Christopher J. Alexander v. C.J. Johnson et al.

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHRISTOPHER J. ALEXANDER,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:24CV731

C.J. JOHNSON et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case arises from law failure to state a claim, Docket Entry enforcement’s response to a call for 40; service at a motel room in Greensboro 2) Alexander’s motion for in August 2021. The plaintiff, reconsideration of the district court’s Christopher J. Alexander, made that judgment filed at Docket Entry 38, call. His girlfriend was in the room, Docket Entry 43; non-responsive. Treating medical 3) The defendants’ motion to strike staff determined that she had acute Alexander’s proposed fifth amended bleeding in her brain, a rib fracture, a complaint, Docket Entry 58; and fractured nose, and bruises all over. 4) Alexander’s motion for an She later died from these injuries, and extension of time to file a the State charged Alexander with her response/reply to the motion to murder. He now brings this Section strike, Docket Entry 60. 1983 action against the responding officers in their individual capacities, Alexander’s claims fail and should be alleging they violated his Fourth dismissed. Assuming arguendo there Amendment right to be free from was a seizure at all, officers effected it unreasonable seizures, when they within the bounds of the law. And allegedly detained him while securing even if not, qualified immunity bars a search warrant for the motel room. this suit. Likewise, his motion for reconsideration of the district court’s There are four pending motions earlier order fails. The Court should before the Court: deny it.

1) The defendants’ motion to dismiss For the same reasons set forth in the the third amended complaint for district court’s order denying Alexander’s motion for leave to standing in the parking lot. Id. He amend his complaint a fourth time, asked Alexander the victim’s name the Court grants the defendants’ and age and what had happened. Id. motion to strike Alexander’s at 17. Alexander told Officer Leeman unauthorized proposed fifth amended that Vassell had fallen and indicated it complaint. Finally, because Alexander was fine if the officer looked around does not provide good cause in the room. Id. support of his motion for an extension of time to reply to the defendants’ two Around that time, Officer Sutphin motions, the Court denies it. (named as a defendant) arrived. Id. After the EMS personnel transported I. FACTS Vassell to the hospital, Officers Leeman and Sutphin followed All well-pled facts are accepted as true Alexander to the motel room and and considered in the light most looked around. Id. favorable to the plaintiff. See Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Alexander alleges that after they left, Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d “one or both of them contacted their 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation supervisor or supervisors, modified). Here, the defendants’ defendants, Sgt. Smith, and/or Sgt. motion to dismiss addresses Pilcher, and/or Det. Johnson, and/or Alexander’s third amended Det. Cpl. Garrison (collectively, complaint.1 ‘supervisors’); two or more above conspired and acted jointly in concert On August 28, 2021, Alexander called and directed their subordinate co- Emergency Medical Services (EMS) conspirators, defendant(s) Sutphin … personnel to the Relax Inn in to return to my motel room.” Id. at 18. Greensboro, North Carolina to tend to his girlfriend, Melissa Vassell, whom Officers Leeman and Sutphin he reported was unresponsive. See returned to Alexander’s room and Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, knocked on the door. Id. at 19. Docket Entry 26 (hereinafter Alexander opened the door partially; “Compl.”), at 16. Officer Sutphin told him that he needed to speak with a detective. Id. Once there, EMS personnel requested Alexander replied that he did not have that law enforcement officers also to talk to a detective, nor did he want assist. Id. Greensboro Police to do so. Id. Department officers responded. Id. When they did, Officer Leeman spoke Alexander tried to shut the door, and with Alexander where he was Officer Sutphin stepped into the

