Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 9, 2015·No. 03-15-00657-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED

03-15-00657-CV

7745200

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

11/9/2015 2:07:47 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

NO. 03-15-00657-CV

FILED IN

3rd COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE AUSTIN, TEXAS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 11/9/2015 2:07:47 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk

CHRIS TRAYLOR, EXECUTIVE COIMMISSIONER OF TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION AND THE TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, APPELLANTS

V.

DIANA D., et al

APPELLEES

ON APPEAL FROM THE 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, HON. TIM SULAK, PRESIDING

APPELLEES’ RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS ORDER, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, INCREASE COUNTER-SUPERSEDEAS BOND

TO THE HONORABLE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

I. INTRODUCTION

1) Appellants have filed a Motion To Vacate Counter-Supersedeas Order, Or In The Alternative Increase Counter-Supersedeas Bond (“Appellants’ Motion” or “the Motion”) in which Appellants claim that the trial judge abused his discretion because: a) the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services has exclusive

authority to enforce the federal Medicaid statutory provisions relating to access to care; and b) the temporary injunction violates various clauses of the U.S. and Texas Constitution. Alternatively, Appellants’ Motion claims that this Court should set the bond for denial of supersedeas at $100,000,000.00 because that is the alleged two-year budget impact of the temporary injunction. 2) The Court should deny Appellants’ Motion because:

a. Appellants’ attack on the trial court actions has nothing to do with their factual or legal basis.

b. There is no federal constitutional or statutory ground to challenge the trial court’s actions.

c. The trial court’s actions do not violate the Texas Constitution.

d. None of Appellants’ objections were ever presented to the trial court.

e. Appellants expressly consented to and waived any objection to the bond for the denial of supersedeas.

f. Appellants’ claims as to the budgetary impact of the temporary injunction lack any evidentiary, or logical, basis.

Because there is no factual or legal basis for the Appellants’ Motion, no error has been presented for review, and all claims in the Motion have been waived, the Court should deny the Motion.1 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 3) Because this is the Court’s first opportunity to review any aspect of this case, Appellees offer this abbreviated statement of facts to provide context for Appellants’ Motion and this response. 4) Appellees include the next friends of five children who suffer from severe and disabling conditions, including seizure disorders, delayed development, autism, speech developmental delays, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, and other conditions. CR 5, 587–88. These children and thousands of other like them receive speech, occupational, and physical therapy services from home health agencies under the Texas Medicaid Program to assist with their disabling symptoms such as

1 As Appellees were finalizing this response, Appellants filed a letter asking the Court to consider the trial court’s comments at a recent hearing when making its determination of Appellants’ Motion. Letter from Kristofer S. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, to Jeffrey D. Kyle, Third Court of Appeals (Nov. 9, 2015) (on file with Court). This request is improper for at least three reasons. First, Appellants are asking the Court to consider statements made after their Motion was filed, which are not part of the Court’s record. Second, Appellants have not attached the hearing transcript to their letter, apparently hoping the Court will adopt Appellants’ misleading and incorrect characterization of Judge Sulak’s words, which in any event did not modify the order Appellants are challenging. Third, by filing this letter the same day Appellees’ response to the Motion is due, Appellants are attempting to amend their argument and avoid a response from Appellees. The Court should disregard Appellants’ letter and decide the Motion based on the record and briefing schedule the Court has already defined. If the Court is inclined to consider Appellants’ letter, Appellees ask that the Court instruct Appellants to include in their filing all portions of any supplemental record on which they will rely, and set a reasonable briefing schedule for any response the Court would like from Appellees.

the inability to speak, walk, control bodily movement, or mentally process information. CR 5, 588. Appellees also include three providers of these home health therapy services. CR 5, 588. Appellees filed this suit on August 11, 2015, to enjoin The Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“HHSC”) from implementing dramatic cuts to Medicaid reimbursement rates for home health therapy services, which HHSC planned to implement on September 1. CR 4–64. 5) Appellees’ suit is based, among other things, on the fact that in promulgating its proposed rates, HHSC did not comply with its own rules, including 1 TAC §355.8021(a)(2)(B), which requires that periodic rate reviews include a study of payments for, as well as costs associated with, providing Medicaid reimbursable therapy services. CR 343, 507–08. Because HHSC failed to comply with its own rules, the proposed rates constitute an effective adoption of a new administrative rule under El Paso Hosp. Dist. v. Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709 (Tex. 2008). CR 507–08; see also CR 203–05, 343–46. Appellees sought to enjoin HHSC from implementing the proposed rates because they had not followed the steps required by the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) to adopt a new rule. Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ch. 2001 et seq.). Alternatively, Plaintiffs assert that Commissioner Traylor’s acts were ultra vires, and should likewise be enjoined. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §37.009; City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284, S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)).

6) The trial court ordered accelerated discovery, which included a deposition of Pam McDonald as the representative of HHSC. CR 98–101. During that deposition, Appellants handed Appellees a second set of proposed rates that HHSC had created over the previous weekend in response to the litigation and discovery. 2 RR 10; 3 RR 201–02. At 9:17 a.m. on the date of the initial temporary injunction hearing, Appellants filed “HHSC’s Advisory to the Court” announcing that HHSC would “start over, with a new rate proposal, pursuant to Rider 502 and HHSC’s rate methodology as prescribed by its administrative rules.” CR 270–71. Because HHSC abandoned the proposed September 1, 2015 implementation of new rates, the injunction hearing was moot and did not proceed. 7) Nine days after abandoning the first two sets of proposed rates and promising to start over, HHSC published a third set of proposed rates to take effect on October 1, 2015. CR 342, 51–73. This led Appellees to amend their petition, CR 336–92, obtain additional discovery, CR 491–94, and set another temporary injunction hearing for the week of September 21. At the hearing, HHSC’s witness admitted that HHSC had not complied with the §355.8021(a)(2)(B) requirement of a study to determine the costs associated with providing the Medicaid-

reimbursable services. 3 RR 229–30. The trial court found, among other things, 2 “Rider 50” refers to a rider to the H.B. 1 General Appropriations budget of the 84 th Legislative Session, which was introduced as Exhibit 9 at the temporary injunction hearing. 6 RR at Ex. 9 p. 2–4. Subsection (c) of Rider 50, which provides that HHSC “should” and “may” (not “shall”) achieve General Revenue Funds savings, is the basis for Appellants’ claim that the Legislature mandated $100,000,000.00 in rate cuts over the next two years.

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Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC (Chris Traylor, as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission And the Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Diana D., as Next Friend of KD, a Child Karen G., as Next Friend of TG and ZM, Children Guadalupe P., as Next Friend of LP, a Child Sally L., as Next Friend of CH, a Child Dena D., as Next Friend of BD, a Child OCI Acquisition, LLC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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