Christopher Gade

2025 VT 68

• Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
• Decided: December 26, 2025
• Docket: 25-AP-042
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: Reporter@vtcourts.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

2025 VT 68

No. 25-AP-042

Christopher Gade Supreme Court

On Appeal from v. Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Family Division

Erin Gade October Term, 2025

Megan J. Shafritz, J.

Jacob Oblak of Henchen & Oblak, LLP, Waterbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rory N. Butler of Lynn, Lynn, Blackman & Toohey, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Cohen and Waples, JJ., and Corbett, Supr. J., Specially Assigned

¶ 1. EATON, J. This appeal involves the enforcement of a premarital agreement

entered by husband, Christopher Gade, and wife, Erin Gade, that designated their assets as separate

property and required husband to pay wife for the increased value of the martial home upon

divorce. Although both parties sought to enforce the agreement, husband asked the family division

to offset wife’s share of the marital home’s appreciation by the damage she allegedly inflicted on

the home and to address alleged breaches of the premarital contract. The family division granted

wife’s motion to enforce the agreement and did not consider the merits of husband’s arguments,

concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over any assets it could award husband in the event that

it found a breach. We conclude that in the context of the divorce proceeding, the family division had jurisdiction over the parties’ property and the premarital agreement and thus authority to

adjudicate husband’s claims regarding breach of that agreement. We therefore reverse and

remand.

¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Prior to the parties’

marriage in 2018, they entered into a premarital agreement, which provided a comprehensive

division of their assets in the event of divorce. Under the agreement, each party’s assets and

anticipated inheritances were categorized as separate property to be retained “free from any claim

by the other Party” should the parties divorce. The agreement was structured such that no property

owned by either party was joint marital property except the marital home.

¶ 3. Husband owned the marital home prior to the marriage. The agreement provided

that, in the event of a divorce, wife was “entitled to FIFTY (50%) PERCENT of the increase in

the appraised value” paid by husband “in monthly installments amortized over thirty (30) years

with a balloon payment at the end of five (5) years from the date of the first payment.” The

agreement required husband to begin payments the month after the home appraisal was completed.

¶ 4. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the agreement also required the parties to

contribute to the living expenses in proportion to their incomes, and provided that if the parties

filed joint tax returns, they each would be responsible for paying all taxes associated with the

income from their separate property and earned income. Finally, the agreement stated that if either

husband or wife breached any provision in the premarital agreement, the breaching party was

responsible for any reasonable legal fees incurred by the other party in seeking to enforce the

agreement.

¶ 5. Husband and wife separated in October 2021, and husband filed a complaint for

divorce in February 2023. Extensive motion practice concerning enforcement of the premarital

agreement followed. Initially, husband asked for “relief” pursuant to the agreement, and wife also

2 moved to enforce it. Wife also asserted, however, that the marital home “is outside of the family

[c]ourt’s jurisdiction” because it had been designated as separate property in the agreement.

¶ 6. In response, husband agreed that husband and wife should “receive their Separate

Property at the time of a divorce” pursuant to the agreement. However, husband alleged that wife

had severely damaged the marital home following its appraisal and that this complicated the

division of assets. Husband further asserted that wife had not met her obligations to assist in

paying for household expenses during the marriage.

¶ 7. Following unsuccessful mediation, wife renewed her motion to enforce the

premarital agreement in August 2023 and added a claim for attorney’s fees. Supporting her

request, wife asserted husband failed to pay her the required monthly installments for the increase

in the home’s equity.

¶ 8. Husband responded, requesting a final hearing on both the issue of the damage to

the home and the motion to enforce. Husband argued that the amount husband owed to wife for

the equity in the marital home should be offset by the amount wife owed to husband for the damage

she caused to the home.

¶ 9. Following a status hearing and further motion practice, the family division granted

wife’s motion to enforce. The court noted that the agreement “precludes the Court from even

considering separate property in dividing whatever portion of the marital estate is within its

jurisdiction” and made no mention of recouping unpaid household expenses or accounting for

depreciation in the value of separate property caused by the other party in the event of divorce.

Thus, the family division concluded that husband could not seek satisfaction of his claims under

the agreement because the family division is a court of limited jurisdiction with authority to

allocate the marital estate and no authority to award damages. The court mentioned, however, that

it would be possible for husband to pursue his claims against wife for the damage done to the

marital home in the civil division, to the extent that his claims were not barred by the agreement.

