FILED Jun 26 2024, 9:10 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Christopher Lewis Laux, Appellant-Plaintiff
v.
Maureen Baker, Daria Walpole, Giles Laux, Terry Laux, Teresa Laux, Amy Laux, Nicole Sholly, Appellees-Defendants
June 26, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-2620 Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Jamie C. Woods, Judge Trial Court Cause No.71D06-2305-CT-249
Opinion by Judge Foley Judges Riley and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 1 of 21 Foley, Judge.
[1] Christopher Lewis Laux (“Laux”) sued his seven siblings (“the Defendants”),
claiming liability for defamation and several other torts. The Defendants
moved to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), arguing Laux did not satisfy the
heightened pleading standard for defamation and otherwise did not state a
viable claim. The trial court granted the motion, and Laux appeals. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] In May 2023, Laux—an attorney—filed a complaint against the Defendants 1
alleging (1) defamation, (2) tortious interference with a business relationship,
(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) invasion of privacy, and (5)
entitlement to punitive damages. The allegations related to Laux’s years of
service as an attorney for Ralph William Laux (“Father”), who is the father of
Laux and the Defendants, and who is now the subject of guardianship
proceedings. Laux claimed he had a “Power of Attorney over [Father]” and
“executed a farm trust for . . . [F]ather” in the fall of 2018. Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2 p. 14. Laux claimed the Defendants were upset because they would not
“get[] their ‘inheritance’ immediately upon the death of [Father] due to the
establishment of the farm trust[.]” Id. at 15. Several of Laux’s claims hinged on
the following allegation: “The Defendants have told Laux’s children, extended
1 The Defendants are Maureen Baker, Daria Walpole, Giles Laux, Terry Laux, Teresa Laux, Amy Laux, and Nicole Sholly.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 2 of 21 family, current clients, [a] guardian ad litem in [a] guardianship proceeding,
and stated under [o]ath, that Laux was trying to ‘steal’ [Father’s] farm.” Id.
Laux alleged that this statement—i.e., that Laux “was attempting to ‘steal the
farm,’” id.—was “malicious, defamatory, and false.” Id. Laux claimed he was
“severely damaged” because the statement “directly affect[ed] Laux’s work”
and “family.” Id. at 13. Laux further alleged that the Defendants “appear[ed]
to be working in consortium,” id. at 12, and had a “larger plot to destroy Laux’s
livelihood” that involved filing “a malicious, defamatory, and frivolous
grievance” with the Indiana Disciplinary Commission regarding his
representation of Father, id. at 14. Laux alleged the grievance was designed “to
harm his long-standing attorney-client relationship with [Father].” Id. at 16.
Laux further alleged the Defendants “deceptively and fraudulently obtained a
temporary guardianship” over Father, id., and that their actions “lock[ed]
[Father] down to keep Laux from [Father],” id. at 17. Among Laux’s other
allegations was that the Defendants “inva[ded] . . . privileged communications
between Laux and [Father]” Id. at 16. Laux further asserted that the “[t]he
purposeful actions taken by [the Defendants] were meant to ruin and damage
Laux personally, and to ruin and damage Laux’s business and livelihood,” and
that the Defendants’ “malicious actions . . . did cause Laux damage.” Id.
[3] In July 2023, the Defendants moved to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6),
arguing that Laux “has not met Indiana’s standards for pleading defamation
with specificity under Indiana law, has failed to allege essential elements of the
claims asserted, and has asserted a claim that is not a recognized cause of action
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 3 of 21 in Indiana.” Id. at 23. In a responding brief, Laux stood on the allegations in
his complaint. Laux also argued that “[a]n objective reasonable person in
considering the allegations . . . as true . . . could only come to one conclusion:
[Laux] . . . has been severely damaged by [the] [D]efendants[.]” Id. at 38.
[4] The trial court held a hearing. At the hearing, Laux again stood on the
allegations in the complaint. See Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 9–10. At one point, the trial
court initiated the following exchange regarding the defamation claim:
[Trial court]: Could you point me to the paragraphs you -- you believe support these -- that there’s specific allegations of defamation in the complaint? The specific allegations of defamatory conduct, what paragraphs are those?
[Laux]: Twenty-five, 26, 27, 28. There may be more.
[Trial court]: Even -- all right. So let’s assume those are specific allegations of defamatory conduct. Do you agree that the complaint has to identify the specific defendant speaker who made each of the alleged statements, the specific statements? . . . [T]here’s a particularity as to statements and a particularity as to the person that made the statement, do you agree with that . . . ?
