discovery not found in Pitchess . . . .”].)
The statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature admirably fulfills that intent. The relatively low threshold for a showing of good cause under section 1043 is tempered, in turn, by the specific exclusions, in camera review procedures, and exacting standards for disclosure of section 1045. Clearly, therefore, our decision sanctioning the use of affidavits on information and belief to demonstrate good cause will not, as the City contends, perpetuate a system of “discovery on demand.” On the contrary, the use of such affidavits is plainly contemplated within the legislation itself, which strikes a fair and workable balance between the need of criminal defendants for “all relevant and reasonably accessible information” {Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535), and the legitimate concerns of peace officers to shield from disclosure confidential information not essential to an effective defense or otherwise obtainable from other nonprivileged sources.10
The legislation, in short, works. But in any event, it is not within our province to rewrite it.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case remanded to that court with directions to remand the matter to the municipal court for a determination of relevance pursuant to the provisions of section 1045.
Mosk, J., Broussard, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.