Church of the Eagle and the Condor v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-1196
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHURCH OF THE EAGLE AND THE No. 25-1196 CONDOR, et al., D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01004-SRB Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted January 6, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and M. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge HAWKINS.

The Church of the Eagle and the Condor (CEC), Joseph Tafur, Belinda

Eriacho, Kewal Wright, Benjaman Sullivan, and Joseph Bellus (collectively,

Plaintiffs-Appellants) appeal from the district court’s order denying their Motion

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Related Non-Taxable Expenses (Motion for

Attorneys’ Fees), as well as their Motion to Incorporate Settlement Agreement in

Order and for Retention of Jurisdiction (Motion to Incorporate). Plaintiffs-

Appellants also appeal from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.

In their ceremonies, the CEC and its members utilize ayahuasca, a tea

containing a Schedule I controlled substance. In 2020, a delivery of ayahuasca to

the CEC was intercepted and seized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Following the seizure, Plaintiffs-Appellants filed an action asserting claims under

the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, First Amendment, Fifth Amendment,

Ninth Amendment, and Freedom of Information Act. After some negotiation, the

parties filed a Notice of Settlement informing the district court that the parties had

entered into a written settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement). In response

to the Notice of Settlement, the district court entered an order addressing attorney’s

fees and costs. The order incorporated language from the Settlement Agreement.

Nevertheless, when Plaintiffs-Appellants filed their Motion for Attorney’s

Fees pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the district court’s

related order, the district court denied the motion, concluding that because there

was no judicial sanction of the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs-Appellants were

not prevailing parties.

2 25-1196 Plaintiffs-Appellants then filed their Motion to Incorporate. The district

court denied the motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiffs-

Appellants filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

1. We review the denial of attorneys’ fees under the Civil Rights

Attorney’s Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)) and the Equal Access to Justice

Act (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)) for abuse of discretion. See Alaska Right to Life Pol.

Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Hoa Hong

Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 2007). “[W]e review questions of

law concerning entitlement to attorneys’ fees de novo and factual findings

underlying those determinations for clear error.” Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes

& Mauritz, L.P., 52 F.4th 1054, 1064 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Whether a

party is a “prevailing party” is a question of law reviewed de novo. San Diego

Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, 65 F.4th 1012, 1033 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 190 (2023).

We review the district court’s decision on enforcing a settlement agreement

for abuse of discretion, see Ashker v. Newsom, 81 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2023),

and “we review the interpretation of a settlement agreement de novo.” Id. (citation

omitted).

2. “Under applicable Ninth Circuit law, a plaintiff prevails when he or

she enters into a legally enforceable settlement agreement . . . [that] materially

3 25-1196 alters the relationship between the parties.” Barrios v. California Interscholastic

Fed’n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). “A settlement agreement meaningfully alters the legal relationship

between parties if it allows one party to require the other party to do something it

otherwise would not be required to do. . . .” Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122,

1130 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs-Appellants were not

prevailing parties. See San Diego Cnty. Credit Union, 65 F.4th at 1034. Plaintiffs-

Appellants “enter[ed] into a legally enforceable settlement agreement” with

Defendants-Appellees. See Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134. The Settlement Agreement

“alter[ed] the legal relationship between [the] parties,” Jankey, 537 F.3d at 1130,

as conceded by Defendants-Appellees. And while a settlement agreement must

receive some “judicial sanction” for a plaintiff to achieve prevailing party status,

P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 474 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007), as amended,

this circuit’s precedent establishes that the “retention of jurisdiction” over a

settlement agreement to resolve the issue of attorneys’ fees “provide[s] sufficient

judicial oversight” to render a plaintiff the prevailing party. Richard S. v. Dep’t of

Dev. Servs., 317 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Prison

Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 451 (9th Cir. 2010) (same).

In this case, the district court not only retained jurisdiction over the

4 25-1196 Settlement Agreement to resolve attorneys’ fees, but it actually exercised that

jurisdiction by enforcing certain terms in the parties’ Settlement Agreement. In

addition, the Settlement Agreement clearly contemplated an award of attorneys’

fees. For instance, the Settlement Agreement provided for Plaintiffs-Appellants’

voluntary dismissal and discharge of Defendants-Appellees “from any and all past

or present claims for attorneys’ fees” upon “the receipt of the payment” of

attorneys’ fees. The Settlement Agreement also strongly reflects an intention by

the parties for the district court to enforce its terms as the parties “agree[d]” that

the federal district court would “retain jurisdiction” to resolve disputes not resolved

informally, and they agreed that unresolved attorney-fee disputes “will be

submitted to the Court.”