1 This case has an extensive procedural history which is set forth in Section II infra. room. Id. at 20. She placed her hand jaw, eye, abdomen, shin, and knees, as on her service weapon and told well as a cut across her neck and Alexander to speak with the detective. symptoms of a head injury. Id. at 4. Id. This, Alexander alleges, is why he Officer Leeman was concerned then left his room, where officers because he believed many of the detained him. Id. at 21. bruises were inconsistent with her falling. See id. The police report related to the incident, which Alexander references Officers Leeman and Sutphin went to in the third amended complaint and Moses Cone Hospital, where medical appended to his objections to the staff were treating Vassell. Id. at 5. magistrate judge’s recommendation There, they learned that Vassell had of dismissal of all charges against the acute bleeding in her brain, a rib defendants save those currently fracture, a fractured nose, and bruises remaining, provides more detail.2 all over her body. Id. She was intubated and never woke again. Id. Officer Leeman noted in his report that Alexander said Vassell had fallen Detective Johnson from GPD’s (on Wednesday) and had been homicide squad (named as a unresponsive since then. See Docket defendant) went to the motel to Entry 34-3 at 4. The paramedic told investigate; he spoke with Alexander Officer Leeman that Vassell was in three times and then left to secure a clean clothing and wearing tied shoes, search warrant for the motel room which would be unusual for someone where medics first encountered who had been in the bed, Vassell. See id. at 17-20. unresponsive for three days. Id. at 4- 5. The paramedics also informed Detective Johnson’s affidavit in Officer Leeman that Vassell had support of probable cause provides bruising on or near her chest, cheek, further details.3 In it, he alleges that

2 “[A] court may consider [a document have not ‘explicitly relied’ on the articles outside the complaint] in determining in their complaint, Defendants whether to dismiss the complaint” if it essentially ask the court to look behind “was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint to find such reliance. This the complaint” and there was no is not proper on a motion to dismiss.”) challenge to its authenticity. See Phillips 3 Alexander also explicitly relied on this v. LCI Int’l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th document in his third amended Cir. 1999). Courts have interpreted complaint, see Docket Entry 26, at 21, “explicit” referral in the complaint to be and the defendants have appended it to specific to the document, as is the case their motion, see Docket Entry 41-1. here, versus a document that could Accordingly, the Court will consider it. generally fall into the same category as an See Davis v. Bacigalupi, 711 F. Supp. 2d allegation. See, e.g., In re Cree, Inc. Sec. 609, 617 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“[W]hen a Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470 plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent (M.D.N.C. 2004) (“Though Plaintiffs document as part of h[er] complaint, the Alexander told the responding patrol patrol car. See Docket Entry 34-3, at officers that Vassell fell sometime 9. three days earlier, he helped her into bed, and she had not been conscious II. PROCEDURAL since then. Docket Entry 41-1, at 6. He HISTORY further states that he spoke with Alexander filed the instant action Alexander at the motel, who told him against a number of law enforcement that he found Vassell on the floor after defendants, along with a request to the fall and did not see any bruising or proceed in forma pauperis, on August injuries on her, but noted that her hair 26, 2024. See Docket Entry 1. The was messed up. Id. magistrate judge granted the status Alexander further told Detective for purposes of recommending Johnson that, on Thursday, he went dismissal with leave to file an to work and returned to the room to amended complaint. See Docket find her still in the bed; she had soiled Entry 5. Alexander then filed a herself, so he assisted with changing defective amended complaint; the her clothing. Id. At that time, magistrate judge struck it with Alexander saw the bruising. See id. instructions to amend again. See Alexander further explained to Docket Entry 11. Alexander filed a Detective Johnson that he assisted in second amended complaint and a changing Vassell on Friday, and that declaration in support thereof. See she had not spoken since Wednesday. Docket Entries 14-15. See id. Shortly after the magistrate The magistrate judge, via text order issued the warrant, Officer Sutphin issued on February 23, 2025, arrested Alexander on charges arising recommended dismissal of the claims from Vassell’s injuries. against a number of defendants based There is no information, in either the on failure to state a claim, noting third amended complaint or the Alexander’s insistence on “press[ing] exhibits that the parties appended in the same defective claims in the same their briefing, that Alexander was manner” despite “the passage of five restrained in any way during the months and after the entry of two conversations with Detective different orders identifying the legal Johnson; at various times, he was insufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims in seated on the stairs or standing in the this action.” See Docket Entry dated parking lot by Detective Johnson’s 02/23/2025. The district court then

