Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 8, 2021
Docket7:21-cv-05668
StatusUnknown

This text of Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc. (Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. LEIGH CHURCHILL, Plaintiff, - -against- 21-CY-5668 (CS) OASIS OUTSOURCING VI, INC. ORDER TO AMEND EMPLOYERS EDGE LLC; PEARLGREEN CORPORATION; UFCW 888, Defendants. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ce to 2000e-17; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ADA”), 42 U.S.C, §§ 12112-12117; 42 U.S.C, § 1981 (“Section 1981”); the New) York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. He alleges that Defendants discriminated against him because of his race and color. Plaintiff also bring unspecified claims under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (““LMRA”), 29 U.S.C, § 185(a). By order dated September 30, 2021, Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted Plaintiffs request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, thatis

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits —

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bel/ Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true. /d. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. /d (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible — not merely possible that the pleader is entitled to relief. Jd, at 679.

:

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action against “Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc. Employers Edge LLC” (“Oasis Outsourcing”); Pearlgreen Corporation (“Pearlgreen”), his former employer; and UFCW 888, his union. He uses the Court’s employment discrimination complaint form and attaches a typed narrative and other documents in support of his claims. On the form complaint, Plaintiff checks a box indicating color as the basis for his Title VII claim, and writes that Defendants “continuously withheld information about the incident and suspension by writing false allegations instead of facts.” (ECF 2 at 3.) He also checks boxes to indicate that he is bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, identifying his race as African-American, and under the ADA, identifying his disability or perceived disability as “Sec. 113 of division EE P.L. 116- 260.CA.” (ECF 2 at 4.) Plaintiff further cites to Section 301 of the LMRA, possibly intending to bring hybrid claims against his employer and union for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and duty of fair representation. In addition, he checks boxes indicating that his former employer provided him different terms and conditions of employment from those of similar employees, harassed him, and “took adverse action[] when documenting H.R. investigation{] during [his] suspension period.” (d. at 5 ) Plaintiff refers the Court to the typed narrative and documents for the facts giving rise to his claims. The following allegations are taken from those sources. Plaintiff was employed as a “picker” in Pearlgreen’s warehouse in New Rochelle, New York. (/d. at 6.) On December 27, 2019, while “picking” an order, Plaintiff pushed a shopping cart so that it rolled unattended into a pallet. Three days later, “Lucy,” the Human Resource Manager, approached Plaintiff and asked

'! The complaint lists the first defendant as Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc. Employers Edge LLC, but the docket lists the party as two different defendants: Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc. and Employers Edge LLC.

him whether he was responsible for pushing the cart. When Plaintiff answered, “Yes,” Lucy accused him of almost hitting an office worker who was passing through the warehouse with the cart. Plaintiff also learned that another warehouse picker had initiated a complaint against him, stating that Plaintiff had directed the cart towards that picker even though that picker was on the other side of the warehouse at the time. Lucy suspended Plaintiff for three days. After the meeting with Lucy, Plaintiff spoke to the office worker and apologized for almost hitting him. On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff returned to Pearlgreen after the suspension “with the intention[] of moving forward.” (/d.) The next day, however, the office worker who was involved in the shopping cart incident, approached him and Plaintiff learned of “misinformation” in the write up? of that incident.? (/d.) Plaintiff requested a copy of the write up, but Lucy responded by mentioning [Plaintiff’s] criminal history and “threats of handling [Plaintiffs] type.” Ud.) Plaintiff submitted grievance letters expressing his concerns on the write up and requesting a video of the shopping cart incident. (/d.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kinneary v. City of New York
601 F.3d 151 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo
544 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Aquino v. Prudential Life & Casualty Insurance
419 F. Supp. 2d 259 (E.D. New York, 2005)
Walters v. INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
651 F.3d 280 (Second Circuit, 2011)
White v. White Rose Food
128 F.3d 110 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Brown v. City of Oneonta
221 F.3d 329 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Zemsky v. City of New York
821 F.2d 148 (Second Circuit, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Churchill v. Oasis Outsourcing VI, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/churchill-v-oasis-outsourcing-vi-inc-nysd-2021.