Christian v. Boulware Jr.

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 12, 2021
DocketCivil Action No. 2021-2003
StatusPublished

This text of Christian v. Boulware Jr. (Christian v. Boulware Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Christian v. Boulware Jr., (D.D.C. 2021).

Opinion

FILED 8/12/2021 Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Court for the District of Columbia FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ERIC LEON CHRISTIAN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02003 (UNA) ) RICHARD BOULWARE, JR., et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court will grant plaintiff’s IFP

application and dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and for want of subject

matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring dismissal of an action “at any time” the

court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).

Plaintiff, who appears to be a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada, sues in their official

capacities, a United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the District of

Nevada, the Clerk of Court of the District of Nevada, and the former United States Attorney for

the District of Nevada. See Template Complaint (“Templ. Compl.”), ECF No. 1, at 2–3, 6. The

complaint is difficult to follow. Plaintiff is seemingly aggrieved regarding the pendency and/or

the outcome of various respective civil and criminal matters, all filed in and/or adjudicated by the

District of Nevada and/or United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 3–5;

Supplemental Complaint (“Supp. Compl.”), ECF No. 1-1, at 1–6. His myriad allegations include:

(1) “years of court delays;” (2) his “statutory right to Victim Compensation Fund payouts from the

Nevada U.S. Attorney[’]s Office;” (3) “the District Court of Nevada[’s] . . . seizure” of his real and personal property, and; (4) an excessive sentence that was extended based on the mishandling

of various criminal and post-conviction matters. See Templ. Compl. at 3. He purports to bring

this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), id. at 3–4, and

demands billions in damages, as well as an order granting him types of property, see Supp. Compl.

at 5.

Plaintiff faces several hurdles that he cannot overcome. First, Rule 8(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown

v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a “complaint [] contains an untidy

assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished

from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the

requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom.

Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Plaintiff’s complaint

falls within this category.

Second, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to revisit or intervene in other legal proceedings,

or review judicial determinations rendered in other federal courts, this court lacks jurisdiction. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions); United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp.

2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Fleming

v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994) (applying District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

415, 416 (1923)), aff’d, No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

1150 (1995).

Third, while the specific claims and allegations against the named United States Attorney

are ambiguous, “unless a prosecutor proceeds in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, absolute

immunity exists for those prosecutorial activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of

the criminal process.” Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (absolute prosecutorial

immunity for even quasi-judicial actions), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).

Fourth, Judges are absolutely immune from suits for “all actions taken in the judge's

judicial capacity, unless these actions are taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Caldwell v. Kagan, 865 F.

Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Judges have absolute immunity for any actions taken in a judicial

or quasi-judicial capacity.”). It is also well-settled that clerks and other court employees are

immune from suit for actions done in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sindram, 986

F.2d at 1460; Hilska v. Suter, 2008 WL 2596213 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 308 Fed. Appx. 451 (D.C.

Cir. 2009).

Last, it is notable that any connection between these claims and the District of Columbia

is entirely unclear, particularly because plaintiff admits that “all events have happened within or

through the federal courthouse located at 333 Las Vegas Blvd. Las Vegas, NV[,] which is the

United States Congressional District of Nevada.” Templ. Compl. at 4. Consequently, venue here

is improper, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), and the ability of this court to

exercise personal jurisdiction over these defendants is, at best, uncertain, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that due process

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Related

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.
263 U.S. 413 (Supreme Court, 1924)
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
326 U.S. 310 (Supreme Court, 1945)
Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1978)
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman
460 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency
355 F.3d 661 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
L. Patrick Gray, III v. Griffin Bell
712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Circuit, 1983)
Jerome S. Wagshal v. Mark W. Foster
28 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Circuit, 1994)
Fleming v. United States
847 F. Supp. 170 (District of Columbia, 1994)
Lewis v. Green
629 F. Supp. 546 (District of Columbia, 1986)
United States v. Choi
818 F. Supp. 2d 79 (District of Columbia, 2011)
Caldwell v. Kagan
865 F. Supp. 2d 35 (District of Columbia, 2012)
Hilska v. Suter
308 F. App'x 451 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Jiggetts v. District of Columbia
319 F.R.D. 408 (D.C. Circuit, 2017)
Brown v. Califano
75 F.R.D. 497 (District of Columbia, 1977)

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