defendant may attach the document to a claim, as well as documents sufficiently motion to dismiss the complaint and the referred to in the complaint, but only so Court may consider the same without long as the authenticity of these converting the motion to one for documents is not disputed.”) (internal summary judgment. Such documents quotations and citations omitted). include documents central to plaintiff’s dismissed all claims save the Fourth on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 Amendment claims against Sutphin, U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Johnson, and Smith. See Docket Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, Entry 20. Alexander filed a third 570 (2007)). Although a plaintiff is amended complaint – the operative not required to prove his case in the one here – on September 24, 2025, complaint, see, e.g., Robertson v. Sea again renewing claims that the district Pines Real Est. Cos., 679 F.3d 278, court had already deemed 291 (4th Cir. 2012); Scott v. City of insufficient. See Docket Entry 26. The Durham, No. 1:20-CV-558, 2021 WL magistrate judge recommended 3856168, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, dismissal of those claims via text 2021), the complaint’s allegations order, see Docket Entry dated should “allow ‘the court to draw a 10/03/2025, and Alexander filed a reasonable inference that the request for leave to file a fourth defendant is liable for the misconduct amended complaint, see Docket Entry alleged,’” Int’l Refugee Assistance 35, along with a motion for Project v. Trump, 961 F.3d 635, 648 reconsideration of the (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 recommendation, see Docket Entry U.S. at 678). 37. On a motion to dismiss, courts view The district court then adopted the the allegations in the complaint as magistrate judge’s recommendation true, drawing all inferences in the and denied Alexander’s motion for plaintiff’s favor. See Twombly, 550 at reconsideration and request for leave 555–56 (2007); Langford v. Joyner, to file a fourth amended complaint. 62 F.4th 122, 124 (4th Cir. 2023). But See Docket Entry 38. The remaining the court does not consider “legal defendants moved to dismiss. See conclusions, elements of a cause of Docket Entry 40. During the briefing action, and bare assertions devoid of of the motion, Alexander filed yet factual enhancement[,] . . . another amended complaint – the unwarranted inferences, fifth one thus far – realleging unreasonable conclusions, or defective claims already addressed arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., multiples times by this Court. See 591 F.3d at 255. A pro se plaintiff’s Docket Entry 56. The defendants complaint must be construed liberally moved to strike it. See Docket Entry in his favor. See Nichols v. 58. Bumgarner, 173 F.4th 511, 517–18, 520 (4th Cir. 2026); Jehovah v. III. STANDARD OF Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. REVIEW 2015). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a “As a general rule, an amended complaint must contain sufficient pleading ordinarily supersedes the factual matter, accepted as true, to original and renders it of no legal ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible effect.” Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. example, it is well-settled that a 2001) (internal quotation marks seizure does not occur simply because omitted), abrogated in nonrelevant a police officer approaches an part by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 individual and asks a few questions. U.S. 389 (2015). Such consensual encounters demand no inquiry into the reasonableness of However, even under this liberal the officer’s justification for engaging pleading standard, Alexander has not the individual, because the Fourth alleged a viable violation of his Fourth Amendment is not at all implicated.” Amendment rights against any of the United States v. Cloud, 994 F.3d 233, defendants, and the Court should 241 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal dismiss the third amended complaint. quotations and citations omitted). Because he continues to flout Court rulings and reallege the same Brief investigatory stops constitute defective claims, the Court should do seizures. See United States v. Curry, so with prejudice. 965 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Officers effect a seizure when IV. ANALYSIS they deploy “‘physical force’ or a ‘show of authority’ that ‘in some way Title 42, United States Code, Section restrain[s] the liberty’ of the person.” 