Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission

92 Ohio St. 3d 177
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 5, 2001
DocketNo. 00-507
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 92 Ohio St. 3d 177 (Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 92 Ohio St. 3d 177 (Ohio 2001).

Opinion

Pfeifer, J.

In 1996, the United States Congress sought to provide for local market competition in the telecommunications industry with the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the “1996 Act”). The 1996 Act allows for new competitive local exchange carriers (“CLECs”) to enter local telephone markets by several mechanisms. One mechanism involves the CLEC’s access to parts of the network of an incumbent local exchange carrier (“ILEC”) as unbundled network elements (“UNEs”) and provision of local telephone services over those elements. By using this entry method, the CLEC can use its own facilities {e.g., switching) in combination with facilities of the ILEC (e.g., the local phone line or “loop”). See, generally, Section 251(c)(2) through (4), Title 47, U.S.Code.

Section 251(d)(1) of the 1996 Act directed the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to establish rules implementing the local competition provisions contained in Section 251 of the 1996 Act. On August 8, 1996, the FCC issued its comprehensive implementation order, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 96-325 (1996), 11 FCC Record 15499.1 The order determined that rates charged to CLECs for access to UNEs would be established using a new methodology it called TELRIC.2 Because the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio proceeding on appeal dealt with establishing the rates charged to CLECs for access to Cincinnati Bell Company’s UNEs and other facilities, the commission was correct in characterizing it as a TELRIC proceeding.

This is an appeal as of right of orders of the commission in its case No. 96-899-TP-ALT, in which the appellant challenges the commission’s determination of [179]*179costs that devolve into the rates to be charged by Cincinnati Bell as an 1LEC for several of its UNEs or other service elements to be provided to CLECs.

I

Local Loops

One category of UNEs for which the commission determined costs was local loops.3 TELRIC costing methodology and the applicable FCC and commission rules require a weighting of business and residential loops. Cincinnati Bell’s cost studies originally weighted its loop costs on the basis of eighty percent business loops and twenty percent residential loops to develop an average loop cost. That weighting was based on a marketing projection of the types of loops that CLECs were expected to request access to as UNEs.

Upon further consideration of the requirements of TELRIC pricing theory, Cincinnati Bell decided that it was inappropriate for it to predict what loops CLECs might request access to. Rather, Cincinnati Bell proposed to weight the cost of business and residential loops according to the actual quantities of each type in its network. It used its total loop universe and actual loop populations in its three rate bands, representing geographical areas, the rates and the business-to-residential weighting being different for each rate band. After considering these changes, the commission adopted the eighty/twenty weighting proportions originally submitted by Cincinnati Bell.

Cincinnati Bell argues that the court should reverse the commission’s decision regarding the pricing of loops and remand the matter to the commission for further proceedings. It contends that the eighty/twenty weighting proportions adopted by the commission are inaccurate, because they were based on projections of usage by CLECs that are based on a small sample of loops. Cincinnati Bell argues that the projections should be based on the total universe of loops, as required by the TELRIC methodology adopted by the commission.

On the other hand, the commission argues that its finding of eighty percent business loops and twenty percent residential loops is appropriate and supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. The commission contends that Cincinnati Bell in its appeal is asking the court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the commission.

We agree with the commission. We have consistently refused to substitute our judgment for that of the commission on evidentiary matters. Cincinnati Gas & [180]*180Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 53, 711 N.E.2d 670; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 91, 4 OBR 341, 447 N.E.2d 733; Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1959), 170 Ohio St. 105, 10 O.O.2d 4, 163 N.E.2d 167. Traditionally, we have deferred to the judgment of the commission in instances involving the commission’s special expertise and its exercise of discretion, when the record supports either of two opposing positions. AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1990) 51 Ohio St.3d 150, 555 N.E.2d 288; Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1962), 174 Ohio St. 160, 21 O.O.2d 427, 187 N.E.2d 150. We have held that we will reverse a commission order only where it is unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence or shows misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 86 Ohio St.3d 53, 711 N.E.2d 670; Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 555, 589 N.E.2d 1292; see R.C. 4903.13.

We have reviewed the record in the matter of local loops and find that it supports the commission’s decision. Because of its unique experience and expertise, the commission is invested with a high level of discretion and is remarkably qualified to make the determination as to local loop weighting. We affirm its order.

II

Loop-Qualification Services Procedural Issue

The commission claims that the issue of charges for loop-qualification services is not properly before the court on appeal, because it was not a subject of Cincinnati Bell’s application for rehearing below and an application for rehearing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal under R.C. 4903.10. R.C. 4903.10(B) states, “Such application shall be in writing and shall set forth specifically the ground or grounds on which the applicant considers the order to be unreasonable or unlawful. No party shall in any court urge or rely on any ground for reversal, vacation, or modification not so set forth in the application.”

Cincinnati Bell filed an application for rehearing by the commission in which it alleged seven errors, and intervenors below filed a joint application for rehearing in which they alleged five errors. Cincinnati Bell had originally prevailed on the issue of loop-qualification charges, which was raised by the intervenors in their joint application for rehearing. On reconsideration, the commission ruled against Cincinnati Bell on the issue in its January 20, 2000 Second Entry on Rehearing.

While assertion of error in an application for rehearing is a statutory jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal on the alleged error, R.C. 4903.10 does not require that the error be alleged in the appellant’s application for rehearing; it can be in an application for rehearing filed by a nonappellant intervening party. [181]*181Cf.

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Bluebook (online)
92 Ohio St. 3d 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cincinnati-bell-telephone-co-v-public-utilities-commission-ohio-2001.