Chong v. Bank of America, N.A.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Hawaii
DecidedNovember 8, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-00151
StatusUnknown

This text of Chong v. Bank of America, N.A. (Chong v. Bank of America, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Hawaii primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chong v. Bank of America, N.A., (D. Haw. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

JEFFREY CHONG, Civ. No. 22-00151 JMS-KJM

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATION vs. SOLUTIONS, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, ECF NO. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. AND 41 EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, ECF NO. 41

Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) moves under 9 U.S.C. § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to compel arbitration of claims against Experian brought in this suit by Plaintiff Jeffrey Chong (“Plaintiff”) against both Experian and Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. See ECF No. 41 (“Motion to Compel Arbitration”).1 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was enrolled in “CreditWorks,” which is affiliated in a relevant manner with Experian, nor that

1 At the October 31, 2022 hearing on the Motion to Compel Arbitration, BANA took no position on Experian’s Motion. Plaintiff’s enrollment agreement with CreditWorks contains an arbitration clause. See, e.g., ECF No. 41-2 at 3, PageID.342; id. at 5, PageID.344. Plaintiff also

agrees that, given the CreditWorks agreement, at least the arbitrability of the dispute should first be decided by an arbitrator. See, e.g., ECF No. 49 at 8, PageID.443 (“[Plaintiff] recognizes that under current Ninth Circuit authority such

questions [of arbitrability] are to be resolved by the arbitrator.”). Rather, the only question at issue for the Motion to Compel is whether Experian waived the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right. See id.; see also ECF No. 59 at 2, PageID.504.

In the Ninth Circuit (until recently), “[a] party seeking to prove waiver of a right to arbitration must demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2) acts inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice

to the party opposing arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts.” Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1986). On May 23, 2022, however, the Supreme Court eliminated the third element (prejudice). See Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 142 S. Ct. 1708, 1712−13 (2022) (holding that, under the FAA, a

court may not “condition a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice”). That is, after Morgan, the waiver question is controlled by Fisher’s first two elements: (1) “knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration”; and

(2) “acts inconsistent with that existing right.” 791 F.2d at 694. See Morgan, 142

2 S. Ct. at 1714 (“Stripped of its prejudice requirement,” the waiver inquiry focuses on whether a party “knowingly relinquish[ed] the right to arbitrate by acting

inconsistently with that right”). In turn, under the Ninth Circuit’s test, “a party acts inconsistently with exercising the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes an intentional decision not to

move to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigates the merits of a case for a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.” Newirth by and through Newirth v. Aegis Senior Cmtys., LLC, 931 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2019). “Seeking a decision on the merits of a key issue in a case indicates an

intentional and strategic decision to take advantage of the judicial forum.” Id. Here, Experian did not “actively litigate[] the merits” of the case, and certainly did not litigate “for a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage

of being in court.” Id. Rather, Experian began asserting its right to arbitrate about a month after receiving proper notice of the suit. Specifically, the record indicates that Experian did not receive proper service of the complaint (filed on April 8, 2022) on April 12, 2022, as initially contended by Plaintiff. See ECF No. 53-2.

Experian did not receive notice of the suit until approximately May 19, 2022, see ECF No. 53-1 at 2, PageID.464, after Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default on May 18, 2022, ECF No. 13. Experian then entered an appearance in the action

on May 24, 2022, see ECF No. 19, and an Answer on June 2, 2022, see ECF No.

3 32. On June 22, 2022—within a month of entering an appearance—Experian notified Plaintiff of the arbitration clause in the CreditWorks agreement, and

Experian began asserting its right to arbitrate by asking Plaintiff to stipulate to arbitrate. See ECF No. 49-2 at 2, PageID.454. Plaintiff did not stipulate, and Experian filed this Motion to Compel Arbitration on August 8, 2022. ECF No.

41.2 After entering an appearance, Experian did not seek a ruling on anything, much less a ruling on the merits of the case. It took no action “to take advantage of being in court.” Newirth, 931 F.3d at 941. All it filed in court was (1) a scheduling conference statement (explaining that it did not participate in an initial

meeting between Plaintiff and BANA because it was not aware of the suit), ECF 27 at 3–4, PageID.147–48, and (2) a certificate indicating it provided initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1), ECF No. 38.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that Experian waived its right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right. See

2 Experian also filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer, ECF No. 40, which is pending before Magistrate Judge Kenneth Mansfield. Although Experian did not include the right to arbitrate as an affirmative defense in its Answer, that omission does not preclude it from compelling arbitration here. See, e.g., Hill v. Ricoh American Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 771 (10th Cir. 2020) (explaining why a defendant is not required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) to demand a right to arbitrate in an answer); Fisher, 791 F.2d at 698 (“Nor is waiver established by the fact that [defendant] failed to raise as an affirmative defense the agreement to arbitrate.”). Given the court’s ruling here compelling arbitration, the Motion for Leave to File an Amended Answer appears to be moot.

4 Newirth, 931 F.3d at 941. The court thus GRANTS Experian’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. ECF No. 41.

Under 9 U.S.C. § 3, if a court finds that an issue “is referable to arbitration,” a court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the

agreement[.]” (emphasis added).3 An exception to the stay requirement exists if the entire action (as opposed to only some of the claims) is subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 755 F.3d 1072, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[N]otwithstanding the language of § 3, a district court may either stay

the action or dismiss it outright when . . . the court determines that all of the claims raised in the action are subject to arbitration.”). But that exception does not apply here because Plaintiff has non-arbitrable claims against BANA remaining in the

action.

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Related

Hill v. Ricoh Americas Corp.
603 F.3d 766 (Tenth Circuit, 2010)
Fatemeh Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale's, Inc.
755 F.3d 1072 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
June Newirth v. Aegis Senior Communities, LLC
931 F.3d 935 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.
596 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 2022)
Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc.
791 F.2d 691 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)

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