Circuit precedent establishes that this factor also supports a plaintiff’s

prevailing party status. See, e.g., Jankey, 537 F.3d at 1130 (holding the plaintiff to

be a prevailing party in part because the settlement agreement “both authorized

judicial enforcement of its terms and expressly reserved resolution of the issue of

attorney fees to the district court”); Saint John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty.

Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the

plaintiff to be a prevailing party in part because the settlement agreement

5 25-1196 “specifically provided that its terms would be enforceable by the district court”).1

Given these facts and precedents, the district court abused its discretion by

declining to enforce the Settlement Agreement. See Ashker, 81 F.4th at 874.

Our dissenting colleague would draw the opposite conclusion. He observes

that the district court “did not say [it] would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms

of the agreement,” but that is immaterial on this record. The district court did

retain jurisdiction for that purpose—and even exercised it. Rather than simply

“acknowledging” the Settlement Agreement, the district court “ORDERED” the

parties to comply with it. That the district court did not “incorporate” the

Settlement Agreement’s “substantive terms” into its order is also inconsequential.

The same can be said of Jankey. Though an order incorporating such terms might

be “sufficient” judicial imprimatur, Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir.

2005), it is not necessary. See, e.g., Jankey, 537 F.3d at 1130; Richard S., 317 F.3d

at 1087–88. And while our colleague would seemingly distinguish Jankey and

Saint John’s because the district courts in those actions opted to retain jurisdiction

1 Defendants-Appellees argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 202 (2025) overrules Barrios and its progeny because those cases would permit a prevailing-party finding without a court “grant[ing] enduring relief” to plaintiffs. But unlike the preliminary injunctive relief at issue in Lackey, the Settlement Agreement at issue here—which the district court enforced—indeed provided Plaintiffs-Appellants “enduring relief.” Id. Because our cases are not “clearly irreconcilable” with Lackey, we remain “bound” by them. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

6 25-1196 over the settlement agreement at the time of dismissal, that point of distinction

makes this case a better candidate for regarding the plaintiffs as prevailing parties,

not a worse one. By enforcing the Settlement Agreement—while retaining

jurisdiction over the case at large—the district court in this matter had even greater

“judicial oversight” over the issue of attorneys’ fees than the courts in Jankey and

Saint John’s. Because the district court’s prevailing-party determination

contravenes our caselaw, we must reverse.

3. The district court did not reference any procedural mechanism or

authority enabling it to dismiss the case sua sponte, nor did Defendants-Appellees

cite any such authority. Dismissal was not warranted under Rule 12(b)(6), Rule

41(a), Rule 41(b), or Rule 52. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 41(a)-(b); 52. Lacking

any procedural basis, the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the case with

prejudice. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam).

REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS TO PLAINTIFFS- APPELLANTS AS PREVAILING PARTIES.

7 25-1196 Church of the Eagle and the Condor v. Bondi, No. 25-1196 FILED MAR 20 2026 HAWKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I join the Majority’s conclusion that the district court erred by sua sponte

dismissing the action.

I part ways with my friends in the majority from their conclusion that the

district court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiffs moved for an award of fees prior to dismissal. At that point, the district

court had entered an order only acknowledging that the parties had reached a

settlement agreement, including a timeline for fee negotiation and dismissal.1 The

order did not say the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the

agreement or otherwise incorporate the substantive terms of the agreement.

Consequently, the district court permissibly concluded that it had not yet “placed its

stamp of approval” on the settlement agreement at the time of Plaintiffs’ fee motion.

See, e.g., Saint John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574

F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009) (settlement agreement “judicially enforceable”

where court entered order incorporating terms of agreement and retaining

jurisdiction to enforce terms and decide applications for fees and costs); Jankey v.

1 Unlike the Majority, I do not view this order as ordering the parties to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement or otherwise amounting to judicial enforcement of the settlement agreement. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 2008) (same where court entered order

acknowledging that plaintiff would file motion for fees and costs and “retaining

jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the parties’ Settlement Agreement”).

The timing of events matters. The district court’s jurisdiction at the time of

Plaintiffs’ fee motion was not the product of the court’s affirmative exercise of

discretion or approval of the settlement agreement. It was the product of timing,

which distinguishes this case from cases like Saint John’s Organic Farm and Jankey.

The district court had authority to incorporate the settlement into an enforceable

order or retain jurisdiction to enforce any aspect of the settlement, including the issue

of attorney’s fees. See Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir.

1996). It declined to do so. I would affirm the district court’s denial of attorneys’

fees as within its discretion.