City of College Park v. Flynn

282 S.E.2d 69, 248 Ga. 222, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 928
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedSeptember 9, 1981
Docket37549
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 282 S.E.2d 69 (City of College Park v. Flynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of College Park v. Flynn, 282 S.E.2d 69, 248 Ga. 222, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 928 (Ga. 1981).

Opinions

Jordan, Chief Justice.

The City of College Park appeals from entry of a declaratory judgment determining that the Flynns’ operation of a group personal care home for mentally disabled persons within a “C-L” or “Commercial-Limited” zoning district does not violate the city’s zoning ordinance.

The Flynns have received from the State and Fulton County health ágencies twelve persons who suffer from various mental disabilities but who do not have illnesses, injuries or disabilities which require continuing medical or nursing services. By contract and for remuneration, the Flynns assume twenty-four hour responsibility for the well-being of these persons, including such matters as being informed about their whereabouts at all times, and supervising them in the areas of nutrition and personal hygiene.

The Flynns’ home in which they and these persons live is situated on a block of one-family residences lying within a commercially-zoned district in the city. Permitted uses within this “C-L” or “Commercial-Limited” zoning district include hotels and motels, restaurants, government or private office buildings, laboratories, banks, package stores for the sale of alcoholic beverages, drug stores, book and stationery stores, dry cleaners, photographer’s or artist’s studios, beauty or barber shops, public or private schools or colleges other than certain types of vocational schools, libraries, museums, art galleries, radio and television stations, telephone exchanges, medical or dental clinics, as well as other uses and accessory uses. Use within the district of premises for a “dwelling” is permitted only in those cases where such use and the building were in existence on a lot of record at the effective date of the ordinance.

The Flynns were encouraged by the city to apply for a permit for the conditional use of their residence as a “nursing home.” Their application was denied, and they did not appeal this decision to the superior court in accordance with the procedural provisions of the zoning ordinance because they are of the opinion that they are not operating a nursing home.

1. We need not determine whether the Flynns’ use of their home was “for governmental purposes” within the meaning of cases such as Evans v. Just Open Government, 242 Ga. 834 (251 SE2d 546) (1979), so as to insulate their property from an imposition of the city zoning ordinance. Neither need we reach the procedural issues presented on appeal. A judgment that is right for any reason will not be reversed. Coker v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 473 (1) (198 SE 74) (1938).

2. This case is controlled by our decision in Douglas County [223]*223Resources v. Daniel, 247 Ga. 785 (280 SE2d 734) (1981). The city’s zoning ordinance defines the word “dwelling” as “Any building or portion thereof, but not an automobile house trailer, which is designed for or used for residential purposes.” Separately defined using their generic meanings are the terms “Dwelling, single-family” and “Dwelling, two-family.” Reasonably construed in light of the purposes to be served and the facts and circumstances of this case, the language of the zoning ordinance does not preclude utilization of the Flynns’ home by members of their family and by the mentally-disabled persons for whom they care.

Decided September 9, 1981 Rehearing denied September 29, 1981. Glaze & McNally, Robert Mark Mahler, Kirby A. Glaze, for appellant. Daniel F. Byrne, for appellees.

We cannot fail to note in passing that although apartments are not specifically mentioned as conforming uses in the “Commercial-Limited” portions of the ordinance, the use of that specie of dwelling in fact has been permitted to exist across the street from the Flynns’ property. The Flynns’ home no less fits the defined term “dwelling” because of the numbers or the mental disabilities of its residents.

Judgment affirmed.

Hill, P. J., Marshall, Clarke, Smith and Gregory, JJ., concur.

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City of College Park v. Flynn
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Bluebook (online)
282 S.E.2d 69, 248 Ga. 222, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 928, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-college-park-v-flynn-ga-1981.