Grice, Justice.
Does this municipal corporation, under its charter powers, have authority to provide by ordinance that before any motion picture may be exhibited in the city, it must be submitted for classification and if classified in either of two specified categories the advertising shall mention such classification?
That issue arises from the filing of identical petitions in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, by Columbia Pictures Corporation and by Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation and other similar corporations, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of such an ordinance on the grounds that the city did not have power under its charter to enact it and also that the ordinance violated stated provisions of the Georgia and United States Constitutions. The petitions named as defendants the City of Atlanta, Christine S. Gilliam in her capacity as Motion Picture Reviewer of that city, and certain named persons in their capacities as the Board of Review.
The two cases were treated together in the trial court. Ruling that the city did not have authority under its charter to enact the ordinance and specifically not ruling on the constitutional attacks made on the ordinance, the trial court overruled the defendants’ general demurrers to the petition and granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the city from attempting to enforce the ordinance.
The pertinent provisions of the ordinance under attack are these:
Section 1 created the office and described the duties of Motion Picture Reviewer, those duties being to “review and rate motion pictures to be shown in the City of Atlanta for the information, benefit and guidance of the public as herein set out.”
Sections 2 and 3 provided: “2. Any motion picture before being shown in the City of Atlanta must first be screened by the Motion Picture Reviewer and rated as herein set out.
“3. Motion pictures to be shown in the City of Atlanta shall be rated by the Motion Picture Reviewer in one of the following classifications: A. Approved . . . B. Unsuitable for the [716] Young . . . C. Objectionable . . . [the standards for each classification being set out].”
Sections 4 and 5 named the Library Board of the city as a Board of Review to hear appeals from the rating of the Reviewer, gave it subpoena powers and provided for appeal to such board.
Section 6 stated: “6. It shall be unlawful to show a motion picture in the City of Atlanta without first having it screened and rated by the Motion Picture Reviewer, as herein set out . . . [some exceptions being stated, including private showings and certain scientific and educational ones].”
Section 7 provided that the advertising of motion pictures classified as “Unsuitable for the Youth” or “Objectionable” must show a statement to that effect.
Section 9 imposed a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both, for each offense in violation of the ordinance.
An extended recital of the allegations made in the petition is not necessary under our view of the case. This is so since petitioners bring the suit as taxpayers as well as distributors of motion pictures, and also since the constitutional questions can not be considered on this review as they were not ruled upon by the trial court.
Petitioners allege that this court in the recent case of K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784 (125 SE2d 207), declared unconstitutional the only provision of the city’s charter dealing with regulation of motion pictures (Ga. L. 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23) and that there is no other provision of the city’s charter or general law which authorizes the enactment of such ordinance.
Petitioners also allege that they have no adequate remedy at law, and unless the defendants are restrained from enforcing the ordinance they will incur irreparable damage in specified respects, including incurrence of the expense of the defendant Reviewer’s salary and other items related to enforcement of the ordinance.
The petitioners’ prayers included a declaration that the ordinance is invalid and the grant of temporary and permanent in[717] junctive relief against enforcement of such invalid ordinance and disbursement of tax money for the Reviewer’s salary and other payments connected with it.
To those petitions the defendants filed demurrers and an answer which, among other things, admitted the facts as to the provisions, passage and steps to enforce the ordinance, but asserted its validity.
Upon the overruling of the defendants’ general demurrers, the admission of certain evidence over their objection, and the grant of the temporary injunction, the defendants assigned those rulings as error.
First, we must determine whether petitioners alleged standing and that they have suffered or are in immediate danger of suffering irreparable injury and, therefore, a right to seek the relief prayed for.
We agree with the trial court that the petitioners, as taxpayers of the defendant city, have shown both of these elements.
They have an interest in the sum made up from taxes in the city, and public funds are necessarily expended under the ordinance for its enforcement. See Aiken v. Armistead, 186 Ga. 368, 383 (198 SE 237); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 43 (70 SE2d 360).
Next, we hold that petitioners alleged that they have no adequate remedy at law. The Motion Picture Reviewer and the Board of Review, under the ordinance, were established only to classify motion pictures and have no power to determine whether the ordinance is authorized by the city’s charter.
