Chmura v. Deegan

581 A.2d 592, 398 Pa. Super. 532, 1990 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3033

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 9, 1990
• Docket: 01465
• Status: Published

Opinions

OLSZEWSKI, Judge:

Sherry Deegan appeals the trial court’s order preliminarily enjoining her from using, copying, disclosing, or otherwise deriving benefit from various computerized embroidery patterns developed by the Chmuras. Deegan asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the computer discs constituted trade secrets, in finding that the Chmuras had the exclusive right to use and enjoy the designs, and in finding that the trade secrets were disclosed while Deegan was an employee of the Chmuras. We find that these issues are beyond the scope of appellate review; accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Frank and Eleni Chmura own and operate The Embroidery Works, a company that creates computer embroidery designs and embroiders those designs on hats, shirts, and other soft goods. Sherry Deegan worked for the Chmuras for three years, operating the computerized embroidery machine. Deegan did not have the artistic or technical knowledge necessary to create the computer designs. In November 1988, Deegan left The Embroidery Works and set up her own shop in competition with The Embroidery Works.

At some time, Deegan obtained copies of the Chmuras’ computer disks and began using the Chmuras’ designs in her business. The Chmuras noticed products made with their programs in the marketplace and brought this action alleging theft of trade secrets, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. They also requested a preliminary injunction to prevent Deegan from using their computer patterns. The trial court granted the injunction. Deegan appeals.

When reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction, we do not inquire into the merits of the underlying action. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Assn. v. Geisinger, 81 Pa.Cmwlth. 421, 426, 474 A.2d 62, 65 (1984). We may examine the record only to determine whether the trial court had reasonable grounds for its order. Id. Our scope of review is particularly limited where, as here, the injunction is merely prohibitive rather than mandatory. Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 495 Pa. 128, 133, 432 A.2d 985, 988 (1981). We may reverse only if there are no grounds to support the decree or if the rule of law was palpably erroneous or misapplied. Roberts v. Board of Directors of School District of Scranton, 462 Pa. 464, 469, 341 A.2d 475, 478 (1975).

Deegan does not allege that there are no grounds to support the decree, nor does she allege that the rule of law was palpably erroneous or misapplied. Her arguments on appeal relate solely to the merits of the underlying action, a matter beyond the scope of review.

At best, we can view Deegan’s appeal as challenging the Chmuras’ “clear right to relief,” a necessary element for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., T. W. Phillips Gas v. Peoples Natural Gas, 89 Pa.Cmwlth. 377, 384, 492 A.2d 776, 780 (1985). To establish a “clear right to relief,” the party seeking an injunction need not prove the merits of the underlying claim, but need only show that substantial legal questions must be resolved to determine the rights of the respective parties. Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 271, 439 A.2d 1172, 1174 (1982). This case presents many substantial legal questions, including the question whether the computer designs in this case are entitled to protection as trade secrets. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed.

Concurring opinion by CIRILLO, President Judge.