3 The court also granted wife’s request for attorney’s fees, determining that husband had failed to

make the required payments called for in the agreement.

¶ 10. Husband filed a motion to reconsider, adding a claim that wife had not met her tax

obligations pursuant to the agreement. The court denied husband’s motion, once again stating that

the family division was limited by its jurisdictional mandate and therefore had “no authority to

award damages for breach of contract.”1 This appeal followed.

¶ 11. On appeal, husband argues that the trial court erred by enforcing certain premarital

agreement terms—namely, the attorney’s-fees provision—while also refusing to enforce other

provisions—the household-expenses provision, taxes provision, and implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing. Husband argues that the family division came to an erroneous conclusion

when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his claims. Wife argues that the civil division,

not the family division, was the proper forum for husband’s claims.

¶ 12. We conclude that the family division has jurisdiction over husband ’s claims that

wife breached the premarital agreement according to the plain language in 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(4),

which gives the family division jurisdiction over all divorce proceedings—including the premarital

agreement and the property allocated therein.

¶ 13. A challenge to a court’s jurisdiction is a legal question that we review de novo.

Aither v. Est. of Aither, 2006 VT 111, ¶ 4, 180 Vt. 472, 913 A.2d 376. The jurisdiction of the

family division is governed by statute, and “[w]hether the family court properly construed the

controlling statutes is a question of law that we review de novo.” Heffernan v. Harbeson, 2004

VT 98, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 239, 861 A.2d 1149. “When the statute’s scope and meaning are readily

apparent, no construction is necessary, and we apply the statute according to its terms.” Id.

1 The parties engaged in further motion practice, largely reiterating arguments summarized

above and disagreeing about whether the family division’s decision regarding attorney’s fees should be stayed pending appeal to this Court. 4 However, if there is doubt or ambiguity, “we discern legislative intent by considering the statute

as a whole, reading integral parts of the statutory scheme together” and, in such cases, “we must

look not only at the letter of a statute but also at its reason and spirit to avoid results that are

irrational or unreasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted).

¶ 14. The family division has exclusive jurisdiction “to hear and dispose of . . . [a]ll

annulment and divorce proceedings.” 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(4). As part of those proceedings, the

Legislature has articulated that “[a]ll property owned by either or both of the parties, however and

whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). It is the

family division’s role to “settle the rights of the parties to their property by including in its

judgment provisions which equitably divide and assign the property” and, in so doing, it may

consider several relevant factors. Id. § 751(a), (b). Thus, the family division is a court of limited

jurisdiction, but over the matters within its control, that jurisdiction is plenary.

¶ 15. Regarding premarital agreements specifically, this Court, as with other jurisdictions

across the country, has recognized that parties to a marriage may enter into enforceable agreements

which reflect their desired disposition of marital property in the event of a divorce. See Stalb v.

Stalb, 168 Vt. 235, 241, 719 A.2d 421, 426 (1998) (describing premarital agreements as

enforceable contracts); 5 Williston on Contracts § 11:8 (4th ed. 2025) (“[P]remarital agreements,

so long as they do not promote divorce or otherwise offend public policy, are generally favored as

conducive to the welfare of the parties and the marriage relationship.” (emphasis omitted)). When

parties enter into such agreements, the family division has jurisdiction over the enforceability and

interpretation of those premarital agreements, including claims alleging breaches of the provisions

controlling the disposition of property. See Bassler v. Bassler, 156 Vt. 353, 362, 593 A.2d 82, 88

(1991) (holding that premarital agreement at issue “violate[d] public policy and should not be

enforced”); Lacroix v. Rysz, 2025 VT 16, ¶ 17, __Vt.__, 336 A.3d 321 (remanding to “family

division to assess wife’s arguments that husband breached the expectations in the agreement”).

5 The family division interprets those premarital agreements “according to rules for construing a

contract.” Gamache v. Smurro, 2006 VT 67, ¶ 7, 180 Vt. 113, 904 A.2d 91.

¶ 16. Consequently, given the plain language in 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(4) and 15 V.S.A.