We come now to the substantial question for this review, whether the ordinance is subject to the attack that it is ultra vires as beyond the charter powers of the city. In reaching its decision on this attack the trial court correctly eliminated from consideration the charter provisions emanating from Georgia Laws 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23, as to censorship of motion pictures, which were held unconstitutional by this court in K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, supra. It then concluded that the ordinance is not authorized by either the remaining provisions of Georgia Laws 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23, supra, relating to regulation of motion pictures or by [718] the city’s police powers granted by Georgia Laws 1874, pp. 116, 119-120, § 15.
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Grice, Justice.
Does this municipal corporation, under its charter powers, have authority to provide by ordinance that before any motion picture may be exhibited in the city, it must be submitted for classification and if classified in either of two specified categories the advertising shall mention such classification?
That issue arises from the filing of identical petitions in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, by Columbia Pictures Corporation and by Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation and other similar corporations, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of such an ordinance on the grounds that the city did not have power under its charter to enact it and also that the ordinance violated stated provisions of the Georgia and United States Constitutions. The petitions named as defendants the City of Atlanta, Christine S. Gilliam in her capacity as Motion Picture Reviewer of that city, and certain named persons in their capacities as the Board of Review.
The two cases were treated together in the trial court. Ruling that the city did not have authority under its charter to enact the ordinance and specifically not ruling on the constitutional attacks made on the ordinance, the trial court overruled the defendants’ general demurrers to the petition and granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the city from attempting to enforce the ordinance.
The pertinent provisions of the ordinance under attack are these:
Section 1 created the office and described the duties of Motion Picture Reviewer, those duties being to “review and rate motion pictures to be shown in the City of Atlanta for the information, benefit and guidance of the public as herein set out.”
Sections 2 and 3 provided: “2. Any motion picture before being shown in the City of Atlanta must first be screened by the Motion Picture Reviewer and rated as herein set out.
“3. Motion pictures to be shown in the City of Atlanta shall be rated by the Motion Picture Reviewer in one of the following classifications: A. Approved . . . B. Unsuitable for the [716] Young . . . C. Objectionable . . . [the standards for each classification being set out].”
Sections 4 and 5 named the Library Board of the city as a Board of Review to hear appeals from the rating of the Reviewer, gave it subpoena powers and provided for appeal to such board.
Section 6 stated: “6. It shall be unlawful to show a motion picture in the City of Atlanta without first having it screened and rated by the Motion Picture Reviewer, as herein set out . . . [some exceptions being stated, including private showings and certain scientific and educational ones].”
Section 7 provided that the advertising of motion pictures classified as “Unsuitable for the Youth” or “Objectionable” must show a statement to that effect.
Section 9 imposed a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or both, for each offense in violation of the ordinance.
An extended recital of the allegations made in the petition is not necessary under our view of the case. This is so since petitioners bring the suit as taxpayers as well as distributors of motion pictures, and also since the constitutional questions can not be considered on this review as they were not ruled upon by the trial court.
Petitioners allege that this court in the recent case of K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784 (125 SE2d 207), declared unconstitutional the only provision of the city’s charter dealing with regulation of motion pictures (Ga. L. 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23) and that there is no other provision of the city’s charter or general law which authorizes the enactment of such ordinance.
Petitioners also allege that they have no adequate remedy at law, and unless the defendants are restrained from enforcing the ordinance they will incur irreparable damage in specified respects, including incurrence of the expense of the defendant Reviewer’s salary and other items related to enforcement of the ordinance.
The petitioners’ prayers included a declaration that the ordinance is invalid and the grant of temporary and permanent in[717] junctive relief against enforcement of such invalid ordinance and disbursement of tax money for the Reviewer’s salary and other payments connected with it.
To those petitions the defendants filed demurrers and an answer which, among other things, admitted the facts as to the provisions, passage and steps to enforce the ordinance, but asserted its validity.
Upon the overruling of the defendants’ general demurrers, the admission of certain evidence over their objection, and the grant of the temporary injunction, the defendants assigned those rulings as error.