[Laux]: My response cannot be made in total because it brings in factual matters outside the 12(B)(6) hearing today. It is my legal opinion that there [are] more than sufficient allegations made in this complaint for th[e] [D]efendants . . . to know
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 4 of 21 exactly what it refers to. Because they’ve all lived it.
But without getting [into] any information outside the 12(B)(6) for here today, all of . . . these arguments by [the] opposing lawyer here today can be easily ferreted out, all these details, through what is meant to be ferreted out, it is discovery.
Id. at 11–12. Shortly thereafter, Laux said the following to the trial court:
[I]n my legal opinion, there is certainly enough in this complaint for anyone reading it to know that there’s been tremendous wrongdoing by the[] [D]efendants, and anyone who has taken this complaint in its most favorable light to the plaintiff, in paragraph 27, the claim that Laux was attempting to . . . [‘]steal the farm,[’] is in sharp juxtaposition [to] the disciplinary complaint, which protests . . . not getting their inheritance.
Your Honor, th[ese] seven defendants all know -- maybe their lawyer doesn’t know because the lawyer has not been told -- but . . . the [D]efendants know what exactly is stated in this complaint.
Id. at 13.
[5] The trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court later issued a
written order granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The trial court generally stated that, “[e]ven though Indiana law
disfavors dismissal,” Laux’s complaint was subject to dismissal because Laux
“failed to assert essential elements of his causes of action.” Id. at 40. The trial
court also provided a count-by-count analysis, ultimately concluding that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 5 of 21 allegations were deficient. After the court issued its order, Laux sought an
extension of time to amend the complaint. He ultimately declined to amend
and instead pursued this appeal of the trial court’s decision. Cf. DeCola v.
Steinhilber, 207 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that when a
plaintiff chooses to appeal rather than correct the pleading, the order of
dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) becomes a final judgment on the merits).
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review [6] Laux challenges the dismissal of his complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). “A
motion to dismiss under [Trial] Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint: that is, whether the allegations in the complaint establish any set of
circumstances under which a plaintiff would be entitled to relief.” Trail v. Boys
& Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ind. 2006). This type of motion
presents a pure question of law. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Blue Sky Innovation
Grp., Inc., 230 N.E.3d 898, 901 (Ind. 2024). Thus, “[a]ppellate review . . . is de
novo.” Id. On appeal, we “accept[] the alleged facts as true, drawing every
reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. Dismissal is
appropriate only “when it is ‘apparent that the facts alleged in the challenged
pleading are incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances.’” Id.
(quoting McQueen v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Corp., 711 N.E.2d 62, 65 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), trans. denied). In general, we “view[] motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim with disfavor because such motions undermine the policy of
deciding causes of actions on their merits.” McQueen, 711 N.E.2d at 65. We Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 6 of 21 may nevertheless “affirm a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss if it is
sustainable on any basis in the record.” Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587
(Ind. 2015).
[7] Before turning to the pleadings, we address the Defendants’ contention that
Laux waived his appellate arguments by failing to present them to the trial
court. The Defendants essentially argue that, because Laux generally stood on
his complaint and did not develop detailed written or oral arguments when
responding to the motion to dismiss, Laux should be precluded from providing
more detailed arguments on appeal regarding the adequacy of the complaint.
We acknowledge the Defendants’ position. However, under the circumstances,
we decline to identify waiver and instead resolve the appeal on the merits. See
Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (noting that we generally prefer
to resolve cases on the merits instead of on procedural grounds such as waiver).
II. Adequacy of the Pleadings [8] The trial court concluded that Laux failed to adequately plead his claims of
defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and entitlement to punitive
damages. Herein, we address in turn the adequacy of each set of allegations.
[9] We begin our analysis by referring to Trial Rule 8(A), which provides that, “[t]o
state a claim,” the complaint generally “must contain: (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled.” Trial Rule 8(E) adds
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 7 of 21 that “[e]ach averment . . . shall be simple, concise, and direct,” and that “[n]o
technical forms of pleading . . . are required.” Moreover, Trial Rule 8(F)
provides that “all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,
lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.”
These “liberal” pleading requirements are rooted in principles of notice
pleading. KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 901 (Ind. 2017). Under
principles of notice pleading, the role of the complaint is to “put the defendant
on notice concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to lose.” Id.
