Cho v. Surgery Partners, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedAugust 26, 2020
Docket8:17-cv-00983
StatusUnknown

This text of Cho v. Surgery Partners, Inc. (Cho v. Surgery Partners, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cho v. Surgery Partners, Inc., (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. SHELDON CHO, M.D., and DAWN BAKER, Relators,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:17-cv-983-T-33AEP

H.I.G. CAPITAL, LLC, and H.I.G. SURGERY CENTERS, LLC,

Defendants. /

ORDER This cause comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss the Relators’ Second Amended Complaint filed by Defendants H.I.G. Capital, LLC and H.I.G. Surgery Centers, LLC (Doc. # 91), filed on July 13, 2020. Plaintiff-Relators Sheldon Cho, M.D., and Dawn Baker filed a response on August 3, 2020. (Doc. # 97). On August 7, 2020, HIG filed a reply. (Doc. # 98). For the reasons explained below, the Motion is granted, and this case is dismissed without prejudice. I. Background A. Factual Allegations 1. H.I.G. acquires Surgery Partners

According to the operative complaint, H.I.G. is a private-equity firm that engages in buyouts of various companies. (Doc. # 85 at ¶¶ 3, 91-93). In December 2009, H.I.G. bought out Surgery Partners,1 a national network of surgical facilities and ancillary services, including pain management services. (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3, 101). On the same day as the buyout, Bayside Capital, Inc. – a “controlled affiliate of H.I.G. Capital, LLC” – entered into a Management and Investment Advisory Services Agreement with Surgery Partners

(hereafter, the “HIG Management Agreement”). (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 94-100). The second amended complaint claims that Bayside is operated and controlled by H.I.G. Capital, and that H.I.G. “directly and through its Bayside business unit, controlled, managed, and advised Surgery Partners.” (Id. at ¶¶ 95, 100). Pursuant to the HIG Management Agreement, H.I.G. provided “management, consulting, and financial advisory services” to Surgery Partners and any companies or businesses formed or acquired by Surgery Partners. (Id. at ¶ 6). The agreement stated that H.I.G. would provide Surgery Partners with “advice and assistance concerning any and all aspects of

the operations, planning, financing and budgeting” of the companies. (Id. at ¶ 7). Relators allege that Surgery Partners

1 The term “Surgery Partners,” as used in the second amended complaint, encompasses Surgery Partners, Inc., Surgery Center Holdings, Inc., Surgery Partners Holding, LLC, and Surgery Center Holding, LLC. (Doc. # 85 at ¶ 2). paid H.I.G. $38.7 million for these services from 2009 to 2017. (Id. at ¶ 8). Following the acquisition, H.I.G. also placed “multiple” representatives on the Surgery Partners’ Board of Directors. (Id. at ¶ 9). “For example, H.I.G. Managing Partner Christopher Laitala was named to the Surgery Partners Board of Directors in 2009,” became Chairman in 2015, and was also

appointed president of Surgery Center Holdings, Inc. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 121). Specifically, H.I.G. had three individuals on the Surgery Partners Board: Laitala, Matthew Lozow, and Fraser Preston. (Id. at ¶ 120). According to Relators, “[b]y virtue of its managerial and advisory role to the buyout fund and the buyout fund’s large equity stake, the H.I.G. Defendants controlled the Surgery Partners business. Further, H.I.G., through its Bayside business unit, contracted to provide Surgery Center Holdings, Inc. with managerial, consulting, and advisory services.” (Id. at ¶ 106). Thus, H.I.G. provided a “robust

management role,” working in “partnership” with Surgery Partners’ executives. (Id. at ¶ 134). 2. H.I.G. and Surgery Partners form Logan Labs The operative complaint alleges that “[u]nder H.I.G.’s control, leadership, experience, and direction, Surgery Partners created a new profit center – urine toxicology testing.” (Id. at ¶ 10). Specifically, beginning in 2011, H.I.G. and Surgery Partners formed a new business, Logan Laboratories LLC (”Logan Labs”). (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 157). Logan Labs was a wholly owned subsidiary of Surgery Partners, and Surgery Partners used it to provide ancillary laboratory services to its physicians. (Id. at ¶ 11).

Logan Labs became “a nationwide provider . . . of urine drug testing (‘UDT’), also called ‘urine toxicology’ testing services.” (Id.). Logan Labs was dependent on UDT referrals from Surgery Partners’ physicians, “whose patients are largely beneficiaries of Government-funded healthcare programs, including, but not limited to, Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE.” (Id. at ¶ 12). a. Urine Drug Testing (UDT) There are two types of UDT: qualitative and quantitative. (Id. at ¶ 16). Qualitative UDT can be performed either via point-of-care testing, which means it is performed

in a doctor’s office, or it can be sent to an outside laboratory. (Id. at ¶ 17). Point-of-care testing is an “easy and cost-efficient” way to perform UDT, and both types of qualitative UDT are “far less expensive” than quantitative UDT. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 21). This is because quantitative UDT can only be performed “in a laboratory using properly calibrated equipment and appropriately qualified laboratory professionals.” (Id. at ¶ 22). Relators state that quantitative UDT is not appropriate or medically necessary for every patient or every clinic visit; in fact, it is medically necessary “only for a narrow subset of patients.” (Id. at ¶¶ 23-24).

b. Logan Labs’ use of UDT According to Relators, Logan Labs generated most of its revenues from “confirmatory” quantitative UDT. (Id. at ¶ 26). “[U]nder the management, control, and direction of the H.I.G. Defendants, Surgery Partners implemented fraudulent schemes to refer patients of Surgery Partners-affiliated physicians to Logan Labs for extensive and expensive confirmatory quantitative UDT. They prohibited the use of office-based UDT without medical or scientific justification, leaving their affiliated physicians with only laboratory-based UDT (either qualitative or quantitative). They monitored their

physicians’ and mid-level providers’ use of ‘confirmation’ UDT and exerted great pressure on physicians to order confirmation UDT for every patient regardless of the patient’s clinical presentation.” (Id. at ¶ 30). Thus, Relators allege that Surgery Partners and H.I.G. submitted, or caused to be submitted, “millions of dollars’ worth of false claims to Government-funded programs . . . for UDT, including confirmatory quantitative UDT, that were not reasonable or necessary.” (Id. at ¶ 34). As Relators tell it, “the strategy put forth by the H.I.G. Defendants and adopted by Surgery Partners . . . in creating Logan Labs was to take advantage of their captive

employed physicians and adopt a fraudulent scheme of over- utilizing UDT as a means to generate revenue . . . largely of Government healthcare program beneficiaries.” (Id. at ¶ 14). To this end, Relators allege that H.I.G. and Surgery Partners drove up quantitative UDT in numerous ways: 1) Surgery Partners’ executives allegedly pre- selected patients, including Government healthcare program beneficiaries, for the expensive UDT service and obtained urine samples from these patients before the patients were even seen by a medical provider. (Id. at ¶¶ 367-77).

2) Surgery Partners fraudulently obtained patients’ consents to urine toxicology screening by falsely representing that quantitative UDT services were required multiple times per year to comply with state and/or federal laws. (Id. at ¶¶ 378-83).

3) Surgery Partners implemented policies prohibiting physicians from using simple, and less expensive, UDT screening methods in the office. (Id. at ¶¶ 384-96).

4) Surgery Partners had a company-wide practice or policy to send all patients with Government- provided insurance or any private insurance plan that would pay for lab-based UDT to Logan Labs, even if the physician preferred a “dip stick test” or a different laboratory. (Id. at ¶¶ 445-51).

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