First, we must determine whether petitioners alleged standing and that they have suffered or are in immediate danger of suffering irreparable injury and, therefore, a right to seek the relief prayed for.
We agree with the trial court that the petitioners, as taxpayers of the defendant city, have shown both of these elements.
They have an interest in the sum made up from taxes in the city, and public funds are necessarily expended under the ordinance for its enforcement. See Aiken v. Armistead, 186 Ga. 368, 383 (198 SE 237); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 43 (70 SE2d 360).
Next, we hold that petitioners alleged that they have no adequate remedy at law. The Motion Picture Reviewer and the Board of Review, under the ordinance, were established only to classify motion pictures and have no power to determine whether the ordinance is authorized by the city’s charter.
We come now to the substantial question for this review, whether the ordinance is subject to the attack that it is ultra vires as beyond the charter powers of the city. In reaching its decision on this attack the trial court correctly eliminated from consideration the charter provisions emanating from Georgia Laws 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23, as to censorship of motion pictures, which were held unconstitutional by this court in K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, supra. It then concluded that the ordinance is not authorized by either the remaining provisions of Georgia Laws 1915, pp. 480, 493-494, § 23, supra, relating to regulation of motion pictures or by [718] the city’s police powers granted by Georgia Laws 1874, pp. 116, 119-120, § 15.
The 1915 act above referred to amended Atlanta’s charter by providing a section on the subject of what were then known as moving pictures. It provides as follows: “That the mayor and general council of the city of Atlanta are hereby authorized and empowered and given full authority to regulate by ordinance places where moving pictures are shown, whether alone or in connection with vaudeville or other entertainments, and to establish rules and regulations governing the manner in which such pictures shall be displayed and the means by which pictures are exposed, especially with reference to the possibility of fire or crowding of patrons, exits, and air, and furthermore, governing the matter of pictures displayed and to prevent the display of obscene or licentious pictures or other pictures that may affect the peace, health, morals and good order of said city . . .” Immediately following this quoted portion is that which provided for a board of censorship, prohibited exhibition of pictures without approval by such board, and empowered the board to approve or reject pictures or scenes, which this court recently held in K. Gordon Murray Productions, Inc. v. Floyd, 217 Ga. 784, supra, was prior restraint in violation of the freedom of speech guaranty of the Georgia Constitution.
As we construe it, the charter language above quoted was untouched by the ruling in the Murray case and empowers this ordinance, particularly the portion which expressly authorizes the city to regulate by ordinance “governing the matter of pictures displayed and to prevent the display of obscene” or other type pictures there described. “Matter” there refers to content of pictures.' Authority to regulate and govern their content is a broad power which surely includes authority to require, before their showing, review of the pictures for classification in certain categories and the display of any classification except “approved” in the advertising of the picture. With this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the police powers granted to the city by Ga. L. 1874, pp. 116, 119-120, § 15, supra.
It was error to overrule bn'this ground the defendants’ general demurrers to the petitions, and this requires reversal.
[719] In holding that the ordinance, in question is within the charter powers of the City of Atlanta, we make no ruling upon any of the attacks challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance, made but not reached and passed upon by the trial court because of its ruling that the ordinance was not authorized by the charter. While it would be desirable, in this one review, to decide all of the questions involved in the case, that is impossible. We are bound by the. rule that this court will never pass upon constitutional questions unless it clearly appears in the record that the point was directly and properly made in the court below and distinctly passed upon by the trial judge. See, in this connection, Brunswick Peninsular Corporation v. Daugharty, 203 Ga. 454 (47 SE2d 275); Bentley v. Anderson-McGriff Hardware Co., 181 Ga. 813 (184 SE 297). Here, the record shows that the consitutional questions were specifically not passed upon.
In view of this ruling subsequent proceedings were nugatory and it is not necessary to pass upon the assignments of error relating to the admission of evidence upon the hearing for interlocutory injunction or the grant of that injunction.
Judgments reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Duck-worth, C. J., Head, P. J., and Candler, J., who dissent.