§ 751(a), divorce proceedings—including premarital agreements and marital property allocated

therein—are squarely within the family court’s jurisdiction. Cf. Quinn v. Schipper, 2006 VT 51,

¶ 7, 180 Vt. 572, 908 A.2d 413 (mem.) (holding breach-of-contract claim concerning separation

agreement was appropriate in family division because agreement and addendum contracts were

“part of the divorce proceedings” and therefore “within the family court’s jurisdiction” (quotation

omitted)); Lussier v. Lussier, 174 Vt. 454, 456, 807 A.2d 374, 378 (2002) (mem.) (“Where the

final divorce order incorporates a stipulation agreement between the parties, that agreement

becomes part of the divorce proceedings . . . [and] is within the family court’s jurisdiction.”

(quotation omitted)). Indeed, the record here demonstrates that the premarital agreement was

integral to the divorce proceedings before the family division: both parties requested that the court

allocate the property in accordance with their individual interpretations of the agreement, and the

court explicitly stated that the terms of the parties’ premarital agreement were incorporated into

the final order and decree. Therefore, under the plain language in the controlling statutes, the

family division had jurisdiction over husband’s claims regarding the premarital agreement.

¶ 17. We have explained that in “the absence of evidence of fraud or unconscionable

advantage taken at the time of execution, the parties themselves are bound according to the terms

of the contract” and that “[o]ur courts will override their provisions only to enforce duties imposed

by law sought to be avoided by contract, or, in particular, to protect the interests of children

involved.” Padova v. Padova, 123 Vt. 125, 129, 183 A.2d 227, 230 (1962). The general

requirement to enforce the terms of a premarital agreement, however, does not affect the court’s

ultimate jurisdiction over the property allocated in an agreement. See 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(4) (stating

“Family Division shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of . . . [a]ll annulment and

6 divorce proceedings”); 15 V.S.A. § 751(a) (stating “[a]ll property owned by either or both of the

parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court ”).

Contrary to wife’s suggestion otherwise, parties cannot “untether[] their separate property from

the divorce action” or “narrow[] the Family Division’s jurisdiction” by delineating certain property

as “separate property” in an agreement. If a premarital agreement is enforceable, it may well be

that the court plays little to no role in deciding how property is distributed, but the property is not

outside the court’s “jurisdiction.” Indeed, our precedent demonstrates that in certain cases, it is

appropriate for the family division to set aside a premarital agreement between the parties and

distribute martial property in a way that deviates from the allocation outlined in the agreement.

See, e.g., Bassler, 156 Vt. at 362, 593 A.2d at 88 (refusing to enforce premarital agreement because

agreement denied wife any interest in husband’s property and wife was receiving public assistance

at time of divorce). In such cases, the court must determine whether the agreement as-written or

the applicable statutory considerations—which may also incorporate the intent of the parties

pursuant to their set-aside agreement—prevail in the property allocation; but its ultimate

jurisdiction over the subject matter remains unchanged.

¶ 18. The parties devote substantial portions of their briefs to a disagreement about the

applicability of the different reasoning expressed by the two concurrences in Allen v. Allen, 161

Vt. 526, 527-43, 641 A.2d 1332, 1333-42 (1994). In Allen, the Court was divided over whether

the family division had jurisdiction over a claim of interest on a loan that the wife made to the

husband during their marriage. Id. at 527, 641 A.2d at 1333 (Dooley, J., concurring). Two

members of the Court articulated that they would hold that the family division did not have

jurisdiction over a debt claim not incorporated into a postnuptial agreement between the parties.

Id. at 533-34, 641 A.2d at 1336-37. Those justices supported their conclusion by pointing out that

“the family court is a court of limited jurisdiction,” and as such, any other type of proceeding like

obligations arising out of a separate contract between the parties “may not be brought in that court.”

7 Id. at 530, 641 A.2d at 1335. Two other members of the Court explained that the family division

should have ancillary jurisdiction over the debt claim as “incidental to [the family division’s]

primary duty of distributing the marital property.” Id. at 537, 641 A.2d at 1338 (Morse, J.,

concurring).