(quoting Noblesville Redev. Comm’n v. Noblesville Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 674 N.E.2d
558, 564 (Ind. 1996)). To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff generally need not
“state all the elements of a cause of action.” State v. Rankin, 294 N.E.2d 604,
606 (Ind. 1973). Rather, the plaintiff “need only plead the operative facts
involved in the litigation.” Id. As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, to
the extent a defendant would like to “clarify the theory and basis for the cause
of action,” the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure offer “[o]ther means less
drastic than dismissal of the action,” such as a Trial Rule 12(E) motion for a
more definite statement and use of “our very broad discovery rules[.]” Id.
[10] Laux argues the trial court misapplied the law to the extent it suggested Laux
improperly failed to recite the elements of each theory for relief. He points out
that, under Indiana’s notice pleading standard, the plaintiff “need only plead
the operative facts involved in the litigation.” Id. We agree that Laux was not
obligated to recite elements or delineate theories. However, for the reasons
discussed herein, we conclude the complaint was deficient in other respects.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 8 of 21 A. Defamation
[11] “To establish a claim of defamation, a ‘plaintiff must prove the existence of a
communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and
damages.’” Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2010)
(quoting Trail, 845 N.E.2d at 136). In general, a statement is defamatory if it
“tends ‘to harm a person’s reputation by lowering the person in the
community’s estimation or deterring third persons from dealing or associating
with the person.’” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind.
2007)). Furthermore, defamation per se “arises when the language of a
statement, without reference to extrinsic evidence, constitutes an imputation of
(1) criminal conduct, (2) a loathsome disease, (3) misconduct in a person’s
trade, profession, office, or occupation, or (4) sexual misconduct.” Id.
[12] We have a “heightened notice pleading standard” for a claim of defamation.
Taylor v. Antisdel, 185 N.E.3d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.
Under this heightened standard, the plaintiff must specifically “set out the
alleged defamatory statements[s] in the complaint[.]” Ali v. Alliance Home Health
Care LLC, 53 N.E.3d 420, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (adding that “[w]hen
specific statements that are alleged to be defamatory have not been sufficiently
identified in a plaintiff’s complaint, an award of summary judgment for the
defendant is proper”) (quoting Miller v. Cent. Ind. Cmty. Found., Inc., 11 N.E.3d
944, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). Furthermore, when there are
multiple defendants, the plaintiff “must specifically attribut[e] each statement to
each separately named defendant.” Taylor, 185 N.E.3d at 874. As the Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 9 of 21 Supreme Court explained, “[t]here is sound reason for this policy, as the
absence of a statement in the complaint works a detriment on both the court
and the defendant.” Trail, 845 N.E.2d at 137. That is, “[t]he court is
handicapped without the statement since, without it, the court cannot actually
determine if the statement is legally defamatory.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he
defendant is placed on an unfair footing since the absence of the statement
denies her the opportunity to prepare appropriate defenses.” Id.
[13] At the hearing, Laux informed the trial court that the alleged defamatory
statements were in paragraphs “[t]wenty-five, 26, 27, [and] 28,” and he noted
“[t]here may be more.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 11. The referenced paragraphs state:
25. During the guardianship proceedings, the [D]efendants made malicious, frivolous, and defamatory statements about Laux. The Guardian ad Litem appointed by the Court took statements from the [D]efendants. The Guardian ad Litem agreed that the “sum total of the materials [provided by the [D]efendants] about [Laux] was to disparage, vilify, and belittle [Laux].”
26. The Defendants have told Laux’s children, extended family, current clients, the guardian ad litem in the guardianship proceeding, and stated under [O]ath, that Laux was trying to ‘steal’ [Father’s] farm.
27. The claim that Laux was attempting to ‘steal the farm’ is in sharp juxtaposition [to] the disciplinary complaint, which protests . . . not getting their ‘inheritance’ immediately upon the death of [Father] due to the establishment of the farm trust; however, this claim of Laux trying to ‘steal the farm’ is equally, if not more so, malicious, defamatory, and false.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 10 of 21 28. [The] Defendants[’] malicious, defamatory, and frivolous grievance[,] and subsequent statements made to family, clients, court officials, and other government officials, were purposely and intentionally crafted to exclude any of Laux’s good works, accomplishments, achievements, or even work done by Laux on [the] [D]efendants[’] behalf.
App. Vol. 2 pp. 14–15.
[14] On appeal, Laux focuses on the following allegation, which the trial court
determined did not satisfy the heightened pleading standard for defamation:
“The Defendants have told Laux’s children, extended family, current clients,
[a] guardian ad litem in [a] guardianship proceeding, and stated under Oath,
that Laux was trying to ‘steal’ [Father’s] farm.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 15.