1983 “is a federal statutory remedy Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 345 available to those deprived of rights (2021) (alteration in original) secured to them by the Constitution (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 and, in a more sharply limited way, (1968)). the statutory laws of the United States” by persons acting under color However, the person must actually of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. acquiesce to the force first. See United Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th States v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991, 995 Cir. 2009). A Section 1983 claimant (4th Cir. 2015) (citing California v must show that a person acting under Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). color of state law violated a That can be explicit submission or Constitutional or other federal legal passive acceptance; regardless, right. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 without it, “there is at most an (1988). attempted seizure, which is not subject to the Fourth Amendment A. Alexander fails to plead a protection.” See Stover, 808 F.3d at Fourth Amendment violation. 995 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to be free from In analyzing whether a reasonable “unreasonable searches and seizures.” person would have felt free to leave a U.S. Const. amend. IV. “But not every scene as here, the Fourth Circuit has police-citizen encounter will implicate this prohibition. For considered the following non- (citing Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212– exclusive categories: 13). (1) how many officers were Where probable cause does not present; (2) whether officers support a seizure, courts must were in uniform and/or examine “the law enforcement displayed firearms; (3) whether interest and the nature of the any officer touched the ‘articulable facts’ supporting the defendant or made any attempt detention.” See id. at 702. “This to block or restrain his analysis entails a balancing test movement; (4) if the officer’s because, under the Fourth questioning was Amendment, reasonableness depends “conversational rather than on a balance between the public intimidating”; (5) whether the interest and the individual’s right to officer informed the defendant personal security free from arbitrary that he suspected him of illegal interference by law officers.” Watson, activity, or treated the 703 F.3d at 690 (internal quotations encounter as “routine”; and (6) and citations omitted). See also if the officer asked for Cloud, 994 F.3d at 242 (“If a person identification, how quickly the acquiesces to an officer’s show of officer returned it to the authority, thereby giving rise to a defendant. seizure, then we must consider whether the officer had a reasonable Cloud, 994 F.3d at 242–43 (quoting articulable suspicion of criminal and citing United States v. Gray, 883 activity to justify the seizure.”) (citing F.2d 320, 322-23 (4th Cir. 1989)). United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir. 2018)). “In cases involving a seizure, the standard of ‘reasonableness’ typically Reviewing courts measure reasonable is satisfied by a showing that the suspicion “by the totality of the police had probable cause to conclude circumstances.” United States v. that the individual seized was Peters, 60 F.4th 855, 864 (4th Cir. involved in criminal activity.” United 2023) (quoting and citing United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Dunaway v. (4th Cir. 2011)). “Evidence that would New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 support only a mere hunch is (1979)). “[A]n official seizure of the insufficient, though a reasonable person must be supported by basis need not establish probable probable cause, even if no formal cause and may well fall[ ] arrest is made.” Michigan v. considerably short of satisfying a Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) preponderance of the evidence standard.” United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted). There must be a will not suffice.” See id. (internal “particularized and objective” basis quotations and citations omitted). for it. See id. Thus, it is of an “officer- centered” nature. See United States v. Here, Alexander contends that Officer Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. Sutphin, her supervisor, Sergeant 2004). See also United States v. Smith, and Detective Johnson Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511 (4th conspired to and did unlawfully Cir. 2011) (“The reasonable suspicion detain him after EMS personnel left standard is an objective one, so we his motel room, in violation of his examine the facts within the Fourth Amendment rights. He is knowledge of [the officer] to wrong. Assuming there was a seizure, determine the presence or the facts as pled indicate that only nonexistence of reasonable Officer Sutphin affected it, and she suspicion.”). acted on an articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal activity. Regarding civil rights conspiracy, And assuming that was not the case, “[t]o establish a civil conspiracy under qualified immunity protects her from § 1983, [the plaintiff] must present liability regardless. evidence that the [defendant]s acted jointly in concert and that some overt As alleged, after officers had already act was done in furtherance of the come to the room where EMS conspiracy which resulted in personnel were assisting Vassell, they