¶ 19. We need not resolve the question posed in Allen because those facts are

distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike in Allen—where the loan agreement and interest at

issue had not been formed in anticipation of a divorce and was a separate contract from the parties’

postnuptial agreement—the issues brought by husband here concern the parties’ premarital

agreement.2 See id. at 527-28, 641 A.2d at 1333-34 (Dooley, J., concurring) (describing loan

agreement as separate contract from postnuptial contract between husband and wife). On appeal,

husband maintains that he was “asking the Family Division to enforce the terms of the Prenuptial

Agreement that Wife had breached, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent

to all contracts.” Specifically, in the family division, husband argued that “[p]ursuant to Paragraph

8 of the Agreement, in the event of divorce, the parties are each entitled to retain all of their separate

property as defined in the provisions of Paragraph 4” but described that “[t]his is not possible

because [wife] essentially took [husband’s] separate property by damaging and destroying parts of

the house and many items of personal property.” Similarly, husband asserted that

“[c]ontractually,” each party “had a clear obligation to avoid taking, damaging, destroying or

2 In Allen, both concurrences recognized that the family division had jurisdiction over the postnuptial agreement between the parties. See id. at 529, 641 A.2d at 1334 (Dooley, J., concurring) (describing family division interpreting postnuptial agreement but articulating concern that court “went too far” when it extinguished loan not incorporated into agreement); id. at 537, 641 A.2d at 1338 (Morse, J., concurring) (stating “the family court has the authority to determine the enforceability of contracts between divorcing parties as part of the property settlement ”). Here, the agreement at issue is a prenuptial agreement and not a postnuptial agreement. Because both the postnuptial agreement in Allen and the prenuptial agreement here between husband and wife were made in contemplation of a divorce and described the parties’ preferred distribution of property in the event of a divorce, we see no reason to distinguish the two types of agreements for the purpose of the jurisdictional question addressed in this case. 8 otherwise rendering the separate property of the other party worthless, unusable, dramatically

damaged to the point of requiring repair and replacement.” Husband also argued that wife did not

meet her obligation under the agreement to pay her required share of household expenses and

taxes. Because husband was alleging breaches of the premarital agreement itself and a breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to that agreement, the family division

could adjudicate those claims.3 See Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled Gas Corp. of Vt., 161 Vt.

200, 208, 635 A.2d 1211, 1216 (1993) (“An underlying principle implied in every contract is that

each party promises not to do anything to undermine or destroy the other’s rights to receive the

benefits of the agreement.”).

¶ 20. In declining to address husband’s claims, the family division pointed out that

husband’s requests were confusing in that he was both seeking to enforce the agreement and

seeking damages for its alleged breach. Husband was not, however, afforded an opportunity to

clarify his position and to articulate what remedy he was seeking for the alleged breaches.

¶ 21. The family division also expressed that it did not have jurisdiction over the parties’

separate property, which had been allocated in the premarital agreement. As explained above, the

family division has jurisdiction over all property allocated as part of a divorce. Supra, ¶ 14. In

addition, while the family division may not have jurisdiction over a freestanding breach-of-

contract claim, it has authority to adjudicate the division of property and to interpret and enforce

the parties’ premarital agreement. Compare supra, ¶ 15 (describing that family division has

jurisdiction over enforceability and interpretation of premarital agreements), with Maier v. Maier,

2021 VT 88, ¶ 35, 216 Vt. 33, 266 A.3d 778 (holding “the family division does not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate an action to enforce a contract between the parties that is untethered to a

3 In the family division, wife argued that husband was claiming damages from an alleged tort—damage done by wife to the marital home—and not a breach of contract. Wife does not make this argument on appeal. As such, we do not address it. 9 divorce”). Insofar as the family division may instead have been commenting on the appropriate

breadth of its discretion in allocating the marital property as a result of the comprehensive language

in parties’ premarital agreement, we leave it to the court to clarify on remand.

¶ 22. Ultimately, we do not reach the question of whether husband’s claims have any

merit. The family division is better suited on remand to create a more fully developed record

regarding the alleged breaches, determine if they are material, and consider any remedies,

including any potential waivers of the contractual provisions. Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 121,

370 A.2d 191, 192 (1977) (“It is the tradition of constitutional common law that the establishment

of legal doctrine derives from the decision of actual disputes, not from the giving of solicited legal

advice in anticipation of issues.”).

¶ 23. We remand to the family division to address whether wife materially breached the

premarital contract as husband alleges and, if so, to determine appropriate remedies applying

contract principles consistent with our precedent regarding premarital agreements.

Reversed and remanded.

FOR THE COURT:

Associate Justice