Laux argues this allegation satisfied the heightened pleading standard because
(1) the allegation identified a specific defamatory statement (that Laux was
trying to “steal” Father’s farm), which has an implication of criminal or
professional misconduct, and (2) the allegation was “clear as to which [of the
Defendants] made this defamatory statement: all of them.” Appellant’s Br. p.
12. The Defendants, however, maintain that the complaint needed to be more
specific to satisfy the heightened pleading standard for a claim of defamation.
They argue that, although there is some specificity about what was purportedly
said, the allegations remain so vague as to impede the preparation of a defense.
The Defendants illustrate vagueness in Laux’s assertion that “all of them” at
some point told various individuals Laux was trying to steal the farm, arguing:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 11 of 21 Did all of the . . . Defendants, in unison, intone the word ‘steal’ to an assembly of all of Laux’s children, extended family, current clients, and a guardian ad litem? Did the whole group of . . . Defendants visit and speak to each individual child, extended family member, current client, and guardian ad litem of Laux? Did every . . . Defendant visit every alleged hearer in a one-on- one session to discuss the ‘steal’? When and where did any of this happen?
Appellees’ Br. p. 11.
[15] The Defendants direct us to Ali, where we concluded that the plaintiff failed to
meet the heightened pleading standard for a claim of defamation. There, the
plaintiff—an in-home health worker—alleged there were “conversations [in]
which [several named individuals] . . . maliciously made certain slanderous
false, malicious, and defamatory statements” to “certain persons” that the
plaintiff “stole . . . pieces of jewelry on several occasions” from two of the
plaintiff’s clients. Ali, 53 N.E.3d at 429. In affirming summary judgment for
the defendants, we noted that the allegation “d[id] not specifically identify the
statements alleged to have been made by each of the several named individuals
. . . [n]or d[id] it specify the persons to whom (or in front of whom) the alleged
defamatory statements were published.” Id. Indeed, although the allegation
was specific in some respects—i.e., that specific individuals said the plaintiff
stole jewelry from her clients—we ultimately concluded that the allegation
“lack[ed] the specificity necessary to state a claim for defamation.” Id.
[16] Here, the Defendants argue that Laux’s allegation is akin to the deficient
allegation in Ali. We agree. At the hearing, Laux suggested the claim was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 12 of 21 adequate because the Defendants subjectively “kn[e]w exactly what” Laux was
referencing “[b]ecause they’ve all lived it,” and it was therefore appropriate
under the circumstances to require the Defendants to use discovery procedures
to “ferret out . . . all th[e] details.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 11. Yet, the pleading must
stand on its own, irrespective of the subjective knowledge of the Defendants.
Cf. Trial Rule 8(A); Trail, 845 N.E.2d at 137 (noting that our heightened
pleading standard for a claim of defamation is designed to not only avoid
working a detriment on the defendant but also avoid “work[ing] a detriment on
. . . the court[.]”). Although the allegation bears a modicum of specificity, we
adhere to Ali and conclude that Laux’s allegation about stealing the farm lacks
the necessary specificity to state a claim of defamation and is prohibitively
vague as to unfairly work a detriment on the trial court in addressing the claim,
and the Defendants in attempting to prepare a defense to the claim. Moreover,
because the farm-related claim was the most specific of Laux’s allegations of
defamation, we identify no error in the dismissal of the claim of defamation.
B. Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship
[17] Generally, the elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are:
“(1) the existence of a valid relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
existence of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s intentional interference with
that relationship; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting from
[the] defendant’s wrongful interference with the relationship.” McCollough v.
Noblesville Schs., 63 N.E.3d 334, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. To be
tortious, the wrongful conduct had to involve “some independent illegal act[.]”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 13 of 21 Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ind. 2003).
However, “[d]efamation . . . ‘does not constitute illegal conduct for the purpose
of determining whether one tortiously interfered with the business relationship
of another.’” McCollough, 63 N.E.3d at 344 (quoting Miller, 11 N.E.3d at 961).
When the claim is for tortious interference with a business relationship, rather
than tortious interference with contractual relations, the claim seeks to remedy
damages stemming from “interference with a prospective advantage.” Kiyose v.
Trustees of Ind. Univ., 333 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (discussing the
“parallel” development of torts related to interference with business matters).