Appellants’ deprivation of a returned. Compl. at 26. Alexander constitutional right[.]” Hinkle v. City alleges that the “defendants” banged of Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, on his door, but the third amended 421 (4th Cir. 1996), citing Hafner v. complaint lists fourteen defendants Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 577 (4th Cir. (in violation of the district court’s 1992). Because a “meeting of the order narrowing the list to Smith, minds represents a critical element of Sutphin, and Johnson), including a conspiracy, [t]o properly plead an four John Does. See id. at 13. It is unconstitutional conspiracy, a unclear which of these individuals plaintiff must assert facts from which actually came to Alexander’s door, as a conspiratorial agreement can be he only identifies Officer Sutphin by inferred.” Marshall v. Marshall, 523 name. F. Supp. 3d 802, 829 (E.D. Va. 2021) Alexander alleges that Officer Sutphin (internal quotation and citation advised him that he needed to speak omitted) (alteration in original). with a detective. Id. at 19. Alexander While there need not be direct alleges that he refused, and the evidence, there must at least be “Defendants continued to exchange “specific circumstantial evidence that (go back and forth) and badger and/or each member of the alleged coerce me, after I had already conspiracy shared the same expressed to them multiple times (my conspiratorial objective. As such, expectation of privacy) that ‘I don’t conclusory allegations of a conspiracy have to talk to or speak with a what they did or did not do to force detective.’” See id. Again, the third him to remain in place. amended complaint does not identify Granted, the pleading standard is a how many officers were present or liberal one, even more so when a involved in the “back and forth.” litigant proceeds pro se. But After this, Alexander alleges he Alexander had, at the time he filed the attempted to close the motel room third amended complaint, submitted door and Officer Sutphin “intrusively four separate pleadings purporting to stepp[ed] into my room (warrantless describe the deprivation of his rights entry) preventing me from closing my arising from this incident. See Order door (again invading my zone of and Judgment of Chief/Senior Judge privacy), and ‘assaulted me by a show Eagles, Docket Entry 38 (“Mr. of violence’ when she put her hand on Alexander has now had three bites at her weapon threatening to use it, and the apple. He is not entitled to a raised her voice and demanded that I fourth, especially when it does not speak with the detective.” See id. at cure long-identified defects. His 20. motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint will be denied.”). Alexander avers that this “scared me, which compelled me to change my Despite this, Alexander still fails to mind and submit to their include critical details supporting his (Defendants] [sic] authority and claims, providing only boilerplate compelled me to step out of the safety legal phrasing such as: of my room. (I felt like if I didn’t come out of my room I’d get shot or jumped • “[W]hen defendants Leeman and by the officers). Then, I was Sutphin concluded their cursory surrounded and forced to stand by for investigation they did not find any an unreasonable delay to be evidence of a crime; nor interrogated against my will.” See id. reasonable suspicion, nor probable cause”, id. at 17; The only identifiable details that • “It was explicit that the could support a finding of seizure are: ‘defendants’ had acted Jointly [sic] 1) the vague reference to multiple in concert”, id. at 18; officers; 2) the reference to Officer • “I had already expressed to them Sutphin placing her hand on her multiple times (my expectation of weapon while directing Alexander to privacy) that ‘I don’t have to talk to speak with the detective; and 3) or speak with a detective[,]”id. at Alexander being “surrounded and 19; forced to stand by,” again with no • “Officer Sutphin intrusively details regarding the number of law stepp[ed] into my room enforcement personnel involved or (warrantless entry) preventing me from closing my door (again invading my zone of privacy),” id. assertion that Officers Leeman and at 20; Sutphin “contacted their supervisor • Officer Sutphin “‘assaulted me by a or supervisors, defendants, Sgt. show of violence’ when she put her Smith, and/or Sgt. Pilcher, and/or hand on her weapon threatening to Det. Johnson, and/or Det. Cpl. use it”, id.; Garrison (collectively, ‘supervisors’); • the defendants compelled him to two or more above conspired and “submit to their (Defendants] [sic] acted jointly in concert and directed authority and compelled me to their subordinate co-conspirators, step out of the safety of my room. defendant(s) Sutphin … to return to (I felt like if I didn’t come out of my my motel room.” This is insufficient to room I’d get shot or jumped by the allege a civil rights conspiracy claim officers)”, see id. at 20-21. against either Johnson or Smith.

