Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 10, 2015·No. 03-15-00657-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00657-CV 7774560 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/10/2015 5:14:45 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-15-00657-CV

FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/10/2015 5:14:45 PM for the Third Judicial District JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk at Austin, Texas

CHRIS TRAYLOR, AS EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER OF THE TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, et al.

Appellants, v.

DIANA D., AS NEXT FRIEND OF KD, A CHILD, et al.

Appellees.

On Appeal from the 200th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas

REPLY SUPPORTING RULE 24.4 MOTION TO VACATE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS ORDER OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, INCREASE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS BOND

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

Plaintiffs misunderstand both the Commission’s argument and the relevant

administrative rules. The Commission does not argue, as plaintiffs suggest, that

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1378 (2015), somehow preempts

state law as a general matter. Resp. at 13 ¶ 17. The Commission’s position is, rather,

that 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, as interpreted in Armstrong, preempts state-court remedies

that change the amount of Medicaid rates. Mtn. at 13-17. Plaintiffs’ response ignores

the actual scope of the Commission’s argument and, as a result, fails to respond to

it.

Although the Commission has drawn its motion narrowly, so as to address

only the remedy of a counter-supersedeas order as opposed to the merits of the

underlying dispute, plaintiffs have brought that issue into this proceeding. See Resp.

at 10-11. Plaintiffs misread or ignore the relevant statutes and rules. Substantively,

plaintiffs’ position is that § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) requires particular reporting

requirements, because the rates in this case were adopted in a “periodic rate

review,” see id. (citing 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.8021(a)(2)(B)). But

§ 355.8021(a)(2)(B) does not apply. These rates were changed through a rate

“adjustment,” not a periodic rate review.1 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 531.021(e); 1 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE § 355.201(d)(1)(A), (D).

The adjustment process occurs “notwithstanding” other legal requirements,

including the reporting requirement of § 355.8021(a)(2)(B) for periodic review. See

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 531.021(e); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.201(d). Nor is there a

procedural basis for this lawsuit in El Paso Hospital District v. Tex. Health & Human

1Plaintiffs attempt to capitalize on their confusion between the APA and the ratemaking process to suggest that there was something improper in pulling down the first and second rates. See Resp. at 5 ¶¶ 6, 7. But the first two sets of rates (1) relied on commercial rates, which the Commission concedes is improper; and (2) failed to cite § 355.201, or present the rates as an “adjustment.” See CR.18-39, CR.212-233. The final, October 1 rates correctly invoke the adjustment process and Rider 50. See CR.351-373; see esp. CR.352 (rules are based on “Rider 50” and “§ 355.201(d)(1)(A) and (D)”).

Services Commission, 247 S.W.3d 709, 711, 714-15 (Tex. 2008) (“El Paso Hospital

District I”). As this Court and the Supreme Court both recognized following

remand, a § 2001.038 claim cannot be used to change Medicaid rates, only to

challenge the underlying rules. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Human

Servs. Comm’n, 400 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. 2013) (“El Paso Hospital District II”) (“our

prior opinion and judgment did not create a remedy for the hospitals’ past

reimbursement claims”); see also Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. El Paso

Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 351 S.W.3d 460, 487 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011) aff’d 400 S.W.3d

72 (Section 2001.038’s scope is limited “solely to the extent of permitting suits

against state agencies for declaratory relief concerning the validity or applicability of

their rules”). And because the Commissioner’s discretion is to set rates, subject to

the limitations of the Medicaid Act, there could be no ultra vires claim related to the

amount of rates, and the discretion granted to proceed “notwithstanding” other

legal requirements set out in § 531.021(e) precludes any ultra vires act. See, e.g., City

of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2007).

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFFS’ RELIANCE ON POST HOC INTENT LETTERS SIGNED BY INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATORS IS AN IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO BRING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE COURT VIA INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE.

Before engaging with the substance of the counter-supersedeas issue, it is

important to deal with the documents that constituted the bulk of plaintiffs’ filing:

the post hoc letters signed by individual legislators and their impact on the meaning

of Rider 50c. Those letters are at odds with the plain text of Rider 50 and are, as a

matter of law, incompetent to change the meaning of a statute. They appear to mark

an attempt to bring political pressure on this Court to avoid the necessary

implications of Rider 50.

A. The Text of Rider 50 Mandates these Rate Cuts.

Rider 50, the relevant language from which is attached to the Commission’s

Rule 24 motion, makes clear that the cuts are not optional. 2016-17 General

Appropriations Act, 84th Leg., R.S., 2015 (Article II, Health & Human Servs.

Comm’n) (“Rider 50”) (excerpts attached as appendix). Part 50a makes clear that

funding has already been cut from the Medicaid portion of the budget. Rider 50a.

(“Included in appropriations above in Goal B, Medicaid, is a reduction of . . . a

biennial total of $373,000,000 in General Revenue Funds and $496,570,428 in

Federal Funds.”) Portions of this larger cut “may” include various initiatives. Rider

50b (“This reduction shall be achieved through the implementation of the plan

described under subsection d which may include any or all of the following

initiatives:”).

Rider 50c is the kicker. After requiring a change in reimbursement

methodology to meet industry standards, “while considering stakeholder input and

access to care,” the Rider makes specific requirements regarding Medicaid therapy

rates:

Out of the amount [already cut] in subsection (a), in each fiscal year at least $50,000,000 in General Revenue Funds savings should be achieved through rate reductions. . . . .

Rider 50(c). In short, plaintiffs’ entire reading of the Rider depends on the word

“should,” which addresses “rate cuts” that are to be used to account for money that

was already cut from the budget, according to Rider 50a.2

Given that the funds have already been cut from the budget, the word

“should” is an instruction to the Commission regarding the proportion of the total

cuts that are to be directed to Medicaid therapy rate reductions. The word “should”

is not included in the list of words given a background meaning by the Code

Construction Act, see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.016, nor is there a large body of case

law governing its use as opposed to the more common statutory terms “shall” and

“may,” see Thomas v. Groebl, 147 Tex. 70, 78-79, 212 S.W.2d 625, 630 (1948)

(“shall” can mean “may,” and vice versa). “Should” is the past tense of “shall,”

and, though it is sometimes used to express “probability or expectation,” it also

serves to indicate “obligation or duty.” AMER. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed.

1994) 1612. Thus, like “shall” and “may,” the word “should” can create a

mandatory standard in some contexts. See A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE

(2d ed. 1995) (“Oddly, should, like may . . . is sometimes used to create mandatory

2 The response suggests that the word “may” also applies to the rate cuts. Resp. at 16 ¶ 21. This is wrong. The word “may” applies to the various initiatives in which the Commission is empowered to initiate to cut an additional $25 million in funding. Rider 50(c).

standards, as in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct”). Texas courts have routinely

applied decrees using the word “should” as creating mandatory duties in statutes,

orders, and instructions.3 It makes sense to do so in this context: Rider 50a sets out

a total amount of cuts, and Rider 50c sets out instructions for how to achieve at least

$100,000,000 of those cuts during the biennium. Given that the word “should” is

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC (Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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