[18] Here, the trial court determined that Laux failed to state a claim of intentional
interference with a business relationship because, among other things, Laux (1)
“fail[ed] to properly allege what his business relationship [was] with [Father],”
(2) “fail[ed] to allege that the Defendants had knowledge of a business
relationship between Laux and [Father],” and (3) “d[id] not allege how [the
Defendants’] conduct was intended to interfere with his business relationship
with his [F]ather.” Appellant’s App. p. 41. We note, too, that there is no
factual allegation indicating that Laux had the expectation of future business
from Father such that Laux could have demonstrated damage. Cf. Comfax Corp.
v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 118, 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (indicating a
claim of tortious interference was deficient because the pleading involved only
“bald assertions of possible business opportunities”). On appeal, Laux likens
his relationship with Father to that of employment “at will.” See Appellant’s
Br. p. 16. Indeed, Laux argues as follows: “[Laux] acknowledges, despite the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 14 of 21 long-standing business relationship, that his business relationship with [Father]
would be considered ‘at-will,’ however, [Laux] and Father have a ‘manifest
interest in the freedom of the employer to exercise his judgment without illegal
interference or compulsion.’” Id. (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38
(1915)). However, we find Laux’s reliance on employment “at will” caselaw to
be misplaced. We agree with the trial court that Laux failed to adequately state
a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
[19] As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he definition of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is that ‘one who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress[.]’” Cullison v.
Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46 (Am. Law Inst. 1965)). The Indiana Supreme Court added that “[i]t is the
intent to harm one emotionally that constitutes the basis for the tort[.]” Id.
Furthermore, “[l]iability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.” Fox v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 320, 329 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Lachenman v. Stice, 838 N.E.2d 451, 456–57 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005), trans. denied), trans. denied. “What constitutes ‘extreme and
outrageous’ conduct depends, in part, upon prevailing cultural norms and
values.” Bradley v. Hall 720 N.E.2d 747, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 15 of 21 claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress presents a question of fact to
the extent “[r]easonable persons may differ” as to “whether [the] conduct was
extreme and outrageous and, if so, whether that conduct caused [the plaintiff]
to suffer severe emotional distress.” See id. Nevertheless, “[i]n the appropriate
case,” these sorts of issues “can be decided as a matter of law.” Id.
[20] Here, the trial court determined that Laux “fail[ed] to allege the first element”
of “‘extreme and outrageous conduct’ by the Defendants.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2 p. 42. On appeal, Laux argues that the trial court “invade[d] the
province of the jury” by dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because reasonable persons could disagree as to whether the
Defendants engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct. Appellant’s Br. p. 20.
As to the allegedly extreme or outrageous conduct, Laux focuses on allegations
that the Defendants (1) “filed a frivolous disciplinary grievance with the
Disciplinary Commission against [Laux],” which “goes to the heart of how [he]
makes a living”; (2) maliciously invaded the attorney-client privilege by the
“breach of privileged communications between Laux and [Father]”; (3) told
Laux’s clients and his own children that he “was trying to ‘steal the farm’”; and
(4) prevented Laux from “see[ing] or communicat[ing] with [F]ather/client
minus a two-minute conversation eighteen (18) months ago.” Id. at 19–20.
[21] Laux relies on Bradley v. Hall, 720 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), where we
reversed an order granting summary judgment to the defendant on a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In that case, the plaintiff alleged
that her former supervisor had engaged in various forms of harassment for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 16 of 21 “approximately twenty years.” Bradley, 720 N.E.2d at 749. Specifically, the
plaintiff claimed the defendant “harassed her, shouted at her[,] . . . criticized her
in front of other employees,” and began making inappropriate lines of inquiry—
i.e., “inquir[ing] about [her] menopause” on several occasions and at one point
“ask[ing] if [her] husband was sexually impotent due to his diabetes.” Id. The
defendant also “told [the plaintiff] that her supervisory position might be
eliminated[.]” Id. On appeal, we identified a question of fact as to whether the
defendant had engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. See id. We
observed that, “[t]oday[,] the print and electronic media openly discuss bodily
functions and dysfunctions as a matter of course, but these can be personal and
private topics when they concern the health or physical condition of a particular
individual.” Id. We ultimately characterized the alleged conduct as potentially
“condescending, intrusive[,] and offensive,” and we noted that the defendant
“may have misled [the plaintiff] about her job security.” Id. All in all, we
concluded that summary judgment was improper because “[r]easonable persons
may differ” as to “whether [the] conduct was extreme and outrageous[.]” Id.