As to Officer Sutphin, even assuming (emphasis added). arguendo that by placing her hand on

her weapon and verbally directing Legal conclusions “must be supported Alexander’s movements, she effected by factual allegations” that amount to a seizure, the facts as pled indicate more than “unadorned, the- that reasonable suspicion justified defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me Alexander’s brief detention4 and accusation[s].” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 removal from the room. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint’s allegations should Specifically: Alexander called EMS “allow the court to draw a reasonable personnel to his motel room because inference that the defendant is liable his girlfriend, Vassell, was for the misconduct alleged.” Int’l unresponsive in the room. See Compl. Refugee Assistance Project, 961 F.3d at 16. Alexander told Officer Leeman at 648 (cleaned up). that Vassell had fallen. See id. at 17. He told Officers Leeman and Sutphin Here, there is no way to ascertain how that Vassell had fallen two days Sergeant Smith or Detective Johnson earlier, he had placed her on the bed, are possibly liable for any purported and he went about his business seizure based on the facts alleged leaving in the morning and not beyond Alexander’s conclusory returning until dark for those two

Compl. at 20. There is no allegation that 4 Alexander does not allege, nor do the any of the named defendants directed supporting exhibits the Court has him to remain in the area, blocked his considered indicate, that Alexander was egress, or made any showing of force that anything other than free to move about would cause a reasonable person to while speaking with Detective Johnson believe he was not free to leave. until his arrest by Officer Sutphin aside from his conclusory legal allegation that he was “interrogated against [his] will.” days. See Docket Entry 34-3 at 3. the strictures of the Fourth Officers Leeman and Sutphin went to Amendment. Moses Cone Hospital, where medical B. Qualified immunity protects personnel were treating Vassell. See the defendants from liability. id. There, Officer Sutphin learned

Vassell was unresponsive and would Even assuming arguendo that be intubated. See id. She further saw Sergeant Smith and Detective that Vassell had a large bruise on the Johnson played any role in the alleged right side of her jaw and bruising seizure outside Alexander’s motel around her left eye. See id. room, and that Officer Sutphin seized Thus, Officer Sutphin knew, at the Alexander unlawfully, because none time of the alleged seizure, that violated a “clearly established Alexander was with Vassell in the statutory or constitutional right” room at various times in the past two which a reasonable person would days, that she had been unresponsive have known, see Harlow v. during that time but he had not called Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), for medical assistance until that they would be entitled to qualified evening, and that while he claimed immunity. Specifically, at the time of she fell, she had serious injuries this incident, there was no clearly rendering her unresponsive, established constitutional right for requiring intubation, and manifesting Alexander to be free of a temporary, as bruising on her person, all non-handcuffed detention by consistent with an assault. And investigating officers after he Alexander was the only person Officer reported that his girlfriend had fallen, Sutphin knew had encountered been non-responsive for two days, Vassell during the past two days. and officers were aware that she was being intubated and had bruising on She had, at the bare minimum, more her face. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah than enough reasonable suspicion to v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021) (per conclude that Vassell had been curiam) (“To determine whether an assaulted and that Alexander was the officer’s conduct violates clearly culprit. Perhaps there were other established law, a court must first explanations for her injuries at that specifically define the right.”). point in time, but that does not obviate reasonable suspicion. See Thus, even if Sergeant Smith and United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, Detective were part of the 277 (2002) (“A determination that unidentified group of law reasonable suspicion exists ... need enforcement personnel that allegedly not rule out the possibility of innocent surrounded Alexander and/or conduct.”). Any seizure complied with directed those actions, and even if those actions constituted an unlawful seizure in which Officer Sutphin participated, they would be entitled to qualified immunity and Alexander’s and new facts or arguments come to claim would still fail. light.” Carlson v. Boston Sci. Corp., 856 F.3d 320, 325 (4th Cir. 2017). But C. The Court should deny this discretion “is not limitless.” Id. Alexander’s motion to alter “Reconsideration under Rule 54(b) is judgment. appropriate on the following grounds: (1) to account for newly discovered Alexander has moved the Court, evidence; (2) to account for a change pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil in applicable law; or (3) to correct a Procedure 59(e), to reconsider its clear error causing manifest prior order and judgment filed under injustice.” Hill v. Carvana, LLC, No. Docket Entry 38, wherein the district 1-22-CV-37, 2022 WL 1604124, at *1 court dismissed all claims save those (M.D.N.C. May 17, 2022) (citing advanced against Smith, Johnson, Carlson, 856 F.3d at 325). and Sutphin, and denied Alexander’s motion for leave to amend his Alexander presents no newly complaint a fourth time. See Docket discovered evidence related thereto Entry 43. and identifies no manifest errors of law. He simply does not like the Rule 59(e) applies to final judgments, ruling. See id. (denying motion for see Fayetteville Inv’rs v. Commercial reconsideration where the plaintiff Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1469 did “little more than disagree with the (4th Cir. 1991), but the challenged Court’s decision”). His motion should order and judgment are not final, see be denied. Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. D. The Court grants the 1993) (reviewing the requirements for defendants’ motion to strike a judgment dismissing less than all Alexander’s proposed fifth the claims or parties pursuant to Rule amended complaint. 54(b) to be final). Contemporaneous to filing his reply Nevertheless, Rule 54(b) permits a to the defendants’ motion to dismiss court to “revise [an interlocutory (almost a month past the deadline to order] at any time before the entry of do so),5 Alexander also filed a a [final] judgment adjudicating all the proposed fifth amended complaint. claims and all the parties’ right and See Docket Entry 56. The defendants liabilities.” “Rule 54(b)’s approach moved to strike it, noting that involves broader flexibility to revise Alexander has previously filed five interlocutory orders before final iterations of the complaint, sought judgment as the litigation develops multiple extensions of time to

5 Even if Alexander had timely filed his of the reasons set forth in the discussion reply, it would not affect the outcome of of it. the defendants’ motion to dismiss, for all respond without complying with plaintiffs one without-prejudice procedural requirements, and did not ruling on the merits before dismissing file a separate motion for leave to with prejudice.” See United States ex amend as required by the Local Rules. rel. Nicholson v. MedCom Carolinas, See Docket Entry 58. Inc., 42 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Adbul-Mumit v. Alexandria The Court has inherent authority to Hyundai, LLC, 896 F.3d 278, 292 manage its docket, see Dietz v. (4th Cir. 2018)). To that end, Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016), and “[d]istrict courts have inherent power strike improper filings, see Iota Xi to manage their dockets with an eye Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. toward speedy and efficient Patterson, 556 F3d 138, 150 (4th Cir. resolutions, Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 2007). Never is that discretion more 40, 47 (2016), and part of that power appropriate here, with a recalcitrant is the use of with-prejudice litigant who continues to paper the dismissals.” See id. Court with late, procedurally improper filings. Thus, the Court Here, it is not a close call. Despite grants the defendants’ motion to Alexander’s many “bites at the apple,” strike Alexander’s proposed fifth he has failed to allege a viable Section amended complaint. 1983 claim. He also continues to defy Court rulings regarding the procedure E. Good cause does not support of his filings. See Order and Judgment Alexander’s motion for an of Chief/Senior Judge Eagles, Docket extension of time to respond to Entry 38 (“Mr. Alexander certainly the motion to strike. has problems complying with the rules governing complaints and Alexander timely filed a motion for a stating a claim … Indeed, it appears he 14-day extension of the deadline by is simply not reading the Court’s which to respond to the defendants’ orders or, if he is, that he is not motion to strike his proposed fifth undertaking the effort needed to amended complaint. Timely motions comply.”). Under these must still be supported by good cause, circumstances, dismissal with though. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). prejudice is appropriate. Alexander provides nothing to justify

this request. The Court therefore IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED denies it. that the Court GRANT the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with V. CONCLUSION prejudice, Docket Entry 40, and

DENY Alexander’s motion to alter Finally, there is the issue of whether judgment, Docket Entry 43. the Court should dismiss the third

amended complaint with or without IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the prejudice. “In the Fourth Circuit, defendants’ motion to strike, Docket district courts are not required to give Entry 58, is GRANTED and that Alexander’s motion for an extension of time to file a reply brief to the motion to dismiss and response brief to the motion to strike, Docket Entry 60, is DENIED.

J i Gibson { cFadden United States Magistrate Judge July 27, 2026