[22] We find Bradley readily distinguishable. Whereas that case involved cavalier
inquiries into distinctly personal and private topics—alongside other alleged
workplace harassment that spanned two decades—the case at hand involves far
less egregious allegations. Indeed, although there is nothing benign about the
nature of the instant allegations, we ultimately conclude that, as a matter of
law, the alleged conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous
conduct to support a viable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 17 of 21 D. Invasion of Privacy
[23] The tort of invasion of privacy “encompasses four distinct injuries: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) appropriation of likeness; (3) public disclosure of private
facts; and (4) false-light publicity.” Cmty. Health Net., Inc. v. McKenzie, 185
N.E.3d 368, 380 (Ind. 2022). On appeal, Laux argues the complaint contains
factual allegations supporting recovery for both public disclosure of private facts
and false-light publicity. These theories require “publicity” of information
about the plaintiff. See generally McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 382. As we have
explained, “there is no threshold number that constitutes ‘a large number’ of
persons.” McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 382. Rather, “[t]he facts and circumstances
of each case must be taken into consideration in determining whether the
communication gave sufficient ‘publicity’” to support these sorts of claims. Id.
[24] At times, Laux focuses on allegations that the Defendants submitted a
disciplinary grievance against him. Yet, Laux’s complaint—together with an
Exhibit attached thereto—indicates that the “grievance was dismissed on its
face as not raising a substantial question of misconduct[.]” Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2 p. 22. As a result, the Interim Executive Director of the Disciplinary
Commission informed Laux that the matter “d[id] not require any formal
response” and the “file on th[e] matter [was] now closed.” Id. Pursuant to the
Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and the Discipline of Attorneys,
because the grievance was dismissed and did not lead to the preparation of a
formal Disciplinary Complaint, the matter was kept confidential and not
available to the public. See Rule 23 §§ 12(a) (directing the preparation of a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 18 of 21 Disciplinary Complaint if the contents of a grievance, “if proved, would
warrant disciplinary action”), 22 (specifying that “[p]roceedings and papers that
relate to matters that have not resulted in the filing of a Disciplinary Complaint
shall be confidential and not available to the public”). Thus, with respect to the
grievance, the alleged facts are incapable of supporting the element of publicity.
[25] Laux also argues there was publicity based on “the communications to [Laux’s]
children, extended family, current clients, the guardian ad litem in the
guardianship proceeding, and while under oath.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23
(footnote omitted). Laux argues these allegations “illustrate that the private
matters between [Laux] and [Father] were disclosed publicly.” Id. Yet, to the
extent the complaint focused on statements made under oath in connection
with a guardianship proceeding, Indiana law bestows an “absolute privilege”
protecting “pertinent and relevant statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings.” Miller v. Reinert, 839 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied. This is because the “public interest in the freedom of expression by
participants in judicial proceedings . . . is so vital and necessary to the integrity
of our judicial system that it must be made paramount to the right of the
individual to a legal remedy when he has been wronged.” Id. at 735 (quoting
Briggs v. Clinton Cnty. Bank & Tr. Co. of Frankfort, 452 N.E.2d 989, 997 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983)). Thus, Laux cannot pursue an invasion of privacy claim premised
on statements made under oath as part of a judicial proceeding. Moreover, the
remaining allegations regarding the farm relate only to communications to
Laux’s family members and a guardian ad litem. Although we acknowledge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 19 of 21 “there is no threshold number that constitutes ‘a large number’ of persons” to
support the publicity requirement,” here, there is simply no indication the
communications were “communicated in a way that either reaches or is sure to
reach the public in general or a large enough number of persons such that the
matter is sure to become public knowledge.” McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d at 382.
[26] In sum, we conclude Laux failed to state a viable claim of invasion of privacy.
E. Punitive Damages
[27] The final count of the complaint alleged Laux was entitled to punitive damages.
Notably, however, “[p]unitive damages are a remedy, not a separate cause of
action.” Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind.
2005). Because we have identified no viable cause of action, there is no claim
that could support a remedy of punitive damages. We therefore conclude that
the trial court did not err in dismissing the claim related to punitive damages.
Conclusion [28] Laux failed to adequately state his claims of defamation, tortious interference
with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, and entitlement to punitive damages. We therefore affirm.
[29] Affirmed.
Riley J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 20 of 21 APPELLANT PRO SE Christopher Lewis Laux Notre Dame, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES Tiernan B. Kane Joseph E. Cavello SouthBank Legal, LLC South Bend, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-2620 | June 26, 2024 Page 21 of 21